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The United States, when asserting sovereign or governmental rights, is not subject to state statutes of limitation.

3. EQUITY 85-LACHES-UNITED STATES.

Messrs. Alexander C. King, Sol. Gen., of Atlanta, Ga., and G. Carroll Todd and Lincoln R. Clark, both of Washington, D. C., for the United States.

*Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In 1912 the United States sued the Canal Company to recover the amount of three div idends which had been declared on shares of its capital stock owned by the government, in the years 1873, 1875, and 1876, payment of which, it was averred, had been refused

Doctrine of laches is not applicable to the when demand was made therefor in the year United States, when asserting sovereign or governmental rights.

501(1)-REVIEW

4. APPEAL AND ERROR
NECESSITY OF EXCEPTIONS.
Correctness of ruling that presumption of
payment from lapse of 20 years without suit
to collect obtains against the United States,
not being questioned by appropriate exceptions
in record, will not be decided.

5. LIMITATION OF ACTIONS
STATUTE-UNITED STATES.

11(1)-STATE

The United States, when suing for dividends declared on stock owned by it, is acting in its governmental capacity as a creditor, and so not subject to state statute of limitations. 6. EVIDENCE 341 PRINTED BOOKS OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT CERTIFICATION. Books printed by public printer from written public records of the treasury department, and so printed by authority of law, and produced from the custody of such department, where they were used as original records in the transaction of the daily business thereof, do not require certification as copies under Rev. St.

882, to be admissible in evidence.

7. EVIDENCE 333(7)-STOCK DIVIDENDS BOOKS OF TREASURY DEPARTMENT.

Printed books of the treasury department, constituting public records, kept pursuant to requirements of Constitution and state statute, presumptively containing a record of all payments made, are evidence that payments not shown of dividends on stocks owned by the Unit

ed States were not made.

1911.

After various vicissitudes the case went to trial on issue joined on the plea of payment by the company and it comes into this court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

[1] There are forty-one assignments of error in this court, which counsel in their brief compress into five questions, and these resolve themselves, at once, into three, viz.: (1) The applicability of the statute of limitations of the state of Delaware; (2) the admissibility in evidence of certain books of the Department of the Treasury; and (3) the propriety of a requested instruction in favor of the Canal Company.

Such a record constrains us to repeat the following:

"This practice of unlimited assignments is a perversion of the rule, defeating all its purposes, bewildering the counsel of the other side, and leaving the court to gather from a brief, often as prolix as the assignments of error, Which of the latter are really relied on." Phillips, etc., Construction Co. v. Seymour, 91 U. S. 646, 648 (23 L. Ed. 341), Grayson v. Lynch, 163 U. S. 468, 16 Sup. Ct. 1064, 41 L. Ed. 230, and Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 35 Sup. Ct. 865, 59 L. Ed. 1433, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 252.

The plea of the statute of limitations was rejected by both lower courts, and, although the specific assignment of this ruling as error in the Circuit Court of Appeals is *not re

8. CORPORATIONS 155(5) STOCK DIVI-peated in this court, it will be considered beDENDS EVIDENCE.

Evidence, in action by United States for dividends declared over 20 years before on stocks owned by it, held to carry clear conviction that they were not paid.

In Error to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.

Action by the United States against the Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Company. Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (240 Fed. 903, 153

cause possibly embraced within some of the general assignments.

Both lower courts ruled that the government was not bound by the state statute of limitations and that the doctrine of laches was not applicable to it, but they agreed that a rebuttable presumption of payment arose after the lapse of more than twenty years from the date when the debt became due, without suit being instituted to collect it, and that, this appearing from the pleadings of the government, the burden was upon it of

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overcoming the presumption by evidence that [ "public money” applicable to public purposes payment, as it averred, had not been made. The company, without introducing any testimony, relied wholly upon this presumption of payment.

Although the burden of the responsibility of proving nonpayment was accepted by the government, the Canal Company, nevertheless, argues that the state statute of limitations is also applicable.

[2, 3] It is settled beyond controversy that the United States when asserting "sovereign" or governmental rights is not subject to either state statutes of limitations or to laches. That the doctrine of laches is not applicable to the government was announced by Mr. Justice Story on the circuit in 1821 and afterward in 1824 authoritatively, upon principle, in United States v. Kirkpatrick, 9 Wheat.

