*195

continue to permit such contracts and advance payments no matter what our declared law or policy in regard to them might be as to vessels coming to our ports.

reasoned opinion by Judge Addison Brown, they saw fit to do so, foreign countries would the law was held not to apply to the shipment of seamen on American vessels in foreign ports. After some amendments in 1898, not important to consider in this connection, the matter came before this court in the case

of Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U. S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002, and it was held to apply to a British vessel shipping seamen at an American port, and, furthermore, that the act, as thus applied to a foreign vessel in United States waters, was constitutional.

[3] In the same section, which thus applies the law to foreign vessels while in waters of the United States, it is provided that the master, owner, consignee, or agent of any such vessel, who violates the provision of the act, shall be liable to the same penalty as would be persons of like character in respect to a vessel of the United States. This provision seems to us of great importance as evi[1] *While the Seaman's Act of 1915 con-dencing the legislative intent to deal civilly tains many provisions for the amelioration and criminally with matters in our own juof conditions as to employment and care of risdiction. Congress certainly did not inseamen, in the aspect now involved we have tend to punish criminally acts done within called attention to the state of legislation a foreign jurisdiction, a purpose so wholly and judicial decision when that act was pass-futile is not to be attributed to Congress. ed. Did Congress intend to make invalid United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117, the contracts of foreign seamen so far as 120, 36 Sup. Ct. 32, 60 L. Ed. 172. The crimadvance payments of wages is concerned, inal provision strengthens the presumption when the contract and payment was made in that Congress intended to deal only with a foreign country where the law sanctioned acts committed within the jurisdiction of the such contract and payment? Conceding for the present purpose that Congress might have legislated to annul such contracts as a condition upon which foreign vessels might enter the ports of the United States, it is to be noted, that such sweeping and important requirement is not found specifically made in the statute. Had Congress intended to make void such contracts and payments a few words would have stated that intention,

United States.

[4] It is true the act provides for the abrogation of inconsistent treaty provisions, but this provision has ample application treating the statute to mean what we have here held to be its proper construction. It abolishes the right of arrest for desertion. It gives to the civil courts of the United States jurisdiction over wage controversies These considerations amply account for the treaty proarising within our jurisdiction. vision. See Treaties in Force, Ed. 1904, index

p. 969.

It is said that the advances in foreign ports are against the policy of the United States and, therefore, not to be *sanctioned here. As we have construed this section of the statute, no such policy as to foreign contracts legal where made, is declared.

not leaving such an important regulation to be gathered from implication. There is nothing to indicate an intention, so far as the language of the statute is concerned, to control such matters otherwise than in the ports of the United States. The statute makes the payment of advance wages unlawful and affixes penalties for its violation, and provides that such advancements shall in no cases except as in the act provided, absolve the We have examined the references in the master from full payment after the wages briefs of counsel to the reports and proceedare earned, and shall be no defense to a libelings in Congress during the progress of this or suit for wages. How far was this intend-legislation so far as the same may have ed to apply to foreign vessels? We find the answer if we look to the language of the act itself. It reads that this section shall apply to foreign vessels "while in the waters of the United States."

[2] Legislation is presumptively territorial and confined to limits over which the lawmaking power has jurisdiction. American Banana Company v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 357, 29 Sup. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed. 826, 16 Ann. Cas. 1047. In Patterson v. Bark Eu

dora, supra, this court declared such legislation as to foreign vessels in United States ports to be constitutional. We think that

*there is nothing in this section to show that Congress intended to take over the control of such contracts and payments as to foreign vessels except while they were in our ports. Congress could not prevent the making of such contracts in other jurisdictions.

If

weight in determining the construction of this section of the act. We find nothing in them, so far as entitled to consideration, which requires a different meaning to be given the statute. We may add that the construction now given has the sanction of the Executive Department as shown in Instructions to Consular Officers, promulgated through the medium of the State Depart

ment.

We are of opinion that the Circuit Court of Appeals reached the right conclusion as to the meaning and interpretation of this section of the act, and its judgment is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice MCKENNA, with whom concur Mr. Justice HOLMES, Mr. Justice BRANDEIS, and Mr. Justice CLARKE, dissenting.

This is a libel in admiralty under the Sea

men's Act of 1915 (38 Stat. 1165-1168), es- vancements *made to seamen within the terpecially involving section 11 (Comp. St. 1916, ritorial jurisdiction of the United States." § 8392a), And, indeed, it is insisted that Congress "ex industria in terms confined the application to the waters of the United States." The conclusions are deduced from the cases which are reviewed and the language of the act is quoted. We give the quotation as it amplifies the contentions:

*200

*199

⭑201

tion for the recovery of such wages." To reason to hesitate in its exercise because of qualify these provisions or not to take them supposed consequences. The policy *of the act for what they say, would, in our opinion, was so insistent that Congress did not hesiascribe to the act an unusual improvidence tate to abrogate opposing treaties. Certainly, of expression. And section 4 should be con- therefore, we cannot give a controlling force sidered in connection. It is hence important to the suggestion that to construe the act that we give it in full. And it may be said as the ship construes it and others, supportthat it is an amendment to section 4530, R. ing the ship, construe it, is to "impose our S. (Comp. St. 1916, § 8322). It is as follows: conception of the rights of seamen upon the "Sec. 4530. Every seaman on a vessel of the nations." The reply is immediate: It was whole world in violation of the comity of United States shall be entitled to receive on demand from the master of the vessel to which for Congress to estimate this and other rehe belongs one-half part of the wages which he sults and to consider how far they were shall have then earned at every port where such counterpoised or overcome by other considervessel, after the voyage has been commenced, ations. If the section was ambiguous the shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is asserted results might be invoked to resolve ended and all stipulations in the contract to its meaning; but we do not think it is amthe contrary shall be void: Provided, such a biguous. demand shall not be made before the expiration of, nor oftener than once in five days. Any failure on the part of the master to comply with this demand shall release the seaman from his contract and he shall be entitled to full payment of wages earned. And when the voyage is ended every such seaman shall be entitled to the remainder of the wages which shall then be due him, as provided in section forty-five hundred and twenty-nine of the Revised Statutes: * And provided further, that this section shall apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement."

It must be conceded, indeed, it is conceded, that the words of the sections are grammatically broad enough to include all seamen, foreign as well as American, and advances and contracts, wherever made, and to the contention that Congress had in mind and was only solicitous for American seamen, the answer is again immediate: The contention would take us from the certainty of language to the uncertainties of construction dependent upon the conjecture of consequences; take us from the deck to the sea, if we may use a metaphor suggested by our subject. Language is the safer guide, for it may be defined; consequences brought forward to modify its meaning may be in fact and effect disputed-foreseen, it may be, and accepted as necessary to the achievement of the purpose of the law. And the purpose is resolute, has been maintained for many years with increasing care, and the ship, being in the waters of the United States, not the nationality of the seamen, selected as its test. And lest there might be impediment in treaties, they are declared, so far as they impede, to

be abrogated.

This section and the others we have quoted express something more than particular re lations of ship and seaman, they express the policy of the United States which no private conventions, no matter where their locality of execution, can be adduced to contravene. The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263, 22 Sup. Ct. 102, 46 L. Ed. 190; United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525, 33 Sup. Ct. 595, 57 L. Ed. 950; United States v. Freeman, 239 U. S. 117, 36 Sup. Ct. 32, 60 L. Ed. 172. Nor are we called upon to assign the genesis of the policy or trace the evolution of its remedy to the act in controversy; and besides it has been done contentions. In Patterson v. Bark Eudora, But authority may be adduced against the elsewhere. It is enough to say that the act supra, the Seamen's Act came under consideritself demonstrates that it is intended as a ation, and it was contended, as it is contendmeans in the development of the merchanted now, that the title determined against the marine and it hardly needs to be added, to quote counsel for the government, "that the welfare of the seaman is remarkably interrelated with that of the merchant marine." This certainly was the conception of Congress and answers the contentions based on contrary opinion and deductions. It is manifest also from the title of the act, which declares its purpose to be "to promote the welfare of American seamen in the merchant marine of the United States; to abolish arrest and imprisonment as a penalty for desertion, and to secure the abrogation of treaty provisions in relation thereto; and to promote safety at sea." Its efficacy as a means or the policy of the means is not submitted to our judgment. Ours is the simple service of interpretation, and there is no

body of the act and that therefore the act did not apply to foreign vessels notwithstanding its explicit words. The contention was declared untenable and the reasoning of the court exhausts discussion on that and

the other contentions as to the purpose and power of Congress. Of the first it was said that it was to protect sailors against certain wrongs practiced upon them, one of the most common being the advancement of wages; of the second it was said, quoting Chief Justice

Marshall:

"The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute; it is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself." The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116, 3 L. Ed. 287.

$202

⚫204

The nationality of the seamen does not appear, but the vessel was foreign, and the application of the statute to the latter constituted the ground of controversy.

Of course, the language of an act, though universal, may find limitation in the jurisdiction of the Legislature; but certainly a ship within the harbors of the United States is within the jurisdiction of the United States, and making its exercise "apply to seamen on foreign vessels," and "the courts of the United States * open to such seamen for its enforcement" was the judgment of Congress of the way to promote its purpose.

it does to domestic vessels. Let the foreign vessel be in the waters of the United States and every provision of the act applies to it as far as it can apply. In other words, it gives the right to a seaman on a foreign vessel to demand from the master one-half part of the wages which he shall have earned at every port and makes void all stipulations to the contrary. And the remedy of the seaman in such case is made explicit. If his demand be refused ("failure on the part of the master to comply" are the words of the act) the seaman is released from his contract and he is, entitled to the full payment of wages earned. And he is given a remedy in the courts of the United States. The defense of an advance payment is precluded and clearance of the foreign vessel is forbidden. And thus the act has completeness of right and remedy and, we think, precludes judicial limitation of either. Its provisions are simple and direct, there is no confusion in their command, no difficulty in their obedience. Of course, a "master, owner, consignee or agent of" any It is enough to say of the contentions, in foreign vessel, to quote the words of the act addition to what has been said, that they im- again, cannot violate any provision of it if pose on the statute qualifications and limita- he be not in the United States. If there be tions precluded by its words and the purpose provisions that cannot reach him, that with they express. There is a great deal said, which this case is concerned can reach him. and ably said, upon these contentions and the We are, therefore, of opinion that the Dismore pretentious one that the act would vio-trict Court was right in refusing to allow late the Constitution of the *United States the Liverpool advances and the Circuit Court unless so "construed as not to apply to foreign of Appeals was wrong in reversing the rulseamen shipped on a foreign vessel in a foreign port, under a contract, valid where made.

These considerations, we think, answer as well other contentions; that is, that the act "should be construed as applicable only to seamen shipping in an American port on vessels which remain for a time in or afterwards return to an American port to load or deliver cargo" or "to seamen of American nationality upon foreign or domestic vessels, irrespective of the port of shipment."

ing.

(248 U. S. 205)

NEILSON et al. v. RHINE SHIPPING CO.
HARDY et al. v. SHEPARD & MORSE
LUMBER CO.

THE RHINE.

We cannot concede the qualification nor doubt the power of Congress to impose conditions upon foreign vessels entering or remaining in the harbors of the United States. And we think that the case of The Eudora declares the grounds of decision. Its principle is broader than its instance and makes the vessel and its locality in the waters of the United States the test of the application of the act and not the nationality of the sea- (Argued Nov. 5, 1918. Decided Dec. 23, 1918.) men nor their place of shipment, nor contravening conventions, and precludes deductions of advances.

SEAMEN

THE WINDRUSH.

Nos. 393 and 394.

23-WAGES-ADVANCE PAYMENTAMERICAN VESSEL IN FOREIGN PORT.

Act June 26, 1884, § 10a, as amended by Act March 4, 1915, § 11 (Comp. St. 1916, § S323), prohibiting paying seamen wages in advance, providing such payment shall not absolve from full payment of wages when earned, and denying clearance papers to vessels violating its terms, does not apply to advances by an American ship in a foreign port in accordance with local custom to seamen there employed.

Nor is there obstacle in the penal provisions of the act. They may be distributively applied and such application has many examples in legislation. It is justified by the rule of reddendo singula singulis. By it words and provisions are referred to their appropriate objects, resolving confusion and accomplishing the intent of the law against, it may be, a strict grammatical construction. United States v. Simms, 1 Cranch, 252, 2 L. Ed. 98; Comm. v. Barber, 143 Mass. 560, 10 N. E. 330; Quinn v. Lowell Electric Light Co., 140 Mass. 106, 3 N. E. 200. The Seamen's Act especially invokes the application of the rule. The act applies to foreign vessels as explicitly and as circumstantially as cuit.

Mr. Justice McKenna, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis, and Mr. Justice Clarke, dissenting.

On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Cir

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

*211

Suits in admiralty by Paul Neilson and, 180. The cases are here on writs of certioothers against the sailing ship Rhine; Rhine rari. Shipping Company, claimant. And by John Hardy and others against the barkentine Windrush; Shepard & Morse Lumber Company, claimant. Decrees for libelants (244 Fed. 833) were reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (250 Fed. 180), and libelants bring certiorari. Affirmed.