"to protect" them in that right. This meant that they were to receive a clear title. The act charged the Secretary of the Interior with the duty of adopting appropriate measures to that end, and when other means failed he invoked the aid of the Attorney General, who brought these suits. Through them the United States seeks to fulfill its obligation under the act to the settlers, and in this it has the requisite interest or concern.

take notice of the occupancy of the settlers, and this, with the act of 1887, which was a public law, renders untenable the claim that those who hold the title under the patents have the status of bona fide purchasers. In these circumstances the settlers, whose claims come within the proviso in section 2 and the latter part of section 6, are entitled to have a trust in their favor declared and enforced.

[4, 5] When the United States sues to en- [7] The situation as to the 80 acres which force a public right or to protect a public were both patented and sold before the act interest the defense of laches is not availa- of 1887 was passed is not the same. Under ble; but when the suit, although in the name an express provision of the act of 1871 they of the United States, is brought for the ben- were withdrawn from entry and sale while efit of a private person his laches may be they were yet vacant and unclaimed, and the interposed with like effect as if he were su- withdrawal was still in force in 1885, when ing. United States v. Beebe, supra. Apply they were patented. No valid claim to them ing this view, the court below reached the could be initiated by settlement or otherwise conclusion that the settlers had been guilty in the presence of the withdrawal. Hamblin of such laches as would bar them from the v. Western Land Co., 147 U. S. 531, 536, 13 relief sought. We are unable to concur in Sup. Ct. 353, 37 L. Ed. 237; Wood v. Beach, that conclusion. The occupancy of the set- 156 U. S. 548, 15 Sup. Ct. 410, 39 L. Ed. 528; tlers was both peaceable and continuous and Spencer v. McDougal, 159 U. S. 62, 15 Sup. gave notice of their equitable rights. Their Ct. 1026, 40 L. Ed. 76. They were part of claims were asserted before the land depart- an odd-numbered section within the primary ment, were the subjects of hearings and ap- limits and opposite a 20-mile section of the peals, and were by it sustained. The land road which was constructed, completed, put officers, conformably to the published regu- in running order and accepted by the Presilations, undertook to secure a restoration of dent before they were patented. In other the outstanding title, and to that end the words, they were lawfully patented and suit of 1901 was brought. The settlers were when the company sold them, in 1886, it had justified in believing that their rights were the right to do so. The purpose of the grantbeing protected, as was required by the acting act in directing that patents be issued of 1887. No attempt was made to disturb as each section of twenty miles of road was their occupancy or to assert any right completed was to enable the company to sell against them. We therefore think it proper- the lands and realize on the grant. In these ly cannot be said that they were guilty of circumstances the purchase was bona fide any such laches as precluded them from ob- and the purchaser took the full title. It taining relief in equity. As a general rule, follows that before the act of 1887 was one who is in peaceable possession under an passed the 80 acres described as the S. 1⁄2 equitable claim does not subject himself to of N. W. 4 of section 3, township 3 N.,

ing to equity to establish his claim against the holder of the legal title where the latter manifests no purpose to disturb him or to question his claim. Ruckman v. Cory, 129 U. S. 387, 389-390, 9 Sup. Ct. 316, 32 L. Ed. 728. We think that rule is applicable here.

a charge of laches for mere delay in resort-range 7 W., L. M.-had passed into hands where they were not within the reach of the act or the company's acceptance. The fact that this land was sold before the *act was passed seems not to have been brought to the attention of the land department-probably because the purchaser was not a party to the contest proceedings.

[6] On the merits, we are of opinion that the act of 1887, as accepted by the company, operated to exclude from the grant and to subject to these settlement claims all the lands in controversy, patented and unpatented, save the 80 acres which are yet to be specially noticed. In so far as these lands were patented it became the duty of the railway company to surrender the title, and in so far as they were unpatented the act forbade the issue of patents to the company for W. 4 of section 3, township 3 N., range 7 them. Intending purchasers were bound to | W., L. M., and reversed as to the other lands.

The contention is made that the portions of that act which are material here do not embrace lands within the indemnity limits, but only those within the primary limits. A survey of the entire act shows that the contention is without merit.

No. 164. Decree reversed.
No. 165. Decree reversed.

No. 166. Decree affirmed as to S. 1⁄2 of N.

*521

(248 U. S. 521)

and telegraphed to Manila for "immediate OELWERKE TEUTONIA v. ERLANGER & assistance for saving crew." Help was sent GALINGER. at once and on the 13th the captain and crew went to Hong Kong on a mail steamer that stopped for them, the captain preferring to take that course rather than

Nos. 162, 181.

1. SALVAGE SALVAGE.

(Submitted Jan. 20, 1919. Decided Feb. 3, to go to Manila by a coast guard cutter that 1919.) had been sent to the wreck. On May 14 the plaintiffs chartered a cutter, and took possession of the Nippon on the 17th. Shortly after this the work of salvage was begun. It was finished in July when the vessel, the claim for which has been paid, and a great part of the cargo were saved.