720, 6 L. Ed. 199.

This rule has been often approved and was applied so lately as Utah Power & Light, Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 409, 37 Sup. Ct. 387, 61 L. Ed. 791.

That the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitations is settled with equal definiteness in United States v. Nashville, etc., Ry. Co., 118 U. S. 120, 6 Sup. Ct. 1006, 30 L. Ed. 81; United States v. Whited & Wheless, 246 U. S. 552, 561, 38 Sup. Ct. 367, 62 L. Ed. 879.

only, the government in collecting them was acting in its governmental capacity as much as if it were collecting taxes, such as those with which, no doubt, the stock which produced the dividends was purchased. The Circuit Court of Appeals answered this contention in a manner not to be improved upon, saying (223 Fed. 926, 928, 139 C. C. A. 406, 408 [L. R. A. 1916B, 734]):

"We may perhaps add a few words to say that the fallacy of the company's argument seems to lurk in the assumption that in this action the government is asserting a right *in its character as a stockholder. Undoubtedly the right came into being because the government owns the stock, but in no other respect has the suit anything to do with such ownership. The government is not suing as a stock

holder; it is suing as a creditor, and in this character alone is it now to be considered."

The questions remain as to the admissibility of the books and the sufficiency of the evidence to carry the case to the jury.

The government produced a witness who testified that he, in conspiracy with another employé of the Canal Company, embezzled the amount of these dividends and that to conceal their crime they placed in the files of the Canal Company, from which they were produced in evidence, forged drafts purport[4] Whether this rule extends to and in- ing to have been drawn by Assistant Treascludes the presumption of payment arising urers of the United States upon the treasurer from the lapse of twenty years *without suit of the Canal Company for payment of these to collect is not questioned by appropriate ex-dividends and also what purported to be receptions in the record before us, and it is, therefore, not decided. It is not intended, however, to approve the holding of the Circuit Court of Appeals on this subject. United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486, 489, 25 L. Ed. 194, and cases hereinbefore cited.

[5] The contention of the Canal Company that the government by becoming a stockholder in a private corporation so abdicated its governmental character that, under the circumstances of this case, it was bound as a private person by statutes and rules of limitation, cannot be allowed.

ceipts therefor. This witness testified that until 1886, when he left the employ of the Canal Company, no notice of the declaration of the three dividends in controversy had been sent to the government, as had been the practice when earlier dividends were declared; that until that time no payment of them had been made, and that the names signed to the drafts and receipts were fictitious.

The government also produced the notices by the Canal Company of the declaration of each of the fourteen earlier dividends and the record of the payment of them.

To supplement this evidence the books were produced in evidence, the admission of which is assigned as error.

Employés of the Department of the Treasury, who produced the books testified: That they were records of the department compil

If the government were asserting any rights with respect to the conduct of the corporation's affairs, its contracts or its torts, then its rights, duties and privileges would be no greater than those of any other stockholder. Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 9 Wheat. 904, 907, 6 L. Ed. 244. But here the government is pursuing a righted by authority of law under the direction of to recover, which is not affected by its relation to the corporation as a stockholder. The declaration of the dividends, which is admitted, gave it the status of a creditor of the company, and, thereafter, the right to recover was unaffected by any stockholder relation. To this must be added that the statutes and rules of limitation relate to the rem-inal entry, and the testimony was that the edy to enforce the right, and not to the corporate relation from which the right springs, and that, since these dividends constituted

the Secretary of the Treasury and were the volumes in daily use by officials and employés in the discharge of their duties; that part of them were printed *from the original records of miscellaneous revenues, in which such dividends would be classed, while others were printed compilations from books not of orig

volumes produced were intended to, and the witnesses believed did, show all of the miscellaneous receipts and disbursements of the

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(39 Sup.Ct.)

government from 1848 to 1914. They showed proper evidence to be submitted to the jury the receipt by the government of fourteen dividends paid by the Canal Company prior to those in controversy, and the witnesses testified that a careful search made by them failed to discover any record in the books of the receipt of any of the three dividends sued for. There was an elaborate description of the method employed by the Department of the Treasury in keeping its accounts and of the necessarily contemporaneous character of the original entries, which it is not necessary to rehearse. The copies produced were printed by the Public Printer.

