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C. C. A. 573. The present decision is enough to establish that the condemnation followed the State law. See also Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Yazoo & Mississippi Valley R. R. Co., 90 Miss. 686, 44 South. 166. No act of Congress prevents the State proceedings having their intended effect.
fied right of way. But they allow only one | Congress gave its assent to the acquisition line of poles to be set up, and require it to be of such rights in post roads by any means erected "in such manner and at such dis- otherwise proper, as against any objection tance from defendant's (the railroad's) track that it was an interference with interstate as in no way to interfere with the operation commerce, and such is the implication of the of trains of said defendants, or with any cases. "State sovereignty under the Constiproper and legitimate use thereof by de- tution is not interfered with." Pensacola fendants, or the use by any telegraph or Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph telephone company now existing thereon, Co., 96 U. S. 1, 12, 24 L. Ed. 708; Western and so as not to be dangerous to persons Union Telegraph Co. v. Richmond, 224 U. S. or property, and subject to all the stipu- 160, 169, 32 Sup. Ct. 449, 56 L. Ed. 710; lations and agreements in said petition con- Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Louisville & tained." The petition contains a agree- | Nashville R. R. Co., 207 Fed. 1, 11, 12, 124 ment that if, after the erection of the poles, etc., "it should become necessary for the said defendant to change the location of its tracks, or construct new tracks, or side tracks, where the same do not now exist, and for such purpose to use or occupy that portion of said right of way on which petitioner's poles are, or may be set, cross arms placed thereon and wires strung, your petitioner will, at its own expense upon reasonable notice from said defendants, remove said poles, cross arms and wires to such other point, or points, on said defendant's right of way as shall be designated by said defendant." This agreement is binding. Mobile & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Postal Telegraph Cable Co., 76 Miss. 731, 752, 753, 26 South. 370, 45 L. R. A. 223. The description has been held to satisfy the requirements of *State law and it would be extravagant to say that the Fourteenth Amendment made it bad.
 It is contended that the State had no power to condemn for the use of the telegraph company any part of the right of way of an interstate road or bridge over navigable waters. Support for the argument is sought in Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 195 U. S. 540, 25 Sup. Ct. 133, 49 L. Ed. 312, 1 Ann. Cas. 517. That case shows, to be sure, that the Act of July 24, 1866, c. 230, 14 Stat. 221, R. S. § 5263 (Comp. St. § 10072), purporting to grant to any telegraph company the right to construct and maintain lines along the post roads of the United States and to cross navigable streams, did not of itself give the right to appropriate private property. But it equally shows that
 We think it unnecessary to deal with the somewhat meticulous objections to the form in which the Mississippi decree was pleaded and proved in the District Court or to repeat the answer of the defendant in error to the contention that if proved it was not an adjudication. If the bill in the District Court had not been disposed of by the State decree it would be dismissed under our present decision. Two days before the answer setting up the *State decree the railroad filed a supplemental bill alleging that the telegraph company had no longer any rights except under the condemnation proceedings but that it still was using its old line. The telegraph company pleaded in reply an injunction, mentioned above, granted by another Court of the United States, forbidding the railroad to interrupt the telegraph in the use of its wires upon the railroad's right of way, the declared purpose being to preserve the status quo for a certain time, or until the condemnation could be carried out. 207 Fed. 1, 5, 124 C. C. A. 573. If for any reason the supplemental bill does not fall with the bill this earlier action in the Sixth Circuit (while it stands, see 252 Fed. 29, 164 C. C. A. 141), properly was regarded as precluding contrary action in the Fifth. Decrees affirmed.
Suit by William H. Odell against the F. C. Farnsworth Company and another. Bill dismissed (257 Fed. 101), and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
Mr. Samuel E. Darby, of New York City, for appellant.
Mr. Edmund H. Parry, of Washington, D. C., for appellees.
one of the defendants, to which the other de
the whole term of said patent," and that on
The prayer is for a discovery of the number of "steam traps" covered by the patent which the defendants have sold and for a decree that they "account for and pay over to your orator the amount of royalties thereon, which the defendants are required to do *Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opin- under the agreement herein referred to," and ion of the Court.
