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227, 153 Pac. 425), and defendants bring er- their property without due process of law Dismissed.
and without compensation, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. A permanent injunction was prayed for, restraining the petitioners from entering into the proposed contract and from levying assessments to carry it into effect.
Mr. Oliver O. Haga, of Boise, Idaho, for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. B. E. Stoutemyer, of Boise, Idaho, for defendant in error.
*Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Board of Directors of the Nampa & Meridian Irrigation District, a quasi municipal corporation, organized under the laws of Idaho (Pioneer Irrigation District v. Walker, 20 Idaho, 605, 119 Pac. 304; Colburn v. Wilson, 23 Idaho, 337, 130 Pac. 381), filed an amended petition in the district court of that state, praying for the examination, approval, and confirmation by the court of a contract which it desired to enter into with the United States government, acting through the Secretary of the Interior, which provided that the United States should sell and the irrigation district should purchase, and in the manner prescribed pay for, a supply of water to irrigate an extensive tract of arid land within the district, and to supplement an insufficient supply, for other lands, which the district had theretofore acquired from other sources. The proposed contract also provided that the United States and the district should share in the expense of constructing a system of drainage, to reclaim considerable areas of land within the district which had become "water-logged" *through seepage from both the government and the district systems of irrigation, and to prevent threatened damage to other lands from such seepage.
The District Court approved the contract, upon a full finding of facts, and its judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the state in a judgment which we are asked to review upon this writ of error.
The required notice having been given, the plaintiffs in error, owners of lands within the irrigation district, filed an "answer and cross-complaint," in which they denied many allegations of the petition, and affirmatively alleged: That if the contract should be entered into they would be obliged to pay an assessment of $75 upon each acre of their land for water rights which they did not require, because they had a sufficient supply from other sources; that neither the United States, nor the Secretary of the Interior, nor the irrigation district had authority under the laws of the United States to enter into the contract; and that, for these reasons, if it were approved and entered into, the plaintiffs in error would be deprived of
*A motion to dismiss the writ of error was postponed until the hearing upon the merits, which has now been had.
The statement which we have made of the issues presented by this record shows that the first ground of the motion-that a federal question was not presented-cannot be sustained. Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation District, 164 U. S. 179, 185, 17 Sup. Ct. 52, 41 L. Ed. 395.
 But the second ground of the motion to dismiss is valid, viz. that, even if it be conceded that the Supreme Court decided a federal question against the plaintiffs in error, nevertheless the court decided against them also upon an independent ground, not involving any federal question and broad enough to support the judgment, and for this reason the federal question involved will not be considered on this writ of error, under a series of decisions by this court extending at least from Klinger v. State of Missouri. 13 Wall. 257, 263, 20 L. Ed. 635, to Enterprise Irrigation District et al. v. Farmers' Mutual Canal Co., 243 U. S. 157, 164, 37 Sup. Ct. 318, 61 L. Ed. 644.
 The proceeding involved is prescribed by the state statutes, which provide that when such a petition is filed the court shall fix a day for hearing, and shall notify the per-tary of the Interior, could lawfully enter into the proposed contract and that the approval and confirmation of it by the court would not deprive the plaintiffs in error of their property without due process of law or without compensation, yet the court also holds that the "cross-complaint," in which these federal rights are asserted, was filed prematurely under the statutes and practice of the state of Idaho, and that no charge or burden would be imposed upon the lands of the plaintiffs in error by the approval of the contract, assuming that it should be executed. This for the reason that the state stat
sons interested therein by publication, for
ute provides that any assessments upon such
While the state Supreme Court finds that the United States, acting through the Secre
if the objection is overruled by the board, and he does not consent to the assessment as finally determined, such objection shall, without further proceeding, be regarded as appealed to the district court, and shall there again be heard in proceedings to confirm the assessment. It is expressly provided that upon such hearing the court shall disregard every error, irregularity, or omission which does not affect the substantial rights of any party, and shall correct any error which may be found in such assessment, or any injustice which may result from it.
For this reason the court held that the claims stated in the "cross-complaint" were prematurely asserted, were "wholly immaterial" to the inquiry presented by the petition of the district, and "should have been stricken from the answer." We cannot doubt that this conclusion of the state Supreme Court, based as it is wholly on state statutes and procedure, is broad enough to sustain the judgment rendered, irrespective of the disposition of any federal question involved, and therefore the writ of error will be dismissed.
