« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »
1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246 (Comp. St. § 1704) | Stat. 313 (Comp. St. § 8738), providing that the judgment of the District Court of the intoxicating liquors transported into any United States for the Southern District of state or territory, or remaining therein for West Virginia sustaining a demurrer and mo- use, consumption, sale or storage, shall be tion to quash an indictment against one Dan subject on the arrival therein to the operaHill. The indictment charged that Hill on tion of the laws of the state or territory enthe 20th of November, 1917, being in the state acted in the exercise of the police power. of Kentucky, there intended to go and be car- Reference was also made to the subsequent ried by means of a common carrier, engaged legislation known as the Webb-Kenyon Act of in interstate commerce, from the state of March 1, 1913, c. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (Comp. St. Kentucky into the state of West Virginia, § 8739), prohibiting the shipment and transand intended to carry upon his person, as a portation of intoxicating liquor from one beverage, for his personal use, a quantity of state into another state when such liquor is intoxicating liquor, to wit, one quart thereof, intended to be received, possessed, sold or into the state of West Virginia, and did in used in violation of the laws of such state. the state of Kentucky purchase and procure Advertence was made to the fact that the a quantity of intoxicating liquor, to wit, one provisions of both the Wilson and Webb-Kenquart thereof, contained in bottles, and did yon Acts apply broadly to the interstate then and there board a certain trolley car, transportation of liquors whether for combeing operated by a common carrier corpora- mercial use or otherwise. It was concluded tion engaged in interstate commerce, and by that Congress in the enactment of the Reed means thereof did cause himself and the said Amendment intended to aid the local law of intoxicating liquor, then upon his person, to the state by preventing shipment of intoxicatbe carried and transported in interstate com- ing liquors in interstate commerce when inmerce into the state of West Virginia. It is tended for commercial purposes; and as the charged that Hill violated the Act of Con- law of West Virginia permits any person to gress approved March 3, 1917, commonly bring into the state not more than one quart known as the Reed Amendment, by thus car- of liquor, in any period of thirty days, for rying in interstate commerce from Kentucky personal use, Congress did not intend to proto West Virginia a quantity of intoxicating hibit interstate transportation of such liquors liquor as a beverage for his personal use, the not intended to be used for commercial purmanufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors poses. We are of opinion that this is a too for beverage purposes being then prohibited narrow construction of the Reed Amendment. by the laws of the state of West Virginia; further that the intoxicating liquor was not ordered, purchased, or caused to be transported for scientinc, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes.
 The Constitution confers upon Congress the power to regulate commerce among the states. From an early day such commerce has been held to include the transportation of persons and property no less than the purchase, sale and exchange of commodities.
The Reed Amendment is a part of section 5 of the Post Office Appropriation Act approv-Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 188, 6 L. Ed. 23; ed March 3, 1917, 39 Stat. 1058, 1069, c. 162 (Comp. St. 1918, § 8739a) and reads as follows:
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 203, 5 Sup. Ct. 826, 29 L. Ed. 158. "Importation into one state from another *is the indispensable element, the test, of interstate commerce." International Text-book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 107, 30 Sup. Ct. 481, 54 L Ed. 678, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103; The Lottery Case, 188 U. S. 321, 345, 23 Sup. Ct. 321, 47 L. Ed. 492. The transportation of one's own goods from state to state is interstate commerce, and, as such, subject to the regulatory power of Congress. Pipe Line Cases, 234 U. S. 548, 560, 34 Sup. Ct. 956, 58 L. Ed. 1459. The transportation of liquor upon the person of one being carried in interstate commerce is within the well-established meaning of the words "interstate commerce." United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525, 532, 33 Sup. Ct. 595, 57 L. Ed. 950.
