The Webb-Kenyon Law, upheld in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. Ed. 326, L. R. A. 1917B, 1218, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 845, is wholly different from the act here involved. It suspends as to intoxicants moving in interstate commerce the rule of freedom from control by state action which the courts infer from congressional silence or failure specifically to regulate. "The absence of any law of Congress on the subject is equivalent to its declaration that commerce in that matter shall be free." Bowman v. Chicago, etc., Railway Co., 125 U. S. 465, 508, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 1062, 31 L. Ed. 700; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 119, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128. In plain terms, it permits state statutes to op vious legislation embodied in the Wilson and the roads are bad or men are hanged for murWebb-Kenyon Laws, we have no question der or coals are dug. Where is the limit? that Congress enacted this statute because of its belief that in states prohibiting the sale and manufacture of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes the facilities of interstate commerce should be denied to the introduction of intoxicants by means of interstate commerce, except for the limited purposes permitted in the statute which have nothing to do with liquor when used as a beverage. That the state saw fit to permit the introduction of liquor for personal use in limited quantity in no wise interferes with the authority of Congress, acting under its plenary power over interstate commerce, to make the prohibition against interstate shipment contained in this act. It may exert its authority, as in the 'Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts, having in view the laws of the state, but it has a pow-erate and thereby negatives any inference er of its own, which in this instance it has exerted in accordance with its view of public policy. drawn from silence. The Reed Amendment as now construed is a congressional fiat imposing more complete prohibition wherever the state has assumed to prevent manufacture or sale of intoxicants. Mr. Justice CLARKE concurs in this dissent. [4] When Congress exerts its authority in a matter within its control, state laws must give way in view of the regulation of the subject-matter by the superior power conferred by the Constitution. Seaboard Air Line Rwy. Co. v. Horton, 233 U. S. 492, 34 Sup. Ct. 635, 58 L. Ed. 1062, L. R. A. 1915C, 1, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 475; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hesterly, 228 U. S. 702, 33 Sup. Ct. 703, 57 L. Ed. 1031; St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 33 Sup. Ct. 651, 57 L. Ed. 1129, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 156; Minnesota Rate Cases, (Argued Dec. 11, 1918. Decided Jan. 13, 1919.) 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, Mr. Justice MCREYNOLDS dissenting. When Hill carried liquor from Kentucky into West Virginia for his personal use he did only what the latter state permitted. Construed as forbidding this action because West Virginia had undertaken to forbid manufacture and sale of intoxicants, the Reed Amendment in no proper sense regulates interstate commerce, but is a direct intermeddling with the state's internal affairs. Whether regarded as reward or punishment for wisdom or folly in enacting limited prohibition, the amendment so construed, I think, goes beyond federal power; and to hold otherwise opens possibilities for partial and sectional legislation which may destroy proper control of their own affairs by the several states. If Congress may deny liquor to those who live in a state simply because its manufacture is not permitted there, why may not this be done for any suggested reason-e. g. because (248 U. S. 457) COON v. KENNEDY. No. 398. COURTS 391(1)-SUPREME COURT JURIS- Decision of the highest state court, denying relief under New Jersey workmen's compensation act for drowning in navigable waters, holding that Act Oct. 6, 1917, § 1 (Comp. St. 1918, § 991 [3]), saving to claimants rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state, was inapplicable, being passed after the accident, and that the rights of parties depended on the maritime laws, held not one allowing review by the national Supreme Court, on writ of error, under Act Sept. 6, 1916, § 2 (Comp. St. § 1214). Mr. James D. Carpenter, Jr., of Jersey City, N. J., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Isidor Kalisch, of Newark, N. J., for defendant in error. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Memorandum opinion by Mr. Justice Mc-| 3. SHIPPING 112 REYNOLDS. This writ of error runs to a judgment of the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey filed March 4, 1918, 103 Atl. 207, denying relief to Rebecca Coon, who *sued to recover under the New Jersey Workmen's Compensation Act (P. L. 1911, p. 134), on account PREVENTION OF CARRIAGE-DUTY TO CARRY BY OTHER VESSEL. Carriage contracted to be done by sailing vessel being prevented by embargo against sailing vessels bound for the war zone, the carrier was not bound to transport by a vessel not subject to the embargo. Certificate from the United States Cir of her husband's death by drowning in the cuit Court of Appeals for the Third Cir navigable waters of that state while employed as a fireman on a tugboat. The court held that as the accident occurred August 4, 1915, the Act of Congress approved October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. L. c. 97, § 1, p. 395 [Comp. St. 1918, § 991, subd. 3]), "saving to claimants the rights and remedies under the workmen's compensation law of any state," was inapplicable, and that under the doctrine announced in Southern Pacific Company v. Jensen, 244 U. S. 205, 37 Sup. Ct. 524, 61 L. Ed. 1086, L. R. A. 1918C, 451, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 900, the rights of the parties depended upon the maritime law of the United States. cuit. Libels by the Vacuum Oil Company and by A. W. Pidwell, respectively, against the sailing vessel Allanwilde; the Allanwilde Transport Corporation, claimant. Decrees for libelants, and cases taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which certifies questions. Questions answered in the affirmative. Messrs. Oscar D. Duncan, Courtland Palmer, and Russell T. Mount, all of New York City, for Allanwilde Corporation. Mr. John C. Prizer, of New York City, for Vacuum Oil Co. and Pidwell. *Mr. Justice MCKENNA delivered the opin libels filed against the Allan wilde to recover prepaid freight for the trans*portation of certain goods and merchandise to designated ports in Europe. There was no decision against the validity of a treaty or statute of or an authority ex-ion of the Court. ercised under the United States, nor in fa- The questions in the cases arise upon vor of the validity of a statute of or an authority exercised under a state challenged because of repugnance to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States. Consequently, under the Act of September 6, 1916 (39 Stat. L. c. 448, § 2, p. 726 [Comp. St. § 1214]), the writ of error was improperly sued out and must be Dismissed. (248 U. S. 377) ALLANWILDE TRANSPORT CORPORA- Nos. 449, 450. The solution of the questions turns upor (1) the asserted prevention of the adventure by a storm at sea which the vessel encountered, requiring her return to port for repairs, and (2) afterwards by the restraining power of the government. On November 1, 1917, the Allanwilde, owned by the Allanwilde Transport Corporation, was seized upon libels filed by the Vacuum Oil Company and A. W. Pidwell, respectively, each of which had shipped certain goods to be carried from New York to Rochefort, France. In May, 1917, the Oil Company chartered the vessel to carry a cargo of oil in barrels at the rate of $16.50 a barrel (changed afterwards to $15.25). 1. SHIPPING 152- PREVENTION OF CAR- The charter party contained inter alia zone. 2. SHIPPING 115 BIAGE-EMBARGO. * Freight to be prepaid net on signing bills of lading in United States gold or equivalent, free of discount, commission, or insurance. Freight earned, retained and irrevocable, vessel lost or not lost." On August 25, the oil having been loaded, the vessel issued a bill of lading containing PREVENTION OF CAR- inter alia the following provision: The condition from embargo laid against sailing vessels bound for the war zone, which would necessarily continue so long as the submarine menace, the cause of its imposition, was so far permanent as to relieve the carrier from further obligation to carry. "All conditions and exceptions of charter party are to be considered as embodied in this bill of lading." Pidwell was permitted to ship certain kegs of nails on the vessel, and on August 15 a bill of lading was issued to him. Inter For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *382 +381 *384 alia it provided that the carrier should not | freight alone, refusing recovery for the other ,be liable for loss, damage, delay or default damages." "by causes beyond the carrier's reasonable control; governments, by by arrest or restraint of princes, rulers, or peoples; prolongation of the voyage. It is provided in paragraph 5 of the bill of lading that: * "Full freight to destination, whether intended to be pre*paid or collected at destination, and all advance charges * are due and payable to (the Allanwilde Transport Corporation) upon the receipt of the goods by the latter and any payment made in respect of the goods shall be deemed fully earned and due and payable to the carrier at any stage before or after loading of the service hereunder without deduction (if unpaid), or refund in whole or in part (if paid), goods or vessel lost or not lost, or if the voyage be broken up. In pursuance of the contracts thus attested the oil and the nails