*269 (248 U. S. 268) (Submitted Nov. 15, 1918. 1919.) No. 54. Decided Jan. 7, urer. The petition alleged the contract for the courthouse and averred that the board of revenue of the county, the governing body which had succeeded to the county commissioners previously in authority, while continuing the levy of the one-fourth of 1 per cent. tax, had in impairment of the obligaREVIEW OF STATE tion of the courthouse contract, dedicated COURTS-FEDERAL QUESTION. the proceeds of that tax, as collected, to roads or bridges, thus depriving the warrant holders under the courthouse contract of the means of payment to which they were entitled. It was alleged that, in consequence of such action, the county treasurer had refused to pay any of the proceeds of the one COURTS 394(9) Decision of state court that mandamus would not lie against county treasurer to enforce contract claim, but that remedy was by proceedings against different officers or the county, does not impair contract rights, so as to allow review by national court. In Error to the Supreme Court of the fourth of 1 per cent. tax to the courthouse State of Alabama. Mandamus by Farson, Son & Co. against Joe S. Bird, County Treasurer of Shelby County, Ala. Judgment for respondent was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Alabama (197 Ala. 384, 72 South. 550), and petitioner brings error. Writ dismissed. Mr. Giles William Lawrence Smith, of Mr. Chief Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. But a single question is required to be decided. We state the case only to the extent essential to make this clear and to elucidate the issue to be considered. In 1905 and 1907 the county of Shelby contracted to build and furnish a courthouse. It was stipulated that the price for the work should be evidenced by interest-bearing warrants, maturing during a series of years. By the Constitution and laws of Alabama the power of taxa*tion of the county for general purposes was limited, but, in addition, the Constitution and laws authorized counties to levy annually a special tax of one-fourth of 1 per cent. to be applied to the erection or repair of county buildings, the construction of roads, bridges, etc. The warrants under the contract were in terms secured by an agreement of the county to levy this onefourth of 1 per cent. tax annually and apply it to the payment of the warrants. The state law contained a provision authorizing the registry of county warrants and making such registration operate as a lien on the proceeds of the taxes dedicated to the payment of the warrants. The courthouse was pleted, furnished, and accepted, and the warrants were issued in conformity with the contract and according to law. com In 1916 Farson, Son & Co., alleging themselves to be holders of warrants issued under the contract as above stated, filed their suit for mandamus against the county treas warrant holders, and had, in further violation of his duty, credited the same to other funds and paid them out accordingly. It was moreover charged that the treasurer had in his hands, despite such wrongful pay: ments to others, the sum of about $7,000, derived from the one-fourth of 1 per cent. tax collected in 1915, which it was *his duty to apply as far as necessary to the discharge of a sum of $1,565, with interest, due on the courthouse warrants, and which he had refused to pay although demand had been made on him to do so. The petition expressly counted upon the protection of the contract rights which it asserted, not only by the Constitution of the state but also by the contract clause of the Constitution of the United States, alleging impairment thereof by action of the board of revenue, legislative in character; and the prayer was that the county treasurer be mandamused to pay out of the one-fourth of 1 per cent. tax for 1915 in his hands the sum of $1,565, with interest. A demurrer to the petition, as stating no cause for relief, was sustained, and the case is before us upon the ground of the deprivation of federal right which arose from the action of the court below in affirming the trial court. The court below conceded that under the state law mandamus was appropriate if the county treasurer had capacity to stand in judgment. It moreover conceded that, if the contract had been entered into as alleged, the attempt to violate it by dedicating the proceeds of the one-fourth of 1 per cent. tax to any purpose other than to the payment of courthouse warrants was, in so far as such proceeds were necessary to pay said warrants, void as an impairment of the obligation of a contract forbidden both by the state Constitution and that of the United States. But from these premises it nevertheless decided that there was no right to the mandamus against the county treasurer. It rested its conclusion on provisions of the state Constitution and laws, which it held