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(40 Sup.Ct.) “That section contains nothing to indicate that other states the privileges and immunities it is not the succession of the New Jersey rep- ' granted to citizens of the state of New Jerresentative that is meant to be taxed. It is true that the tax is not necessarily 5 per cent. the federal Constitution, which reads, “The
sey, in violation of paragraph 1, § 2, art. 4, of upon the whole New Jersey succession. amount depends on the ratio of the New Jersey citizens of each state shall be entitled to all property to the entire estate wherever situated. privileges and immunities of citizens in the This, however, merely affords a measure of the several states;" (b) abridges the privileges tax imposed; the tax is still by the very words and immunities of plaintiffs in error, the de of the section imposed upon the property located ceased persons whom they represent, and within this state. The reason for adopting this those taking by will or intestacy under them, provision was to make srre that the rate of tax
as citizens of the United States, in contra*536 ation in case of nonresident decedents *should vention of section 1 of the Fourteenth equal but not exceed the rate imposed in the Amendment. case of resident decedents.
The provision quoted from article 4 of “In the case of the estates of nonresident the Constitution was intended to prevent disdecedents, it is open for the law of the domicile crimination by the several states against to provide, as testators sometimes do, that such citizens of other states in respect of the taxes shall be a general charge against the es fundamental privileges of citizenship. As is tate. Our Legislature must be assumed to have had in mind its lack of jurisdiction over said by Judge Cooley in his Constitutional legacies under a nonresident's will, and in order Limitations (7th Ed.) p. 569: to protect the New Jersey executor, adminis- "It appears to be conceded that the Constitutrator or trustee who paid the tax, authorized tion secures in each state to the citizens of all its deduction from 'property for distribution.' | other states the right to remove to, and carry This phrase suffices to reach not only a distribu
on business therein; the right by the usual tive share of a resident's estate in the case of modes to acquire and hold property, and to prointestacy, but the whole of the New Jersey tect and defend the same in the law; the right property of a nonresident when turned over
to the usual remedies for the collection of debts to the executor or administrator at the domicile and the enforcement of other personal rights; of the decedent. The provision for both cases- and the right to be exempt, in property and legacies and property for distribution--demon- person, from taxes or burdens which the propstrates that the Legislature did not mean to erty, or persons, of citizens of the same State provide, as counsel contends, for a legacy duty are not subject to.” Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. only."
168, 180, 19 L. Ed. 357; Ward v. Maryland, 12
Wall. 418, 430, 20 L. Ed. 449. This language correctly characterizes the nature and effect of the tax as imposed under
The Fourteenth Amendment recognized a the amendment of 1914; but that act, under distinction between citizenship of the United which the present cases arise, instead of reaching "the whole of the New Jersey prop- States and citizenship *of one of the States. erty of a nonresident when turned over to It provides: the executor or administrator at the domi
"No state shall make or enforce any law cile of the decedent,” now confines the trans- which shall abridge the privileges or immunities fer tax upon the property of nonresident de- of citizens of the United States." cedents to real estate and tangible personal property within the state, the stock of New What those privileges and immunities were Jersey corporations, and the stock of nation was under consideration in Slaughterhouse al banks located within the state.
Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 72–79, 21 L. Ed. 394, The tax is, then, one upon the transfer of where it was shown (16 Wall. 77, 78, 21 L property in New Jersey, to be paid upon turn- Ed. 394) that it was not the purpose of this ing it over to the administrator or executor at amendment, by the declaration that no state the domicile of the decedent. That transfers should make or enforce any law which of this nature are within the taxing power should abridge the privileges and immunities of the state, and that taxes may be assessed of citizens of the United States, to transfer upon such rights owing their existence to from the states to the federal government
local laws, and to them alone, is not disput. the security and protection of those civil ed. The right to inherit property, or to re- rights that inhere in state citizenship; and ceive it under testamentary disposition, has (16 Wall. 79, 21 L. Ed. 394) that the privileges •537
and immunities of citizens of the United been so frequently *held to be the creation of States thereby placed beyond abridgment by statutory law, that it is quite unnecessary to the states were those which owe their existcite the decisions which have maintained the ence to the federal government, its national principle. While this is confessedly true, the character, its constitution, or its laws. To assessment of such taxes is, of course, sub- the same effect is Duncan v. Missouri, 152 ject to applicable limitations of the state U. S. 377, 382, 14 Sup. Ct. 570, 38 L. Ed. 485. and federal Constitutions; it is with the lat. We are unable to discover in the statute ter class only that this court has to do. before us, which regulates and taxes the
(2-4) (1) Taking up, then, the objections right to succeed to property in New Jersey raised under the federal Constitution, it is upon the death of a nonresident owner, any said that the law (a) denies to citizens of infringement of the rights of citizenship ei
ther of the states or of the United States, , within its *jurisdiction in such a way as to
*540 secured by either of the constitutional provisions referred to. We have held that the really amount to taxing that which is beyond protection that they afford to rights inherent its authority, that such exercise of power in citizenship are not infringed by the taxa- by the state is held void. In cases of that tion or transfer of property within the juris- character the attempted taxation must fail. diction of a state passing by will or intes- Looney v. Attorney General, 245 U. S. 178, 38 tacy, where the decedent was a nonresident Sup. Ct. 85, 62 L. Ed. 230; International of the taxing state, although the entire suc
Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 38 cession was taxed in the state where he re- Sup. Ct. 292, 62 L. Ed. 624, Ann. Cas. 1918C, sided. Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 617. To say that to apply a different rule 207, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439.
regulating succession to resident and non Upon this point it is unnecessary to de- resident decedents is to levy a tax upon forcide whether the case might not be rested on
eign estates, is to distort the statute from a much narrower ground. The alleged dis- its purpose to tax the privilege, which the crimination, here complained of, so far as statute has created, into a property tax, and privileges and immunities of citizenship are
is unwarranted by any purpose or effect of concerned, is not strictly applicable to this the enactment, as we view it. statute, because the difference in the method
 (3) It is further contended that the tax
bears so unequally upon nonresidents as to of taxation rests upon residence *and not up- deny to them the equal protection of the laws. on citizenship. La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 The subject of taxes of this character was U. S. 465, 39 Sup. Ct. 160, 63 L. Ed. 362. given full consideration by this court in
 (2) It is next contended that the effect Magoun v. Illinois, 170 U. S. 283, 18 Sup. Ct. of including the property beyond the jurisdic- 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037, in which case a graded tion of the state in measuring the tax legacy and inheritance tax law of the state amounts to a deprivation of property with- of Illinois was sustained. The statute exout due process of law because it in effect empted all estates valued at less than $20,000, taxes property beyond the jurisdiction of if passing to near relations, or at less than the state.
$500 if passing to those more remote, made It is not to be disputed that, consistently the rate of tax increasingly greater as the inwith the federal Constitution, a state may not heritances increased, and assessed it differtax property beyond its territorial jurisdic- ently according to the relationship of the tion; but the subject-matter here regulated is a beneficiary to the testator or intestate. The privilege to succeed to property which is statute was attacked as void under the equal within the jurisdiction of the state. When protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend. the state levies taxes within its authority, ment, but was held to be valid. Of this class property not in itself taxable by the state of taxes the court said (170 U. S. 288, 18 may be used as a measure of the tax im- Sup. Ct. 596, 42 L. Ed. 1037): posed. This principle has been frequently
"They [inheritance taxes) are based on two declared by decisions of this court. The pre- principles: (1) An inheritance tax is not one vious cases were reviewed and the doctrine on property, but one on the succession. (2) The applied in Kansas City R. R. Co. v. Kansas, right to take property by devise or descent is the 240 U. S. 227, 232, 36 Sup. Ct. 261, 60 L. Ed. creature of the law, and not a natural right-a 617. After deciding that the privilege tax, privilege, and therefore the authority which conthere involved, did not impose a burden upon these principles it is deduced that the states