The plaintiff, as receiver of the Alabama Trust & Savings Company, a banking corporation organized under the laws of the state of Alabama, filed his bill in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, against the Second National Bank of Cincinnati to recover sums of money for which he alleged the Second National Bank was liable on account of certain transactions which had taken place between the National Bank and the Savings Company and its officers the details of which it is unnecessary to set forth. Upon final hearing the District Court found the defendant liable for the application of a balance of the Savings Company's deposit in the National Bank, upon paper held by it on which the Savings Company appeared as principal maker, but which was found to have been given for the benefit of certain of the Savings Company's STERRETT v. SECOND NAT. BANK OF officers. Plaintiff's remaining claims were rejected. Both parties appealed to the Cir(Argued Nov. 8, 1918. Decided Dec. 9, 1918.) cuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which reversed the decree of the District Court, upon the ground that the receiver had no authority to bring the suit (246 Fed. 753, 159 C. C. A. 55), and the case is here on writ of certiorari to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
(248 U. S. 73)
It is settled doctrine in federal jurisprudence that a chancery receiver has no authority to sue in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction to recover demands or property situated therein; his functions and authority being confined to the jurisdiction of his appointment, and the practice permitting application for ancillary receivership in a foreign jurisdiction where local assets may be recovered, and, if necessary, administered. 2. COURTS 96(1)—FEDERAL RULE-CHANGE. The contrary rule having become the settled law of the federal courts, if the powers of chancery receivers are to be enlarged to give them authority to sue beyond the jurisdiction of the appointing court, such extension of authority must come from legislation, not from judicial
Messrs. Edmund H. Dryer and Forney
Lawrence Maxwell, of Cincinnati,
3. RECEIVERS 210-AUTHORITY TO SUE IN FOREIGN JURISDICTION.
In view of Code Ala. 1907, §§ 3509, 3511, 3512, 3560, Alabama receiver of a banking cor
poration held not vested with title to its assets as assignee or statutory successor so as to authorize him to sue for their recovery in a foreign federal jurisdiction.
*Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the court.
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
The chancery court on April 27, 1911, rendered a final administration decree wherein it found that the defendant Savings Company was insolvent; that its assets constituted a trust fund for the payment of its creditors, and the same should be marshaled and administered in that court; that the defendant was a corporation organized under the General Laws of Alabama; that upon final settlement it should be dissolved; that
Suit by W. C. Sterrett, as receiver of the Alabama Trust & Savings Company, against the Second National Bank of Cincinnati, Ohio. From the decree of the District Court, both parties appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, which reversed (246 Fed. 753, 159 C. C. A. 55), and plaintiff petitions for certiorari. Decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.
it had suspended business and was not about to resume the same, and could not do so with safety to the public; that, therefore, W. C. Sterrett be appointed receiver of defendant, and empowered and directed to demand and take into his possession all of the defendant's assets and property to which it was entitled and to recover the same and reduce it to money, and administer the same under the further order of the court. And the court further authorized the receiver to employ counsel and to bring such actions at law or in equity as he might be advised and to incur such expenses as might be necessary. Later, on March 8, 1912, the Alabama chan
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
In the year 1911 certain creditors of the Savings Company, an Alabama corporation, filed a bill against it in a chancery court of Alabama alleging its insolvency.
cery court specifically directed the receiver, later decisions of this court.
Section 3511 provides for the dissolution of corporations by action of the stockholders,
and enacts that the court
* shall appoint a receiver of all the books, property, and assets of the corporation * (who) shall, under the direction of the court, collect all debts due the corporation, and sell all the property, real and personal, of the corporation, pay the debts thereof ratably or in full as the funds realized may admit, and divide the residue after the debts and costs are paid, among the several classes of stockholders, according to the amount owned by each, and according to the preferences, if any, of the several classes as provided in the certificates of incorporation."
*Section 3512 covers the application for receivership and dissolution of insolvent corporations upon bill of creditors or stockholders in the chancery court, and provides: The court * * * may appoint a receiver of all the property and assets of the corporation (who) under the direction of the court, must exercise the same powers and perform the same duties as are required of receivers in the next preceding section, and otherwise manage the affairs of the corporation pending final settlement thereof as the court shall direct.
