Under Rev. St. § 1624 (Comp. St. § 2961), Articles for the Government of the Navy, art. 8, par. 13 (Comp. St. § 2969), as elucidated by Navy Regulatio.is, § 1020, where the commanding officer of an American Warship in Havana Harbor received on board the equivalent of $51,000 in American gold coin, no contract arose between the United States and the depositor for the return of the gold to the depositor or his proper agent, so as to render the United States liable for its return to one not the agent of the depositor. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Suit by Ricardo Cartas against the United States. From a judgment dismissing the petition (48 Ct. Cl. 161), plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. Messrs. William R. Andrews, and George H. Lamar, both of Washington, D. C., for appellant. Messrs. Solicitor General Alex C. King, of Atlanta, Ga., Asst. Attorney General Davis, and George M. Anderson, of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Mr. Chief Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. *546 This suit was brought to recover from the United States $51,000 in American gold coin with interest from 1869, *based upon a contract alleged to have been made in that year by the United States as the result of a deposit of the principal sum claimed on a war vessel of the United States. The court, concluding that the facts alleged had no substantial tendency to establish a contract liability on the part of the United States either express or implied, dismissed the suit for want of jurisdiction as its power to adjudge against the United States extended only to obligations of that character. A written opinion was filed, but no finding of facts was made. The United States suggests that the cause be remanded for such finding, but if that course were pursued only the relevant facts could be embraced in the finding and as all such facts were admitted by the court below, the case is open to our consideration and we think there is no necessity for remanding it. In the petition which was filed in 1902 by Ricardo Cartas, now the appellant, it was alleged that about 33 years before, in January, 1869, Carlos del Costillo deposited on board the American flagship Contoocook, then in Havana Harbor, Spanish gold the equivalent of $51,000 in American gold coin. It was alleged that the deposit was evidenced by a receipt given by the American consul at Havana and that the petitioner was the grandson of Costillo and was vested by inheritance with all his rights growing out of the deposit. It was further alleged that the deposit was a contract between the depositor and the United States binding the United States to preserve and return the deposit when demanded, and that it had never been returned; indeed, that no demand for its return had been made during the time which elapsed either by Costillo or by any one authorized to represent him or his interest. Further, it was averred that, although it appeared from the files of the Navy Department that a few months after the deposit was made, that is in April, 1869, it had been returned by the officer commanding the Contoo *547 *cook to one Arridondo, acting as the agent of Costillo and who was believed by such commanding officer to be fully authorized to receive it, nevertheless the contract obligation on the part of the United States yet existed because said Arridondo was not the agent of Costillo and the United States remained bound to return the said deposit and was not relieved therefrom by the payment made by such officer, although in good faith to a person not entitled to receive it. disputable that the only question for decision Admitting the facts thus alleged, it is inis the making of the alleged contract with the United States. Indeed, it is to that question and to that question alone that the errors assigned and the contentions advanced to sustain them relate. They all are based upon a power in the commanding officer to contract on behalf of the United States asserted to be conferred by paragraph 13 of article 8 of the "Articles for the Government of the Navy" (Rev. Stat. § 1624 [Comp. St. § 2969]), as elucidated by section 1020 of the Navy regulations. A brief reference to the matters thus relied upon will bring us to the end of the controversy. The first, the statutory provision, imposes a penalty upon any person in the navy who"takes, receives, or permits to be received, on board the vessel to which he is attached, any goods or merchandise, for freight, sale, or traffic, except gold, silver, or jewels, for freight or safe-keeping, or demands or receives any com pensation for the receipt or transportation of any other article than gold, silver, or jewels, without authority from the President or the Secretary of the Navy." The wide discretion possessed by the commanding officer of a naval vessel concerning the receipt on board, for the protection of private rights, of gold, silver or jewels, which it was the obvious purpose of this statute not to modify, since the power as to such articles was excepted from the additional limitation which the statute imposed For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *548 *as to other articles, affords no ground for the implication that contract obligations would automatically arise as against the United States from the mere exercise by the officer of his discretion. A consideration of the nature of the objects which the provision excepted and the complex and varied character of the conditions which might call for the exercise of the discretion add cogency to this view and at once suggest the incongruity and conflict which must result from the contrary contention. And this view serves also to dispose of the contention based upon section 1020 of the Navy Regulations which but comprehensively recognizes that compensation due for services rendered as the result of the exercise of the discretion of the officer, to permit the articles in question to be taken on board, should be applied, not for the benefit of the United States in virtue of any contract relation with the subject, but for the benefit of the officers and men designated in the proportions stated in the regulation. Indeed, the co-ordination which the regulation thus board and the distribution of the emoluments (40 Sup.Ct.) (250 U. S. 573) PELL et al. v. MCCABE et al. (two cases). (Argued Oct. 16, 1919. Decided Nov. 10, 1919.) Nos. 311 and 335. DECREE IN BANKRUPTCY On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Cir cuit. Decree of District Court dismissing bill (254 Fed. 356) was modified and affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (256 Fed. 512), and complainants bring certiorari to and appeal from the Circuit Court of Appeals. Appeal dismissed, and decree affirmed. Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Suit by Stephen H. P. Pell and others against W. Gordon McCabe, Jr., and another. *574 *Messrs. Lindley M. Garrison, Emanuel J. Myers, and Gordon S. P. Kleeberg, all of New York City, for petitioners. COURTS 264(4) Decree in the matter of the bankruptcy of a partnership, in which petitions were pending to have T. declared a general partner, and liable The bill discloses the following facts: Aft as such, that on T. complying with a composi-er the appointment of receivers in the banktion agreement he should be relieved of further ruptcy proceedings petitions were filed to liability to the receiver or the estate, and the have Thompson declared a general partner petitions declaring him liable as a general part- and adjudicated a bankrupt with the other ner should be dismissed, merely determines that members of the firm. Later an offer of comhis property shall not be administered in the position was made by the firm in considerabankruptcy proceeding, and so does not give tion of the discharge of the bankrupts from ancillary jurisdiction to the District Court to their debts and the release of Thompson from enjoin action against him for fraud of the firm liability to S. H. P. Pell & Co. and to any creditor of the firm who should assent to the composition. By the terms of the composition Thompson gave up a scheduled claim of over three million dollars and assumed obligations of over two million dollars for which property of his was pledged. Pursuant thereafter discovered. to this offer an agreement was made between Thompson and the receivers by which Thompson accepted the composition and agreed to For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes Messrs. William St. John Tozer, of New York City, and Henry Buist, of Charleston, S. C., for respondents. Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is a bill in equity brought in the Dis-. trict Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, by persons formerly doing business as partners under the name S. H. P. Pell & Co., to restrain the defendants from proceeding with a suit them with fraud in partnership transactions against them in South Carolina charging in cotton and seeking to recover a million and a half of doilars. The bill was dismissed on demurrer for want of equity by the District tion by the Circuit Court of Appeals, 256 Fed. Court, 254 Fed. 356, and for want of jurisdic512. It is brought here by certiorari (No. 311) and by appeal (No. 335). the bill is ancillary to proceedings in bankThe ground of jurisdiction set up is that ruptcy against S. H. P. Pell & Co. in the same district. The present plaintiff Thompson was the only party served in the South Carolina suit and he alleges that he was a special partner under the laws of New York, that he was adjudicated not to be liable as a general partner in the bankruptcy proceedings and that the Court had ancillary jurisdiction to make its decree respected. The other partners set up a discharge under *575 a *composition but as they were not served with process in South Carolina the only question raised before us is whether Thompson can maintain the bill. Ct. 263, 63 L. Ed. 587; Manson v. Williams, 213 U. S. 453, 29 Sup. Ct. 519, 53 L. Ed. 869. The claim of the present defendants in their action in South Carolina is based as we have said upon allegations of fraud, and it is further alleged in their complaint that they believed the representations said to be pay the last mentioned obligations and the receiver agreed to turn over the pledged securities to him, he undertaking in case it should be adjudged that he was a general partner to hold the equities in the same as trustee for the estate-all conditioned upon the Court making an order approving the contract. The order was made on January 6, 1915. On January 25, 1915, the composition was declared to be for the best interests of his estate and the creditors thereof, it and the arrangement with Thompson were confirmed, and it was decreed that on his complying with its terms he should be "relieved of any further liability to the said receiver or the estate by reason of the order heretofore' entered by this Court dated January 6, 1915 or otherwise." It was further decreed that the petitions to have Thompson declared liable as a general partner be dismissed. The defendants had been notified of the bankruptcy and the appointment of receivers, had paid one claim made against them for the estate and had disputed another which is now the subject *of a suit in New York, but they did not appear in the bankruptcy proceedings, assent to the composition, or attempt to prove à claim. *576 10, 1919.) We believe that we have stated the essential facts relied upon to support the bill. They seem to us not sufficient for that purpose. It is said that in pursuance of a contract sanctioned by the Court there was a settlement with Thompson discharging him from all liability to the firm and anyone claiming under it. We do not perceive that the decree just recited even purports to deal with the defendants' claim, and reading it in connection with the proposal as to Thompson in the offer of composition we find it at least difficult to understand it to have been directed against other creditors than those who assented to the latter. It is argued, to be sure, (Argued Oct. 22 and 23, 1919. Decided Nov. that the petitioners seeking to charge Thompson as a general partner were dismissed out Nos. 374, 375 and 376.-October Term, 1919. and out and that that portion of the decree at least must be taken to operate in rem and decide against all the world that he was not one. But it would be going far to say that the dismissal was not to be read with the rest of the decree in determining its scope, especially when it is remembered that the composition bound the parties who brought the petitions thus dismissed. It is altogether probable that the dismissal was by consent. However this may be, the decree only determined as against everybody that Thompson's property should not be administered in the bankruptcy proceedings; it did not conclusively establish as against the present defendants the finding of facts upon which it is supposed to have been based, if there is any reason to suppose that the facts as to his relation to the firm were found. Gratiot State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U. S. 246, 39 Sup. Workmen's Compensation Law of the State of New York, amended and re-enacted by Laws 1914, c. 41 (Consol. Laws, c. 67), and section 15, amended by Laws 1916, c. 622, § 3, to anthorize the Industrial Commission in its discretion, in case of an injury resulting in serious facial or head disfigurement, to make such award as it may deem proper and equitable, not to exceed $3,500, held not to deprive employers ordered to pay such an award of their property without due process of law, in contravention of Const. U. S. Amend. 14; the provision not being unreasonable, arbitrary, or contrary to fundamental right, while the allowance prescribed does not exceed the constitutional limitations on state power. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes *577 fraudulent *until long after the decree set up here as a bar. If those allegations are proved the composition would not discharge the claim, and of course they were not passed upon in the bankruptcy court. A decree that, as we have tried to show, cannot be taken to deal with the defendants' rights does not give ancillary jurisdiction to the District Court to enforce it against them. The concession by the demurrer that Thompson was a special partner does not affect the scope of the decree, and the jurisdiction depends upon that alone. It is true that if he was only liable as a special partner the South Carolina suit cannot be maintained, but the allegations of fraud open the whole matter and moreover the question here is not whether that suit can be maintained but whether an injunction against it should be issued by the District Court. The appeal is dismissed and upon the writ of certiorari the decree dismissing the bill is affirmed. Appeal dismissed. (250 U. S. 596) NEW YORK CENT. R. CO. v. BIANC. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301 MASTER (40 Sup.Ct.) lars." 2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 301 MASTER not to exceed three thousand five hundred dol- Whether an award to an injured employé for permanent facial or head disfigurement should be made in combination with, or independent of, the compensation allowed for mere inability to work, is a matter of detail for determination by the state, as is also the question whether the compensation should be paid in a single sum or in installments; decision one way or the other not rendering the portion of a state Workmen's Compensation Act unconstitutional as a taking without due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice McReynolds dissenting. In Error to the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department, of the State of New York. In the matter of the claims of George Sweeting and others, employés, for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, against the American Knife Company and others, the employers, and the Etna Life Insurance Company the insurance carrier. From orders of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court (186 App. Div. 925, 172 N. Y. Supp. 880; 186 App. Div. 926, 172 N. Y. Supp. 921; 186 App. Div. 925, 172 N. Y. Supp. 924), affirming awards of the State Industrial Commission, the employers and insurance carrier appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York, which affirmed (226 N. Y. 199, 123 N. E. 82; 123 N. E. 856, 893), and the employers and insurance carrier bring error. Judgments affirmed. $600 The present writs of error bring up for review three judgments of the Court of Appeals of that state, affirming orders of the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department, in which awards based upon this amendment were sustained. The opinion of the Court of Appeals, applicable to all of the cases, is reported under the title of Matter of Sweeting v. American Knife Co., 226 N. Y. 199, 123 N. E. 82. In each case the commission found accidental injuries sustained by an employé in a hazardous occupation, arising out of and in the course of the employment, and, as a result of the injury, some serious facial or head In each case an disfigurement, or both. award was made on account of such disfigurement irrespective of the allowance of com pensation according to the schedule based upon the average wage of the injured employé and the character and duration of the disability. [1] The sole contention here is that the amendment of 1916, as thus carried into ef *601 fect, deprives the respective plaintiffs *in error of property without due process of law, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. The argument is that an award for disfigurement, made wholly independent of claimant's inability to work, is not based upon impairment of earning power; that only such impairment can justify imposing upon an employer without fault compulsory pay In No. 374: Mr. Robert E. Whalen, of Al- ment by way of compensation to an injured bany, N. Y., for plaintiff in error. workman; and hence that the "disfigurement clause" is not a reasonable exercise of the police power, but is arbitrary and oppressive. In Nos. 375, 376: Mr. William H. Foster, of Syracuse, N. Y., for plaintiffs in error. Mr. E. C. Aiken, of Albany, N. Y., for Industrial Commission of New York. In view of our recent decisions sustaining state laws imposing upon employers in the hazardous industries responsibility in one *Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion form or another for the consequences of inof the Court. juries received by employés in the course of The Workmen's Compensation Law of the the employment in the absence of fault on state of New York (chapter 816, Laws 1913, the employer's part (New York Central R. R. as amended and re-enacted by chapter 41, Co. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, Laws 1914 [Consol. Laws, c. 67]), which was 61 L. Ed. 667, L. R. A. 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. sustained by this court against attacks bas- 1917D, 629; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washed upon the Fourteenth Amendment in Newington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 Sup. Ct. 260, 61 L. York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U. S. Ed. 685, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 642; Arizona Em188, 37 Sup. Ct. 247, 61 L. Ed. 667, L. R. A. ployers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 1917D, 1, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 629, was amended | Sup. Ct. 553, 63 L. Ed. 1058), little need now by Laws 1916, c. 622, among other things by be said. inserting in the fifteenth section, which contains the schedule of compensation for cases of disability, a clause reading as follows: Even were impairment of earning power the sole justification for imposing compulsory payment of workmen's compensation "In case of an injury resulting in serious fa- upon the employer in such cases, it would be sufficient answer to the present contencial or head disfigurement the commission may in its discretion, make such award or compention to say that a serious disfigurement of sation as it may deem proper and equitable, in the face or head reasonably may be regarded view of the nature of the disfigurement, but as having a direct relation to the injured For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes person's earning power, irrespective of its | provision debar a state from adopting other effect upon his mere capacity for work. Under ordinary conditions of life, a serious and unnatural disfigurement of the face or head very probably may have a harmful effect upon the ability of the injured person to obtain or retain employment. Laying aside exceptional cases, which we must assume will be fairly dealt with in the proper and equitable administration of the act, such a disfigurement may render one repulsive or offensive to the sight, displeasing, or at least less pleasing, to employer, to fellow em*602 See ployés, and to patrons or customers. methods, or a composite of different methods, provided the result be not inconsistent with fundamental rights. As was stated in the Arizona case, 250 U. S. 429, 39 Sup. Ct. 559, 63 L. Ed. 1058: "If a state recognizes or establishes a right of action for compensation to injured workmen upon grounds not arbitrary or fundamentally unjust, the question whether the award shall be measured as compensatory damages are measured at common law, or according to some prescribed scale reasonably adapted to produce a fair result, is for the state itself to determine." And we see no constitutional reason why *603 But we cannot concede that impairment of earning power is the sole ground upon which a state may not, *in ascertaining the amount compulsory compensation to injured work- of such compensation in particular cases, men legitimately may be based. Unques- take into consideration any substantial phys tionably it is a rational basis, and it is adopt-ical impairment attributable to the injury, ed for the generality of cases by the New whether it immediately affects earning ca York law. But the Court of Appeals has pacity or not. construed the 1916 amendment as permitting For the reasons thus outlined, it was not an allowance for facial or head disfigure- unreasonable, arbitrary, or contrary to funment although it does not impair the claim-damental right to embody in the New York ant's earning capacity. Matter. of Erickson Workmen's Compensation Law a provision v. Preuss, 223 N. Y. 365, 368, 119 N. E. 555; for a special allowance of compensation for and see opinion of Judge Cardozo in the pres- a serious disfigurement of the face or head. ent case, 226 N. Y. 199, 200, 123 N. E. 82. Nor is there any ground for declaring that In view of this, and there being no specific the allowance prescribed by the 1916 amendfinding of such impairment in these cases, ment exceeds the constitutional limitations it is proper to say that in our opinion the upon state power. "due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the states to base compulsory compensation solely upon loss of earning power. [2] Whether an award for such disfigurement should be made in combination with or independent of the compensation allowed for the mere inability to work is a matter of detail for the state to determine. The same is true of the question whether the compensation should be paid in a single sum, or in installments. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 429, 39 Sup. Ct. The New York law as at first enacted, the Washington, and the Arizona laws presented for our consideration three different methods adopted for the purpose of imposing upon the industry the burden of making some compensation for the human wastage attributa-553, 63 L. Ed. 1058. ble to the hazards of the work. We were unable to find that any of these ran counter to the "due process" clause. Nor does that Judgments affirmed. Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS dissents. |
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