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have granted the carrier's request for a di- this policy is in force and not previously asrected verdict.
The judgment of the court is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.
signed, to change the present beneficiary or beneficiaries." By formal written instruments dated July 15, 1910, he assigned both policies to his wife "if she outlives me, otherwise to my estate, with full power to the insured to change the beneficiary or surrender
Mr. Justice MCKENNA and Mr. Justice this policy to said company at any time, this CLARKE dissent.
(248 U. S. 450) *
to be done by instrument in writing under his hand and seal to be recorded at the home office of the company."
[1, 2] While both policies were in the bankrupt's possession, the trustee demanded them in order that their cash surrender value might
(Argued and Submitted Dec. 18, 1918. Decided. be secured and distributed under Bankruptcy
COHN v. MALONE.
Jan. 13, 1919.)
Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (Comp. St. §§ 9585-9656). The bankrupt defended upon two grounds: First, that the cash sur
1. BANKRUPTCY 143(12)-LIFE INSURANCE render value was not property which could POLICIES-RIGHTS OF TRUSTEE.
The cash surrender value of policies on bankrupt's life, the beneficiaries in which he could change, is property which he could have transferred prior to bankruptcy, so that right thereto passed to the trustee.
2. INSURANCE 587 - LIFE INSURANCE CHANGE OF BENEFICIARY.
Civ. Code Ga. 1910, § 2498, relative to life insurance, providing assured may direct the money to be paid to any of various classes, and on such direction, given and assented to by insurer, no other person can defeat it, does not prevent insured, after such a direction, making a change in beneficiary as authorized by the policy.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
In the matter of the bankruptcy of A. S. Cohn. Petitions by R. A. Malone, trustee in bankruptcy, to superintend and revise decrees denying his right to policies on the life of bankrupt, were granted, and the decrees reversed, by the Circuit Court of Ap peals (236 Fed. 882, 150 C. C. A. 144), and bankrupt brings certiorari. Affirmed.
*Messrs. J. R. Pottle, of Albany, Ga., George S. Jones, of Macon, Ga., James McIntosh, of New York City, and J. W. Kieve and I. J. Hofmayer, both of Albany, Ga., for petitioner.
Messrs. Sam S. Bennet, of Albany, Ga., Alexander Akerman and Charles Akerman, both of Macon, Ga., and John D. Pope and H. A. Peacock, both of Albany, Ga., for respondent.
have been transferred by him prior to bank. ruptcy; and, second, that the assignment to his wife could not be defeated by the trustee because protected by section 2498, Georgia Code 1910, which provides:
"The assured may direct the money to be paid to his personal representative, or to his widow, or to his children, or to his assignee; and upon such direction given, and assented to by But the assignment is good without such asthe insurer, no other person can defeat the same.
The Circuit Court of Appeals held both grounds of defense bad. 236 Fed. 882, 150 C. C. A. 144. As to the first its ruling accords with the doctrine recently announced in Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U. S. 50, 38 Sup. Ct. 36, 62 L. Ed. 143. In respect of the second that court declared:
"Nothing in the terms of the statute, especially when they are considered in the light of the circumstances of its enactment, indicates that it had any other purpose or effect than to deny to any one other than the assured himself the power to defeat a direction by him to pay to his personal representative, or to his widow, or to his children, or to his assignee, the money payable in a life policy issued to him. The provision does not purport to make every such direction by the assured irrevocable by him, or to invalidate a stipulation in a life policy giving the assured the right to change the beneficiary The statute puts a direction by the assured to at any time during the continuance of the policy. pay to his widow on the same footing as one to pay to his assignee. If a policy is assigned as security for a debt which the assured pays during his life, certainly the statute is not to be given the effect of putting it out of the power
Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the of the assured to change the beneficiary upon opinion of the Court.
the reassignment of the policy to him by the In 1902 and 1905 the bankrupt took out satisfied creditor. Nothing in its terms justifies two policies on his life in the Penn Mutual giving it a different operation or effect in the case of a direction to pay to the widow. We Life Insurance Company, loss under one payare not of opinion that the provision quoted had able to his "executors, administrators or asthe effect of conferring on the bankrupt's wife, signs," under the other to his sister and as the result of her having been named as the brother with full power in the assured "while | beneficiary, a vested and indefeasible interest in
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policies by the terms of which the beneficiaries | as a residence homestead twenty-six acres in could be changed by the bankrupt at any time." Travis county desirable as an addition to
the university grounds. Having failed in And we approve its conclusion. Petitioner has not complained here of the their efforts to purchase, the regents were action below concerning a third policy, issued about to meet and ask the Attorney General by the New York Life Insurance Company. to institute proceedings to condemn this euThe judgment of the Circuit Court of Ap-tire tract. Thereupon appellants instituted
(248 U. S. 453)
this proceeding against them and the AttorLey General in the United States District Court seeking to restrain their threatened action
"on the ground [among others] that said law CAVANAUGH et al. v. LOONEY, Attorney conflicts with the Constitution of the United General of Texas, et al.