fers it may impose conditions upon it. From interstate commerce, this court held that it was not in substance and effect a tax upon atives, and between these and strangers, and
may tax the privilege, discriminate between relproperty beyond the state's jurisdiction, al- grant exemptions, and are not precluded from though a large amount of the property, which
•541 was referred to as a measure of the assess- this power *by the provisions of the respective ment, was situated outside of the state. In state Constitutions requiring uniformity and the present case the state imposes a privilege equality of taxation.” tax, clearly within its authority, and it has And upon examining (170 U. S. 296, 297, adopted as a measure of that tax the pro- 18 Sup. Ct. 594, 42 L. Ed. 1037) the classificaportion which the specified local property tion upon which the provisions of the Illinois bears to the entire estate of the decedent. statute were based, the court found there That it may do so, within limitations which was no denial of the equal protection of the do not really make the tax one upon prop- laws either in discriminating between those erty beyond its jurisdiction, the decisions to lineally and those collaterally related to dewhich we have referred clearly establish. cedent, and those standing as strangers to The transfer of certain property within the the blood, or in increasing the proportionate state is taxed by a rule which considers the burden of the tax progressively as the entire estate in arriving at the amount of the amount of the benefit increased. tax. It is in no just sense a tax upon the for- Equal protection of the laws requires equal eign property, real or personal. It is only in operation of the laws upon all persons in like instances where the state exceeds its author- circumstances. Under the statute, in the ity in imposing a tax upon a subject-matter present case, the graduated taxes are lev(40 Sup.Ct.) led equally upon all interests passing from mate authority of the state. We are not nonresident testators or intestates. The tax prepared so to declare. The resident testator is not upon property, but upon the privilege or intestate stands in a different relation to of succession, which the state may grant or the state than does the nonresident. The withhold. It may deny it to some and give it resident's property is usually within the to others. The state is dealing in this in- ready control of the state, and easily open stance not with the transfer of the entire es- to inspection and discovery for taxation pur: tate, but only with certain classes of prop- poses, by means quite different from those erty that are subject to the jurisdiction of afforded in cases of local holdings of nonresthe state. It must find some rule which will ident testators or intestates. As to the resiadequately deal with this situation. It has dent, his entire intangible, and usually most adopted that of the proportion of the local of his tangible property, pay tribute to the estate in certain property to the entire es
state when transferred by will or intestacy ; tate of the decedent. In making classifica- the transfer of the nonresident's estate is tion, which has been uniformly held to be taxed only so far as his estate is located within the power of the state, inequalities within the jurisdiction and only so far as it necessarily arise, for some classes are reach- comes within the descrintion of "real propered, and others omitted; but this has never
•843 been held to render such statutes unconsti- ty within this state, or of goods, wares, *and tutional. Beers v. Glynn, 211 U. S. 477, 29 merchandise within this state, or of shares Sup. Ct. 186, 53 L Ed. 290. This principle of stock of corporations of this state, or of
national banking associations located in this has been recognized in a series of cases in this court. Board of Education v. Illinois, New Jersey debtors to nonresidents and
state.” Simple contract debts owing by 203 U. S. 553, 27 Sup. Ct. 171, 51 L. Ed. 314,
some other kinds of property of nonresidents 8 Ann. Cas. 157; Campbell v. California, 200 U. S. 87, 26 Sup. Ct. 182, 50 L. Ed. 382; the purpose of founding administration, sim
are exempt, although it is settled that, for Keeney v. Comptroller of the State of New York, 222 U. S. 525, 32 Sup. Ct. 105, 56 L. Ed. ple contract debts are assets at the domicile
of the debtor (Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. 299, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1139. It has been uniformly held that the Fourteenth Amend. and that the state of the debtor's domicile
S. 654, 656, 3 Sup. Ct. 417, 27 L. Ed. 1068), ment does not leprive the states of the right to determine the limitations and restrictions may impose a succession tax (Blackstone v. upon the right to inherit property, but “at the Miller, 188 U. S. 189, 205, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47
L. Ed. 439; Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., most can only be held to restrain such an
242 U. S. 394, 401, 37 Sup. Ct. 152, 61 L. Ed. exercise of power as would *exclude the con
386). ception of judgment and discretion, and
The question of equal protection must be which would be so obviously arbitrary and decided as between resident and nonresident unreasonable as to be beyond the pale of decedents as classes, rather than by the ingovernmental authority.” Campbell v. Cali- cidence of the tax upon the particular estates fornia, 200 U. S. 95, 26 Sup. Ct. 185, 50 L. Ed. whose representatives are here complaining. 382. In upholding the validity of a gradu- Absolute equality is impracticable in taxaated tax upon the transfer of personal prop- tion, and is not required by the equal protec
tion clause. erty, to take effect upon the grantor's death.