This is an appeal from a decree of the District Court for the Southern District of New York, dismissing plaintiff's (appellant's) bill for want of jurisdiction.
The District Court certifies: That the case was heard on the bill of complaint and a motion by the defendants to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, that the court ruled that the cause of action stated in the bill is an action on a contract and is not a suit arising under the patent laws of the United States, and that the bill was dismissed for want of jurisdiction, solely because it showed on its face that the matter in controversy is less than $3,000.
for the costs of suit.
Thus, neither the allegations nor the prayer of the bill aims at annulling or even modifying either the assignment of the patent or the contract on account of the breach of the latter, but, on the contrary, plainly, the case intended to be stated, is one to enforce the contract and collect the royalties stipulated in it. Infringement of the patent is not alleged, but, on the contrary, a completed grant and assignment of the legal title to it is pleaded, sufficient on its face, while unmodified, to disable the plaintiff from maintaining a suit for any infringement subsequent to the date of such assignment.
The bill shows the requisite diversity of To constitute a suit under the patent laws citizenship to give the court jurisdiction, but the "plaintiff must set up some right, title or the amount claimed is only $1,800, and there-interest under the patent laws, or at least fore it did not have jurisdiction (Judicial Code [Act March 3, 1911, c. 231] § 24, par. 1, 36 Stat. 1091 [Comp. St. § 991]), unless the case is one arising under the patent laws of the United States.
The contention of the appellant is that the suit is one for infringement of a patent and arises under the patent laws, and that therefore the Court had jurisdiction, regardless of the amount involved, Judicial Code, § 24, par. 7.
make it appear that some right or privilege will be defeated by one construction, or sustained by the opposite construction, of these laws." Pratt v. Paris Gaslight & Coke Co., 168 U. S. 255, 259, 18 Sup. Ct. 62, 64 (42 L. Ed. 458).
The party who brings suit is "master to decide what law he will rely upon," and the allegations of his bill are the evidence, or the expression, of his decision, upon which the courts must act in determining the quesThe allegations of the bill are: That the tion of their jurisdiction. The Fair v. plaintiff was an inventor of a new and use- Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U. S. 22, 33 ful "steam trap," upon which he was granted Sup. Ct. 410, 57 L. Ed. 716; Healy v. Sea letters patent No. 837,711; that on Septem- | Gull Specialty Co., 237 U. S. 479, 35 Sup. Ct. ber 8, 1914, he made a grant, in writing, to 658, 59 L. Ed. 1056.
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It is too clear for discussion that the case | McReynolds and Mr. Justice Van Devanter constated in the bill is a suit for royalties based cur in the result, but do not assent to the on the contract, and not at all involving the grounds on which it is based. construction of any law relating to patents. It has been often decided by this court that such a suit is not one arising under the patent laws, and since less than the requisite juris
dictional amount is claimed the District Court did not err in dismissing the bill. Wilson V. Sandford, 10 How. 99, 13 L. Ed. 344; Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt, 125 U. S. 46, 8 Sup. Ct. 756, 31 L. Ed. 683; Albright v. Teas, 106 U. S. 613, 1 Sup. Ct. 550, 27 L. Ed. 295; Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pacific Bridge Co., 185 U. S. 282, 22 Sup. Ct. 681, 46 L. Ed. 910; Briggs v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 239 U. S. 48, 36 Sup. Ct. 6, 60 L. Ed. 138. The decree of the District Court must be Affirmed.
(250 U. S. 478)
On Writ of Certiorari to the Court of Civil
Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial
Action by B. Leatherwood against the Texas & Pacific Railway Company and the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway of Texas. A judgment for plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals, and that court having denied rehearing and declined to certify to the Supreme Court of Texas, defendants, bring certiorari. Reversed.