OF

Appeals to the Supreme Court concerning the amount of allowance for salvage are not encouraged, unless there has been some violation of principle or clear mistake. 2. SALVAGE

There were protests on behalf of interested parties after the plaintiffs had started and it is denied that the vessel was abandoned.

But all the earliest communications and circumstances indicate that the only hope when the chief officer left the ship was to save the lives of those left on board, and that there was no greater expectation when the captain was taken off. It is unnecessary to say more Appeals from the Supreme Court of the about the evidence than that it shows no Philippine Islands.

ground for departing from the usual rule when two courts have agreed about the facts. As the only point of difference with regard to them concerns the amount of salvage allowed, that is the only question upon which we shall say a word.

ERLANGER & GALINGER v. OELWERKE
TEUTONIA.

51-APPEAL-AMOUNT

26-RECOVERY-EXPENSES.

While the necessary work and danger are matters to be considered in determining the share of salvors in the benefit resulting from their work, they having undertaken it without contract or request, the cost is their own affair.

Suit by Erlanger & Galinger against Oelwerke Teutonia. Award to plaintiffs was reduced by the Supreme Court of the Philip pine Islands, and both parties appeal. Affirmed.

Mr. Harry W. Van Dyke, of Washington,

D. C., for Oelwerke Teutonia.

[1, 2] Unless there has been some violation

of principle or clear mistake, appeals to this
Court concerning the amount of the allow-
ance are not encouraged. Hobart v. Drogan,
10 Pet. 108, 119, 9 L. Ed. 363; Post v. Jones,
19 How. 150, 160, 15 L. Ed. 618. The plain-
tiff's complain that their expenses were not
taken into account or were not given suffi-
cient consideration. But, as was pointed out
by the Court below, the *cost was their affair.
There was no contract and no request. They
went into a speculation and their only claim
is a lien upon goods that they have rescued
for a share in the saving that they have made
for the owners. The right to share in a bene-
fit that is the result of their work is the only
ground upon which the plaintiffs can stand.
Of course, within that limit the necessary
work and the danger are matters to be con-
sidered. Here the danger might have been
great but it was not, and the work seems to
deserve neither much praise nor much blame.
There was more of commercial speculation
and less of help not to be found elsewhere
than is usual in salvage cases, and we are
not prepared to say that the Supreme Court
ought to have allowed more. We are equally
unprepared to say that it should have allow-
ed less. The services were rendered right-
fully and were fairly efficient. Neither side
would be likely to inspire enthusiasm and
both justly may be left where they were left
by the Court below.
Decree affirmed.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

Mr. F. C. Fisher, of Manila, P. I., for Erlanger & Galinger.

*Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

These are cross appeals from a judgment on a complaint for salvage of cargo brought by Erlanger & Galinger to which the defendant, Oelwerke Teutonia, answered denying the services and setting up a counterclaim for damages alleged to have been caused by the negligence and incompetence of the plaintiffs. The Court of First Instance found for the plaintiffs and awarded to them one-half of the net proceeds of the property saved. On appeal the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, while otherwise confirming the findings of the Court of First Instance, reduced the award to forty per cent. of the main part of the cargo, which was copra, and to twenty per cent. of a small item of agar agar which does not need further mention. We assume that the plaintiffs receive a corresponding proportion of the interest accruing upon the fund. The main facts are these. The steamship Nippon, loaded principally with copra, went aground on Scarborough Reef, 120 or 130 miles from Luzon, in the afternoon of May 8, 1913. The next day the chief officer and nine of the crew were sent off in the only seaworthy small boat in search of help and on the twelfth reached Santa Cruz, Luzon,

*526

bring the case here. It presents another attempt to accomplish, by a change in form, what in Wright v. Central of Georgia Ry. Co., 236 U. S. 674, 35 Sup. Ct. 471, 59 L. Ed.

(Argued Jan. 21, 1919. Decided Feb. 3, 1919.) 781, was held to be an unconstitutional result.

No. 163.

[1, 2] In that decision it was explained how the Central of Georgia Railway Company had I become the holder of leases from the Augusta & Savannah and the Southwestern Railroad of property which by the charters of the lessors was to be taxed only in a certain An attempt way and to a certain amount. had been made to tax the lessee for the property, the leases being for one hundred and one years, renewable in like periods upon the same terms forever. The tax was laid & upon the real estate, road *bed, and franchise! value, (with a certain deduction,) of the two lessors. It was held that the statutes made the fee exempt from other taxation than that provided for, in favor as well of the lessee as of the lessor. The taxes now attempted to be levied are upon the leasehold interests

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of the lessee in the same roads and it is arguof Georgia.

ed that, if the leases produce a profit in excess of the rental, the value is required to be taxed by the Constitution of the State. But the Constitution was subsequent to the charters that created the exemption and must yield to them if they apply to the present attempt. We are of opinion that although the decision in the former case necessarily was confined to the question before the Court, the reasoning applies with equal force to that now before us. The cases of Rochester Ry. Co. v. Rochester, 205 U. S. 236, 27 Sup. Ct. 469, 51 L. Ed. 784, and Jetton v. University of the South, 208 U. S. 489, 28 Sup. Ct. 375, 52 L. Ed. 584, were urged as opposed to the conclusion reached but were thought not to control in view of the exceptional facts and language that had to be considered, as was

|

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion recognized in Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. of the Court. Baird, 239 U. S. 126, 132, 36 Sup. Ct. 28, 60 L. Ed. 177. We must follow the precedent that was established after full discussion and with recognition of the difficulties involved.