[2, 3] Congress in the passage of the Reed Amendment must be presumed to have had, and in our opinion undoubtedly did have, in mind this well-known and often declared meaning of interstate commerce. It had already provided in the Wilson Act for state
Whoever shall order, purchase, or cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce, except for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and mechanical purposes, into any state or territory the laws of which state or territory prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes shall be punished as aforesaid: Provided, that nothing herein shall authorize the
shipment of liquor into any state contrary to
the laws of such state. * *
The ground of decision, as appears by the opinion of the District Court, was that the phrase, “transported in interstate commerce," as used in the act, was intended to mean and apply only to liquor transported for commercial purposes. This conclusion was reached from a *construction of the act when read in the light of other legislation of Congress upon the subject of interstate transportation of liquor. Attention was called to the terms of the Wilson Act of Aug. 8, 1890, c. 728, 26
control over liquor after its delivery to the plished by prescribing rules for its conduct. consignee in interstate commerce. In the That regulation may take the character of Webb-Kenyon Act it had prohibited the ship-prohibition, in proper cases, is well establishment of liquor in interstate commerce where ed by the decisions of this court. Lottery the same was to be used in violation of Case, supra; Hipolite Egg Co. v. United the law of the state into which it was trans- States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364, 55 L. ported. In the passage of the Reed Amend- Ed. 364; Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. ment it was intended to take another step 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281, 57 L. Ed. 523, 43 L. R. in legislation under the authority of the com- | A. (N. S.) 906, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 905; Camimerce cause (article 1, § 8, cl. 3). The mean- netti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 37 Sup. ing of the act must be found in the lan- Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, guage in which it is expressed, when, as Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168; Clark Distilling Co. v. here, there is no ambiguity in the terms of Western Maryland Railroad Co., 242 U. S. the law. The order, purchase, or transpor- 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326, L. R. A. tation in interstate commerce, save for cer- | 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845; Hammer tain excepted purposes, is forbidden. The ex- v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251, 270, 271, 38 Sup. ceptions are specific and are those for scien- Ct. 529, 62 L. Ed. 1101. tific, sacramental, medicinal, or mechanical purposes; and in the proviso it is set forth that nothing contained in the act shall authorize interstate commerce shipments into a state contrary to its laws.
*That Congress has this authority over the transportation of liquor in interstate commerce, we entertain no doubt. In the recent case of Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Railroad Co., supra, this subject was West Virginia is a state in which the man- given full consideration. That case involved ufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors for the constitutionality of the Webb-Kenyon beverage purposes is prohibited. If the act Law, prohibiting the shipment of liquors into is within the constitutional authority of Con- states to be used therein in violation of the gress, it follows that the indictment charged local law. While such was the particular an offense within the terms of the law. That case before the court, the authority of ConCongress possesses supreme authority to reg-gress to make regulations of its own was diulate interstate commerce subject only to the rectly involved, and its authority over interlimitations of the Constitution, is too well es- state commerce in intoxicating liquors was tablished to require the citation of the nu- clearly stated and definitely recognized. Aftmerous cases in this court which have so er discussing the power of Congress over held. Congress may exercise this authority such shipment in interstate commerce, and afin aid of the policy of the state, if it sees fit firming the ample power possessed by Conto do so. It is equally clear that the policy of gress over the subject-matter in view of its Congress acting independently of the states characteristics, this court said: may induce legislation without reference to the particular policy or law of any given state. Acting within the authority conferred by the Constitution it is for Congress to determine what legislation will attain its purposes. The control of Congress over interstate commerce is not to be limited by state laws. Congress, and not the states, is given the authority to regulate interstate commerce. When Congress acts, keeping within the authority committed to it, its laws become by the terms of the Constitution itself the supreme laws of the land.
We can see no reason for saying that although Congress in view of the nature and character of intoxicants had a power to forbid their movement in interstate commerce, it had not the authority to so deal with the subject as to establish a regulation (which is what was done by the Webb-Kenyon Law) making it impossible for one state to violate the prohibitions of the laws of another through the channels of interstate commerce. Indeed, we can see no escape from the conclusion that if we accepted the proposition urged, we would be obliged to announce the contradiction in terms that because Congress had exerted a regulation therefore its action was void for excess of powlesser in power than it was authorized to exert, er; or, in other words, stating the necessary result of the argument from a concrete consideration of the particular subject here involved, that because Congress in adopting a regulation had considered the nature and character of our dual system of government, state and nation, and in
"This is not to say that the nation may deal with the internal concerns of the state, as such, but that the execution by Congress of its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce is not limited by the fact that intrastate transactions may have become so interwoven therewith that the effective government of the former incidentally controls the latter. This stead of absolutely prohibiting, had so conformconclusion necessarily results from the suprem-ed its regulation as to produce co-operation be acy of the national power within its appointed *tween the local and national forces of governsphere." Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, ment to the end of preserving the rights of all, 399, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 739 (57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 it had thereby transcended the complete and L. R. A. [N. S.] 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18), perfect power of regulation conferred by the and previous decisions of this court therein cited. Constitution."