States, in that the defendants are thereby pretendedly authorized to take plaintiffs' property
(Argued and Submitted Dec. 19, 1918. Decided without due process of law, and plaintiffs are Jan. 13, 1919.)
1. INJUNCTION 85(2)-FEDERAL COURTSPROCEEDINGS OF STATE OFFICERS.
While federal courts may enjoin proceedings by state officials under act violative of federal Constitution, it should not be done, except in a case reasonably free from doubt, and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.
thereby deprived of the equal protection of the laws."
They alleged invalidity of the act because in conflict with both state and federal Constitutions and averred:
"That unless restrained by writ from this honorable court, the said defendants constituting the board of regents of the University of Texas will, at their next meeting aforesaid, request the Attorney General to file a petition in
2. INJUNCTION 135-PRELIMINARY INJUNC- the district court of Travis county for the con
demnation of their property or a part thereof under said pretended act, and that the said Preliminary injunction against proceedings by regents of state university to condemn land, Attorney General, unless so restrained, will on the ground of state law authorizing taking comply with said request of the board of regents, without due process and denying equal protec-filing of such petition will cause irreparable loss acting under said purported act, and that the tion of laws, held properly denied, in the ex- and damage to your petitioners by impounding ercise of wise discretion; allegation of irreparable loss and damage appearing fanciful, in view their property in court pending the disposition of said proceeding and will cloud the title thereto and prevent the vending of same or any part thereof."
of detailed circumstances.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Texas.
Suit by Mary Cavanaugh and another against Ben F. Looney, Attorney General of the State of Texas, and others. Preliminary injunction was denied, and plaintiffs appeal.
Mr. Joseph Manson McCormick, of Dallas, Tex., for appellants.
*Messrs. B. F. Looney and C. M. Cureton, both of Austin, Tex., for appellees.
The challenged act provides: That if the regents cannot agree with the owners for purchase they shall request the Attorney General to file petition in the district court of the county, describing the land, stating rurpose for which desired, and praying that its value be ascertained and decree be entered vesting title thereto in the state; that upon filing such petition the owner shall be cited as in other civil causes; that at the first term thereafter the cause shall be tried by a jury upon a single issue as to the val
Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the ue of the land and the decision of such jury opinion of the Court.
shall be final-provided there shall be a right of appeal as in other civil cases; that when the value has been ascertained and the court satisfied therewith it shall enter a decree vesting title but not until such amount together with all reasonable costs and expenses including reasonable attorney's fees shall be paid to the owner or into court for his benefit.
The University of Texas is a state institution under immediate control of officers known as regents, appointed by the Governor, with its principal educational departments in Travis and Galveston counties. An act of the Legislature, approved August 30, 1911 (S. B. No. 20, c. 6, General Laws Texas) undertook to authorize the regents to purchase or condemn through proceedings in the dis- It is alleged that the act of 1911 especially trict courts such lands within those coun- offends the Constitution of Texas because a ties as they might deem expedient for ex- local law passed without the required notice; tension of campus or other university pur- and that it is bad under both federal and poses. Appellants have long owned and used | state Constitutions because (1) it delegates For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
The judgment of the court below is Affirmed.
to the board of regents power to determine upon to inquire narrowly into the disputable what property is reasonably necessary for points urged against the statute. No more the purposes mentioned and forbids inquiry are we. concerning this by the court; (2) it forbids inquiry into the damages to the remainder of a tract where a part only is taken; and (3) it permits the state *to acquire fee simple title to property which thereafter may be
(248 U. S. 420)
UNITED STATES v. HILL.
sold. It is further alleged that appellants' (Argued Nov. 5 and 6, 1918. Decided Jan.
property is so situated that to take a part would necessarily cause serious damage to the remainder.
A special court assembled as provided by section 266, Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1162 [Comp. St. § 1243]), denied application for preliminary injunction without opinion and allowed this direct appeal.
 It is now settled doctrine— "that individuals, who, as officers of the state, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a federal court of equity from such action." Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 155, 156, 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 216 U. S. 165, 166, 167, 30 Sup. Ct. 286, 54 L. Ed. 430; Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278, 293, 33 Sup. Ct. 312, 57 L. Ed. 510; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 37, 36 Sup. Ct. 7, 60 L. Ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Greene v. Louis & Interurban R. R. Co., 244 U. S. 499, 506, 37 Sup. Ct. 673, 61 L. Ed. 1280, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88.
