*325 ery thereof." of destination before or on delivery. One | by means of bills of lading to the shipper's ormade the carrier having the shipment the col- der with drafts for the purchase price attached, lecting agent; another committed the collec- and many other transactions essential to the tions to a separate carrier, the liquor being title to merchandise is postponed to the delivfreedom of commerce, by which the complete forwarded as railroad freight *and the bill of lading being sent to an express company with instructions to hand it to the buyer when the money was paid; and still another made use of an agent, such as Cooley was here, the bill of lading being sent to him with a sight draft on the buyer for the purchase price. In some instances the liquor was consigned to the buyer and in others to the shipper's order, the bill of lading then being suitably indorsed by the shipper. Where the transactions were real and not merely colorable, the business so conducted was lawful interstate commerce and entitled to protection as such until the sale and transportation were consummated by the delivery of the liquor to the vendee at the point of destination. Such was the decision of this court in American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133, 25 Sup. Ct. 182, 49 L. Ed. 417, a case which arose out of the transportation into the state of Iowa of a collect-on-delivery shipment of liquor ordered from a dealer in Illinois. The Supreme Court of Iowa had held that, as the sale was to be completed in that state by payment and delivery there, the laws of the state enacted to prevent sales of liquor therein applied. This court reversed that ruling and said in the opinion (196 U. S. 143, 144, 25 Sup. Ct. 184 [49 L. Ed. 417]): "The right of the parties to make a contract in Illinois for the sale and purchase of merchandise, and in doing so to fix by agreement the time when [and] the condition on which the completed title should pass, is beyond question. The shipment from the state of Illinois into the state of Iowa of the merchandise constituted interstate commerce. * "When it is considered that the necessary result of the ruling below was to hold that wherever merchandise shipped from one state to another is not completely delivered to the buyer at the point of shipment so as to be at his risk from that moment the movement of such merchandise is not interstate commerce, it becomes apparent that the principle, if sustained, would operate materially to cripple if not destroy that freedom of commerce between the states which it was the great purpose of the Constitution to promote. If upheld, the doctrine would deprive a citizen of one state of his right to order merchandise from another state at the risk of the seller as to delivery. It would prevent the citizen of one state from shipping into another unless he assumed the risk; it would subject contracts made by common carriers and valid by the laws of the state where made to the laws of another state, and it would remove from the protection of the interstate commerce clause all goods on consignment upon any condition as to delivery, express or implied. Besides, it would also render the commerce clause of the Constitution inoperative as to all that vast body of transactions by which the products of the country move in the channels of interstate commerce After that decision the matter of further regulating interstate commerce in liquor was much considered in Congress and as a result of extended hearings conducted by the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate that committee, speaking through Senator Knox, proposed the enactment of what afterwards became sections 238-240 of the Criminal Code (Comp. St. §§ 10408-10410). The report [1] With the conditions just described in mind we come to examine section 239. It consists of two parts, both relating to liquor transported from one state into another. The first deals with the collection of the purchase price, and the second with acts done "for the purpose of buying or selling or completing the sale" of "any such liquor." If the meaning of the first is affected by the second it is not in a restrictive way, but the reverse, so, if Cooley and his acts are within the first, the second need not be noticed further. The first, as before quoted, says: "Any railroad company, express company, or other common carrier, or any other person who, in connection with the transportation of any * * * intoxicating liquor from one ** shall state * into another state, collect the purchase price or any part thereof, The words "any railroad company, express company, or other common carrier," comprehend all public carriers; and the words "or any other person" are equally broad. When combined they perfectly express a purpose to include all common carriers and all persons; and it does not detract from this view that the inclusion of railroad companies and express companies is emphasized by specially naming them. To hold that the words "or any other person" have the same meaning as if they were "or any agent of a common carrier" would be not merely to depart from the primary rule that words are to be taken in their ordinary sense, but to narrow the