for the determination of its value we cannot doubt. Such books so kept presumptively contained a record of all payments made, and the absence of any entry of payment, where it naturally would have been found if it had been made, was evidence of nonpayment proper for the consideration of the jury. United States v. Teschmaker et al., 22 How. 392, 405, 16 L. Ed. 353; State v. McCormick, 57 Kan. 440, 46 Pac. 777, 57 Am. St. Rep. 341; Bastrop State Bank v. Levy, 106 La. 586, 31 South. 164; Wigmore on Evidence, § 1531, and section 1633, par. 6.

[8] We agree with the Circuit Court of Appeals that the evidence introduced carries clear conviction that the dividends were never paid, and that the request of the Canal

[6] The objection is that these are not books of original entry and that they are not certified as copies of public records are required to be by Rev. St. § 882 (Comp. St. § 1494). It is enough to say of this last contention | Company for an instructed verdict in its fathat although the books admitted were printed from written public records, they were so printed by authority of law and were produced from the custody of the Department of the Treasury, where they were used as original records in the transaction of the daily business of the department, and therefore they did not require certification.

[7] They were public records, kept pursuant to constitutional and statutory requirement. Constitution of the United States, Article 1, § 9, cl. 7; Act of Congress, approved September 2, 1789, c. 12, § 2 (1 Stat. 65); Rev. St. § 257 (Comp. St. § 386); Act of Congress, approved September 30, 1890 (26 Stat. 504, 511, c. 1126); Act approved July 31, 1894, (c. 174, § 15, 28 Stat. 210 [Comp. St. § 388]). Thus, their character as public records required by law to be kept, the official character of their contents entered under the sanction of public duty, *the obvious necessity for regular contemporaneous entries in them and the reduction to a minimum of motive on the part of public officials and employés to either make false entries or to omit proper ones, all unite to make these books admissible as unusually trustworthy sources of evidence. Gaines v. Relf, 12 How. 472, 570, 13 L. Ed. 1071; Bryan et al. v. Forsyth, 19 How. 334, 338, 15 L. Ed. 674; Post v. Supervisors, 105 U. S. 667, 670, 26 L. Ed. 1204; Oakes v. United States, 174 U. S. 778, 783, 796, 19 Sup. Ct. 864, 43 L. Ed. 1169; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245, 253, 31 Sup. Ct. 2, 54 L. Ed. 1021, 20 Ann. Cas. 1138. Obviously such books are not subject to the rules of restricted admissibility applicable to private account books. The considerations which we have found rendered the books admissible in evidence as tending to prove the truth of the statements of entries contained in them also make them admissible as evidence tending to show that because the receipt of the dividends was not entered in them they were not received and therefore were not paid. The evidence may not be as persuasive in the latter case as in the former, but that it was

vor was properly denied. The judgment of
the Circuit Court of Appeals is
Affirmed.

(250 U. S. 104)

UNITED STATES v. REYNOLDS. (Argued March 4 and 5, 1919. Decided May 19, 1919.)

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that the right of the President to extend the trust period continued beyond the 25 years and until the United States surrendered its trust by conveying the absolute fee-simple title to the Indian allottee or his heirs.

other persons, heirs at law of Stella Wash- | had the effect of extending the trust, with ington, deceased, who was a member of the resulting *restriction upon the right of alienAbsentee Shawnee Tribe of Indians of Okla-ation, for the further period of 10 years. If, homa; its object being to cancel a deed made on the other hand, the original trust period by Tyner to Suda Reynolds on February 17, should be dated from the approval of the al1917, purporting to convey an undivided elev-lotment, it still is insisted by the government enth interest in a tract of land inherited by the 11 heirs from Stella Washington, who was the allottee thereof. The legal title to the tract was held by the United States under a certificate of allotment or "trust patent," dated February 6, 1892, containing a provision that the United States did and would hold the land in question in trust for the said Stella and in case of her death for her heirs, for a period of 25 years, at the expiration of which time the United States would convey the same by patent in fee, discharged of the trust, to said Indian or her heirs, unless the trust period had been extended by the President of the United States. The allotment was made under the provisions of the Act of Congress approved February 8, 1887 (chapter 119, 24 Stat. 388), as amended by Act of March 3, 1891 (chapter 543, *26 Stat. 989, 1019). Section 5 of the Act of 1887 (Comp. St. § 4201) provided:

The District Court sustained the contention of the United States and entered a decree canceling Tyner's deed as void and constituting a cloud upon its title. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decree and directed a dismissal of the bill. 252 Fed. 65.