* * #
There is also a provision for proceedings by the attorney general (page 444):
“3560. Proceedings when bank found not solvent-Whenever the treasurer finds that a bank or corporation chartered by the laws of this state and doing a banking business, is not in a solvent condition, he shall immediately report the condition of the bank to the governor, and the governor shall direct the attorney general to institute proceedings in a court having jurisdiction in the county where the bank or parent bank is located, to put the bank in the hands of some competent person, who shall give bond in an amount to be fixed by the judge for the faithful discharge of his duties, and said person so appointed shall immediately take charge of the business of said bank, collecting its assets and paying off its liabilities under the law and
rules of such court."
Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56, 23 Sup. Ct. 244, 47 L. Ed. 380; Great Western Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, 198 U. S. 561, 575, 577, 25 Sup. Ct. 770, 49 L. Ed. 1163; Keatley v. Furey, 226 U. S. 399, 403, 33 Sup. Ct. 121, 57 L. Ed. 273. This practice has become general in the courts of the United States, and is a system well understood and followed. It permits an application for an ancillary receivership in a foreign jurisdiction where the local assets may be recovered and, if necessary, administered. The system es
tablished in Booth v. Clark has become the settled law of the federal courts, and, if the powers of chancery receivers are to be enlarged in such wise as to give them authority to sue beyond the jurisdiction of the appointing court, such extension of authority must come from legislation and not from judicial action. Great Western Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Harris, supra, 198 U. S. page 577, 25 Sup. Ct. 770, 49 L. Ed. 1163.
 Counsel for petitioner insists that the case is not ruled by the doctrine of Booth v. Clark, and that under the Alabama statutes and the decisions of the Supreme Court of that state the title to the property of the Trust Company is vested in the receiver in such wise that he is authorized to sue for its recovery in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction. If this contention is well founded there is no question of the authority of the receiver to prosecute the action. Relfe v. Rundle, 103 U. S. 222, 26 L. Ed. 337; Hawkins v. Glenn, 131 U. S. 319, 9 Sup. Ct. 739, 33 L. Ed. 184; Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U. S. 516, 534, 27 Sup. Ct. 755, 51 L. Ed. 1163; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 257, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1292; Keatley v. Furey, 226 U. s. 399, 403, 33 Sup. Ct. 121, 57 L. Ed. 273.
The question presented for our consideration is whether the receiver appointed in the chancery court is authorized to sue in the federal court for the recovery of such property.
The Alabama cases, Oates v. Smith, 176 Ala. 39, 57 South. 438; Montgomery Bank & Trust Co. v. Walker, 181 Ala. 368, 61 South. 951; Cobbs, Receiver, v. Vizard Investment Co., 182 Ala. 372, 62 South. 730, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 801; Coffey v. Gay, 191 Ala. 137, 67 South. 681, L. R. A. 1915D, 802; Hundley v. Hewitt, 195 Ala. 647, 71 South. 419-are fully reviewed in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals. To rehearse them now would be but a repetition of what is said in that opinion.
*An examination of the sections of the statutes, here involved, in the light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Alabama, does not in our opinion warrant the conclusion that title is vested in the receiver as assignee or as statutory successor of the insolvent corporation in such wise as to authorize the action to recover in a foreign
[1, 2] Since the decision of this court in Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 322, 15 L. Ed. 164, it is the settled doctrine in federal jurisprudence that a chancery receiver has no authority to sue in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction to recover demands or property therein situated. The functions and author- jurisdiction. Collectively, these sections proity of such receiver are confined to the juris-vide for a receivership to administer the diction in which he was appointed. The rea- property and assets of the insolvent corporasons for this rule were fully discussed in tion under the authority and direction of the Booth v. Clark and have been reiterated in appointing court. The statutes do not un
dertake to vest in the receiver an estate in [property on subscription without a license, the property to be administered for the ben- which may be had on payment of specified efit of creditors as was the case in Bern- fees. The plaintiff in error argues that the heimer v. Converse, supra, and Converse v. application of this law should be determined Hamilton, supra, in which the right to sue by the general course of business, not by an in the courts of a foreign jurisdiction was isolated transaction, and the argument has sustained. force. It depends, however, on the construction of the ordinance, and as the State Court has construed it to apply to and forbid the act proved, the judgment must be affirmed. Judgment affirmed.