were shipped on the Allanwilde and the freight was paid in advance $49,745.50 for the oil and $3,128.00 for the nails. Upon these facts the Circuit Court of Appeals have certified four questions, two in each libel, as follows: "1. Was the adventure frustrated, and was the contract evidenced by the charter party and by the bill of lading issued to the Oil Company dissolved, so as to relieve the carrier from further obligation to carry the oil? "2. Whatever answer may be given to the first question, did the contract thus evidenced justify the carrier under the facts stated in refusing to refund the prepaid freight? "3. Was the adventure frustrated, and was the contract evidenced by the bill of lading issued to Pidwell dissolved, so as to relieve the carrier from further obligation to carry the nails? "4. Whatever answer may be given to the third question, did the contract thus evidenc ed justify the carrier under the facts stated in refusing to refund the prepaid freight?" A copy of the charter party and copies of the bills of lading are attached to the certificate and also the official bulletin rerusing clearance to "sailing vessels destined to proceed through the war zone." ranging through all of the ways in which contracts can be dissolved or their performance excused by the agreement of the parties or prevented by some supervening cause independent of the parties and dominating their convention. We do not think it is necessary to follow the argument through that range. It may be brought to the narrower compass of the charter party and the bills of lading. The vessel was seaworthy and properly manned and equipped, and set sail Septem- The argument of counsel upon the ele ber 11. After she had been out about 14 | ments of the questions is quite extensive, days and was about 500 miles from New York she encountered a storm so severe that her boats were carried away and she sprang a leak so threatening that the water in her hold was three or four feet deep and was gaining on the pumps. Thereupon the master properly decided that he must seek a port of refuge for safety and repair. Hallfax was about 500 miles away, but in that direction the wind was against him, while it was favorable for New York, and on this account as well as for other good reasons he headed for New York, where he arrived on October 5, having been out 24 days. Re pairs were undertaken at once, the cargo remaining on board meanwhile. "On September 28, while the vessel was at sea, the government decided to refuse clearance thereafter to any sailing vessel bound for the war zone. The master did not know of this condition until the vessel returned to New York; he received no information from the shore after September 11. The repairs being finished, the vessel attempted to resume her voyage, but clearance *was refused, and none could be obtained in spite of her efforts to induce the government to modify its stand. Toward the end of October the shippers were notified by the carrier to unload their goods, and this they did, but under protest and reserving their rights. Afterwards the oil was forwarded by steamship, but at a higher rate of freight and under other charges. What became of the nails after they were unloaded does not appear. "The vessel declined to refund the freight to either shipper, and the libels were filed to recover not only the prepaid freight but also damages for failure to carry. On each libel the District Court entered a decree for the prepaid of [1-3] The physical events and what they determined are certified. First, there was the storm, compelling the return of the ship to New York to avert greater disaster; then the action of the government precluding a second departure. Does the contract the parties provide for such situation and take care of it, and assign its consequences? The charter party provides, as we have seen, that "Freight to be prepaid net on signing bills of lading. Freight earned, retained and irrevocable, vessel lost or not lost." And it is provided that this provision is, with other provisions, “to be embodied" in the bill of lading. They seem necessarily, therefore, deliberately adopted to be the measure of the rights and obligations of shipper and carrier. Let us repeat: the explicit declaration is "Freight to be prepaid net on signing bills of lading. * Freight earned, retained and irrevocable, vessel lost or not lost." The provision was not idle or accidental. It is easy to make a charge of injustice against it if we consider only the defeat of the voyage and the noncarriage of the cargo. But there are opposing considerations. There were * expected hazards and contingencies in the adventure, and we must presume that the contract was framed in foresight of both and in provision for both. We cannot step in with another and different accommoda (248 U. S. 387) THE GRACIE D. CHAMBERS. INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO. v. THE GRACIE D. CHAMBERS. 13, 1919.) No. 479. 