operation of the statute to an extent that would seriously imperil the accomplishment of its purpose. The rule that where particular words of description are followed by general terms the latter will be regarded as applicable only to persons or things of a like class is invoked in this con nection, but it is far from being of universal | tion, it would seem to be equally present application, and never is applied when to do here. so will give to a statute an operation different from that intended by the body enacting it. Its proper office is to give effect to the true intention of that body, not to defeat it. United States v. Mescall, 215 U. S. 26, 30 Sup. Ct. 19, 54 L. Ed. 77. [3] We conclude that section 239 reaches and embraces acts done by an agent such as Cooley was. The ruling on the right of a principal to recover from an agent money received by the latter in carrying out an arrangement between them which involved the violation of a criminal statute turned on a question of local law and cannot be re-examined here. Judgment affirmed. FISHER v. RULE. (248 U. S. 314) *Without question the practice of collecting the purchase price at the point of destination as a condition to delivery is the thing at which the statute is aimed. Through that practice the sale of liquor in interstate commerce was rapidly increasing. But, as before shown, such collections were not confined to carriers and their agents, but often were made by others. In principle and result there was no difference; the evil was the same in either event. Besides, if the stat- (Argued Nov. 22, 1918. Decided Jan. 7, 1919.) ute were made applicable only to carriers and their agents, it could be evaded so readily by having other collectors that it would accomplish nothing. The volume of the business and the attending mischief would be unaffected. Doubtless all this was in mind when the statute was drafted and accounts for its comprehensive terms. That the words "or any other person" are intended to include all persons committing the acts described is, as we think, quite plain. [2] To be within the statute it is essential that the act of collecting the purchase price be done "in connection with the transportation of" the liquor. The statute does not say "in the transportation," but "in connection with" it. Transportation, as this court often has said, is not completed until the shipment arrives at the point of des tination and is there delivered. Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412, 415, 420, 18 Sup. Ct. 664, 42 L. Ed. 1088; Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 451, 18 Sup. Ct. 674, 42 L. Ed. 1100; Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Cook Brewing Co., 223 U. S. 70, 82, 32 Sup. Ct. 189, 56 L. Ed. 355; Kirmeyer v. Kansas, 236 U. S. 568, 572, 35 Sup. Ct. 419, 59 L. Ed. 721; Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241 U. S. 48, 50, 36 Sup. Ct. 510, 60 L. Ed. SSO. What Cooley did, while not part of the transportation, was closely connected with it. He was at the point of destination and held the bill of lading, which carried with it control over the delivery. Conforming to his principal's instructions he required that the purchase price be paid before the bill of lading was passed to the vendee. The money was paid under that requirement and he then turned over the bill of lading. A delivery of the shipment *followed and that completed the transportation. Had the carrier done what he did No. 78. 1. PUBLIC LANDS 128 - PATENT - ATTACK FOR GOVERNMENT. a An individual, maintaining a suit to have patentee of land declared a trustee thereof for him, may not complain on behalf of the United States that defendant was not entitled to a patent. 2. PUBLIC LANDS 102-ESTABLISHMENT OF TRUST-INTEREST OF PLAINTIFF-APPLICATION TO ENTER. Plaintiff, by application, never allowed, to interest in the land, entitling him to complain enter land as a homestead, acquired no right or of issuance of patent to defendant; the application as originally made, after cancellation of defendant's entry on decision and direction of the Secretary of the Interior, not sufficiently showing plaintiff was a qualified applicant, and, before further showing was made all action under the Secretary's decision being by him suspended, pending a reconsideration thereof, on which the decision was recalled. To succeed in a suit to have a patentee of land declared trustee thereof for plaintiff, he must show a better right than patentee, such as should have been respected by the land department, and being respected, would have given him the patent; it not being enough that patentee should not have received it. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. all would agree that the requisite connection was present. As the true test of its Suit by William Allen Fisher against Newpresence is the relation of the collection, ton Rule. Decree for defendant was affirmrather than the collector, to the transporta-ed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (232 Fed. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 878 861, 147 C. C. A. 55), and plaintiff appeals. | the rehearing, of which the contestant had Affirmed. Messrs. Homer Guerry, of Washington, D. C., and Allen G. Fisher, of Chadron, Neb., for appellant. Mr. Samuel Herrick, of Washington, D. C., for appellee. *Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court. timely notice, the Secretary recalled his rulings, dismissed the contest and directed first decision, adhered to the prior settled that the entry be reinstated. 43 L. D. 217. It was under that decision that the patent was issued. On receiving the usual notice of the Secretary's first decision the local officers complied therewith by cancelling the entry on their records. Fisher, who knew of the en-, This is a suit by Fisher to have Rule de- try and the contest, then presented an apclared a trustee for him of the title to plication to enter the land as a homestead. certain land in Nebraska, for which Rule The application, while disclosing that he was holds a patent under the homestead law of a minor and unmarried, asserted in a genthe United States. Fisher lost in the Dis-eral way that he was the head of a family, trict Court and its decree was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 232 Fed. 861, 147 C. C. A. 55. The case presented by the record is as follows: ing order, no further action was had on the application until after the Secretary's last decision, when the application was rejected. During the continuance of the suspending order, and without the consent of Rule, Fisher went on the land, erected improvements and attempted to establish a residence there. and therefore a qualified applicant, by reason of having adopted a minor child. The local officers called for a further showing respecting the asserted adoption and for the time being withheld action on the application. In 1904, when the land was public land, Before a further showing was made the a son of Rule applied for and secured a pre- Secretary of the Interior, who was being liminary homestead entry thereof at the local asked to reconsider his first decision, ordered land office. Under the ruling then and for a suspension of all action under that decimany years prevailing in the land depart- sion;2 and of this Fisher was advised by ment he had six months within which to the local officers. Subsequently Fisher proestablish residence on the land. During the duced a court order purporting to show his early part of that period he died intestate adoption of a younger brother eighteen days without establishing such residence. The fa- after his homestead application was presentther was the only heir and as such, accord-ed, but, by reason of the Secretary's suspending to the ruling then and theretofore prevailing in the land department, *could acquire title under the son's entry without himself residing on the land. Shortly after the son's death he took possession under the entry, fenced the land, erected substantial buildings thereon, cultivated forty acres or more and pastured live stock on the remainder, but resided on an adjoining tract. In due course, after continuing his cultivation and improvements for five years, he submitted final proof at the local land office showing what he had done and made the payments required by law. In that connection his right to a pat ent was contested by one who, although making no claim to the land, insisted that the entry was extinguished ipso facto when the son died without establishing residence on the land, and that, if the entry was not thus extinguished, the father forfeited his rights thereunder by failing to make the land his own place of residence. The local officers held against the contestant and with the father, and that decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of the General Land Office. But when the matter came before the Secretary of the Interior that officer, conceiving that the settled rulings of the land department before noticed were not well grounded, [1-3] In no admissible view of these facts can this suit be sustained. Even if under a right construction of the homestead law Rule was not entitled to the patent-which we do not at all intimate-Fisher is not in a position to take advantage of the error. He cannot be heard to complain on behalf of the United States; and he has no such personal interest in the land as entitles him to complain on his own account. He acquired no right by his homestead application. It never was allowed; nor could it reasonably have been allowed. As originally presented it did not sufficiently show that he was a qualified applicant, and his additional showing-whatever else might be thought of it-came after the suspending order had superseded the cancellation of the Rule entry and become an obstacle to the initiation of 1 There was place or mode of adoption or the identity of the no statement respecting the time, child. In Nebraska adoption seems to be controlled by statute, Kofka v. Rosicky, 41 Neb. 328, 342, 59 N. W. 788, 25 L. R. A. 207, 43 Am. St. Rep. 685; and the statute apparently provides that only adults may adopt. Rev. Stat. 1913, § 1615. sustained the insistence of the contestant, reversed the decisions of the local officers and the Commissioner and directed that the entry be cancelled. 