And inequalities that result we said in Keeney v. Comptroller of New not from hostile discrimination, but occasionYork, supra, 222 U. S. page 535, 32 Sup. Ct. ally and incidentally in the application of a 107, 56 L. Ed. 299, 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1139: system that is not arbitrary in its classifica
tion, are not sufficient to defeat the law. "The validity of the tax must be determined by the laws of New York.
In our opinion, there are substantial dif
The Fourteenth Amendment does not diminish the taxing power this court permit the classification which
ferences which within the rules settled by of the state, but only requires that in its exercise the citizen must be afforded an opportunity has been accomplished by this statute. St. to be heard on all questions of liability and Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, value, and shall not, by arbitrary and discrimi- 235 U. S. 350, 367, 35 Sup. Ct. 99, 59 L. Ed. natory provisions, be denied equal protection. 265, and cases cited. It does not deprive the state of the power to
Finding no error in the judgments of the select the subjects of taxation. But it does not Court of Errors and Appeals of the state of follow that because it can tax any transfer New Jersey, the same are (Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152, 159 [27 Sup.
Aflirmed. Ct. 188, 51 L. Ed. 415, 9 Ann. Cas. 736]), that it must tax all transfers, or that all must be
Mr. Justice HOLMES (dissenting). Many treated alike."
things that a legislature may do if it does
them with no ulterior purpose, it cannot do In order to invalidate this tax it must be as a means to reach what is beyond its conheld that the difference in the manner of stitutional power. That I understand to be assessing transmission of property by testa- the principle of Western Union Telegraph Co. tors or intestates, as between resident and v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 190, 54 L. nonresident decedents, is so wholly arbitrary Ed. 355, Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. and unreasonable as to be beyond the legiti. '56, 30 Sup. Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed. 378, and other
as to secure equality between residents in cases *in 216 U. S. Western Union Telegraph New Jersey and those in other States. Co. v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105, 114, 38 Sup. Ct.
New Jersey could not deny to residents in 438, 62 L. Ed. 1006, 1 A. L. R. 1278. New other States the right to take legacies which Jersey cannot tax the property of Hill or it granted to its own citizens, and therefore McDonald outside the State and cannot use its power to prohibit all legacies cannot be her power over property within it to accom- invoked in aid of a principle that affects the plish by indirection what she cannot do di- foreign residents alone. Io Kansas City, Ft rectly. It seems to me that that is what she Scott & Memphis Ry. Co. v. Kansás, 240 U. S. is trying to do and therefore that the judgment of the Court of Errors and Appeals 227, 235, 36 Sup. Ct. 261, 60 L. Ed. 617, the should be reversed.
State could have refused incorporation It seems to me that when property outside altogether and therefore could impose the the State is taken into account for the pur- carefully limited condition that was upheld. pose of increasing the tax upon property within it, the property outside is taxed in
The CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice VAN effect, no matter what form of words may be DEVANTER and Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS used. It appears to me that this cannot be concur in the opinion that I express, done, even if it should be done in such a way.
DISPOSED OF AT OCTOBER TERM, 1919
(250 U. S. 675)
(250 U, S. 676) No. 107. POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE No. 275. ARKANSAS CENTRAL RAILCOMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. CITY OF ROAD COMPANY, plaintiff in error, v. W. L. OIL CITY. Oct. 6, 1919. In Error to the GOAD. Oct. 6, 1919. In Error to the Supreme Superior Court of the State of Pennsylvania. Court of the State of Arkansas. For opinion Mr. Bynum E. Hinton, of Washington, D. C., below, see 206 S. W. 901. Mr. Thomas B. for plaintiff in error. Dismissed with costs, Pryor, of Ft. Smith, Ark., for plaintiff in error. on motion of counsel for the plaintiff in error. Dismissed, per stipulation.
(250 U. S. 675)
(250 U. S. 676) No. 201. John W. FROTHINGHAM et al., No. 368. J. K. LUMBER COMPANY, plainetc., appellants, v. The UNITED STATES. tiff in error, v. E. P. ASH, Oct. 6, 1919. In Oct. 6, 1919. Appeal from the Court of Claims. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of For opinion below, see 53 Ct. Cl. 641. Messrs. Washington. For opinion below, see 176 Pac. Simon Lyon and R. B. H. Lyon, both of Wash- 550. Messrs. Harrison G. Platt and Robert ington, D. C., for appellants. The Attorney Treat Platt, both of Portland, Or., for plainGeneral, for the United States. Dismissed, on
tiff in error. Mr. Fred Miller, of Spokane, motion of Mr. Simon Lyon for the appellants. Wash., for defendant in error. Dismissed with
costs on motion of counsel for the plaintiff
in error. (250 U. S. 675) No. 246. Marion CALDWELL, State
(250 U. S. 676) Supervisor of Oil Inspection, etc., appellant,
No. 398. GREAT LAKES DREDGE & v. The MOORE OIL COMPANY et al. Oct. DOCK COMPANY, petitioner, v. EASTERN 6, 1919. On Appeal from the District Court STEAMSHIP CORPORATION. Oct. 6, 1919. of the United States for the District of In- Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United diana. Messrs. Ele Stansbury, of Indianapolis, States Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Ind., and Will R. Wood, of Washington, D. Circuit. For opinion below, see 256 Fed. 497. C., for appellant. Mr. Charles D. Chamberlin, Mr. Charles E. Kremer, of Chicago, Il., for peof Cleveland, Ohio, for respondents. Dismissed titioner. Dismissed, on motion of counsel for the with costs, on motion of counsel for the appel- | petitioner. lant
(250 U. S. 676) (250 U. S. 676)
No. 428. The ALABAMA & VICKSBURG No. 255. Frank E. LOW, plaintiff in error, RAILWAY COMPANY et al., plaintiffs in er v. K. SUGAWA & COMPANY, Limited. Oct. ror, v. W. W. BEARD. Oct. 6, 1919. In Er6, 1919. In Error to the District Court of the ror to the Supreme Court of the State of United States for the Southern District of Mississippi. For opinion below, see 81 South. New York. Mr. Abram J. Rose, of New York 14. Messrs. J. Blanc Monroe and Monte M. City, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Henry Swartz, Lemann, both of New Orleans, La., and Robert of New York City, for defendant in error. H. Thompson, of Jackson, Miss., for plaintiffs Dismissed, per stipulation.
in error. Messrs. Marcellus Green and Garner
(40 Sup.Ct.) Wynn Green, both of Jackson, Miss., W. J. No. 305. The NORTHWESTERN MUTULamb, of Corinth, Miss., and N. Vick Rob- AL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. Isabel bins, of Vicksburg, Miss., for defendant in er- H. JOHNSON; and ror. Writ of error and petition for writ of No. 306. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE certiorari dismissed, per stipulation.
COMPANY OF MONTPELIER, VERMONT, V. A. M. MILLER, administrator, etc. Oct. 13, 1919. Messrs. George Lines, of Milwaukee,
Wis., and George B. Young, of Montpelier, Vt., No. Original. The STATE OF NEW for petitioners. Motion to bring up the entire MEXICO, complainant, v. The STATE OF records and cases denied. COLORADO. Oct. 13, 1919. Motion for leave to file bill of complaint herein granted, and
(250 U. S. 658) process ordered to issue returnable on Monday, No. 371. Daniel Curry CAMPBELL, petitionMarch 1 next.
er, v. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY. Oct. 13, 1919. For opinion below, see 255 Fed.
· 437, 166 C. C. A. 513. Messrs. A. H. & RosNo. 73. MARYLAND CASUALTY COM- well King and H. L. Anderson, all of JacksonPANY, appellant, v. The UNITED STATES. ville, Fla., for petitioner. Messrs. F. P. FlemOct. 13, 1919. Messrs. A. R. Serven and Burt E. ing, of Jacksonville, Fla., Walter L. Clark, of Barlow, both of Washington, D. C., appel- Baltimore, Md., and William C. Prentiss, of lant. The Attorney General, for the United Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition States. Motion to remand this cause for fur- for a writ of certiorari to the United States Cirther findings of fact granted.
cuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied.