152-PEVENTION OF CARRIAGE— RETENTION OF FREIGHT-CONTRACT. That the vessel did not break ground for the voyage, an embargo being laid, did not prevent retention of prepaid freight, bill of lading providing for its payment on shipment of goods, and right to retain it; carriage being prevented by causes beyond carrier's control. tion. It is urged, however, that there is no (Argued Dec. 12 and 13, 1918. Decided Jan. provision in the contract (charter party and bill of lading) of the Oil Company excepting "restraints of princes, rulers and peoples" and that, therefore, the carrier was *not relieved from its obligation by the refusal of SHIPPING clearance to sailing vessels. And it is further urged that such embargo was at most but a temporary impediment and the cargo should have been retained until the impediment was removed or transported in a vessel not subject to it. We cannot concur in either contention. The duration was of indefinite extent. Necessarily, the embargo would be continued as long as the cause of its imposition-that is, the submarine menace and that, as far as then could be inferred, would be the duration of the war, Libel by the International Paper Comof which there could be no estimate or re- pany against the schooner Gracie D. Chamliable speculation. The condition was, there-bers; Florence G. Payne, claimant. Judg fore, so far permanent as naturally and jus- ment for libelant was reversed by the Cir tifiably to determine business judgment and cuit Court of Appeals (253 Fed. 182), and action depending upon it. libelant brings certiorari. Affirmed. The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, 244 U. S. 12, 37 Sup. Ct. 490, 61 L. Ed. 960. There is no imputation of bad faith. The carrier demonstrated an appreciation of its obligations and undertook their discharge. It was stopped, first by storm, and then prevented by the interdiction of the government. In neither situation was it inactive. It quickly repaired the effects of the former and protested against the latter, joining with the shipper in an earnest effort for its relaxation. It gave up only when the impediment was found to be insurmountable. The answer to the other contention is that the contract regarded the Allanwilde, a sailing ship, not some other kind of ship or means. The Tornado, 108 U. S. 342, 2 Sup. Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed. 747; The Kronprinzessin Cecilie, supra. The bill of lading in No. 450 is even more circumstantial. It provided that "Full freight to destination, whether intended to be prepaid or collect at destination * shall be deemed fully earned and due and payable to the carrier at any stage before or after loading of the service hereunder, without deduction (if unpaid) or refund in whole or in part (if paid), goods or vessel lost or not lost, or if the voyage be broken up." And there is exemption *from liability "for any loss, damage, delay or default by arrest or restraint of government, princes, rulers, or peoples. The questions certified are therefore answered in the affirmative. So ordered. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Mr. William C. Cannon, of New York City, for petitioner. Mr. Robinson Leech, of New York City, for respondent. Mr. Justice MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court. Libel in admiralty on the schooner Gracie D. Chambers, her tackle, etc., to recover the sum of $5,845 prepaid freight on a cargo of paper loaded on the schooner for shipment from New York to Bordeaux, France, by the International Paper Company. Judgment went for libelant in the District Court. It was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals by a divided court (253 Fed. 182). To this action this writ is directed. The facts as found by the Circuit Court of Appeals are as follows: "September 14, 1917, the schooner Gracie D. Chambers began to load a general cargo in the port of New York, *to be delivered at Bordeaux. Between September 27 and 29 the libelant Paper Company shipped 120 tons of print paper. "September 28, at 4:25 p. m., the Treasury Department at Washington telegraphed the collector at the port of New York to withhold clearance of all sailing vessels, any part of whose voyages would bring them within the danger zone. There was no official publication of this embargo, but it was put into effect beginning September 29, by the refusal of clearance to such vessels as they applied for them. Both the shippers and the shipowners had heard rumors of the embargo as early as October 1. "October 3 the schooner moved out to an anchorage at the Red Hook Plats, to save wharfage charges and to await clearance. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *387 *391 068* *392 "October 4 the freight was paid against de- | proclamation, for exportation, carrier could livery of the bill of lading. retain prepaid freight under contract, declaring it is to be considered as earned on shipment of goods, and is to be retained by vessel's owners if there be a forced interruption or abandonment of voyage, and exempting carrier from loss by restraint of princes, rulers, and peoples. "October 5 the master applied to the collector for clearance, which was refused. He then applied to the authorities at Washington to except this schooner from the embargo, on the ground that she had begun to load before the order was made. Refusal to allow an exception in her favor was not definitely and finally made until October 10. Subsequently the cargo was discharged and the owners refused to return the prepaid freight. "The bill of lading contained the following provisions: "Restraints of princes and rulers excepted.' "Freight for the said goods to be prepaid in full without discount retained and irrevocably, ship and/or cargo lost or not lost.'" The case was submitted with Nos. 449 and 450, 248 U. S. 377, 39 Sup. Ct. 147, 63 L. Ed. 312, and its primary question is, as there, the sufficiency of the clauses in the bill of lading as a defense. In those cases we decided that the bill of lading expressed the contract of the parties and hence deternined their rights and liabilities. And it is the safer reliance, the accommodation of all the circumstances that induced it. It was for the parties to consider them and to accept their estimate is not to do injustice but accord to each the due of the law determined by their own judgment and convention, which represented, we may suppose, what there was of advantage or disadvantage as well in the rates as in the risks. It is asserted, however, that the vessel in this case did not break ground and that this fact distinguishes the case from Nos. 449 and 450. The fact does not deflect the principle of those cases. It was not made to depend upon the fact of breaking ground, but upon the bills of lading which provided for the payment of freight upon the shipment of the goods and the right to retain it though the goods were not carried, their carriage being prevented by causes beyond the control of the carrier. Therefore, upon the authority of those cases, the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case is affirmed. So ordered. (248 U. S. 392) THE BRIS. STANDARD VARNISH WORKS ▼. THE BRIS. On Certificate from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Libel by the Standard Varnish Works against the Steamship Bris; Rederiaktiebolaget, claimant. Judgment for libelant, and case taken to Circuit Court of Appeals, which certifies questions (254 Fed. 987) Questions answered in the affirmative. Messrs. Julius J. Frank and Everett F. Wheeler, both of New York City, for Standard Varnish Works. Mr. Clarence Bishop Smith, of New York City, for The Bris. *Mr. Justice MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court. This case was submitted with Nos. 449 and 450, 248 U. S. 377, 39 Sup. Ct. 147, 63 L. Ed. 312, and No. 479, 248 U. S. 387, 39 Sup. Ct. 149, 63 L. Ed. 318, being a suit in admiralty, as they were, to recover prepaid freight upon a shipment of articles of merchandise which were not carried to destination, the carriage having been prevented by action of the government. Judgment was rendered for libelant and the case taken to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The case is here on certificate from that court (254 Fed.987). induced, as the court recites, by its decision in the case of International Paper Co. v. The Schooner Gracie D. Chambers (No. 479), to review which a certiorari has been granted by this court. The facts as certified are these: libelant was shipped by it in the port of New "On August 17, 1917, varnish belonging to York for Gothenburg, Sweden, upon the steamship Bris, consigned to the Allmanna Svenska Elektriska A. B. Westeras, and the agents for said ship thereupon delivered to libelant a bill of lading, of which a copy is annexed hereto, which formed a contract between libelant and claimant in reference to said goods. Particular reference is made to clause 6, clause 7 and the next to last clause of the bill of lading. The libelant paid in advance the freight mentioned in said bill of lading. At the time of said shipment, shippers were required to obtain export licenses from the British government on cargo of this class, and were also required by (Argued Dec. 13, 1918. Decided Jan. 13, 1919.) the United States Statutes to obtain export No. 745. licenses from the United States government in connection with such articles as the President should, by proclamation, designate. At the SHIPPING 152-PREVENTION OF CARRIAGE- time that said shipment was made the Presi-, RETENTION OF FREIGHT-CONTRACT. dent had designated certain articles as to which Vessel being prevented from carrying ship-licenses must be thus procured when destined ment of varnish to war zone by failure of ship- for Gothenburg, Sweden, but varnish was not per to procure license, required by President's included among them. At the time of shipment, For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *396 *397 |