*Messrs. George Thompson and J. H. Barwise, Jr., both of Ft. Worth, Tex., for peti
Mr. D. T. Bomar, of Ft. Worth, Tex., for respondent.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS announced the
TEXAS & P. RY. CO. et al. v. LEATHER- judgment of the Court, and delivered the fol
(Submitted March 19, 1919. Decided June 9,
1919.) No. 249.
1. CARRIERS 219(8) — INTERSTATE TRANSPORATION-BILLS OF LADING.
Leatherwood made, in 1913, a shipment of horses from Watrous, N. M., to Waco, Tex., over four connecting railroads. The initial carrier gave him a through bill of lading which contained a provision barring any action for damages unless suit was brought within six months after the loss occurred. When the horses reached the lines of the Texas & Pacific Railway and of the Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway, each of these companies insisted, as a condition of carrying them further, that Leatherwood accept and sign a new bill of lading covering the shipment over its line, and he did so.
Under the Carmack Amendment (Comp. St. §§ 8604a, 8604aa), a bill of lading on an interstate shipment of live stock issued by the initial carrier is binding on the shipper and all connecting carriers, just as the rate properly filed by the initial carrier is binding on them; so connecting carriers, though they insisted as a condition of carrying the shipment further that the shipper accept and sign a new bill of lading, may rely on a provision in the original In 1915 he brought suit in a state court of bill of lading limiting the time for action, Texas for injury to the horses while in transthough the bills they issued contained no such it on the lines of those two companies. The limitation. (Per the Chief Justice, Mr. Jus- bills of lading issued by them did not contice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. tain the provision requiring suit to be brought Justice Day.) within six months; but the carriers set up 2. CARRIERS CARRIAGE OF LIVE as a defense the provisions to that effect conSTOCK-TIME FOR SUIT-LIMITATION. A provision in a through bill of lading issued for the interstate shipment of live stock, barring any action for damages unless suit should be brought within six months after loss occurred, is reasonable and should be enforced. (Per the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. Justice Day.) 3. CERTIORARI 71-COSTS-PRINTING UNNECESSARY MATTER IN RECORD.
Under rule 8, § 1 (32 Sup. Ct. vi), petitioner will be required to pay the entire expenses of printing a lengthy transcript, where most of the matter which was included in it at the instance of petitioner was clearly not required for proper presentation of the question submitted. (Per the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Brandeis, Mr. Justice Holmes, and Mr. Justice Day.)
Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Pitney, and Mr. Justice Clarke dissent, while Mr. Justice
tained in the original bill of lading, contending that under the Carmack Amendment (Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, 34 Stat. 584, 595 [Comp. St. §§ 8604a, 8604aa]) all connecting carriers were bound by its terms and that the later ones issued by themselves were of no legal effect. The trial court denied this contention, and ruled as matter of law that the carriers could not rely upon the provision in the initial bill of lading. Judgment was entered for the plaintiff and affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. On June 2, 1917, that court denied a rehearing and declined to certify to the Supreme Court of Texas the questions involved. The case comes here on
1 The rights of the parties are not affected by the Act of Mareh 4, 1915, c. 176, 38 Stat. 1196, which prohibits a common carrier from providing by contract or otherwise for a shorter period than two years for the institution of suits.
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writ of certiorari (245 U. S. 649, 38 Sup. Ct. | 853, L. R. A. 1915E, 665; Missouri, Kansas 12, 62 L. Ed. 530) under section 237 of the & Texas Ry. Co. of Texas v. Schnoutz, 245 U. Judicial Code (Act March 3, 1911, c. 231, 36 S. 641, 38 Sup. Ct. 221, 62 L. Ed. 527 (per Stat. 1156), as amended by Act of September curiam). 6, 1916, c. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726 (Comp. St. § 1214).
 The provision in the original bill of lading limiting to six months the time within which suit may be brought, not being unreasonable (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 672, 673, 33 Sup. Ct. 397, 57 L. Ed. 690), was valid; and as the original bill of lading remained binding, the lower courts erred in denying it effect. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals must therefore be reversed.