The latter decision rests upon the ground that under section 5 of the allotment act the right of the allottee to a preliminary or trust patent became absolute upon the approval of the allotment by the Secretary of the Interior; that her equitable title was then complete, and did not depend upon the delivery of the patent. Ballinger v. Frost, 216 U. S. 240, 30 Sup. Ct. 338, 54 L. Ed. 464, was cited in support of this; but it is not entirely apposite. That case turned upon the effect of a certificate of allotment issued under the Choctaw and Chickasaw Agreement (Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1362, 32 Stat. 641, 644), the twenty-third section of which declared that such certificate should be "conclusive evi

"That upon the approval of the allotments provided for in this act by the Secretary of the Interior, he shall cause patents to issue therefor in the name of the allottees, which patents shall be of the legal effect, and declare that the United States does and will hold the land thus allotted, for the period of twenty-five years, in trust for the sole use and benefit of the In-dence of the right of any allottee to the tract dian to whom such allotment shall have been made, or, in case of his decease, of his heirs according to the laws of the state or territory where such land is located, and that at the expiration of said period the United States will convey the same by patent to said Indian, or his heirs as aforesaid, in fee, discharged of said trust and free of all charge or incumbrance whatsoever: Provided, that the President of the United States may in any case in his discretion extend the period. And if any conveyance shall be made of the lands set apart and allotted as herein provided, or any contract made touching the same, before the expiration of the time above mentioned, such conveyance or contract shall be absolutely null and void."

of land described therein." The Indian, being a citizen and resident of the Choctaw Nation duly enrolled and entitled to an allotment, selected as such the land in controversy, upon which were her buildings and improvements; this was received by the Commission to the Five Civilized Tribes, and, after the expiration of 9 months, the time prescribed by statute for contest, no contest of her right to the designated allotment having been made, a certificate was issued and delivered to her. This court held the allottee's rights had become fixed, the Secretary of the Interior thereafter having nothing but the ministerial duty to perform of seeing that a

Stella Washington's allotment was approv-patent was duly executed and delivered, and ed by the Secretary September 16, 1891; the allotment certificate or trust patent was issued on February 6, 1892. On November 24, 1916, the President by executive order extended the trust period for 10 years. Thereafter, on February 17, 1917, Tyner executed the deed in question to Suda Reynolds.

upon this ground sustained a judgment awarding a writ of mandamus, citing Barney v. Dolph, 97 U. S. 652, 656, 24 L. Ed. 1063; Simmons v. Wagner, 101 U. S. 260, 261, 25 L. Ed. 910; Cornelius v. Kessel. 128 U. S. 456, 461, 9 Sup. Ct. 122, 32 L. Ed. 482; Orchard v. Alexander, 157 U. S. 372, 383, 15 Sup. Ct.

[1] The first question presented by the rec-635, 39 L. Ed. 737; and other cases. ord is whether the original trust period ex- The rule established by these cases is fatended for 25 years from February 6, 1892, miliar. But we do not think it can be apthe date of the trust patent, or from Septem- plied so as to give finality to the act of the ber 16, 1891, the date of the approval of the Secretary in approving the allotment under allotment. If the former, there is no ques- section 5 of the act of 1887. Nor does that tion that the executive order, being made act contain any such declaration of concluwithin the original trust period, was valid sive effect as is found in section 23 of the (subject to an objection as to its form), and | Choctaw-Chickasaw Agreement. While the

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matter is not free from doubt, we have reached the conclusion that by the better construction the trust period begins and dates from the issuance of the trust patent, and not from the approval of the allotment. The Department distinctly so ruled in Klamath Allotments, 38 Land Dec. 559, 561, where it was said, after quoting the pertinent language of section 5 of the act of 1887:

"Clearly no trust is declared until actual issuance of patent, and the use of a word of the present tense, 'does,' shows that the trust period begins to run only upon such issuance."