defined the duty of that officer and absolute For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Index 99 #270 *272 *271 ly deprived him of all power to apply or pay | cy to the Constitution of the state and to money coming into his hands by taxation the contract clause of the Constitution of levied for a particular purpose to another the United States. and different purpose. It decided, therefore, that if under the theory that the board of revenue had wrongly directed the appropriation of the one-fourth of 1 per cent. tax, action against that body and not merely against the county treasurer was appropriate and necessary under the state law. The court said: "If the facts alleged in this petition are true, they [the courthouse warrant holders] ought to bave relief, and the county ought to be required to carry out its contract, or to answer in damages for the breach thereof, if the contract was valid and binding; but the relief must be had by different proceedings and against different officers, or the county itself, and not against the county treasurer. Mandamus may be petitioners' remedy, but under the facts alleged it must be against different officers than the county treasurer." 197 Ala. 384, 72 South. 550. Thus resting its decision exclusively upon the question of procedure and the power of the particular officer against whom the mandamus was asked as limited and defined by the state law, we see no basis for the contention that the action of the state court gave effect to the impairment of the obligation of a contract in violation of the contract clause of the Constitution. On the contrary, we are of opinion that when correctly tested it becomes apparent that the action of the court below involved only a ruling upon a question of remedy resting upon considerations of state law broad enough to sustain the conclusion reached without any reference to the federal questions which were raised and relied upon. It is true, indeed, that in that case the court referred to its ruling in this case with approval, but the relief which was denied in the one and afforded in the other leaves no support upon which to rest the contention that contract rights secured by the Constitution were impaired by the ruling which was made in this case. As our conclusion is that the federal question relied upon as the basis for the writ of error had no foundation, it follows that our decree must be, and it is, Writ of error dismissed for want of jurisdiction. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Suit in admiralty by John W. Erickson against the Union Fish Company. Decree for libelant was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (235 Fed. 385, 148 C. C. A. 647), and respondent brings certiorari. Affirmed. Messrs. G. S. Arnold and William Denman, both of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner. Mr. Charles J. Heggerty, of San Francisco, Cal., for respondent. And any possible doubt on this subject, we are of opinion, is removed by the subsequent action of the court below in the case of Board of Revenue of Shelby County v. Farson, Son & Co., 197 Ala. 375, 72 South. 613, L. R. A. 1918B, 881, cited in the brief of the plaintiff in error. In that case, which was an action against the board of revenue of Shelby county to compel the levy of the onefourth of 1 per cent. tax, as provided in the courthouse contract, for the purpose of paying, not only certain warrants which were past due in 1916, but to provide for the warrants falling due in 1917, the court *awarded the mandamus sought. In doing so, it not Erickson filed a libel in admiralty in the only held that the courthouse contract was District Court of the United States for the valid and that the agreement to levy the Northern District of California, alleging that tax as therein stipulated was lawful, but, by an oral contract with the petitioner, ownmoreover, that the subsequent action of the er of the vessel Martha, he engaged to proboard of revenue in diverting the fund to the ceed to Pirate Cove, Alaska, and after ardetriment of the courthouse warrant holders rival there to serve for a year as master of was an impairment of the obligations of the the vessel, and perform certain duties in contract and was void because of repugnan- connection therewith for an agreed compen. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court. #311 sation. The libel averred that he proceeded in, the whole country. It certainly could not to Pirate Cove, and performed his duties have been the intention to place the rules and under the contract until he was wrongfully limits of maritime law under the disposal and discharged by the respondent. Libelant regulation of the several states." sought to recover damages for breach of conThis principle was reiterated in Workman tract. An answer was filed denying the al- v. New York City, 179 U. S. 552, 560, 21 Sup. leged contract, and averring that libelant Ct. 212, 45 L. Ed. 314. In that case it was dewas discharged because of his wrongful con-clared that neither local law nor decisions duct. could deprive of redress where a cause of A decree was rendered in favor of libelant action, maritime in its nature, was prosein the District Court; upon appeal that de-cuted in a court of admiralty of the United cree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of States. Appeals. 