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by the treaty of 1898 and other treaties of the United States. A good illustration of a case of this character is found in Vilas v. Manila, 220 U. S. 345, 31 Sup. Ct. 416, 55 L. Ed. 491, where certain claims were made against the city of Manila, which it was contended survived, notwithstanding the cession to the United States. A writ of error was sued out to a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denying relief because of its holding that the municipality of Manila after the treaty was a totally different corporate entity and in nowise liable for debts created under the Spanish sovereignty. Exception was taken to the jurisdiction, but this court held that the case involved the treaty of 1898, as the question was made to turn in the court below upon the consequence of the change of sovereignty and the reincorporation of the city after the substituted sovereignty. Mr. Justice Lurton, who delivered the opinion of the court, said:

Certainly the treaty, in providing that property rights of this class should be respected, did not intend to prevent the consideration by the courts of the nature and extent of the rights granted, or prohibit the application of laws for the enforcement and regulation of such property rights when not in derogation thereof. Philippine Act 666, § 14, Comp. of the Acts of the Philippine Com. § 68, itself provides that certificates issued under the Spanish-sovereignty, unannulled under the royal decree of 1888, shall be conclusive evidence of the exclusive right of ownership of such trademarks or trade-names.

Reliance is had by appellant, to sustain the jurisdiction, on the decision of this court in Ubeda v. Zialcita, 226 U. S. 452, 33 Sup. Ct. 165, 57 L. Ed. 296. There suit was brought upon a trade-mark registered *under the Spanish régime. The record shows that the appeal was allowed upon two grounds: (1) That the amount involved exceeded $25,000; "This disposes of the question of the jurisdic- (2) alleged violation of treaty rights in the tion of this court grounded upon the absence decision that the trade-mark being itself an from the petition of the plaintiffs of any dis-imitation of earlier trade-marks prevented tinct claim under the treaty of Paris, since un- an injunction in favor of its owner. As to der section 10 of the Philippine Organic Act of July 1, 1902, this court is given jurisdiction to review any final decree or judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands where any treaty of the United States 'is involved.' That treaty was necessarily involved,' since

neither the court below nor this court can deter

mine the continuity of the municipality nor the liability of the city as it now exists for the obligations of the old city, without considering the effect of the change of sovereignty resulting from that treaty. See Reavis v. Fianza, 215 U. S. 16, 22 [30 Sup. Ct. 1, 54 L. Ed. 72].”

In this case no such question is presented. The decision involved no consideration of treaty rights, nor were the same discussed in the judgment in the court below. The Philippine Supreme Court in determining the issues, held that the name "Isabela," which appellees were charged with using, was a geographical and descriptive term and incapable of registration as a trade-mark either under the Philippine Act No. 666 (Pub. Laws 1902-1903), or the law as it existed under the Spanish régime; that the Spanish trade-name as registered consisted of the words "La Flor de la Isabela" and the trademark of a shield with certain devices thereon. That the action was not for the infringement of the trade-name "La Flor de la Isabela," but was for the violation of the trade-name "Isabela." And that unfair competition was not shown.

the treaty claim this court said (226 U. S. 454, 33 Sup. Ct. 166 [57 L. Ed. 296]):

9.

"In such a case [the wrongful appropriation of an earlier mark] the Philippine Act denies the plaintiff's right to recover. Act No. 666, § See section 12, and No. 744, § 4. It is said that to apply the rule there laid down would be giving a retrospective effect to section 9 as against the alleged Spanish grant of December 16, 1898, to the plaintiff, contrary to the general principles of interpretation and to article 13 of the Treaty of Paris, of April 11, 1899, providing that the rights of property secured by copyrights and patents shall continue to be respected. But the treaty, if applicable, to contravene the cannot be supposed principle of section 9, which only codifies common morality and fairness. The section is not

retrospective in any sense, for it introduces no

new rule."

Certainly, this was far from holding that a right of appeal existed because a right se cured by the treaty was involved.

The present case was decided upon grounds entirely compatible with continued respect for the trade-mark and trade-name rights granted by the Spanish sovereignty. It results that in the sense of the statute, giving a right to review in this court, no treaty of the United States was involved in the decree which it is sought to reverse. The appeal must be Dismissed.

(249 U. S. 152)

Wer, and dissenting employé has no other remedy MIDDLETON v. TEXAS POWER & LIGHT than withdrawing from the employment.

