Bargaining Theory with Applications

Εξώφυλλο
Cambridge University Press, 19 Αυγ 1999 - 357 σελίδες
1 Κριτική
The first unified and systematic treatment of the modern theory of bargaining, presented together with many examples of how that theory is applied in a variety of bargaining situations. Abhinay Muthoo provides a masterful synthesis of the fundamental results and insights obtained from the wide-ranging and diverse (game theoretic) bargaining theory literature. Furthermore, he develops new analyses and results, especially on the relative impacts of two or more forces on the bargaining outcome. Many topics - such as inside options, commitment tactics and repeated bargaining situations - receive their most extensive treatment to date. In the concluding chapter, he offers pointers towards future research. Bargaining Theory with Applications is a textbook for graduate students in economic theory and other social sciences and a research resource for scholars interested in bargaining situations.
 

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Περιεχόμενα

Preliminaries
1
12 Outline of the Book
3
13 The Role of Game Theory
6
The Nash Bargaining Solution
9
22 Bargaining over the Partition of a Cake
10
221 Characterization
12
222 Examples
15
23 Applications
16
Procedures
187
72 Who Makes Offers and When
188
721 The Ultimatum Game
189
722 Repeated Offers
190
723 Simultaneous Offers
191
724 Random Proposers
192
725 AlternatingOffers with Different Response Times
193
73 The Effect of Retractable Offers
194

232 Optimal Asset Ownership
17
24 A General Definition
22
241 Characterization
24
25 Applications
25
252 Moral Hazard in Teams
27
An Extension
29
26 Axiomatic Foundation
30
27 An Interpretation
33
28 Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions
35
Proofs
37
210 Notes
39
The Rubinstein Model
41
32 The Basic AlternatingOffers Model
42
321 The Unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
43
322 Proof of Theorem 31
47
323 Properties of the Equilibrium Uniqueness and Efficiency
50
324 The Value and Interpretation of the AlternatingOffers Model
53
33 An Application to Bilateral Monopoly
55
34 A General Model
59
341 The Subgame Perfect Equilibria
60
342 Small Time Intervals
64
343 Relationship with Nashs Bargaining Solution
65
344 Proof of Theorems 32 and 33
67
35 An Application to a TwoPerson Exchange Economy
69
36 Notes
71
Risk of Breakdown
73
42 A Model with a Risk of Breakdown
74
421 The Unique SPE when both Players are Risk Neutral
75
422 The Unique SPE with Risk Averse Players
77
43 An Application to Corruption in Tax Collection
81
44 The Effect of Discounting
85
441 Small Time Intervals
87
SplitTheDifference Rule
89
45 An Application to Price Determination
91
46 A Generalization
95
47 Notes
96
Outside Options
99
52 A Model with Outside Options
100
521 Relationship with Nashs Bargaining Solution
104
53 Applications
105
532 Sovereign Debt Negotiations
107
533 Bribery and the Control of Crime Revisited
109
54 The Effect of a Risk of Breakdown
110
541 The Unique Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
111
542 Relationship with Nashs Bargaining Solution
113
543 The Impact of The Manner of Disagreement
114
544 A Generalization
115
55 Searching for Outside Options
116
551 Searching on the Streets
118
552 Searching while Bargaining
121
56 The Role of the Communication Technology
124
561 Equilibria in the Telephone Game
125
562 An Application to RelationshipSpecific Investments
130
563 Rubinstein Bargaining with Quit Options
131
Proofs
133
58 Notes
135
Inside Options
137
62 A Model with Inside Options
138
63 Applications
143
632 Sovereign Debt Renegotiations
144
64 The Effect of Outside Options
146
641 And a Risk of Breakdown
149
642 Relationship with Nashs Bargaining Solution
151
643 A Generalization
152
65 An Application to Intrafamily Allocation
154
66 Endogenously Determined Inside Options
158
661 Stationary Equilibria
159
662 Markov Equilibria
160
663 Uniqueness of SPE and NonMarkov Equilibria
165
67 An Application to Wage Renegotiations
170
671 Multiple ParetoEfficient Equilibria
171
672 Equilibria with Strikes
173
Proofs
174
69 Notes
185
731 A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
195
733 Multiple Equilibria and Delay
197
734 Discussion and Interpretation
198
A Tactical Move
200
741 A Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
201
743 Multiple Equilibria
202
744 Equilibrium Delay
204
745 Discussion
208
75 Notes
209
Commitment Tactics
211
82 The Basic Model
214
822 Interpretation
217
823 The Equilibrium
218
83 Discussion
222
832 Relationship with Nashs Bargaining Solution
223
833 Comparison with the Nash Demand Game
224
834 Robustness
225
835 A Generalization
227
84 An Application to Delegation
230
85 Uncertainty and Simultaneous Concessions
232
851 A Model with Simultaneous Concessions
233
Two Bargaining Positions
234
853 A Generalization
236
86 Uncertainty and Wars of Attrition
240
861 A Model with Wars of Attrition
241
862 Equilibrium in the War of Attrition Subgames
242
863 Equilibrium Partial Commitments
246
87 Notes
248
Asymmetric Information
251
92 Efficiency under OneSided Uncertainty
253
921 The Case of Private Values
254
922 The Case of Correlated Values
256
93 Applications
262
932 Litigation or OutofCourt Settlement
263
94 Efficiency under TwoSided Uncertainty
265
941 The Case of Private Values
266
942 The Case of Correlated Values
268
95 Applications
270
952 Litigation or OutofCourt Settlement Revisited
271
961 An Example of a Screening Equilibrium
273
962 General Results
280
963 The Effect of Retractable Offers
285
97 An Application to WageQuality Contracts
289
971 The Commitment Equilibrium
290
972 The Unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
291
98 Notes
292
Repeated Bargaining Situations
295
102 A Basic Repeated Bargaining Model
297
1021 The Unique Stationary Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
300
1022 Small Time Intervals Between Consecutive Offers
304
1023 Comparison with a LongTerm Contract
307
1024 NonStationary Subgame Perfect Equilibria
309
103 An Application to Dynamic Capital Investment
312
104 The Role of Outside Options
316
1041 An Application to Firm Provided General Training
319
105 The Role of LongTerm Contracts
321
1051 Equilibrium Without a Long Term Contract
322
1052 Equilibrium With a Complete Long Term Contract
323
1053 Equilibrium With an Incomplete Long Term Contract
324
106 Reputation Effects
327
1061 A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in a Simple Model
328
1062 Further Remarks
329
107 Notes
330
Envoi
333
112 Omissions
334
1121 NonStationary and Stochastic Environments
335
1122 Multilateral and Coalitional Bargaining
336
1123 Arbitration and Mediation
338
1124 Multiple Issues and the Agenda
339
113 Thorny Issues
340
114 On the Role of Experiments
341
References
345
Index
354
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Δημοφιλή αποσπάσματα

Σελίδα 345 - Avery, C. and P. Zemsky (1994) "Money Burning and Multiple Equilibria in Bargaining", Games and Economic Behavior, Vol.
Σελίδα 345 - Bac, M., Raff, H.: Issue-by-issue negotiations: The role of information and time preferences.

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