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(40 Sup.Ct.)

(251 U. S. 1)

District Court found that the charge was UNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN PAC. CO. true and entered a decree of cancellation, et al.

(Argued March 5 and 6, 1919. Decided Nov. 17, 1919.)

No. 179.

[1] "All mineral lands" other than those

"MINERAL LANDS" BARS OIL

EXCLUDING
LANDS.

The exclusion from a railroad land grant of "all mineral lands," other than those containing coal or iron, embraces oil lands.

1. PUBLIC LANDS 78 RAILROAD GRANT Containing coal or iron were excluded from the grant, and this exclusion embraced oil lands. Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 234 U. S. 669, 676-679, 34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 1527. As will be seen presently, there can be no doubt that the patent was procured by representing that the lands were not mineral. Whether this representation was false turns upon the character of the lands as known when the patent was sought and obtained. If they then were known to be valuable for oil, as the government asserts they were, they were mineral in the sense of the granting act.

To compensate for losses to the grant within its primary limits the railroad company was entitled to select other lands of like

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Mineral Land.]

2. PUBLIC LANDS 120-CANCELLATION OF RAILROAD GRANT OF LANDS KNOWN AS OIL

LANDS.

Evidence in suit by the government to cancel for fraud a patent to a railroad company for indemnity lands held to entitle it to the relief, as showing that, when the patent was sought and obtained on affidavit that the lands were nonmineral, they were known by the company's officers to be valuable for oil; that is, that the then known conditions were such as to reasonably engender the belief that the lands contained oil of such quality and in such quantity as would render its extraction profitable and justify expenditures to that end.

area within the indemnity limits, approval by the Secretary of the Interior being essential to passing the selections to patent. The established mode of making the selections was by presenting at the local land office selection lists designating the lands lost and those selected, with supporting affidavits showing, among other things, that the lands selected were of the character

contemplated, that is to say, were not miner

Suit by the United States against the Southern Pacific Company and others. De-al but agricultural. These lists and aflidavits would then be examined in that office

and in the General Land Office, and ultimately the selections would be passed to the Secretary of the Interior for his action. That course was followed here.

The original list was presented November 14, 1903, but it encountered obstacles which

*Messrs. J. Crawford Biggs, of Raleigh, N. led to the presentation of a substituted list C., and Assistant Attorney General Kearful, for the United States.

Messrs. Charles R. Lewers, and William F. Herrin, both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

cree of District Court for the United States

was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (249 Fed. 785, 162 C. C. A. 19), and the United States appeals. Decree of Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and decree of District Court affirmed.

⚫2

and this was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting. Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 249 Fed. 785, 162 C. C. A. 19.

*6

*8

covering the same lands on Septem*ber 6, 1904. Both lists were presented by the company's land agent, Mr. Eberlein, and were accompanied by affidavits made by him stating that the lands selected "are not interdicted mineral," but "are of the character contemplated by the grant," and that "he has caused" them "to be carefully examined by the agents and employés of said company as to their mineral or agricultural character, and that to the best of his knowledge and belief none of the lands returned in said list are mineral lands." In acting on the substituted list the officers of the Land Department relied upon and gave effect to the statements in the supporting affidavits, and the selections were accordingly approved and passed to patent.

company *fraudulently obtained the patent by falsely representing to the land department that the lands were not mineral but agri- In truth Mr. Eberlein had not examined cultural, when it was known that they were the lands or caused them to be examined by mineral. From the evidence presented the others. Nor had any examination of them For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

*Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit by the United States to cancel a patent issued December 12, 1904, to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company for eight full and two partial sections of land within the indemnity limits of the grant made to that company by an act of Congress (Act July 27, 1866, c. 278, 14 Stat. 292), it being charged in the bill that the railroad

*7

person's earning power, irrespective of its | provision debar a state from adopting other effect upon his mere capacity for work. methods, or a composite of different methods, Under ordinary conditions of life, a seri- provided the result be not inconsistent with ous and unnatural disfigurement of the face fundamental rights. As was stated in the or head very probably may have a harmful | Arizona case, 250 U. S. 429, 39 Sup. Ct. 559, effect upon the ability of the injured person 63 L. Ed. 1058: to obtain or retain employment. Laying aside exceptional cases, which we must assume will be fairly dealt with in the proper and equitable administration of the act, such a disfigurement may render one repulsive or offensive to the sight, displeasing, or at least less pleasing, to employer, to fellow em602 ployés, and to patrons or custom*ers. See Ball v. Wm. Hunt & Sons, Ltd., [1912] App. Cas. 496.

"If a state recognizes or establishes a right of action for compensation to injured workmen upon grounds not arbitrary or fundamentally unjust, the question whether the award shall be measured as compensatory damages are measured at common law, or according to some prescribed scale reasonably adapted to produce a fair result, is for the state itself to determine.”

And we see no constitutional reason why 603

But we cannot concede that impairment of earning power is the sole ground upon which a state may not, *in ascertaining the amount compulsory compensation to injured work- of such compensation in particular cases, men legitimately may be based. Unques- take into consideration any substantial phystionably it is a rational basis, and it is adopt-ical impairment attributable to the injury, ed for the generality of cases by the New whether it immediately affects earning caYork law. But the Court of Appeals has pacity or not. construed the 1916 amendment as permitting For the reasons thus outlined, it was not an allowance for facial or head disfigure- unreasonable, arbitrary, or contrary to funment although it does not impair the claim-damental right to embody in the New York ant's earning capacity. Matter. of Erickson Workmen's Compensation Law a provision v. Preuss, 223 N. Y. 365, 368, 119 N. E. 555; for a special allowance of compensation for and see opinion of Judge Cardozo in the pres- a serious disfigurement of the face or head. ent case, 226 N. Y. 199, 200, 123 N. E. 82. Nor is there any ground for declaring that In view of this, and there being no specific the allowance prescribed by the 1916 amendfinding of such impairment in these cases, ment exceeds the constitutional limitations it is proper to say that in our opinion the upon state power. "due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the states to base compulsory compensation solely upon loss of earning power.

The New York law as at first enacted, the Washington, and the Arizona laws presented for our consideration three different methods adopted for the purpose of imposing upon the industry the burden of making some compensation for the human wastage attributable to the hazards of the work. We were unable to find that any of these ran counter to the "due process" clause. Nor does that

[2] Whether an award for such disfigurement should be made in combination with or independent of the compensation allowed for the mere inability to work is a matter of detail for the state to determine. The same is true of the question whether the compensation should be paid in a single sum, or in installments. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 429, 39 Sup. Ct. 553, 63 L. Ed. 1058.

Judgments affirmed.

Mr. Justice MCREYNOLDS dissents.

(40 Sup.Ct.)

(251 U. S. 1)

District Court found that the charge was UNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN PAC. CO. true and entered a decree of cancellation, et al.

(Argued March 5 and 6, 1919. Decided Nov. 17, 1919.)

No. 179.

[1] "All mineral lands" other than those containing coal or iron were excluded from the grant, and this exclusion embraced oil lands. Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 234 U. S. 669, 676-679, 34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 1527. As will be seen presently, there can be no doubt that the patent was procured by representing that the lands were not mineral. Whether this representation was false turns upon the character of the lands as known when the patent was sought and obtained. If they then were known to be valuable for oil, as the government asserts they were, they were mineral in the sense of the granting act.

To compensate for losses to the grant within its primary limits the railroad company

was entitled to select other lands of like area within the indemnity limits, approval by the Secretary of the Interior being essential to passing the selections to patent. The established mode of making the selections was by presenting at the local land office selection lists designating the lands lost and those selected, with supporting affidavits showing, among other things, that the lands selected were of the character

contemplated, that is to say, were not miner

Suit by the United States against the Southern Pacific Company and others. De-al but agricultural. These lists and affidavits would then be examined in that office

and in the General Land Office, and ultimately the selections would be passed to the Secretary of the Interior for his action. That course was followed here.

1. PUBLIC LANDS 78 RAILROAD GRANT EXCLUDING "MINERAL LANDS" BARS OIL LANDS.

The exclusion from a railroad land grant of "all mineral lands," other than those containing coal or iron, embraces oil lands.

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Mineral Land.]

2. PUBLIC LANDS 120-CANCELLATION OF RAILROAD GRANT OF LANDS KNOWN AS OIL

LANDS.