235 Fed. 385, 148 C. C. A. 647. [1, 2] The question presented and argued here concerns the application of the California statute of frauds, which it is alleged rendered the contract void because not to be performed within one year from the making thereof. The Civil Code of California provides (section 1624): "The following contracts are invalid, unless the same, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or by his agent: "1. An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof." The contract of the master was of a maritime character. This does not seem to be controverted by the petitioner. See The Boston, Fed. Cas. No. 1669; The William H. Hoag, 168 U. S. 443, 18 Sup. Ct. 114, 42 L. Ed. 537. We have, then, a maritime contract for services to be performed principally upon the sea and the question is can such engagement be nullified by the local laws of a state, where the contract happens to be entered into, so as to prevent its enforcement in an admiralty court of the United States? In the recent case of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 216, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 529 (61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900), the subject was again considered and the cases in this court reviewed and state legislation was declared invalid "if it works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law or interferes with the proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international and interstate relations.” In entering into this contract the parties contemplated no services in California. They were making an engagement for the services of the master of the vessel, the duties to be upon the sea. performed in the waters of Alaska, mainly in this respect, and was not subject to limitation because the particular engagement happened to be made in California. The parties must be presumed to have had in contemplation the system of maritime law under which it was made. Watts v. Camors, 115 U. S. 353, 362, 6 Sup. Ct. 91, 29 L. Ed. 406. The maritime law controlled masters of *vessels has been the subject of In different countries the appointment of maritime law which has directed the conduct of "those who pursue commerce and put to been the subject of regulation by the recog sea." Their duties and qualifications have The Constitution (article 3, § 2) extends the judicial power of the United States to all cases of admiralty and maritime juris-nized principles of admiralty law. Benedict's diction. Admiralty jurisdiction under the federal Constitution "embraces," says Mr. Justice Story in his treatise on the Constitution, “two great classes of cases-one dependent upon locality and the other upon the nature of the contract. In the latter class are embraced maritime contracts and services, rights and duties appertaining to commerce and navigation." Story on the Constitution (4th Ed.) § 1666. lated by statutes enacted under Federal auAdmiralty (4th Ed.) § 146. They are reguthority. See U. S. Comp. Stats. of 1916, vol. 12, Index, "Masters of Vessels." *This court has had occasion to consider the nature and extent of admiralty jurisdiction as it was intended to be conferred by the Constitution. In The Lottawanna, 21 Wall. 558, 22 L. Ed. 654, the subject was much considered, and Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for the court, said: void for one reason, another may do likewise If one state may declare such contracts for another. Thus the local law of a state in a court of admiralty of the United States may deprive one of relief in a case brought of rules governing such contracts may be upon a maritime contract, and the uniformity destroyed by perhaps conflicting rules of the states. We think the Circuit Court of Appeals correctly held that this contract was maritime in its nature and an action in admiralty thereon for its breach could not be defeated "One thing, however, is unquestionable; the by the statute of California relied upon by Constitution must have referred to a system of the petitioner. law coextensive with, and operating uniformly Affirmed. 39 SUP.CT.-8 *314 (248 U. S. 365) MERCHANTS' EXCHANGE OF ST. LOUIS v. STATE OF MISSOURI ex rel. BARKER, Atty. Gen. Messrs. Percy Werner, of St. Louis, Mo.. and Frank Hagerman, of Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff in error. Messrs. John T. Gose, of Shelbina, Mo., Argued Dec. 19, 1918. Decided Jan. 7, 1919.) and Frank McAllister, of Jefferson City, Mo., for defendant in error. No. 116. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 296(1)-DEPRIVA GRAIN Laws Mo. 1913, p. 354, as to inspection and weighing of grain, section 63 of which prohibits any one other than a state weigher issuing weight certificate for, or charging for, weighing grain weighed at a public warehouse, where state weighers are stationed, does not deprive one of liberty or property, in violation of Const. U. S. Amend. 14. 2. WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 2 GRAIN 8. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ~~240(1) EQUAL PROTECTION-GRAIN WEIGHT CERTIFICATES. That Laws Mo. 1913, p. 354, as to inspection and weighing, is limited to grain and hay, does not make it an arbitrary discrimination against dealers in those articles. 4. CORPORATIONS 391 - REGULATION LICE POWER. *Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court. A statute of Missouri relating to the inspection and weighing of grain, approved March 20, 1913 (Laws Missouri 1913, pp. 354-373) and amended March 23, 1915 (Laws Missouri 1915, p. 302), declares that in cities of more than 75,000 inhabitants all buildings used for the storage or transferring of grain of different owners, for a compensation, shall be deemed public warehouses; and, by sec tion 63 (page 372) thereof, prohibits under severe penalties "any person, corporation or association other than a duly authorized and bonded state weigher to issue any weight certificate [for any] grain weighed at any warehouse or elevator in this state where duly appointed and qualified state weighers are stationed, ** or to make any charge for such weighing, or weight certificates. * * In June, 1915, an original proceeding in the nature of quo warranto was brought under this statute at the relation of the Attorney General in the Supreme Court of the - Po- state against the Merchants' Exchange, a Missouri corporation with the usual powers A corporation is subject to the state's police of a board of trade. See House v. Mayes, power. 5. COMMERCE 57-BURDENING INTERSTATE COMMERCE-WEIGHING GRAIN. Laws Mo. 1913, p. 372, § 63, prohibiting another than state weigher issuing weight certificate for grain weighed at a public warehouse, does not burden interstate commerce, and so violate the commerce clause of the federal Constitution. 6. COMMERCE 8(1) WEIGHING GRAIN FEDERAL LEGISLATION. State regulation of weighing of grain was not superseded by United States Grain Standards Act (Comp. St. 1918, §§ 87471⁄2-87471⁄2k); it in no way referring to the weighing of grain, and by section 7 (section 8747% f), as does the United States Warehouse Act (section 8747487474 pp), by section 29 (section 874734 nn) manifesting intention to co-operate with state officials charged with enforcement of state laws for inspection and weighing of grain. 219 U. S. 270, 31 Sup. Ct. 234, 55 L. Ed. 213; Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U. S. 236, 25 Sup. Ct. 637, 49 L. Ed. 1031. The information stated that St. Louis is a city of more than 75,000 inhabitants; that *public weighers of grain are maintained there at all public warehouses and elevators in compliance with the act; and that the respondent in violation thereof and in abuse of its corporate franchise maintains a bureau for weighing grain, grants weight certificates, and makes charges therefor. The prayer is that respondent be adjudged guilty of these practices and that a fine be imposed. The return admitted substantially the facts stated in the information but alleged that the services were rendered only at the request of members; that the weighing by its bureau in addition to that of the public weighers added to the general security, thus benefitting farmer, dealer, and consumer; that similar weighing bureaus were maintained by In Error to the Supreme Court of the State the boards of trade at competing grain mar of Missouri. Quo warranto by the State of Missouri, at the relation of John T. Barker, Attorney General, against the Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis. Judgment was against respondent (269 Mo. 346, 190 S. W. 903, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 871), and it brings error. Affirmed. kets; and that the statute, in prohibiting the practice, deprived its members of liberty and property and of equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Ariendment. The return also set forth that the grain weighed by its bureau was in large part shipped into or out of the state; that For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 998* +367 it is commercially necessary as a part of | B of chapter 313) relates exclusively to the interstate transit to pass grain through an establishment by the Secretary of Agriculture elevator where it is weighed, and the issue of standards of quality and condition. It of certificates of weight is essential; and does not in any way refer to the weighing that the provisions of the Missouri act there- of grain. And part B of chapter 313, by secfore violated the commerce clause of the fed- tion 7 (page 484 [section 8747%1⁄2f]), like part eral Constitution. Upon a demurrer to the C, the United States Warehouse Act (secreturn, the full court found the respondent tions 87474-8747 pp), which does contain guilty and ordered that it be ousted of the some reference to weighing, by section 29 usurped power of weighing grain received in- (page 490 [section 8747% nn]), makes manito or discharged from public warehouses and fest the purpose of Congress not to superelevators and of making charges therefor, sede *state laws for the inspection and weighand of issuing weight certificates and making ing of grain, but to co-operate with state charges therefor; and that the respondent officials charged with the enforcement of pay costs. State ex inf. Barker v. Mer- such state laws. The Missouri act is not chants' Exchange of St. Louis, 269 Mo. 346, superseded by or in conflict with the federal 190 S. W. 903, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 871. The legislation. case comes here on writ of error. The judgment of the Supreme Court of TAXATION JERSEY CITY et al. 179 GRANT BY STATE. 7, 1919.) (248 U. S. 328) TIDELANDS LEASE OB An instrument executed on behalf of the [1-4] First. Section 63 of the act does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. As the state court has pointed out, the statute does not prohibit owners of grain from weighing it before it is sent to a public warehouse or after it is removed therefrom. But the issue LEARY v. MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF of a private weigher's *certificate in addition to the certificate of the public weigher might lead to embarrassment or confusion or prove (Argued Nov. 12 and 13, 1918. Decided Jan. a means of deception. The regulation of weights and measures with a view to preventing fraud and facilitating commercial transactions is an exercise of the police power. To require that goods received in or discharged from public warehouses shall be weighed by public weighers and that no one else shall issue certificates of or make charges for weighing under those circumstances is not an unreasonable or arbitrary exercise of the discretion vested in the Legislature.. Compare House v. Mayes, supra; Brodnax v. Missouri, 219 U. S. 285, 31 Sup. Ct. 238, 55 L. Ed. 219. Nor can we say that to limit the application of the provision to grain and hay is an arbitrary discrimination against dealers in those articles. The fact that respondent is a corporation does not lessen the scope of the state's police power. We have no occasion to consider whether it is thereby enlarged. [5, 6] Second. Section 63 does not violate the commerce clause of the Constitution (article 1, § 8, cl. 3). The contention that it does was rested below solely on the ground that the prohibition, as applied to grain received from or shipped to points without the state, burdens interstate commerce. It clear state of New Jersey under its statutes, whereby in terms it bargained, sold, leased, and conveyed forever, lands under tide water to a riparian owner, with privilege of excluding the waters therefrom, subject to payment of specified rent, with right of re-entry for nonpayment, and covenanted to convey free from rent charge on payment of a certain sum, held to confer such an ownership as was taxable under state laws. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Suit by Daniel J. Leary against the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Jersey City and another. Decree dismissing the bill (189 Fed. 419) was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (208 Fed. 854, 126 C. C. A. 12) and complainant appeals. Affirmed. Messrs. Merritt Lane, of Newark, N. J., and John M. Enright, of Jersey City, N. J., for appellant. Mr. John Bentley, of Jersey City, N. J. (Messrs. John Milton and Edward P. Stout, both of Jersey City, N. J., of counsel), for appellees. ly does not. Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. V. Louisiana, 156 U. S. 590, 15 Sup. Ct. 459, 39 L. Ed. 544; W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452, 21 Sup. Ct. 423, 45 L. Ed. 619. But the additional contention is made here that all state regulation of the weighing of grain was superseded by the United This was a suit in equity brought in the States Grain Standards Act, approved Au- United States Circuit (afterwards District) gust 11, 1916 (39 Stat. 482 [Comp. St. 1918, Court for the District of New Jersey by 88 87472-87472k]). That act (which is part | Leary, the appellant, against the city of *Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 698* *329 |