42 L. D. 62, 64. The father sought to have the matter reconsidered 2A second suspending order was made by the and, while at first his efforts were unavail- Secretary at a time when Rule was resorting to juing, a rehearing ultimately was granted. On | dicial proceedings in the District of Columbia. *286 any adverse claim. Neither did he acquire | to restrain Weigle, the Dairy and Food Comany right by his attempted settlement after missioner of Wisconsin, from enforcing certhat order was made. The order was no tain laws of the State, especially Statutes less effective against that mode of initiating of 1913, § 4601g. That section makes it una claim than against the other. Its purpose lawful to sell any article of food that conwas to preserve the status quo rending final tains benzoic acid or benzoates, with qualifiaction on the Rule entry. A settlement in cations not material here. The plaintiff opposition to such an order is nothing short makes such articles from fruit, and adds of a trespass and confers no right under the benzoate of soda as a preservative. It put public land laws. Lyle v. Patterson, 228 U. them up in glass bottles and jars properly S. 211, 216, 33 Sup. Ct. 480, 57 L. Ed. 804. labelled under the Food and Drugs Act (June 30, 1906, c. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 [Comp. St. §§ 8717-8728]) packs the bottles and jars' in wooden cases containing a number of the same, and ships the cases from its factory in New York to customers in Wisconsin among others. Of course the single bottles are sold in the retail trade, and their contents are served to guests in restaurants and hotels. The defendant disavowed any contention that the state laws affected or purported to affect sales by the importer in the unbroken wooden packages containing the bottles and the decree *treated that subject as taken out of the case. But the bill went farther and setting up a decision, incorporated in a regulation under the Food and Drugs Act, that benzoate of soda is not injurious to health and that objection would not be raised to it under the Act if each container should be plainly labelled, contended that under the Food and Drugs Act and the Com.. merce Clause of the Constitution, the Wisconsin law was invalid even as applied to domestic retail sales of single bottles or the contents of single bottles of the plaintiff's goods. The defendant stood on a motion to [4] It is a familiar rule that to succeed in such a suit the plaintiff "must show a better right to the land than the patentee, such as in law should have been respected by the officers of the land department, and being respected, would have given him the patent. It is not sufficient to show that the patentee ought not to have received the patent." Sparks v. Pierce, 115 U. S. 408, 413, 6 Sup. Ct. 102, 105 (29 L. Ed. 428); Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 636, 647, 26 L. Ed. 875; Bohall v. Dilla, 114 U. S. 47, 50, 5 Sup. Ct. 782, 29 L. Ed. 61; Lee v. Johnson, 116 U. S. 48, 50, 6 Sup. Ct. 249, 29 L. Ed. 570; Duluth & Iron Range R. R. Co. v. Roy, 173 U. S. 587, 590, 19 Sup. Ct. 549, 43 L. Ed. 820; Johnson v. Riddle, 240 U. S. 467, 481, 36 Sup. Ct. 393, 60 L. Ed. 752; Anicker v. Gunsburg, 246 U. S. 110, 117, 38 Sup. Ct. 228, 62 L. Ed. 603. Decree affirmed. (248 U. S. 285) WEIGLE v. CURTICE BROS. CO. (Argued Dec. 17, 1918. Decided Jan. 7, 1919.) COMMERCE 8(10)-INTERSTATE COMMERCE- The Food and Drugs Act (Comp. St. §§ 8717-8728) does not affect the question when interstate commerce in an article of food satisfying that act ceases, and the article becomes subject to the laws of the state, into which it is brought, prohibiting its sale. dismiss and the District Court made a decree following the prayer of the bill. The defendant appealed. The argument in support of the decree con tends in various forms that the sale of the individual bottles when removed from the original package after entering the State, still is a part of commerce among the States, since the Act of Congress as to misbranding applies to them. But the Food and Drugs Act does not change or purport to change the Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Wiscon-moment at which an object ceases to move in sin. Suit by the Curtice Bros. Company against George J. Weigle. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed. Messrs. Spencer Haven, Atty. Gen., Walter H. Bender, Deputy Atty. Gen., and J. E. Messerschmidt, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appel interstate commerce. It imposes an obligation to label the bottles severally, although contained in one original package, as of course it may. Seven Cases of Eckman's Alterative v. United States, 239 U. S. 510, 515, 516, 36 Sup. Ct. 190, 60 L. Ed. 411, L. R. A. 1916D, 164. It provides for seizure and condemnation of misbranded or adulterated articles that have been transported from one State to another, although the transit is at an end, while the articles remain unsold or in original unbroken packages, as again *Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opin- it may. There is no reason why a lien ex ion of the Court. lant. Mr. H. O. Fairchild, of Green Bay, Wis., for appellee. This is a bill in equity brought by Curtice Brothers Company, a New York corporation, delicto should be lost by the end of the journey in