The power of Congress, it is true, is to reg- In view of the authority of Congress over ulate commerce, which is ordinarily accom- the subject-matter, and the enactment of pre
vious legislation embodied in the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Laws, we have no question that Congress enacted this statute because of its belief that in states prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes the facilities of interstate commerce should be denied to the introduction of intoxicants by means of interstate commerce, except for the limited purposes permitted in the statute which have nothing to do with liquor when used as a beverage. That the state saw fit to permit the introduction of liquor for personal use in limited quantity in no wise interferes with the authority of Congress, acting under its plenary power over interstate commerce, to make the prohibition against interstate shipment contained in this act. It may exert its authority, as in the 'Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, having in view the laws of the state, but it has a pow-erate and thereby negatives any inference er of its own, which in this instance it has drawn from silence. The Reed Amendment exerted in accordance with its view of public as now construed is a congressional fiat impolicy. posing more complete prohibition wherever the state has assumed to prevent manufacture or sale of intoxicants.
The Webb-Kenyon Law, upheld in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326, L. R A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845, is wholly different from the act here involved. It suspends as to intoxicants moving in interstate commerce the rule of freedom from control by state action which the courts infer from congressional silence or failure specifically to regulate. "The absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter shall be free." Bowman v. Chicago, etc., Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465, 508, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 1062, 31 L. Ed. 700; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 119, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128. In plain terms, it permits state statutes to op
 When Congress exerts its authority in a matter within its control, state laws must give way in view of the regulation of the subject-matter by the superior power conferred by the Constitution. Seaboard Air Line Rwy. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. 635, 58 L. Ed. 1062, L. R. A. 1915C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702, 33 Sup. Ct. 703, 57 L. Ed. 1031; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 33 Sup. Ct. 651, 57 L. Ed. 1129, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 156; Minnesota Rate Cases, (Argued Dec. 11, 1918. Decided Jan. 13, 1919.) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 18.
COON v. KENNEDY.
It follows that the District Court erred in sustaining the demurrer and motion to quash, and its judgment is
COURTS 391(1)-SUPREME COURT-JURIS-
the roads are bad or men are hanged for murder or coals are dug. Where is the limit?
Mr. Justice MCREYNOLDS dissenting.
When Hill carried liquor from Kentucky into West Virginia for his personal use he did only what the latter state permitted. Construed as forbidding this action because West Virginia had undertaken to forbid manufacture and sale of intoxicants, the Reed Amendment in no proper sense regulates interstate commerce, but is a direct intermeddling with the state's internal affairs. Whether regarded as reward or punishment for wisdom or folly in enacting limited prohibition, the amendment so construed, I think, goes beyond federal power; and to hold otherwise opens possibilities for partial and sectional legislation which may destroy proper control of their own affairs by the several states.
If Congress may deny liquor to those who live in a state simply because its manufacture is not permitted there, why may not this be done for any suggested reason-e. g. because
Mr. Justice CLARKE concurs in this dissent.
(248 U. S. 457)
Decision of the highest state court, denying relief under New Jersey workmen's compensation act for drowning in navigable waters, holding that Act Oct. 6, 1917, § 1 (Comp. St. 1918, § 991 ), saving to claimants rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state, was inapplicable, being passed after the accident, and that the rights of parties depended on the maritime laws, held not one allowing review by the national Supreme Court, on writ of error, under Act Sept. 6, 1916, § 2 (Comp. St. § 1214).
In Error to the Court of Errors and Appeals of the State of New Jersey.
Proceeding by Rebecca Coon for compensation under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act, opposed by James Kennedy. Judgment for defendant was affirmed by the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey (103 Atl. 207), and petitioner brings error.
Mr. James D. Carpenter, Jr., of Jersey City, N. J., for plaintiff in error.
Mr. Isidor Kalisch, of Newark, N. J., for defendant in error.