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2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245 MASTER AND SERVANT 347-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS. The Texas Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 33d Leg. c. 179 [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz]) does not deny the equal protection of the laws, in that it excludes from operation of the act domestic servants, farm laborers, employés of railroad carrier, laborers working cotton gin, and employés of persons, etc., employing no more than five; there being sufficient reasons as to each class for their exclusion.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW NATION-PRESUMPTION.

48-DISCRIMI

There is a strong presumption that a Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds.

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EQUAL

4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 209
PROTECTION CLAUSE-CONSTRUCTION.
The equal protection clause of the federal
Constitution does not require that state laws
shall cover the entire field of proper legislation
in a single enactment.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 48
OF ACTS-BURDEN OF PROOF.

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In Error to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas.

Action by Charlie Middleton against the Texas Power & Light Company. From a judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas (188 S. W. 276), affirming on rehear ing, after answer to certified questions (108 Tex. 96, 185 S. W. 556), a judgment dismissing the action, which judgment had been previously reversed (178 S. W. 956), plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Mr. Charles B. Braun, of Waco, Tex., for plaintiff in error.

Messrs. Harry P. Lawther and Alexander Pope, both of Dallas, Tex., for defendant in

error.

Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.

Alleging that in the month of December, 1913, he was in the employ of the Texas Power & Light Company in the *state of Texas, and while so employed received VALIDITY serious personal injuries through the bursting of a steam pipe due to the negligence of his

The burden is on him who attacks a law for employer and its agents, Middleton sued the unconstitutionality.

6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245 EQUAL PROTECTION-TEXAS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT.

The Texas Workmen's Compensation Act

(Acts 33d Leg. c. 179 [Vernon's Sayles' Ann.

Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz]) does not deny the equal protection of the laws, in that discrimination results from operation of act as between employés of different employers engaged in the same work, where one employer becomes a subscriber and another does not.

245

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
EQUAL
PROTECTION-TEXAS WORKMEN'S COMPENSA-
TION ACT.

The Texas Workmen's Compensation Act (Acts 33d Leg. c. 179 [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz]) does not deny the equal protection of laws, because option to become a subscriber rests with employ

company in a district court of that state to recover his damages. The defendant interposed an answer in the nature of a plea in abatement setting up that at the time of the accident and at the commencement of the ac

tion defendant was the holder of a policy of liability and compensation insurance, issued in its favor by a company lawfully transacting such business in the state, conditioned to pay the compensation provided by the Texas Workmen's Compensation Act, which was approved April 16, 1913, and took effect on the 1st day of September in that year (chapter 179, Acts of 33d Legislature, [Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, arts. 5246h-5246zzzz]) of which fact the plaintiff had proper and timely notice as provided by the act; and that no claim for the compensation provided in the act with respect to the alleged injury had been made by plaintiff,

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

#153

but on the contrary he had refused to receive [suits for damages based on negligence for such compensation, with other matters suffi- injuries to employés or for death resulting cient to bring defendant within the protection | therefrom, and are deprived of the so-called of the act. Plaintiff took a special exception "common-law defenses" of fellow servant's in the nature of a demurrer, upon the negligence and assumed risk, and also of ground (among others) that the act was in contributory *negligence as an absolute deconflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to fense, it being provided that for contributhe Constitution of the United States. The tory negligence damages shall be diminished exception was overruled, the plea in abate except where the employer's violation of a ment sustained, and the action dismissed. On statute enacted for the safety of employés appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals it was contributes to the injury or death; but that at first held that the judgment must be revers- where the injury is caused by the willful ed (178 S. W. 956); but upon an application | intention of the employé to bring it about for a rehearing the constitutional questions the employer may defend on that ground. were certified to the Supreme Court of the Every employer becoming a subscriber to the state. That court sustained the constitution- insurance association is required to give ality of the law (108 Tex. 96, 185 S. W. 556); written or printed notice to all his employés and in obedience to its opinion the Court of that he has provided for the payment by the Civil Appeals set aside its former judgment association of compensation for injuries reand affirmed the judgment of the district ceived by them in the course of their employcourt. Thereupon the present writ of error ment. Under certain conditions an employer was sued out under section 237, Judicial Code holding a liability policy issued by an insur(Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1156), ance company lawfully transacting such as amended by Act of September 6, 1916, c. business within the state is to be deemed a 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). subscriber within the meaning of the act. *Thus we have presented, from the stand- There are administrative provisions, includpoint of an objecting employé, the questioning procedure for the determination of diswhether the Texas Employers' Liability Act is in conflict with the due process and equal protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.