The Circuit Court of Appeals left open the question of the right to apply for an ancillary receivership in the District Court, and the effect of such appointment, if made, upon the pending suit. We pursue the like course, and as such an application could only originate in the District Court we express VAN DYKE et al. v. ARIZONA EASTERN no opinion concerning it.
(248 U. S. 49)
The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is affirmed.
R. CO. (Argued Nov. 19, 1918. Decided Dec. 9, 1918.) No. 59.
(248 U. S. 65)
WATTERS v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF
1. PUBLIC LANDS
92-LOCATION OF RIGHT OF WAY UNDER FEDERAL ACT.
Definite location by railroad of right of way under Act Cong. March 3, 1875 (Comp. St. 1916.
(Submitted Nov. 19, 1918. Decided Dec. 9, §§ 4921-4926), occurs by actual construction of
COURTS 366(6) FEDERAL COURTS ·FOL-
The state court having construed an ordinance declaring it unlawful to engage in peddling any goods without a license to apply to an isolated transaction, a sale of two small articles at rest in the state before the sale, though defendant's business was otherwise interstate commerce, judgment of state court must be affirmed. In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan.
2. PUBLIC LANDS 92-LOCATION OF RAILROAD RIGHT OF WAY-FOREST RESERVATION -DISCRETION OF SECRETARY OF INTERIOR.
Under Act Cong. March 3, 1875 (Comp. St. 1916, §§ 4921-4926) and Act March 3, 1899 (Comp. St. 1916, § 4945), railroad which platted line across public lands, filing in local land office map of definite location some months after land was incorporated in forest reserve, held to have acquired part of land involved, as against homesteader, despite change in right of way, as constructed, from filed map; Secretary of Interior having given permission to enter reserve and approved map. 3. PUBLIC LANDS 92-LOCATION OF RAILROAD'S RIGHT OF WAY-ULTRA VIRESRIGHT TO OBJECT.
Homesteaders of lands in forest reserve, claimed by railroad as within right of way under Act Cong. March 3, 1875 (Comp. St. 1916, $$ 4921-4926) and Act March 3, 1899 (Comp. St. 1916, § 4945), could not object, as against
Mr. Maurice B. Dean, of New York City, railroad, that it was beyond its charter powers for plaintiff in error. to construct line involved, that being matter for Secretary of Interior when granting permission *Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opin- tion to railroad entitling them to complain. to locate line, while homesteaders had no relaion of the Court.
Harvey Watters was convicted of peddling without a license. Judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Michigan (192 Mich. 462, 158 N. W. 865), and defendant brings error. Affirmed.
The plaintiff in error was complained of for having engaged in peddling goods and having canvassed and taken orders from house to house for the sale of goods in the city of Munising, Michigan, without having received a license as required, by a city ordinance. It may be assumed that much the greater part of his business was interstate commerce and free from any obligation that the ordinance imposed. But in the course of his business he did sell two cans of toilet cream that were at rest in the state before the sale, and it is admitted that this transaction was not protected from state legislation. Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 33 Sup. Ct. 299, 57 L. Ed. 615. On this ground the Supreme Court of the State sustained a conviction and fine. People v. Watters, 192 Mich. 462, 158 N. W. 865. The ordinance makes it unlawful to engage in peddling any goods or to canvass from house to house for the sale of
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
In Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Arizona.
Action by the Arizona Eastern Railroad Company against Cleve W. Van Dyke and others. From judgment for plaintiff, defendants appealed to the Supreme Court of Arizona, which affirmed (18 Ariz. 220, 157 Pac. 1019), and defendants bring error. Judg
Messrs. Richard E. Sloan, of Phoenix, Ariz., and William C. Prentiss, of Washington, D. C., for plaintiffs in error.
Messrs. Charles L. Rawlins, of Globe, Ariz., and Eugene S. Ives, of Tucson, Ariz., for defendant in error.
*Mr. Justice MCKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Error to review a judgment of affirmance of a judgment rendered in the Superior Court of Gila County, Arizona, quieting the title of
the Railroad Company to 2.23 acres of land | its amended map and profile of its right of in the N. W. 1⁄4 of the S. E. 4, Sec. 30, T. 1 N., R. 15, E., Gila County Arizona.
way in the local land office which was regularly and duly approved March 4, 1911.