(248 U. S. 525)

CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RY. CO. v.
WRIGHT, Comptroller General
of Georgia.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 138-IMPAIRING CONTRACT OBLIGATION-CORPORATE CHARTER-EXEMPTION FROM

TAXATION-STATE

CONSTITUTION.

The Constitution of a state, being subsequent to the charters of a railroad that created an exemption from taxation, must yield to them. 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 137-IMPAIRING CONTRACT OBLIGATION-TAXATION-EFFECT OF LEASE.

The charter of a railroad company, making its property taxable only in a certain way and to a certain amount, held to prevent additional taxation of the leasehold of its lessee of such property.

Suit by the Central of Georgia Railway Company against William A. Wright, Comptroller General of the State of Georgia. De cree for complainant was reversed by the Supreme Court of Georgia (146 Ga. 406, 91 S. E. 471), and complainant brings error. Reversed.

On reargument, decree affirmed, 250 U. S 40 Sup. Ct. 1, 64 L. Ed.

――.

*Messrs. A. R. Lawton and T. M. Cunning. ham, Jr., both of Savannah, Ga., for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Samuel H. Sibley, of Union, Ga., and John C. Hart, of Atlanta, Ga., for de fendant in error.

This is a bill in equity brought by the Railway Company to prevent the collection of certain taxes, which, it is alleged, would be contrary to Article 1, § 10, and to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The case was heard on bill, demurrer and answer and certain agreed facts, and the Court of first instance issued an injunction as prayed. The decree was reversed however by the Supreme Court of Georgia and a writ of error was taken out to

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

The charter contracts in question are of a kind that goes back to the time when railroads were barely beginning and that would not be likely to be repeated, but of course will be carried out by the State according to what was meant when they were made. Decree reversed.

MEMORANDUM DECISIONS

DISPOSED OF AT OCTOBER TERM, 1918

(248 U. S. 595)

Circuit denied.

(248 U. S. 585)

No. 150. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COM- No. 783. Olof N. TEVANDER et al., petiPANY, petitioner, v. CALIFORNIA ADJUST- tioners, v. Eleanor M. RUYSDAEL. Jan. 13, MENT COMPANY. Jan. 13, 1919. On writ 1919. For opinion below, see 253 Fed. 918. of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. For opinion | States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh below, see 237 Fed. 954, 150 C. C. A. 604, which affirms, California Adjustment Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 226 Fed. 349. Mr. C. W. Durbrow, of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner. Mr. Leon E. Morris, of San Francisco, Cal., for respondent. Dismissed with costs, on motion of counsel for the petitioner.

(248 U. S. 547)

No. 287. FEDERAL GAS & FUEL COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, OHIO: Jan. 13, 1919. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Ohio. For opinion below, see 96 Ohio St. 530, 118 N. E. 103. Mr. Henry A. Williams, of Columbus, Ohio, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Henry L. Scarlett, of Columbus, Ohio, for defendant in error.

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Consolidated Turnpike Co. v. Norfolk & O. V. R. Co., 228 U. S. 596, 599, 33 Sup. Ct. 605, 57 L. Ed. 982; Municipal Securities Corporation v. Kansas City, 246 U. S. 63, 69, 38 Sup. Ct. 224, 62 L. Ed. 579; Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern Realty Co., 244 U. S. 300, 304, 37 Sup. Ct. 643, 61 L. Ed. 1153; Bilby et al. v. Stewart, 246 U. S. 255, 257, 38 Sup. Ct. 264, 62 L. Ed. 701.

(248 U. S. 585) No. 785. Sarah BRESSLER, petitioner, v. Mary C. LUDWIG and Henry W. Ludwig. Jan. 13, 1919. For opinion below, see Ludwig v. Bressler, 253 Fed. 8. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied.

No. 157. Maggie L. LUKENS, plaintiff in error, v. INTERNATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY. Jan. 16, 1919. In error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. For opinion below, see 269 Mo. 574, 191 S. W. 418. Mr. William C. Scarritt, of Kansas City, Mo., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Fred A. Boxley, of Kansas City, Mo., for defendant in error. Dismissed, per stipulation.

(248 U. S. 550) No. 182. J. D. BOXLEY, plaintiff in error, v. E. M. SCOTT and Franklin Chaney. Jan. In error to the Supreme Court of 27, 1919. the State of Oklahoma. For opinion below, see 162 Pac. 688. Mr. Harry H. Rogers, of Tulsa, Okl., for plaintiff in error.

(248 U. S. 586)

No. 780. Michael PEYSER, petitioner, v. Elizabeth J. GRAUTEN. Jan. 20, 1919. For opinion below, see 254 Fed. 688. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. § 1214).

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156), as amended by the act of September 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St