puted claims. By section 2 of part 1 (Vernon's Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1914, art. 5246hh) it is enacted as follows:

"The provisions of this act shall not apply to actions to recover damages for the personal injuries or for death resulting from personal injuries sustained by domestic servants, farm laborers, nor to the employés of any person, firm or corporation operating any railway as a working for a cotton gin, nor to employés of common carrier, nor to laborers engaged in any person, firm or corporation having in his or their employ not more than five employés."

Following the order adopted in the argument of plaintiff in error, we deal first with the contention that the act amounts to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. This is based in part upon the classification resulting from the provisions of the section

The act creates an employers' Insurance association, to which any employer of labor in the state, with exceptions to be mentioned, may become a subscriber; and out of the funds of this association, derived from premiums on policies of liability insurance issued by it to subscribing members and assessments authorized against them if necessary, the compensation provided by the act as due on account of personal injuries sustained by their employés, or on account of death resulting from such injuries, is to be paid. This is a stated compensation, fixed with relation to the employé's average weekly wages, and accrues to him absolutely when he suffers a personal injury in the course of his employ- | just quoted, it being said that employés of ment incapacitating him from earning wages for as long a period as one week, or to his representatives or beneficiaries in the event of his death from such injury, whether or not it be due to the negligence of the employer or his servants or agents. Such compensation is the statutory substitute for damages otherwise recoverable because of injuries suffered by an employé, or his death occasioned by such injuries, when due to the negligence of the employer or his servants; it being declared that the employé of a subscrib- | ing employer, or his representatives or beneficiaries in case of his death, shall have no cause of action against the employer for damages except where a death is caused by the willful act or omission or gross negligence of the employer. Employers who do not become subscribers are subject as before to

the excepted classes are left entitled to cer-
tain privileges which by the act are denied
to employés of the non-excepted classes, with-
out reasonable basis for the distinction.
[1] Of course plaintiff in error, not being an
employé in *any of the excepted classes, would
not be heard to assert any grievance they
might have by reason of being excluded from
the operation of the act. Southern Ry. Co. v.
King, 217 U. S. 524, 534, 30 Sup. Ct. 594, 54
L. Ed. 868; Standard Stock Food Co. v.
Wright, 225 U. S. 540, 550, 32 Sup. Ct. 784,
56 L. Ed. 1197; Rosenthal v. New York, 226
U. S. 260, 271, 33 Sup. Ct. 27, 57 L. Ed. 212,
Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71; Plymouth Coal Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531, 544, 34 Sup. Ct.
359, 58 L. Ed. 713; Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg,
235 U. S. 571, 576, 35 Sup. Ct. 167, 59 L. Ed.
364. But plaintiff in error sets up a griev-

157

158

ance as a member of a class to which the act in its reach (New York Central R. R. Co. v. is made to apply.

[2] However, we are clear that the classification cannot be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. The Supreme Court of Texas in sustaining it said (108 Tex. 110, 111, 185 S. W. 561):

"Employés of railroads, those of employers having less than five employés, domestic servants, farm laborers and gin laborers are excluded from the operation of the act, but this was doubtless for reasons that the Legislature deemed sufficient. The nature of these several employments, the existence of other laws governing liability for injuries to railroad employés, known experience as to the hazards and extent of accidental injuries to farm hands, gin hands and domestic servants, were all matters no doubt considered by the Legislature in exempting them from the operation of the act. Distinctions in these and other respects between them and employés engaged in other industrial pursuits may, we think, be readily suggested. We are not justified in saying that the classification was purely arbitrary."

[3, 4] There is a strong presumption that a Legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience, and that its discriminations are based upon adequate grounds. The equal protection clause does not require that state laws shall cover the entire field of proper legislation in a single enactment. If one entertained the view that the act might as well have been extended to other classes of employment, this would not *amount to a constitutional objection. Rosenthal V. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 271, 33 Sup. Ct. 27, 57 L.

Ed. 212, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144, 34 Sup. Ct. 281, 58 L. Ed. 539; Missouri, Kan. & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U. S. 642, 649, 650, 34 Sup.