But no such injunction "ought to be granted unless in a case reasonably free from doubt," and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury. Ex parte Young, supra, 209 U. S. 166, 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764. The jurisdiction should be exercised only where intervention is essential in order effectually to protect property rights against injuries otherwise irremediable.
 When considered in connection with established rules of law relating to the power of eminent domain, complainants' allegation of threatened "irreparable loss and damage" appear fanciful. The detailed circumstances negative such view and rather tend to support the contrary one. Nothing indicates that any objections to the validity of the statute could not be presented in an orderly way before the state court where defendants intended to institute condemnation proceedings; and if by any chance the state courts should finally deny a federal right the *appropriate and adequate remedy by review here is obvious. Exercising a wise discretion we think the court below properly denied an inJunction. Upon the record it was not called
March 3, 1917 [Comp. St. 1918, §§ 8739a, Reed Amendment (part of section 5 of Act 10387a-10387c]), declaring a punishment for one causing liquor to be transported in interstate Commerce, except for certain purposes, into a state whose laws prohibit its manufacture or sale there for beverage purposes, providing that nothing therein shall authorize shipment of liqview of the prior Wilson and Webb-Kenyon uor into a state contrary to its laws, held, in Acts (Comp. St. §§ 8738, 8739), not intended merely to aid the state law, but to apply to liquor which a person was bringing in for his own consumption, as allowed by the state law. 3. COMMERCE 55 REGULATION BY CONGRESS PROHIBITION.
Power of Congress to regulate commerce may in proper cases take the character of prohibition.
*Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a writ of error bringing in review under the Criminal Appeals Act March 2,
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state or territory, or remaining therein for use, consumption, sale or storage, shall be subject on the arrival therein to the operation of the laws of the state or territory enacted in the exercise of the police power. Reference was also made to the subsequent legislation known as the Webb-Kenyon Act of March 1, 1913, c. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (Comp. St. § 8739), prohibiting the shipment and transportation of intoxicating liquor from one state into another state when such liquor is intended to be received, possessed, sold or used in violation of the laws of such state. Advertence was made to the fact that the provisions of both the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts apply broadly to the interstate transportation of liquors whether for commercial use or otherwise. It was concluded that Congress in the enactment of the Reed Amendment intended to aid the local law of the state by preventing shipment of intoxicating liquors in interstate commerce when intended for commercial purposes; and as the law of West Virginia permits any person to bring into the state not more than one quart of liquor, in any period of thirty days, for personal use, Congress did not intend to prohibit interstate transportation of such liquors not intended to be used for commercial purposes. We are of opinion that this is a too narrow construction of the Reed Amendment.
1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (Comp. St. § 1704) | Stat. 313 (Comp. St. § 8738), providing that the judgment of the District Court of the intoxicating liquors transported into any United States for the Southern District of West Virginia sustaining a demurrer and motion to quash an indictment against one Dan Hill. The indictment charged that Hill on the 20th of November, 1917, being in the state of Kentucky, there intended to go and be carried by means of a common carrier, engaged in interstate commerce, from the state of Kentucky into the state of West Virginia, and intended to carry upon his person, as a beverage, for his personal use, a quantity of intoxicating liquor, to wit, one quart thereof, into the state of West Virginia, and did in the state of Kentucky purchase and procure a quantity of intoxicating liquor, to wit, one quart thereof, contained in bottles, and did then and there board a certain trolley car, being operated by a common carrier corporation engaged in interstate commerce, and by means thereof did cause himself and the said intoxicating liquor, then upon his person, to be carried and transported in interstate commerce into the state of West Virginia. It is charged that Hill violated the Act of Congress approved March 3, 1917, commonly known as the Reed Amendment, by thus carrying in interstate commerce from Kentucky to West Virginia a quantity of intoxicating liquor as a beverage for his personal use, the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes being then prohibited by the laws of the state of West Virginia; further that the intoxicating liquor was not ordered, purchased, or caused to be transported for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes.
The Reed Amendment is a part of section 5 of the Post Office Appropriation Act approved March 3, 1917, 39 Stat. 1058, 1069, c. 162 (Comp. St. 1918, § 8739a) and reads as follows:
Whoever shall order, purchase, or cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce, except for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and mechanical purposes, into any state or territory the laws of which state or territory prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes shall be punished as aforesaid: Provided, that nothing herein shall authorize the shipment of liquor into any state contrary to the laws of such state. *
The ground of decision, as appears by the opinion of the District Court, was that the phrase, "transported in interstate commerce," as used in the act, was intended to mean and apply only to liquor transported for commercial purposes. This conclusion was reached from a *construction of the act when read in the light of other legislation of Congress upon the subject of interstate transportation of liquor. Attention was called to the terms of the Wilson Act of Aug. 8, 1890, c. 728, 26
 The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states. From an early day such commerce has been held to include the transportation of persons and property no less than the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188, 6 L. Ed. 23; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 203, 5 Sup. Ct. 826, 29 L. Ed. 158. "Importation into one state from another *is the indispensable element, the test, of interstate commerce."