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
Memorandum opinion by Mr. Justice Mc-3. SHIPPING 112 PREVENTION OF CarREYNOLDS. RIAGE-DUTY TO CARRY BY OTHER VESSEL.
This writ of error runs to a judgment of the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey filed March 4, 1918, 103 Atl. 207, denying relief to Rebecca Coon, who *sued to recover under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act (P. L. 1911, p. 134), on account of her husband's death by drowning in the cuit Court of Appeals for the Third Cirnavigable waters of that state while employed as a fireman on a tugboat.
Certificate from the United States Cir
The court held that as the accident occurred August 4, 1915, the Act of Congress approved October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. L. c. 97, § 1, p. 395 [Comp. St. 1918, § 991, subd. 3]), "saving to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state," was inapplicable, and that under the doctrine announced in Southern
Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900, the rights of the parties depended upon the maritime law of the United States.
(248 U. S. 377)
ALLANWILDE TRANSPORT CORPORA-
1. SHIPPING 152- PREVENTION OF CARRIAGE RETENTION OF FREIGHT-CONTRACT. Provision of charter party, there stipulated to be embodied in bill of lading: "Freight to be prepaid net on signing bill of lading. * Freight earned, retained and irrevocable, vessel lost or not lost"-justifies carrier in retaining prepaid freight; vessel being forced by injuries from storm to return to port, and second departure being rendered impossible by embargo laid against sailing vessels bound for war
Carriage contracted to be done by sailing vessel being prevented by embargo against sailing vessels bound for the war zone, the carrier was not bound to transport by a vessel not subject to the embargo.
*Mr. Justice MCKENNA delivered the opin
There was no decision against the validity of a treaty or statute of or an authority ex-ion of the Court. ercised under the United States, nor in fa- The questions in the cases arise upon vor of the validity of a statute of or an au- libels filed against the Allanwilde to recover thority exercised under a state challenged prepaid freight for the trans*portation of because of repugnance to the Constitution, certain goods and merchandise to designated treaties or laws of the United States. Con- ports in Europe. sequently, under the Act of September 6, 1916 (39 Stat. L. c. 448, § 2, p. 726 [Comp. St. § 1214]), the writ of error was improperly sued out and must be
Libels by the Vacuum Oil Company and by A. W. Pidwell, respectively, against the sailing vessel Allanwilde; the Allanwilde Transport Corporation, claimant. Decrees for libelants, and cases taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which certifies questions. Questions answered in the affirmative.
Messrs. Oscar D. Duncan, Courtland Palmer, and Russell T. Mount, all of New York City, for Allanwilde Corporation.
Mr. John C. Prizer, of New York City, for Vacuum Oil Co. and Pidwell.
The solution of the questions turns upor (1) the asserted prevention of the adventure by a storm at sea which the vessel encountered, requiring her return to port for repairs, and (2) afterwards by the restraining power of the government.
On November 1, 1917, the Allanwilde, owned by the Allanwilde Transport Corporation, was seized upon libels filed by the Vacuum Oil Company and A. W. Pidwell, respectively, each of which had shipped certain goods to be carried from New York to Rochefort, France.
In May, 1917, the Oil Company chartered the vessel to carry a cargo of oil in barrels at the rate of $16.50 a barrel (changed afterwards to $15.25).
The charter party contained inter alia the following provisions:
* Freight to be prepaid net on signing bills of lading in United States gold or equivalent, free of discount, commission, or insurance. Freight earned, retained and irrevocable, vessel lost or not lost."
On August 25, the oil having been loaded, the vessel issued a bill of lading containing
2. SHIPPING 115 PREVENTION OF CAR- inter alia the following provision: BIAGE-EMBARGO.
The condition from embargo laid against sailing vessels bound for the war zone, which would necessarily continue so long as the submarine menace, the cause of its imposition, was so far permanent as to relieve the carrier from further obligation to carry.
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
"All conditions and exceptions of charter party are to be considered as embodied in this bill of lading."
Pidwell was permitted to ship certain kegs of nails on the vessel, and on August 15 a bill of lading was issued to him. Inter
alia it provided that the carrier should not | freight alone, refusing recovery for the other be liable for loss, damage, delay or default damages." "by causes beyond the carrier's reasonable control; by arrest or restraint of governments, princes, rulers, or peoples; by prolongation of the voyage.
