(249 U. 8. 606) No. 904. Oliver R. GILLESPIE and Martha Morgan, petitioners, v. E. D. SCOTT, trustec, etc. March 17, 1919. For opinion below, see 103 Kan. 745, 176 Pac. 132. Mr. Frans E. Lindquist, of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioners. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Kansas denied. (249 U. B. 619) No. 572. NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. J. R. THOMPSON, as County Treasurer of Flathead County, Mont. March 19, 1919. In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. For opinion below, see 253 Fed. 178. Mr. Milton S. Gunn, of Helena, Mont., for plaintiff in error. Dismissed with costs, on motion of counsel for the plaintiff in error. (249 U. S. 585) (249 U. S. 586) Nos. 26S and 269. CRESCENT MILLING COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. The H. N. STRAIT MANUFACTURING COMPANY. March 24, 1919. In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. For opinion below, see 245 Fed. 984, 157 C. C. A. 665. Mr. Harris Richardson, of St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiff in error. Mr. John I. Dille, of Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of ju risdiction upon the authority of section 128 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1133 [Comp. St. § 1120]); Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165, 166, 25 Sup. Ct. 6, 49 L. Ed. 142; Hull v. Burr, 234 U. S. 712, 720, 34 Sup. Ct. 892, 58 L. Ed. 1557; St. Anthony's Church v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 237 U. S. 575, 577, 35 Sup. Ct. 729, 59 L. Ed. 1119; Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439, 444, 35 Sup. Ct. 902, 59 L. Ed. 1397. No. 261. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO COAL & COKE COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. The TOLEDO & OHIO CENTRAL RAILWAY COMPANY. March 24, 1919. In error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the (249 U. S. 586) Fourth Circuit. For opinion below, see 245 No. 270. CRESCENT MILLING COMFed. 917, 158 C. C. A. 205, which affirmed 238 PANY, appellant, v. The H. N. STRAIT MANFed. 629. Messrs. George E. Price and Buck-UFACTURING COMPANY. March 24, 1919. ner Clay, both of Charleston, W. Va., for plaintiff in error. Mr. E. W. Knight, of Charleston, W. Va., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 128 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1133 [Comp. St. § 1120]); Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165, 166, 25 Sup. Ct. 6, 49 L. Ed. 142; Hull v. Burr, 234 U. S. 712, 720, 34 Sup. Ct. 892, 58 L. Ed. 1557; St. Anthony's Church v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 237 U. S. 575, 577, 35 Sup. Ct. 729, 59 L. Ed. 1119; Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439, 444, 35 Sup. Ct. 902, 59 L. Ed. 1397. (249 U. S. 584) No. 265. CRESCENT MILLING COMPANY, appellant, v. The H. N. STRAIT MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al. March 24, 1919. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota. Mr. Harris Richardson, of St. Paul, Minn., for appellant. Mr. John I. Dille, of Minneapolis, Minn., for appellees. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 6 of the act of September 6, 1916, chapter 448, 39 Stat., 726, 727 (Comp. St. § 1228a). (249 U. S. 586) Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. For opinion below, see 245 Fed. 984, 157 C. C. A. 665. Mr. Harris Richardson, of St. Paul, Minn., for appellant. Mr. John I. Dille, of Minneapolis, Minn., for appellee. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 128 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 Stat. 1133 [Comp. St. § 1120]); Stevenson v. Fain, 195 U. S. 165, 166, 25 Sup. Ct. 6, 49 L. Ed. 142; Hull v. Burr, 234 U. S. 712, 720, 34 Sup. Ct. 892, 58 L. Ed. 1557; St. Anthony's Church v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 237 U. S. 575, 577, 35 Sup. Ct. 729, 59 L. Ed. 1119; Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co. v. Yurkonis, 238 U. S. 439, 444, 35 Sup. Ct. 902, 59 L. Ed. 1397. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 237 of the Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, tember 6, 1916, chapter 448, § 2, 39 Stat., 726 (Comp. St. § 1214). Nos. 266 and 267. CRESCENT MILLING 36 Stat. 1156), as amended by the act of SepCOMPANY, plaintiff in error, V. H. N. STRAIT MANUFACTURING COMPANY. March 24, 1919. In error to the District Court of the United States for the District of Minne. sota. Mr. Harris Richardson, of St. Paul, Minn., for plaintiff in error. Mr. John I. Dille, of Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant in error. PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of section 6 of the act of September 6, 1916, chapter 448, 39 Stat., 726, 727 (Comp. St. § 1228a). 39 SUP.CT.-19 (249 U. S. 596) No. 849. C. C. CALHOUN, petitioner, v. Bland MASSIE. March 24, 1919. For opinion below, see 97 S. E. 576. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Appeals of the State of Virginia granted. (249 U. S. 607) 1919. V. NORTHERN No. 853. NORTH AMERICAN TELE- (249 U. S. 607) No. 854. DALY-WEST MINING COMPANY et al., petitioners, v. Catherine SAVAGE et al. March 24, 1919. For opinion below, see 253 Fed. 548. Messrs. William H. King and Hiram E. Booth, both of Salt Lake City, Utah, for petitioners. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. (249 U. S. 606) No. 860. FIDELITY TITLE & TRUST COMPANY, Ancillary Administrator, etc., petitioner, v. The DUBOIS ELECTRIC COMPANY. March 24, 1919. For opinion below, see Du Bois Electric Co. v. Pancoast's Adm'r, 253 Fed. 987. Messrs. James R. Sterrett, M. W. Acheson, Jr., and Charles Alvin Jones, all of Pittsburgh, Pa., for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied, with reservation of and without prejudice to the right to apply for a reinstatement of the petition at any time before the end of this term in case the judgment below should fail to award a new trial. (249 U. S. 607) No. 867. Troy DEASON, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. March 24, 1919. For opinion below, see 254 Fed. 259. Messrs. Levi Herring, of Glen Rose, Tex., and H. P. Brown, of Cleburne, Tex., for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. (249 U. S. 608) (249 U. S. 608) No. 887. Wilhelm KNAUTH et al., petitioners, v. John W. KNIGHT et al. March 24, 1919. For opinion below, see 255 Fed. 677. Messrs. Edward H. Cabaniss, of Birmingham, Ala., George T. Hogg, of New York City, Cabaniss & Bowie, of Birmingham, Ala., and Davies, Auerbach & Cornell, of New York City, mingham, Ala. (Messrs. Percy, Benners & Burr, for petitioner. Mr. Augustus Benners, of Birof Birmingham, Ala., of counsel), for respond ents. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the (249 U. S. 608) No. 890. Henry A. HOUSE, petitioner, v. Laurence W. LUELLEN. March 24, 1919. Mr. C. P. Goepel, of New York City (Messrs. J. J. Darlington and Joseph D. Sullivan, both of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for petitioner. Mr. Joseph H. Milans, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia denied. (249 U. S. 609) No. 897. James F. BISHOP, administrator, etc., petitioner, v. GREAT LAKES TOWING COMPANY. March 24, 1919. For opinion below, see Great Lakes Towing Co. v. St. JosephChicago S. S. Co., 253 Fed. 635. Mr. Harry W. Standidge, of Chicago, Ill., for petitioner. Messrs. Harvey D. Goulder and Thomas H. Garry, both of Cleveland, Ohio, and Ralph F. Potter, of Chicago, Ill., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit denied. (249 U. S. 609) No. 898. NORTH BRITISH & MERCANNo. 873. Edward E. GOLD et al., petition- TILE INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, v. ers, v. James T. NEWTON, Commissioner of H. BAARS & COMPANY. March 24, 1919. Patents. March 24, 1919. For opinion below, For opinion below, see 255 Fed. 625. Messrs. see 254 Fed. 824. Messrs. William A. Redding Blount & Blount & Carter, of Pensacola, Fla. and Arthur C. Fraser, both of New York City, (Messrs. D. Roger Englar and Oscar R. Housfor petitioners. Mr. Otto R. Barnett, of Chi-ton, both of New York City, of counsel), for cago, Ill. (Mr. Grafton L. McGill, of Wash- petitioner. Messrs. W. H. Watson and S. ington, D. C., of counsel), for defendant. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Pasco, Jr., both of Pensacola, Fla., for respond- (249 U. S. 609) No. 907. OTTO HIGEL COMPANY, Inc., [ of Oshkosh, Wis., for petitioner. Petition for petitioner, V. AUTOPIANO COMPANY. a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of March 24, 1919. For opinion below, see 256 the State of Wisconsin denied. Fed. 992. Mr. William F. Hall, of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Mr. Louis W. Southgate, of Worcester, Mass., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. Messrs. No. 271. CORN PRODUCTS REFINING COMPANY et al., appellants, v. The UNITED STATES of America. March 31, 1919. For opinion below, see 234 Fed. 964. Charles E. Hughes, Morgan J. O'Brien, and Preston Davie, all of New York City, James M. Sheean, of Chicago, Ill., and Junius Parker and Frank H. Hall, both of New York City, for appellants. Mr. Attorney General, for the United States. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Dismissed, on motion of counsel for the appellants, and mandate granted. No. 809. ARKANSAS CENTRAL RAIL ROAD COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. W. L. GOAD. March 31, 1919. For opinion below, see 206. S. W. 901. Messrs. Edward J. White, of St. Louis, Mo., and Thomas B. Pryor, of Fort Smith, Ark., for petitioner. Messrs. Jeptha H. Evans and Chas. I. Evans, both of Booneville, Ark., and Robert J. White and Sidney H. White, both of Paris, Ark., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari herein denied. (249 U. S. 596) No. 901. KWOCK JAN FAT, petitioner, v. Edward WHITE, as Commissioner of Immigration, etc. March 31, 1919. For opinion below, see 255 Fed. 323. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted. (249 U. S. 610) No. 910. PULP WOOD COMPANY, petitioner, v. GREEN BAY PAPER & FIBRE COMPANY. March 31, 1919. For opinion below, see 170 N. W. 230. Mr. Moses Hooper, (249 U. S. 610) No. 916. William A. HAMILTON, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. March 31, 1919. For opinion below, see 255 tiorari to the United States Circuit Court of (249 U. S. 610) United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the (249 U. S. 610) No. 922. J. H. HUGHES, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. March 31, 1919. For opinion below, see 253 Fed. 543. of Kansas City, Mo., for petitioner. Mr. Claude Messrs. John T. Barker and B. F. Pursel, both R. Porter, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the (249 U. S. 620) No. 951. L. R. GARRETT, plaintiff in error, v. The UNITED STATES of America. March 31, 1919. In error to the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California. Mr. Solicitor General King, for the United States. Docketed and dismissed, on motion of Mr. Solicitor General King for the defendant in error, and mandate granted. (249 U. S. 620) No. 952. L. R. GARRETT, appellant, v. The March 31, UNITED STATES of America. 1919. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California. Mr. Solicitor General King, for the United States. Docketed and dismissed, on motion of Mr. Solicitor General King for the appellee, and mandate granted. (249 U. S. 620) No. 953. L. R. GARRETT, appellant, v. The UNITED STATES of America. March 31, 1919. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California. Mr. Solicitor General King, for the United States. Docketed and dismissed, on motion of Mr. Solicitor General King for the ap pellee, and mandate granted. (249 U. S. 234) CAPITOL TRANSP. CO. v. CAMBRIA (Argued March 14 and 17, 1919. SHIPPING March 31, 1919.) Decided No. 231. -PERSONAL CONTRACT. Act June 26, 1884, § 18 (Comp. St. § 8028), and section 30, limiting the liability of owners of vessels and repealing conflicting acts, did not repeal the provision of Rev. St. § 4283 (Comp. St. § 8021), restricting limitation of liability to loss occurring without the privity of the own ers, and an owner who personally contracted to carry the cargo warranting seaworthiness, and knew that the vessel was unseaworthy because overloaded, cannot limit his liability. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Petition by the Capitol Transportation Company against the Cambria Steel Company to limit its liability for loss of cargo on the vessel Benjamin Noble. A decree of the District Court denying the petition (The Benjamin Noble, 232 Fed. 382), was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (244 Fed. 95, 156 C. C. A. 523), and petitioner brings certiorari. Affirmed. *Messrs. J. Parker Kirlin, of New York City, and Frank S. Masten, of Cleveland, Ohio, for petitioner. Messrs. Francis S. Laws, of Philadelphia, Pa., and Sherwin A. Hill, of Detroit, Mich., for respondent. Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a petition to limit liability for the loss of cargo on the Benjamin Noble, brought by the present petitioner after libels in personam had been filed in different districts by the cargo owners, the Cambria Steel Company. The right was denied by the District Court on the ground that the vessel was unseaworthy with the privity and knowledge of the owner when she sailed and that the owner had made a personal contract by which it warranted seaworthiness. The Benjamin Noble, 232 Fed. 382. The findings, rulings and decree of the District Court were affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals. 244 Fed. 95, 156 C. C. A. 523, sub nom. The Benjamin Noble. A writ of certiorari was granted before Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U. S. 139, 39 Sup. Ct. 53, 63 L. Ed. 170, and Pendleton v. Benner Line, 246 U. S. 353, 38 Sup. Ct. 330, 62 L. Ed. 770, were decided but when they were before this Court. 245 U. S. 648, 38 Sup. Ct. 12, 62 L. Ed. 530. See Ewing v. United States ex rel. Fowler Car Co., 242 U. S. 638, 37 Sup. Ct. 111, 61 L. Ed. 540; Pendleton v. Benner Line, 241 U. S. 677, 36 Sup. Ct. 726, 60 L. Ed. 1232. The findings of fact are contested here, and because of some expressions it is suggested that the Circuit Court of Appeals is to be taken not to have made findings of its own upon the facts. On the contrary it appears to us to have reconsidered the evidence, giving to the findings below only the weight usually accorded to those of the tribunal that see the witnesses and we see no sufficient reason for departing from the general rule where the two lower courts have concurred. Luckenbach v. McCahan Sugar Refining Co., 248 U. S. 139, 145, 39 Sup. Ct. 53, 63 L. Ed. 170. *We are urged to reconsider the question whether the limitation of liability is not made independent of the "privity or knowledge" of the owner by the omission of those words from the Act of June 26, 1884, c. 121, § 18, 23 Stat. 53, 57 (Comp. St. § 8028), coupled with the repeal, in section 30, of all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of that act. It is argued that the effect of the omission and the repealing section is to do away with the former qualifi8021), and the argument is fortified by a cation in Rev. Stat. § 4283 (Comp. St. § reference to the history of the act, which shows that some of the Senators thought it important to make the limitation absolute. On the other hand in Butler v. Boston & Savannah Steamship Co., 130 U. S. 527, 553, 554, 9 Sup. Ct. 612, 616 (32 L. Ed. 1017), it was said by Mr. Justice Bradley that possibly the later act was intended to remove all doubt as to the application of the law to all cases of loss "caused without the privity or knowledge of the owner." We find no different expression in O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U. S. 287, 303, 18 Sup. Ct. 140, 42 L. Ed. 469. Mr. Justice Bradley's opinion was adopted after considerable discussion in Richardson v. Harmon, 222 U. S. 96, 106, 32 Sup. Ct. 27, 56 L. Ed. 110, and Richardson v. Harmon was accepted as establishing that the statute does not limit liability for the personal acts of the owners done with knowledge, in the late case of Pendleton v. Benner Line, 246 U. S. 353, 356, 38 Sup. Ct. 330, 62 L. Ed. 770. In that case the argument that the limitation of the exoneration to acts, etc., done or incurred without the privity or knowledge of the owner was repealed by the Act of 1884, was presented in the fullest way. We very much appreciate the danger that the act should be cut down from its intended effect by too easy a finding of privity.or knowledge on the part of owners, as also by too liberal an attribution to them of contracts as personally theirs. We are not disposed to press the law in those directions For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes #336 further than the cases go. But in this case | Franklin K. Lane, as Secretary of the Inin addition to the finding of the owner's priv- terior. ity to the unseaworthiness was the further He alleged: That when serving as the finding that the contract was the personal duly appointed superintendent of Crater contract of the petitioner-a finding that Lake National Park on June 7, 1913, the seems warranted if any contract by a cor- defendant requested him to resign; that proporation can fall within the class. That such testing against such removal from office, he contracts may impose a liability that can- demanded that he be furnished with a statenot be transferred to what is left of the ship ment in writing of the reasons for his re is decided. Luckenbach v. W. J. McCahan moval and that he be given a reasonable time Sugar Refining Co., 248 U. S. 139, 149, 39 Sup. in which to answer; that upon June 28th, he Ct. 53, 63 L. Ed. 170. Upon the whole case received a telegram from the defendant notiwe cannot escape from the conclusion that fying him that he had been removed, and directing that he should transfer all government property to his successor, who was named; that he refused to relinquish his position or to transfer the property until convinced that the order for his removal was lawful; and that upon July 20, he was forcibly ejected from the government office building and the records and papers of his office were seized by government officials. the decree must be affirmed. Decree affirmed. (249 U. S. 367) UNITED STATES ex rel. ARANT v. LANE, (Argued March 6 and 7, 1919. Decided March 31, 1919.) No. 441. He further averred: That as such superintendent he was in the classified civil service of the government and that he could not lawfully be removed therefrom "except for such cause as would promote the efficiency" of 1. MANDAMUS 143(1) - LIMITATIONS AND the service and for reasons stated in writing, LACHES. Since mandamus issues in the exercise of judicial discretion, and is recognized as different from ordinary actions by Code of Law, D. C. 1901, §§ 1273-1282, providing for the remedy, it is not embraced within the ordinary statutes of limitation, but is subject to the doc trine of laches. 2. MANDAMUS 143(2)-LACHES-RESTORA TION TO PUBLIC OFFICE. The unexplained delay of a national park superintendent, who claimed to be in the classified civil service, for nearly two years, in applying for mandamus to compel his restoration to office, is such laches as will bar his right to .the relief. which he must be given a reasonable opportunity to answer; that on July 1, 1913, he notified the defendant that he was able and willing to perform the duties of his office, that he had so continued to the time of the filing of his petition, and that he had made every reasonable effort to be restored to his position, but without avail. His prayer was that the defendant be required to answer his petition and that upon hearing a writ of mandamus should issue requiring the defendant to vacate the order for his dismissal, and to restore him to his former office. In response to a rule to show cause the defendant filed an answer, containing, among other things, this paragraph: "10. He denies the allegations of paragraph 10 to the extent that the same attempt to show that he has made every reasonable effort to be restored to the office of superintendent as aforesaid, in this: That if relator were improperly or unlawfully removed from said office, under circumstances such as to justify the interference of the courts, such condition existed immediately upon relator's removal from office and upon the Secretary's refusal to continue him in said office, notwithstanding which and notwithstanding that since said time, to wit, July 1, 1913, another person has been appointed to and has discharged the duties of said office and has received the salary and allowance therefor appropriated from time to time by Congress, the relator did not seek recourse to the courts until *Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion the lapse of nearly two years, and therein has of the Court. The relator, on April 30, 1915, filed his petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia for a writ of mandamus against by his gross laches barred any right to the relief sought if any such right ever existed." A demurrer to this answer or return was filed stating as a ground: For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes |