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Counsel argue the case by reference to the transcript of the record in the Circuit Court of Appeals, and it is apparent that a proper consideration of the case requires such reference. This transcript is no part of our record. This court alone has authority to have it sent up. The briefs in the Circuit Court of Appeals are no part of the record here. The certificate is required to state the pertinent facts in order that this court may answer the questions of law certified with reference to such facts, and not by searching the records and briefs of the Circuit Court of Appeals itself.
 The certificate therefore fails to comply with our rule, *and in accordance with the established practice must be dismissed. Cincinnati, Hamilton & Dayton R. R. Co. v. McKeen, 149 U. S. 259, 261, 13 Sup. Ct. 840, 37 L. Ed. 725; Stratton's Independence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 422, 34 Sup. Ct. 136, 58 L. Ed. 285, and cases cited. Dismissed.
(248 U. S. 185)
SANDBERG et al. v. McDONALD.
tion and giving civil courts of the United States jurisdiction over wage controversies arising within its jurisdiction, amply account for the provision for abrogation of inconsistent treaty provi
(Argued Nov. 5, 1918. Decided Dec. 23, 1918.) No. 392.
1. SEAMEN 23-WAGES-ADVANCE PAYMENT-FOREIGN SHIPS IN FOREIGN PORTS.
Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, § 11 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8323), declaring it unlawful to pay a seaman wages in advance, that such an advancement shall in no case except as herein provided absolve from full payment of wages when actually earned, and that this section shall apply to foreign vessels "while in the waters of the United States," does not apply to advancements by foreign vessels in foreign ports. 2. STATUTES
Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to the limits over which the lawmaking power has jurisdiction.
Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Clarke,
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Suit in admiralty by Erik Sandberg and others against the British ship Talus; John Decree for libelants McDonald, claimant. (242 Fed. 954) was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (248 Fed. 670, 160 C. C. A. 570), and libelants bring certiorari.
Messrs. Alexander T. Howard, of Mobile, Ala., and W. J. Waguespack, of New Orleans, La., for petitioners.
Mr. Palmer Pillans, of Mobile, Ala., for respondent.
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Brown, for the United States.
23-WAGES-ADVANCE 3. SEAMEN PAYMENT APPLICABILITY OF SEAMEN'S ACT. That Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, § 11 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8323), prohibiting payment of wages in advance to seamen, and declaring that an advancement shall not absolve from payment of wages when earned and shall subject the offender to criminal liability, declares the master and owner of any foreign ship violating the section liable to the same penalty that the master or owner of a vessel of the United States would be, strengthens the presumption that it was intended to deal only with acts committed within the jurisdiction of the United States.
*Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
4. SEAMEN 4-SEAMEN'S ACT-ABROGATION OF INCONSISTENT TREATIES.
The provisions of Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, abolishing the right of arrest for deser
This case brings before us for consideration certain features of the so-called "Seaman's Act." Act March 4, 1915, c. 153, 38 Stat. 1165. The act is entitled:
"An act to promote the welfare of American seamen in the merchant marine of *the United States; to abolish arrest and imprisonment as a penalty for desertion and to secure the abrogation of treaty provisions in relation thereto; and to promote safety at sea."
It contains numerous provisions intended to secure better treatment of seamen, and to 212-APPLICATION-INTENT- secure for them better conditions of service.
The libel charges a demand in Mobile, Alabama, for one-half part of the wages then earned by the seamen, and the refusal of the master to pay the amount which the libelants claimed to be due. The master paid each of them what he conceived to be due, deducting certain advances made to the men at Liverpool, England, where the seamen were signed.
The facts are:
The Talus is a British ship and the libelants and petitioners citizens or subjects of nations other than the United States and at the time of employment by the ship and before boarding her they received certain advances at Liverpool by the ship or its agents, a practice usual and customary and not forThe bidden by the laws of Great Britain. advance did not, as to any libelant, exceed the amount of a month's wages.
The libelants boarded the ship at Dublin, Ireland, December 1, 1916, and remained in
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
her service until they left her at Mobile, | providing him with employment, he shall for every such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not more than six months or fined not more than $500.
The ship arrived in American waters on February 11, 1917, off Port Morgan, from whence she proceeded immediately to Mo-* bile, where she remained until after February 24th, and unloaded and loaded cargoes. During the voyage and at Mobile prior to February 22d, libelants received certain payments from the ship in cash and in articles purchased from it.
On February 22d libelants demanded of the master of the ship payment of one-half of the wages earned by them to that date. The master then paid to them a sum which, with the cash paid them and the price of the articles *purchased as stated above, together with the advances made in Liverpool, equaled or exceeded the one-half of the wages then earned by each of them from the commencement of his service for the ship. It was less, however, than such one-half wages if the advances at Liverpool had not been included in the credits. The master claimed that those advances should be deducted from the one-half wages, and did deduct them, and the sum or sums paid by the master to the libelants exceeded the amount of wages earned by them for the eleven days the had been in American waters. The libelants quit the ship February 24, 1917, and were logged as deserters on the same day.
foreign vessels while in the waters of the United "(e) That this section shall apply as well to States, as to vessels of the United States, and any master, owner, consignee, or agent of any foreign vessel who has violated its provisions shall be liable to the same penalty that the master, owner, or agent of a vessel of the United States would be for similar violation.
"The master, owner, consignee, or agent of any vessel of the United States, or of any forUnited States, shall present his shipping articles eign vessel seeking clearance from a port of the at the office of clearance, and no clearance shall be granted any such vessel unless the provisions of this section have been complied with."
"Sec. 10. (a) That it shall be, and is hereby, made unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages, or to make any order, or note, or other evidence of indebtedness therefor to any other person, or to pay any person, for the shipment of seamen when payment is deducted or to be deducted from a seaman's wages. Any person violating any of the foregoing provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than $100, and may also be imprisoned for a period of not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such advance wages or allotment shall in no case except as herein provided absolve the vessel or the master or the *owner thereof from the full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit or action for the recovery of such wages. If any person shall demand or receive, either directly or indirectly, from any seaman or other person seeking employment, as seaman, or from any person on his behalf, any remuneration whatever for
The genesis and history of this legislation is found in U. S. Compiled Statutes 1916, volume 7, section 8323, annotated.
The Dingley Act of June 26, 1884 (c. 121, 23 Stat. 55, 56), which is the origin of this section, contains terms much like those found in this act. That statute, as the present one, in the aspect now before us, was intended to prevent the evils arising from advanced payshipments to seamen, and to protect them against a class of persons who took advantage of their necessities and through whom vessels were obliged to provide themselves with seamen. These persons obtained assignments,
Under the foregoing statement of facts the question for decision is: Was the mas- of the advanced wages of sailors. In many ter entitled to make deduction from the sea-instances this was accomplished with little men's pay in the amount of the advance- or no service to the men who were obliged ments made at Liverpool? The District to obtain employment through such agencies. Court held that these advancements could In the Dingley Act it was made unlawful not be deducted. 242 Fed. 954. The Circuit to pay seamen's wages before leaving the Court of Appeals reached the opposite con- port at which he was engaged. In the presclusion. 248 Fed. 670, 160 C. C. A. 570. The ent act it is made unlawful to pay seamen's pertinent section of the act for consideration wages in advance of the time when he has reads: actually earned the same. The Act of 1884 by its terms applied as well to foreign vessels as to the vessels of the United States, and masters of foreign vessels violating the law were refused clearance from any port of the United States. The present statute is made to apply as well to foreign vessels while in the waters of the United States as to vessels of the United States.
In the present statute, in the section from which we have just quoted, masters, owners, consignees, or owners of foreign vessels are made liable to the same penalties as are the like persons in case of vessels of the United States. Such persons in case the vessels are those of the United States or foreign vessels, seeking clearance in ports of the United States, are required to present their shipping articles at the office of clearance, and no clearance is permitted unless the provisions of the statute are complied with.
The Act of 1884 came before the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in the case of The State of Maine, 22 Fed. 734. In a clear and well
reasoned opinion by Judge Addison Brown, they saw fit to do so, foreign countries would the law was held not to apply to the shipment of seamen on American vessels in foreign ports. After some amendments in 1898, not important to consider in this connection, the matter came before this court in the case
continue to permit such contracts and advance payments no matter what our declared law or policy in regard to them might be as to vessels coming to our ports.
men at an American port, and, furthermore, that the act, as thus applied to a foreign
 In the same section, which thus applies of Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, the law to foreign vessels while in waters of 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002, and it was the United States, it is provided that the held to apply to a British vessel shipping sea-master, owner, consignee, or agent of any act, shall be liable to the same penalty as such vessel, who violates the provision of the would be persons of like character in respect to a vessel of the United States. This provision seems to us of great importance as eviand criminally with matters in our own judencing the legislative intent to deal civilly risdiction. Congress certainly did not intend to punish criminally acts done within
vessel in United States waters, was constitutional.
 *While the Seaman's Act of 1915 con
tains many provisions for the amelioration of conditions as to employment and care of seamen, in the aspect now involved we have called attention to the state of legislation a foreign jurisdiction, a purpose so wholly and judicial decision when that act was pass-futile is not to be attributed to Congress. ed. Did Congress intend to make invalid United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117, the contracts of foreign seamen so far as 120, 36 Sup. Ct. 32, 60 L. Ed. 172. The crimadvance payments of wages is concerned, inal provision strengthens the presumption when the contract and payment was made in that Congress intended to deal only with a foreign country where the law sanctioned acts committed within the jurisdiction of the such contract and payment? Conceding for United States. the present purpose that Congress might have legislated to annul such contracts as a condition upon which foreign vessels might enter the ports of the United States, it is to be noted, that such sweeping and important requirement is not found specifically made in the statute. Had Congress intended to make void such contracts and payments a few words would have stated that intention, not leaving such an important regulation to be gathered from implication. There is nothing to indicate an intention, so far as the language of the statute is concerned, to control such matters otherwise than in the ports of the United States. The statute makes the payment of advance wages unlawful and affixes penalties for its violation, and provides that such advancements shall in no cases except as in the act provided, absolve the We have examined the references in the master from full payment after the wages briefs of counsel to the reports and proceedare earned, and shall be no defense to a libelings in Congress during the progress of this or suit for wages. How far was this intend-legislation so far as the same may have ed to apply to foreign vessels? We find the weight in determining the construction of answer if we look to the language of the act this section of the act. We find nothing in itself. It reads that this section shall ap- them, so far as entitled to consideration, ply to foreign vessels "while in the waters which requires a different meaning to be given the statute. We may add that the construction now given has the sanction of the Executive Department as shown in Instructions to Consular Officers, promulgated through the medium of the State Depart
of the United States."
We are of opinion that the Circuit Court of Appeals reached the right conclusion as to the meaning and interpretation of this section of the act, and its judgment is
 Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the lawmaking power has jurisdiction. American Banana Company v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 357, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047. In Patterson v. Bark Eu
dora, supra, this court declared such legislation as to foreign vessels in United States ports to be constitutional. We think that
*there is nothing in this section to show that Congress intended to take over the control of such contracts and payments as to foreign vessels except while they were in our ports. Congress could not prevent the making of such contracts in other jurisdictions. If
 It is true the act provides for the abrogation of inconsistent treaty provisions, but this provision has ample application treating the statute to mean what we have here held to be its proper construction. It abolishes the right of arrest for desertion. It gives to the civil courts of the United States jurisdiction over wage controversies arising within our jurisdiction. These considerations amply account for the treaty provision. See Treaties in Force, Ed. 1904, index p. 969.
It is said that the advances in foreign ports and, therefore, not to be *sanctioned here. As are against the policy of the United States we have construed this section of the statute,
no such policy as to foreign contracts legal where made, is declared.
Mr. Justice MCKENNA, with whom concur Mr. Justice HOLMES, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, and Mr. Justice CLARKE, dissenting. This is a libel in admiralty under the Sea
men's Act of 1915 (38 Stat. 1165-1168), especially involving section 11 (Comp. St. 1916, § 8392a),
The libel was filed by petitioners here and others. It was dismissed as to the latter and they have acquiesced in the judgment. The facts are set out in the opinion of the court.
vancements *made to seamen within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." And, indeed, it is insisted that Congress "ex industria in terms confined the application to the waters of the United States." The conclusions are deduced from the cases which are reviewed and the language of the act is quoted. We give the quotation as it amplifies the contentions:
"That this section shall apply as well to foreign vessels while in waters of the United States [counsels' emphasis], as to vessels of the United States, and any master, owner, consignee, or agent of any foreign vessel who has violated its
With this case were submitted others that present the act of Congress in different aspects. Among these was No. 361. Dillon v. Strathearn S. S. Co., 248 U. S. 182, 39 Sup. Ct. 83, 63 L. Ed. 199. It was a libel by a seaman who had shipped on a British vessel and was based on a demand for wages not due at the time of the demand under the terms of the shipping articles signed by him. Section 4 (section 8322) of the act, infra, was especially involved in consideration and its constitutionality was attacked by the ship. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth ance shall be granted any such vessel unless Circuit, to which the case had gone, present- the provisions of this section have been com
provisions shall be liable to the same penalty that the master, owner, or agent of a vessel of the United States would be for similar violation. "The master, owner, consignee, or agent of any vessel of the United States, or of any foreign vessel seeking clearance from a port of the United States, shall present his shipping
articles at the office of clearance, and no clear
ed the question to this court in two aspects, first generally, and, second, more particularly that provision which makes the section "apply to seamen on foreign vessels while
in the harbors of the United States."
In the present case the ship is also British and the libelants and petitioners citizens or subjects of nations other than the United States, and the controversy is as to the right of the master to deduct from the wages, of which the law authorizes the demand, advances made to the seamen in Liverpool, England. To make such advances was a practice usual and customary and not forbidden by English law. It would seem, therefore, that the constitutional question is as much involved in one case as in the other. But under the court's construction of the act that question can be pretermitted. Under our construction it would seem to be not only of ultimate but of first insistence. The court, however, is of opinion that the question of the constitutionality of the act was not certified in such manner as to be subject to its consideration. From that conclusion we are not disposed to dissent and shall assume, as the court does, that the legislation is valid and pass to its consideration.
The instant case, the facts not being in dispute, is brought to the question of the right of the master to deduct the Liverpool advances, the ship asserting the right and the libelants denying it. The solution of the question necessarily depends upon the construction of the act, or, more precisely, its application. It is conceded, yielding to the authority of Patterson v. The Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002, that the act applies to American seamen shipping in an American port upon foreign vessels, but it is contended from that case and other cases that it ought "to seem plain on principle and authority that the advancement statute has no effect except upon ad
The quotation is but a part of section 11.18 It is preceded by *the explicit declaration that it is "unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages in advance of the time when he has actually earned the same or to pay such advance wages." There is no limitation of place or circumstances and the universality of the declaration is given emphasis and any implication of exception is precluded with tautological care by the provision that "the shall in no case except as herein provided abpayment of such advance wages or allotment solve the vessel or the master or the owner thereof from the full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit or ac
1 Section 11 was an amendment of section 24 of the Act of December 21, 1898, and section 24 was
an amendment of section 10 of the laws of 1884 as amended in 1886, and, as it now stands as far as pertinent, is as follows:
"Sec. 10. (a) That it shall be, and is hereby, made unlawful in any case to pay any seaman wages in
advance of the time when he has actually earned the same, or to pay such advance wages, or to make any order, or note, or other evidence of indebtedness therefor to any other person, or to pay any person, for the shipment of seamen when payment is deducted or to be deducted from a seaman's wages. Any person violating any of the foregoing provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than $25 nor more than
$100, and may also be imprisoned for a period of not exceeding six months, at the discretion of the court. The payment of such advance wages or al
absolve the vessel or the master or the owner there
lotment shall in no case except as herein provided of from the full payment of wages after the same shall have been actually earned, and shall be no defense to a libel suit or action for the recovery of such wages. If any person shall demand or receive, either directly or indirectly, from any seaman ** or from any person on his behalf, any remuneration whatever for providing him with em
ployment, he shall for every such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be imprisoned not more than six months or fined not more than $500.”
tion for the recovery of such wages." To qualify these provisions or not to take them for what they say, would, in our opinion, ascribe to the act an unusual improvidence of expression. And section 4 should be considered in connection. It is hence important that we give it in full. And it may be said that it is an amendment to section 4530, R. S. (Comp. St. 1916, § 8322). It is as follows:
"Sec. 4530. Every seaman on a vessel of the United States shall be entitled to receive on demand from the master of the vessel to which he belongs one-half part of the wages which he shall have then earned at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is ended and all stipulations in the contract to the contrary shall be void: Provided, such a demand shall not be made before the expiration of, nor oftener than once in five days. Any failure on the part of the master to comply with this demand shall release the seaman from his contract and he shall be entitled to full payment of wages earned. And when the voyage is ended every such seaman shall be entitled to the remainder of the wages which shall then be due him, as provided in section forty-five hundred and twenty-nine of the Revised Statutes: ** * And provided further, that this section shall apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement."
reason to hesitate in its exercise because of supposed consequences. The policy *of the act was so insistent that Congress did not hesitate to abrogate opposing treaties. Certainly, therefore, we cannot give a controlling force to the suggestion that to construe the act as the ship construes it and others, supporting the ship, construe it, is to "impose our conception of the rights of seamen upon the whole world in violation of the comity of nations." The reply is immediate: It was for Congress to estimate this and other results and to consider how far they were counterpoised or overcome by other considerations. If the section was ambiguous the asserted results might be invoked to resolve its meaning; but we do not think it is ambiguous.
related with that of the merchant marine."
This certainly was the conception of Congress and answers the contentions based on contrary opinion and deductions. It is manifest also from the title of the act, which declares its purpose to be "to promote the welfare of American seamen in the merchant marine of the United States; to abolish arrest and imprisonment as a penalty for desertion, and to secure the abrogation of treaty provisions in relation thereto; and to promote safety at sea." Its efficacy as a means or the policy of the means is not submitted to our judgment. Ours is the simple service of interpretation, and there is no
It must be conceded, indeed, it is conceded, that the words of the sections are grammatically broad enough to include all seamen, foreign as well as American, and advances and contracts, wherever made, and to the contention that Congress had in mind and was only solicitous for American seamen, the would take us from the certainty of language answer is again immediate: The contention to the uncertainties of construction dependent upon the conjecture of consequences; take us from the deck to the sea, if we may use a metaphor suggested by our subject. Language is the safer guide, for it may be defined; consequences brought forward to modify its meaning may be in fact and effect disputed-foreseen, it may be, and accepted as necessary to the achievement of the purpose of the law. And the purpose is resolute, has been maintained for many years with increasing care, and the ship, being in the waters of the United States, not the nationality of the seamen, selected as its test. And lest there might be impediment in treaties, they are declared, so far as they impede, to
This section and the others we have quoted express something more than particular relations of ship and seaman, they express the policy of the United States which no private conventions, no matter where their locality of execution, can be adduced to contravene. The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 22 Sup. Ct. 102, 46 L. Ed. 190; United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525, 33 Sup. Ct. 595, 57 L. Ed. 950; United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117, 36 Sup. Ct. 32, 60 L. Ed. 172. Nor are we called upon to assign the genesis of the policy or trace the evolution of its remedy to the act in controversy; and besides it has been done elsewhere. It is enough to say that the act itself demonstrates that it is intended as a means in the development of the merchanted marine and it hardly needs to be added, to quote counsel for the government, "that the welfare of the seaman is remarkably inter
contentions. In Patterson v. Bark Eudora, But authority may be adduced against the supra, the Seamen's Act came under consideration, and it was contended, as it is contend
now, that the title determined against the body *of the act and that therefore the act did not apply to foreign vessels notwithstanding its explicit words. The contention was declared untenable and the reasoning of
the court exhausts discussion on that and the other contentions as to the purpose and power of Congress. Of the first it was said that it was to protect sailors against certain wrongs practiced upon them, one of the most common being the advancement of wages; of the second it was said, quoting Chief Justice
"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116, 3 L. Ed. 287.