The trial court made findings of fact which were concurred in by the Supreme Court. 18 Ariz. 220, 157 Pac. 1019. And we see no reason for not accepting them, notwithstanding plaintiffs in error urge a review of them. They are as follows:
Van Dyke attempted to show that he had established residence upon the land prior to December 22, 1909, the date upon which he filed his homestead entry. But it is clear that he did not go upon the land prior to its inclusion in the Forest Reserve. He was upon the land under the option to purchase mentioned and he attempted to show that he was there under a verbal permit from the Forest Supervisor with the intention of entering the land as a homestead and that he made application to the Forestry Department for an examination and listing thereof under the Act of June 11, 1906; application, however, was rejected. *That he did not rely upon the settlement prior to December 22, 1909, is clearly shown by his testimony. He said:
The railroad, as the successor of the Gila Valley Globe & Northern Railway Company, acquired its rights, including rights of way and all other assets. In March, 1906, the latter company platted a line of railroad from Globe to Miami, Arizona, about nine miles in length, passing over and across certain public land, and, November 5, 1908, filed in the local land office its map or profile of definite location as provided by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1875. Prior to that time the land covered by the map as well as the land in dispute was thrown into the Crook National Forest Reserve. April 16, 1909, written ap plication to the United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, with map of right of way attached, was made by the railroad to enter and extend its line across a portion of the forest reserve. The railroad was given permission on July 6, 1909, to enter the reservation and to locate and construct its road therein. The map and profile of its road was approved September 21, 1909, by the Secretary of the Interior in accordance with the act of Congress.
In April, 1909, the Globe Company commenced the construction of its road and completed it in September of that year, and it and the appellee company have operated trains ever since October, 1909. Before construction was commenced, to wit, in November and December, 1908, *the Globe Company amended its line of survey and changed the course of its road upon and across the land in dispute and along its entire length to the extent of 100 feet in width on each side of the center line of its railroad and constructed its road on the amended location conforming on the ground to the staked and marked line.
At the time of the amended location the land was held by the Miami Land & Improvement Company, a corporation, as mineral land and the Globe Company accepted a deed from it to a right of way across the land. By executive order the land in dispute was restored to the public domain December 22, 1909, on which date appellant, Cleve Van Dyke, filed upon the same under the homestead law. He had theretofore accepted it under an option to purchase as a mineral location from the Miami Improvement Company. On that date he went off the land, but immediately returned and established his residence with a view to homesteading. In due course he made final proof and on February 12, 1912, a patent without any reservation "Fifty feet on each side of the center line of the track, or one hundred feet of the right was issued to him for his homestead. of way, are not involved in this suit. The area December 30, 1909, the Globe Company filed in question being the excess of one hundred feet
the Miami Land & Improvement Company,
in the execution of which deed Van Dyke "acquiesced." Therefore, as said by the Supreme Court:
"It is a fact that about midnight on the 22d of December, 1909, I took up residence in the house testified to. ground and back on again at midnight." That is, I went off the
December 22d was the first time the land could have been settled upon without permission from the national government, and this permission he did not obtain.
Upon these facts the Supreme Court said certain contentions arose: (1) It is that of the railroad that its rights were fixed and established in August and September, 1909, when it completed the construction of its railroad. (2) Opposing, plaintiffs in error assert that because the railroad changed its route as located by its original map and profile approved by the Secretary of the Interior it acquired no rights until it filed with the local land office on December 30, 1909, its amended map of location, which was too late; Van Dyke having taken the land as a homestead December 22, 1909. And to the contention of the company that if the land was public it was not bound to follow the line as shown on its map and profile, plaintiffs in error reply that the land had ceased to be public land by being thrown into the National Forest Reserve and
that the railroad was hence restricted to the specific right of way shown on its approved map and profile; or, if changed to another and different route, the consent of the Interior Department was necessary and that such permission had not been given and hence the railroad acquired no rights, It is at least against plaintiffs in error. conceded, however, that the railroad company was entitled to a right of way to the extent of 50 feet on each side of the center of its line of track acquired by deed from