which the wrong was done. The two things have no relation to each other. Hipo For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *287 milk as such, under that name, but applies to a FOOD 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 296(1) 1-DUE PROCESS OF LAW-SALE OF FOOD -POLICE POWER. lite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, | ated milk from which the cream has not been 57, 58, 31 Sup. Ct. 364, 55 L. Ed. 364. Final- removed, is not limited to sales of condensed ly the duty to retain the label upon the single bottles does not disappear at once. For reasons stated in McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 33 Sup. Ct. 431, 57 L. Ed. 754, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 984, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 39, if the State could require the label to be removed while the bottles remained in the importer's hands unsold it could *interfere with the means reasonably adopted by Congress to make its regulations obeyed. But all this has nothing to do with the question when interstate commerce is over and the articles carried in it have come under the general power of the State. The law upon that point has undergone no change. Gen. Code Ohio, § 12725, penalizing sale of condensed milk, unless made from unadulterat ed full cream milk, does not, in case of wholesome compound of condensed skimmed milk, contravene Const. U. S. Amend. 14. 3. COMMERCE 41(2) "ORIGINAL PACKAGE"-CANS IN CASES. The "original package" of food in cans, shipped in interstate commerce in fiber cases The Food and Drugs Act indicates its in- containing a number of cans, is not the intent to respect the recognized line of distinc-dividual can, but the case. 4. COMMERCE 8(10) INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE REGULATION OF SALE-FOOD AND DRUGS ACT. The Food and Drugs Act (Comp. St. §§. 8617-8728) does not prevent state regulation of domestic retail sales of food shipped in from another state. 5. COMMERCE 60(3) INTERSTATE COMMERCE-INDIRECT EFFECT OF STATE STAT UTE. Indirect effect on interstate commerce of Gen. Code Ohio, § 12725, penalizing sale of condensed milk, unless made from full cream milk, does not invalidate the act. tion between domestic and interstate com- [Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words merce too clearly to need argument or an and Phrases, First and Second Series, Original examination of its language. It naturally Package.] would, as the distinction is constitutional. The fact that a food or drug might be condemned by Congress if it passed from State to State, does not carry an immunity of foods or drugs, making the same passage, that it does not condemn. Neither the silence of Congress nor the decisions of officers of the United States have any authority beyond the domain established by the Constitution. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U. S. 342, 362, 36 Sup. Ct. 370, 60 L. Ed. 679, L. R. A. 1917A, 421, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 455. When objects of commerce get within the sphere of State legislation the State may exercise its independent judgment and prohibit what Congress did not see fit to forbid. When they get within that sphere is determined, as we have said, by the old long-established criteria. The Food and Drugs Act does not interfere with State regulation of selling at retail. Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510, 517, 36 Sup. Ct. 440, 60 L. Ed. 771, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 548; McDermott V. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115, 131, 33 Sup. Ct. 43. 57 L. Ed. 754, 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 984, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 39. Such regulation is not an attempt to supplement the action of Congress in interstate commerce but the exercise of an authority outside of that commerce that always has remained in the States. Decree reversed. (248 U. S. 297) Mr. Justice Day, Mr. Justice Van Devanter, and Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio. Suit by the Hebe Company and the Carnation Milk Products Company against Norman E. Shaw, Secretary of Agriculture of Ohio, and another. Bill dismissed, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed. Mr. Charles E. Hughes, of New York City, for appellants. Messrs. Louis D. Johnson, of Urbana, Ohio, and Charles J. Pretzman, of Columbus, Ohio, for appellees. *Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion HEBE CO. et al. v. SHAW, Secretary of Ag- of the Court. riculture of Ohio et al. This is a bill in equity brought to restrain (Argued Dec. 11 and 12, 1918. Decided Jan. 7, prosecutions threatened against the plaintiffs 1919.) No. 664. and their customers for selling a food product of the plaintiffs called Hebe, the bill being based upon the destruction of the plaintiffs' "CON- business which it is alleged will ensue. The prosecutions are threatened mainly or wholly Gen. Code Ohio, § 12725, penalizing sale of under certain statutes of Ohio which, the condensed milk, unless made from unadulter- plaintiffs argue, do not bear the construc For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *301 |