 The record occupies 213 printed pages. Most of the matter which was included in it at the instance of petitioners, was clearly not required for a proper presentation of the questions submitted here. Much useless expense has been incurred; and both court and counsel have been subjected to the burden of examining much that is irrelevant. Section 1 of rule 8 of this court (32 Sup. Ct. vi) specifically provides that if portions of the record unnecessary to a proper presentation of the case are found to have been incorporated into the transcript by either party, the court may order that the whole or any part of the clerk's fees for supervising the printing and the cost of printing the record be paid by the offending party. Under the circumstances of this case it seems appropriate that the whole of this expense be borne by the petitioners; and it is so ordered.
 The final decision below was rendered two days before the decision of this court in Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Ward, 244 U. S. 383, 37 Sup. Ct. 617, 61 L. Ed. 1213. There one of the same railroads had, as connecting carrier, issued a second bill of lading to shippers of live stock, who had received from the initial carriers a through bill of lading on an interstate shipment. But there the carriers relied for defense upon a clause in the second bill of lading, which was not contained in the first. We held that the second bill of lading was void, since under the Carmack Amendment the several carriers must be treated, not as independent contracting parties, but as one system; and that the connecting lines become in effect mere agents whose duty it is to forward the goods under the terms of the contract made by their principal, the initial carrier, and that they are prevented by law from varying the terms of that contract. Leatherwood contends that the principle upon which the case was decided is not applicable here, because there the carriers sought to avail themselves of the second bill of lading, while here they seek to ignore it; and he insists that the carriers are, by their conduct, estopped from asserting its invalidity. As stated in Georgia, Florida & Alabama Ry. Co. v. Blish Milling Co., 241 U. S. 190, 197, 36 Sup. Ct. 541, 60 L. Ed. 948, the parties to a bill of lading cannot waive its terms, nor can the carrier by its conduct give the shipper a right to ignore them. "A different view would antagonize the plain policy of the act and open the door to the very abuses at which the act was aimMr. Justice MCREYNOLDS concurring. ed." The bill of lading given by the initial I concur in the conclusion that the judgcarrier embodies the contract for transporta- ment below must be reversed. Circumstances tion from point of origin to destination; and disclosed by the record and not discussed in its terms in respect to conditions of liability the opinion, I think, require this result. But are binding upon the shipper and upon all the broad declaration that the parties to a bill connecting carriers, just as a rate properly of lading cannot waive its terms nor can the filed by the initial carrier is binding upon carrier, by its conduct, give the shipper the them. Each has in effect the force of a stat- right to ignore them goes beyond what is necute, of which all affected must take notice. essary to the decision and I am not prepared That a carrier cannot be prevented by estop- to assent to it as a proposition of law. pel or otherwise from taking advantage of *Suit was originally brought against the the lawful rate properly filed under the In- initial line (The Santa Fé) and connecting terstate Commerce Act is well settled. A ones-Texas & Pacific Ry. Co., and Missouri, carrier has, for instance, been permitted to Kansas & Texas Railway-the claim being collect the legal rate, although it had quoted based upon the implied obligation arising out a lower rate and the shipper was ignorant of of delivery and acceptance of the horses by the fact that it was not the legal rate. Texas the former for through interstate carriage. & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 26 In his pleadings the shipper expressly denied Sup. Ct. 628, 50 L. Ed. 1011: Illinois Central validity of all bills of lading-one issued by Railroad Co. v. Henderson Elevator Co., 226 the Santa Fé and one by each of the petitionU. S. 441, 33 Sup. Ct. 176, 57 L. Ed. 290; ers. Of course, under the rule approved in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Max- Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Ward, well, 237 U. S. 94, 35 Sup. Ct. 494, 59 L. Ed. | 244 U. S. 383, 37 Sup. Ct. 617, 61 L. Ed. 1213,
I am authorized to say that the CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice HOLMES, and Mr. Justice DAY concur in the above opinion.
Mr. Justice MCKENNA, Mr. Justice PITNEY, and Mr. Justice CLARKE dissent.
*Mr. Thomas Watts, of Middletown, N. Y., for petitioner.
Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
he could have relied upon the first bill; but it does not follow that if, during transit, a connecting carrier declined to recognize the Mr. Reeves T. Strickland, of Washington, original agreement for through transporta- | D. C., for respondents. tion and refused to proceed thereunder, he had no power to acquiesce, take possession of the animals and re-ship under another contract with such carrier not subject to avoidance by it. And if, in the present cause, instead of repudiating the bills of lading issued by connecting roads he had relied upon them the question presented would be a very different one, decision of which is not now demanded.
Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER joins in this opinion.
(250 U. S. 465)
ERIE R. CO. v. SHUART et al.
Respondents delivered to the Toledo, St. Louis & Western Kailroad, at East St. Louis, Ill., a carload of horses for transportation, under a limited liability live stock contract or bill of lading via petitioner's road, to themselves at Suffern, N. Y., their home. Among other things the contract provided:
"That the said shipper is at his own sole risk and expense to load and take care of and to feed and water said stock whilst being transported, whether delayed in transit or otherwise, and to unload the same; and neither said carrier nor any connecting carrier is to be under any liability or duty with reference thereto,
(Submitted April 25, 1919. Decided June 9, except in the actual transportation of the same.
1919.) No. 342.
1. CARRIERS 218(3)
* That no claim for damages which may accrue to the said shipper under this contract shall be allowed or paid by the said carrier, or sued for in any court by the said shipper, unless a claim for such loss or damage shall be made in writing, verified by the affidavit of the said shipditor of the said carrier at his office in the city per or his agent, and delivered to the general auof Chicago, Ill., within five days from the time said stock is removed from said car or cars, and that if any loss or damage occurs upon the shall not be liable unless a claim shall be made line of a connecting carrier, then such carrier
A provision in a limited liability live stock contract or bill of lading for an interstate shipment, requiring presentation within five days from the time the stock is removed from the car or cars of claim for any loss or damage as a condition to recovery, is valid and controlling as to any liability of carrier arising from begin-in like manner, and delivered in like time, to ning to end of the transportation.
some proper officer or agent of the carrier, on 2. CARRIERS 218(10)-LIVE STOCK-LIMI- whose line the loss or injury occurs." TATION OF LIABILITY-CLAIM-"TRANSPORTATION."
 Immediately after the car arrived at Though a car containing an interstate ship-Suffern, petitioner placed it on a switch track ment of horses had arrived at its destinatiou, opposite a cattle chute and left it in charge of and the consignees were proceeding to unload respondents for unloading. By letting down the animals through a cattle chute owned and a bridge they at once connected the chute operated by the carrier, the transportation was not complete, and, where the horses were in- and car and were about to lead out four jured when other cars were pushed against the horses, when an engine pushed other cars one being unloaded, written claim of loss, made against it and injured the animals therein. a condition to liability in bill of lading, must No written claim was made for the loss or be given in order to support recovery against damage as provided by the bill of lading; the carrier. and when sued the carrier defended upon that ground. Respondents maintain that transportation had ended when the accident occurred and consequently no written claim was necessary. The courts below accepted this view.
[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Transportation.]
Mr. Justice Clarke, Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Day dissenting.
Under our former opinions, the clause requiring presentation of a written claim is
On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme clearly valid and controlling as to any liaCourt of the State of New York.
Action by John R. Shuart, Leo Shuart, and John R. Shuart, Jr., doing business under the name of John R. Shuart & Sons against the Erie Railroad Company. A judgment for plaintiffs (166 App. Div. 895, 150 N. Y. Supp. 1112) was affirmed (221 N. Y. 680, 117 N. E. 1084), and defendant brings certiorari. Reversed and remanded.
bility arising from beginning to end of the transportation contracted for. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. McLaughlin, 242 U. S. 142, 37 Sup. Ct. 40, 61 L. Ed. 207; St. Louis, Iron Mt. & So. Ry. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U. S. 592, 37 Sup. Ct. 462, 61 L. Ed. 917; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. J. G. Leach, 249 U. S. 217, 39 Sup. Ct. 254, 63 L. Ed. 570 (decided March 10, 1919); Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St.
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