Ct. 678, 58 L. Ed. 1135; International Har

vester Co. v. Missouri, 234 U. S. 199, 215, 34 Sup. Ct. 859, 58 L. Ed. 1276, 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 525; Keokee Coke Co. v. Taylor, 234 U. S. 224, 227, 34 Sup. Ct. 856, 58 L. Ed. 1288; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 384, 35 Sup. Ct. 342, 59 L. Ed. 628, L. R. A. 1915F, 829.

[5] The burden being upon him who at tacks a law for unconstitutionality, the courts need not be ingenious in searching for grounds of distinction to sustain a classification that may be subjected to criticism. But in this case adequate grounds are easily discerned. As to the exclusion of railroad employés, the existence of the federal Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, c. 149, 35 Stat. 65 (Comp. St. §§ 8657-8665), as amended by act April 5, 1910, c. 143, 36 Stat. 291, applying exclusively as to employés of common carriers by rail injured while employed in interstate commerce, establishing liability for negligence and exempting from liability in the absence of negligence in all cases with

Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. 546, 61 L. Ed. 1045, L. R. A. 1918C, 439, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139; Erie R. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 170, 37 Sup. Ct. 556, 61 L. Ed. 1057, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 662), and the difficulty that so often arises in determining in particular instances whether the employé was employed in interstate commerce at the time of the injury (see Pedersen v. Del., Lack. & West. R. R., 229 U. S. 146, 151, 152, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 57 L. Ed. 1125, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 153; North Carolina R. R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248, 259, 260, 34 Sup. Ct. 305, 58 L. Ed. 591, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 159; Illinois Central R. R. v. Behrens, 233 U. S. 473, 478, 34 Sup. Ct. 646, 58 L. Ed. 1051, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 163; New York Central R. R. Co. v. Carr, 238 U. S. 260, 263. 35 Sup. Ct. 780, 59 L. Ed. 1298; Pennsylvania Co. v. Donat, 239 U. S. 50, 36 Sup. Ct. 4, 60 L. Ed. 139; Shanks v. Del., Lack. & West. R. R., 239 U. S. 556, 559, 36 Sup. Ct. 188, 60 L. Ed. 436, L. R. A. 1916C, 797; Louisville & Nash. R. R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U. S. 13, 37 Sup. Ct. 4, 61 L. Ed. 119; Erie R. R. Co. v. Welsh, 242 U. s. 303, 306, 37 Sup. Ct. 116, 61 L. Ed. 319; Southern Ry. Co. v. Puckett, 244 U. S. 571, 573, 37 Sup. Ct. 703, 61 L. Ed. 1321, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 69), reasonably may have led the Legislature to the view that it would be unwise to attempt to apply the new system to railroad employés, in whatever kind of commerce employed, and that they might better be left to common-law actions with statu*tory modifications already in force (Vernon's, Sayles' Texas Civ. Stat. 1914, arts. 6640

6652), and such others as experience might

show to be called for.

The exclusion of farm laborers and domes

tic servants from the compulsory scheme of the New York Workmen's Compensation Act

was sustained in New York Central R. R.

Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 208, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629, upon the ground that the Legislature reasonably might consider that the risks inherent in those occupations were exceptionally patent, simple, and familiar. The same result has been reached by the state courts generally. Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 610, 96 N. E. 308; Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 349, 106 N. E. 1; Hunter v. Colfax Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 287, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917D, 15, Ann. 'Cas. 1917E, 803; Sayles v. Foley, 38 R. I. 484, 490-492, 96 Atl. 340. Similar reasoning may be applied to cotton gin laborers in Texas; indeed, it was applied to them by the Supreme Court of that state, as we have seen. And the exclusion of domestic servants, farm laborers, casual employés, and railroad employés engaged in interstate commerce was sustained in Mathison v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 293, 148 N. W. 71, L. R. A. 1916D, 412.