International Text-book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 107, 30 Sup. Ct. 481, 54 L Ed. 678, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103; The Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 345, 23 Sup. Ct. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492. The transportation of one's own goods from state to state is interstate commerce, and, as such, subject to the regulatory power of Congress. Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 560, 34 Sup. Ct. 956, 58 L. Ed. 1459. The transportation of liquor upon the person of one being carried in interstate commerce is within the well-established meaning of the words "interstate commerce." United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525, 532, 33 Sup. Ct. 595, 57 L. Ed. 950.
[2, 3] Congress in the passage of the Reed Amendment must be presumed to have had, and in our opinion undoubtedly did have, in mind this well-known and often declared meaning of interstate commerce. It had already provided in the Wilson Act for state
plished by prescribing rules for its conduct. That regulation may take the character of prohibition, in proper cases, is well established by the decisions of this court. Lottery Case, supra; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364, 55 L. Ed. 364; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 906, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 905; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168; Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railroad Co., 242 U. S.
control over liquor after its delivery to the consignee in interstate commerce. In the Webb-Kenyon Act it had prohibited the shipment of liquor in interstate commerce where the same was to be used in violation of the law of the state into which it was transported. In the passage of the Reed Amendment it was intended to take another step in legislation under the authority of the commerce cause (article 1, § 8, cl. 3). The meaning of the act must be found in the language in which it is expressed, when, as here, there is no ambiguity in the terms of the law. The order, purchase, or transpor-311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326, L. R. A. tation in interstate commerce, save for certain excepted purposes, is forbidden. The exceptions are specific and are those for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes; and in the proviso it is set forth that nothing contained in the act shall authorize interstate commerce shipments into a state contrary to its laws.
1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845; Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 270, 271, 38 Sup. Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101.
*That Congress has this authority over the transportation of liquor in interstate commerce, we entertain no doubt. In the recent case of Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railroad Co., supra, this subject was given full consideration. That case involved the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon
states to be used therein in violation of the local law. While such was the particular case before the court, the authority of Con
rectly involved, and its authority over interstate commerce in intoxicating liquors was clearly stated and definitely recognized. After discussing the power of Congress over such shipment in interstate commerce, and affirming the ample power possessed by Congress over the subject-matter in view of its characteristics, this court said:
West Virginia is a state in which the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes is prohibited. If the act | Law, prohibiting the shipment of liquors into is within the constitutional authority of Congress, it follows that the indictment charged an offense within the terms of the law. That Congress posses*ses supreme authority to reg-gress to make regulations of its own was diulate interstate commerce subject only to the limitations of the Constitution, is too well established to require the citation of the numerous cases in this court which have so held. Congress may exercise this authority in aid of the policy of the state, if it sees fit to do so. It is equally clear that the policy of Congress acting independently of the states may induce legislation without reference to the particular policy or law of any given state. Acting within the authority conferred by the Constitution it is for Congress to determine what legislation will attain its purposes. The control of Congress over interstate commerce is not to be limited by state laws. Congress, and not the states, is given the authority to regulate interstate commerce. When Congress acts, keeping within the authority committed to it, its laws become by the terms of the Constitution itself the supreme laws of the land.
"This is not to say that the nation may deal with the internal concerns of the state, as such, but that the execution by Congress of its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce is not limited by the fact that intrastate transactions may have become so interwoven therewith that the effective government of the former incidentally controls the latter. This conclusion necessarily results from the supremacy of the national power within its appointed sphere." Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 399, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 739 (57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18), and previous decisions of this court therein cited.
We can see no reason for saying that although Congress in view of the nature and character of intoxicants had a power to forbid their movement in interstate commerce, it had not the authority to so deal with the subject as to establish a regulation (which is what was done by the Webb-Kenyon Law) makprohibitions of the laws of another through the ing it impossible for one state to violate the channels of interstate commerce. Indeed, we can see no escape from the conclusion that if we accepted the proposition urged, we would be obliged to announce the contradiction in terms that because Congress had exerted a regulation therefore its action was void for excess of powlesser in power than it was authorized to exert, er; or, in other words, stating the necessary result of the argument from a concrete considerabecause Congress in adopting a regulation had tion of the particular subject here involved, that considered the nature and character of our dual system of government, state and nation, and instead of absolutely prohibiting, had so conformed its regulation as to produce co-operation be *tween the local and national forces of government to the end of preserving the rights of all, it had thereby transcended the complete and perfect power of regulation conferred by the Constitution."
The power of Congress, it is true, is to reg- In view of the authority of Congress over ulate commerce, which is ordinarily accom- the subject-matter, and the enactment of pre