It is provided in paragraph 5 of the bill of lading that:
"Full freight to destination, whether intended to be prepaid or collected at destination, and all advance charges * * are due and payable to (the Allanwilde Transport Corporation) upon the receipt of the goods by the lat* and any payment made in respect of the goods ** shall be deemed fully earned and due and payable to the carrier at any stage before or after loading of the service hereunder without deduction (if unpaid), or refund in whole or in part (if paid), goods or vessel lost or not lost, or if the voyage be broken up.
In pursuance of the contracts thus attested the oil and the nails were shipped on the Allanwilde and the freight was paid in advance $49,745.50 for the oil and $3,128.00 for the nails.
The vessel was seaworthy and properly manned and equipped, and set sail September 11. After she had been out about 14 days and was about 500 miles from New | York she encountered a storm so severe that her boats were carried away and she sprang a leak so threatening that the water in her hold was three or four feet deep and was gaining on the pumps. Thereupon the master properly decided that he must seek a port of refuge for safety and repair. Hallfax was about 500 miles away, but in that direction the wind was against him, while it was favorable for New York, and on this account as well as for other good reasons he headed for New York, where he arrived on October 5, having been out 24 days. Re pairs were undertaken at once, the cargo remaining on board meanwhile.
"On September 28, while the vessel was at sea, the government decided to refuse clearance thereafter to any sailing vessel bound for the war zone. The master did not know of this condition until the vessel returned to New York; he received no information from the shore after September 11. The repairs being finished, the vessel attempted to resume her voyage, but clearance *was refused, and none could be obtained in spite of her efforts to induce the government to modify its stand. Toward the end of October the shippers were notified by the carrier to unload their goods, and this they did, but under protest and reserving their rights. Afterwards the oil was forwarded by steamship, but at a higher rate of freight and under other charges. What became of the nails after they were unloaded does not appear. "The vessel declined to refund the freight to either shipper, and the libels were filed to recover not only the prepaid freight but also damages for failure to carry. On each libel the District Court entered a decree for the prepaid
Upon these facts the Circuit Court of Appeals have certified four questions, two in each libel, as follows:
"1. Was the adventure frustrated, and was the contract evidenced by the charter party and by the bill of lading issued to the Oil Company dissolved, so as to relieve the carrier from further obligation to carry the oil?
"2. Whatever answer may be given to the first question, did the contract thus evidenced justify the carrier under the facts stated in refusing to refund the prepaid freight?
"3. Was the adventure frustrated, and was the contract evidenced by the bill of lading issued to Pidwell dissolved, so as to relieve the carrier from further obligation to carry the nails?
"4. Whatever answer may be given to the third question, did the contract thus evidenc ed justify the carrier under the facts stated in refusing to refund the prepaid freight?"
A copy of the charter party and copies of the bills of lading are attached to the certificate and also the official bulletin rerusing clearance to "sailing vessels destined to proceed through the war zone."
The argument of counsel upon the ele ments of the questions is quite extensive, ranging through all of the ways in which contracts can be dissolved or their performance excused by the agreement of the parties or prevented by some supervening cause independent of the parties and dominating their convention. We do not think it is necessary to follow the argument through that range. It may be brought to the narrower compass of the charter party and the bills of lading.
[1-3] The physical events and what they determined are certified. First, there was the storm, compelling the return of the ship to New York to avert greater disaster; then the action of the government precluding a second departure. Does the contract of the parties provide for such situation and take care of it, and assign its consequences? The charter party provides, as we have seen, that "Freight to be prepaid net on signing bills of lading. Freight earned, retained and irrevocable, vessel lost or not lost." And it is provided that this provision is, with other provisions, “to be embodied" in the bill of lading. They seem necessarily, therefore, deliberately adopted to be the measure of the rights and obligations of shipper and carrier. Let us repeat: the explicit declaration is-"Freight to be prepaid net on signing bills of lading.
Freight earned, retained and irrevocable, vessel lost or not lost." The provision was not idle or accidental. It is easy to make a charge of injustice against it if we consider only the defeat of the voyage and the noncarriage of the cargo. But there are opposing considerations. There