#159

⭑160

The exclusion of employés where not more Victor Chemical Works v. Industrial Board, than four or five are under a single employer 274 Ill. 11, 113 N. E. 173, Ann. Cas. 1918B, is common in legislation of this character, 627; Mathison v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., and evidently permissible upon the ground 126 Minn. 286, 148 N. W. 71, L. R. A. 1916D, that the conditions of the industry are dif- 412; Shade v. Cement Co., 93 Kan. 257, 144 ferent and the hazards fewer, simpler, and Pac. 249; Sayles v. Foley, 38 R. I. 484, 96 more easily avoided where so few are em- Atl. 340; Greene v. Caldwell, 170 Ky. 571, ployed together; the Legislature, of course, 186 S. W. 648, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 604; Hunter being the proper judges to determine precise- v. Colfax Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. ly where the line should be drawn. Classifi- 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917D, 15, Ann. cation on this basis was upheld in Jeffrey Cas. 1917E, 803. The Ohio law was sustained Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 576-577, by this court against special *attacks in Jef35 Sup. Ct. 167, 59 L. Ed. 364, and has been frey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U. S. 571, 576, 35 sustained repeatedly by the state courts. Sup. Ct. 167, 59 L. Ed. 364, and the Iowa State v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 404, 405, law in Hawkins v. Bleakly, 243 U. S. 210, 213, 97 N. E. 602, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694; Borg- et seq., 37 Sup. Ct. 255, 61 L. Ed. 678, Ann. nis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 355, 133 N. W. Cas. 1917D, 637. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489; Shade v. Cement Co., 93 Kan, 257, 259, 144 Pac. 249; Sayles v. Foley, 38 R. I. 484, 491, 493, 96 Atl. 340.

[6] The discrimination that results from the operation of the *act as between the employés of different employers engaged in the same kind of work, where one employer be comes a subscriber and another does not, furnishes no ground of constitutional attack upon the theory that there is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. That the acceptance of such a system may be made optional is too plain for question; and it necessarily follows that differences arising from the fact that all of those to whom the option is open do not accept it must be regarded as the natural and inevitable result of a free choice, and not as a legislative discrimination. They stand upon the same fundamental basis as other differences in the conditions of employment arising from the variant exercise by employers and employés of their right to agree upon the terms of employment. And see Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 354, 133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489; Mathison v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 286, 294, 148 N. W. 71, L. R. A. 1916D, 412.

In recent years many of the states have passed elective workmen's compensation laws not differing essentially from the one here in question, and they have been sustained by well-considered opinions of the state courts of last resort against attacks based upon all kinds of constitutional objections, including alleged denial of the equal protection of the laws; usually, however, from the standpoint of the employer. Sexton v. Newark District Telg. Co., 84 N. J. Law, 85, 86 Atl. 451; Id., 86 N. J. Law, 701, 91 Atl. 1070; Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 96 N. E. 308; Young v. Duncan, 218 Mass. 346, 106 N. E. 1; Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327;1 State v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349, 97 N. E. 602, 39 L. R. A. (N. S.) 694; Diebeikis v. Link-Belt Co., 261 Ill. 454, 104 N. E. 211, Ann. Cas. 1915A, 241; Crooks v. Tazewell Coal Co., 263 Ill. 343, 105 N. E. 132, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 304; 1133 N. W. 209, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489.

[7] Stress is laid upon the point that the Texas act, while optional to the employer, is compulsory as to the employé of a sub. scribing employer. Our attention is not called to any express provision prohibiting a voluntary agreement between a subscribing employer and one or more of his employés taking them out of the operation of the act; but probably such an agreement might be held by the courts of the state to be inconsistent with the general policy of the act. The Supreme Court, in the case before us, did not intimate that such special agreements would be permissible; and hence it is fair to assume that all who remain in the employ of a subscribing employer, with notice that he has provided for payment of compensation by the association or by an authorized insurance company, will be bound by the provisions of the act.

But a moment's reflection will show the impossibility of giving an option both to the employer and to the employé and enabling them to exercise it in diverse ways. The provisions of the act show that the legislative purpose is that it shall take effect only upon acceptance by both employer and employé. The former accepts by becoming a subscriber; the latter by remaining in the service of the employer after notice of such acceptance. And we see in this no ground for holding that there is a denial of the equal protection of the laws as between employer and employé. They stand in different relations to the common undertaking, and it was permissible to recognize this in determining how they should accept or reject the new system. The employer provides the plant, the organization, the capital, the credit, and necessarily must control and manage the operation. In the nature of things his contribution has less mobility than that of the employé, who may go from place to place seeking *satisfactory employment, while the employer's plant and business are comparatively, even if not absolutely, fixed in position. Again, in order that the new scheme of compensation should be a success, the Legislature deemed it proper, if not essential, that

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