(250 U. S. 659)
No. 381. HOUSTON OIL COMPANY OF No. 85. Sue Erskine NEWMAN, adminis- TEXAS, petitioner, v. Mrs. M. J. BROWN. tratrix, etc., et al., appellants, v. Ida M. MOY- Oct. 13, 1919. For opinion below, see 202 S. ERS et al., etc.; and
W. 102. Messrs. H. O. Head, of Sherman, Tex., No. 86. William G. McADOO, Secretary of and Thomas M. Kennerly, of Houston, Tex. the Treasury, et al., appellants, v. De Forest (Messrs. Jesse J. Lee and Kennerly, Williams, L. ORMES, administrator, etc. Oct. 13, 1919. Lee & Hill, all of Houston, of counsel), for petiThe Attorney General, for appellants. Motion tioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the to substitute as one of the appellants Carter Court of Civil Appeals for the Ninth Supreme Glass, present Secretary of the Treasury, in Judicial District of the State of Texas denied. place of William G. McAdoo, former Secretary of the Treasury, submitted by Mr. Solicitor
(250 U. S. 659) General King for the appellants, and motion
No. 383. James B. ROBERTS, administrator, granted.
etc., petitioner, v. TENNESSEE COAL, IRON & RAILROAD COMPANY. Oct. 13, 1919.
For opinion below, see 255 Fed. 469, 166 C. C. No. 168. Joseph W. NICHOLS, appellant, A. 545. Mr. W. A. Denson, of Birmingham, v. The UNITED STATES. Oct. 13, 1919. Ala. (Mr. Hannis Taylor, of Washington, D. For opinion below, see 53 Ct. Cl. 463. Messrs. C., of counsel), for petitioner. Petition for a L. T. Michener, of Washington, D. C., and writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit William E. Russell, of New York City, for ap- Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied. pellant. The Attorney General, for the United States. Motion to remand thls cause for
(250 U. S. 659) further findings of fact granted, and the Court
No. 384. D. M. HARDY et al., petitioners, v. of Claims is directed to set aside its judgment The UNITED STATES of America. Oct. 13, and reopen the case for further testimony and 1919.
For opinion below, see 256 Fed. 284. additional findings of fact.
Messrs. William H. Atwell, of Dallas, Tex., and J. H. Barwise, Jr., of Ft. Worth, Tex., for petitioners. The Attorney General and Mr.
La Rue Brown, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the United No. 260. George C. BEIDLER, appellant, v. States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to The UNITED STATES. Oct. 13, 1919. Mr. the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for Frank S. Appleman, of Washington, D. C., for the Fifth Circuit denied. appellant. The Attorney General, for the United States. Motion for a writ of certiorari
(250 U. S. 659) or to remand this cause for further findings
No. 389. Isidore S. WORKIN et al., plaintiffs of fact denied.
in error, v. The UNITED STATES of America.
Oct. 13. 1919. For opinion below, see 260 Fed. (250 U S. 651)
137. Mr. Lawrence B. Cohen, of New York No. 276, October term, 1918. Richard H. City, for plaintiffs in error. The Attorney GenDANA, individually, plaintiff in error, v. Rich- eral, for the United States. Petition for a writ ard H. DANA, executor, etc., et al.
of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court 1919. See, also, 250 U. S. 220, 39 Sup. Ct. of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. 449, 63 L. Ed. 947. Mr. Hollis R. Bailey, of Boston, Mass., for plaintiff in error. Mr. Wm.
(250 U. S. 677) Harold Hitchcock, of Boston, Mass., for de- No. 392. Frederick SCHREIBER et al., etc., fendants in error. Motion to stay mandate petitioners, v. The GERMAN EVANGELICAL and to amend proceedings into proceedings as PROTESTANT CONGREGATION OF THE on writ of certiorari denied.
CHURCH OF THE HOLY GHOST et al.