[2] Calculating the 25-year period from February 6, 1892, the date of trust patent for the Stella Washington allotment, it expired on February 5, 1917; but the trust was extended for a further term of ten years, and hence the deed made by Claudius Tyner to Suda Reynolds February *17, 1917, was null and void by the terms of section 5 of the act of 1887.

As the President's order was made within the original 25-year period, it is unnecessary to consider whether he might have acted with like effect at a later time.

The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed and that of the District Court is affirmed.

(250 U. S. 114)

This ruling was made in the year 1910, and may be inconsistent with some previous rulirgs of the Department, as counsel for respondent insists that it is. Nevertheless it is entitled to weight as an administrative interpretation of the act; it comports with our impression of the natural meaning of the language employed by Congress; and it very (Argued April 16, 1919. Decided May 19, probably was relied upon by the President when promulgating the order of November 24, 1916, extending the trust period.

This

BERKMAN et al. v. UNITED STATES.

1919.)

No. 865.

order might as well have been made a few COURTS 385(5) — Supreme Court — Error months earlier, had it been supposed that the 25-year period was to expire in September.

TO DISTRICT COURT-UNSUBSTANTIAL CON-
STITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.

This construction of the act of 1887 puts it The suggested constitutional questions that in agreement with other acts for the allot- Rev. St. § 828 (Comp. St. § 1383), giving 1 ment of Indian lands, which, while subse- per cent. of the amount to a District Court clerk quently passed and perhaps not strictly to be as compensation for receiving, keeping, and payregarded as a legislative interpretation, nev-ing out money, construed as applicable where ertheless seem to us to indicate the effect that Congress attributed to the act of 1887. Some criticism is made by counsel for respondent upon the form of the executive order of November 24, 1916, as being indefinite and not in accordance with the act of Congress. We deem this criticism unfounded, and need spend no time upon it.

1 Act of March 2, 1889 (chapter 422, 25 Stat. 1013, 1014), providing for allotments to Peorias and Miamis, contains this provision: "The land so allotted shall not be subject to alienation for twenty-five years from the date of the issuance of patent therefor."

Act of March 2, 1895 (chapter 188, 28 Stat. 876, 907, the Quapaw Act), contains this: "Provided, that said allotments shall be inalienable for a period of twenty-five years from and after the date of said patents."

Act of July 1, 1902 (chapter 1362, 32 Stat. 641, 642, Choctaw-Chickasaw Act), contains the following: Section 12, relating to homesteads: "Shall be

inalienable during the lifetime of the allottee, not

exceeding twenty-one years from the date of certificate of allotment."

Section 13: "The allotment of each Choctaw and Chickasaw freedman shall be inalienable during the lifetime of the allottee, not exceeding twentyone years from the date of certificate of allotment." Section 16: "All lands allotted to the members of said tribes, except such land as is set aside to each for a homestead as herein provided, shall be alienable after issuance of patent as follows: Onefourth in acreage in one year, one-fourth in acreage in three years, and the balance in five years; in each case from date of patent."

Cherokee Allotment Act of July 1, 1902 (chapter 1375, 32 Stat. 716), contains similar language in sections 13 and 15.

cash is deposited in lieu of bail for appearance of persons charged with crime, deprives them of property without due process, or takes private property for public use without compensation, or deprives them of privileges or immunities enjoyed by citizens of other states, are wholly wanting in merit, and too insubstantial to support jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of error to the District Court by the Supreme Court under Judicial Code, § 238 (Comp. St. § 1215). Mr. Justice Holmes and Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting.

In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York.

Alexander Berkman and Emma Goldman were prosecuted by the United States. The District Court refused to direct return of the 1 per cent. of defendants' cash bail, retained by the clerk as compensation, and they bring error. Dismissed.

Mr. Harry Weinberger, of New York City, for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Porter, for the United States.

*Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Section 828, U. S. Revised Statutes (Comp. St. § 1383), which specifies the compensation to be taxed and allowed to clerks of District Courts, among other things provides:

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