Evidence in suit by the government to cancel for fraud a patent to a railroad company for indemnity lands held to entitle it to the relief, as showing that, when the patent was sought and obtained on affidavit that the lands

were nonmineral, they were known by the company's officers to be valuable for oil; that is, that the then known conditions were such as to reasonably engender the belief that the lands contained oil of such quality and in such quantity as would render its extraction profitable and justify expenditures to that end.

Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

cree of District Court for the United States

was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (249 Fed. 785, 162 C. C. A. 19), and the United States appeals. Decree of Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and decree of District Court affirmed.

#2

and this was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting. Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 249 Fed. 785, 162 C. C. A. 19.

The original list was presented November 14, 1903, but it encountered obstacles which

*Messrs. J. Crawford Biggs, of Raleigh, N. led to the presentation of a substituted list C., and Assistant Attorney General Kearful, for the United States.

Messrs. Charles R. Lewers, and William F. Herrin, both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

*6

*8 covering the same lands on Septem*ber 6, 1904. Both lists were presented by the company's land agent, Mr. Eberlein, and were accompanied by affidavits made by him stating that the lands selected "are not inter

*Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered dicted mineral," but "are of the character contemplated by the grant," and that "he has caused" them "to be carefully examined by the agents and employés of said company as to their mineral or agricultural character, and that to the best of his knowledge and belief none of the lands returned in said list are mineral lands." In acting on the substituted list the officers of the Land Department relied upon and gave effect to the statements in the supporting affidavits, and the selections were accordingly approved and passed to patent.

company fraudulently obtained the patent by falsely representing to the land department that the lands were not mineral but agri- In truth Mr. Eberlein had not examined cultural, when it was known that they were the lands or caused them to be examined by mineral. From the evidence presented the others. Nor had any examination of them For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit by the United States to cancel a patent issued December 12, 1904, to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company for eight full and two partial sections of land within the indemnity limits of the grant made to that company by an act of Congress (Act July 27, 1866, c. 278, 14 Stat. 292), it being charged in the bill that the railroad

*7

person's earning power, irrespective of its | provision debar a state from adopting other effect upon his mere capacity for work.

Under ordinary conditions of life, a serious and unnatural disfigurement of the face or head very probably may have a harmful effect upon the ability of the injured person to obtain or retain employment. Laying aside exceptional cases, which we must assume will be fairly dealt with in the proper and equitable administration of the act, such a disfigurement may render one repulsive or offensive to the sight, displeasing, or at least less pleasing, to employer, to fellow em*602 ployés, and to patrons or custom*ers. See Ball v. Wm. Hunt & Sons, Ltd., [1912] App. Cas. 496.

methods, or a composite of different methods, provided the result be not inconsistent with fundamental rights. As was stated in the Arizona case, 250 U. S. 429, 39 Sup. Ct. 559, 63 L. Ed. 1058:

"If a state recognizes or establishes a right of action for compensation to injured workmen upon grounds not arbitrary or fundamentally unjust, the question whether the award shall be measured as compensatory damages are measured at common law, or according to some prescribed scale reasonably adapted to produce a fair result, is for the state itself to determine."

And we see no constitutional reason why *603

But we cannot concede that impairment of earning power is the sole ground upon which a state may not, *in ascertaining the amount compulsory compensation to injured work- of such compensation in particular cases, men legitimately may be based. Unques- take into consideration any substantial phystionably it is a rational basis, and it is adopt-ical impairment attributable to the injury, ed for the generality of cases by the New whether it immediately affects earning caYork law. But the Court of Appeals has pacity or not. construed the 1916 amendment as permitting For the reasons thus outlined, it was not an allowance for facial or head disfigure- unreasonable, arbitrary, or contrary to funment although it does not impair the claim-damental right to embody in the New York ant's earning capacity. Matter. of Erickson Workmen's Compensation Law a provision v. Preuss, 223 N. Y. 365, 368, 119 N. E. 555; for a special allowance of compensation for and see opinion of Judge Cardozo in the pres- a serious disfigurement of the face or head. ent case, 226 N. Y. 199, 200, 123 N. E. 82. Nor is there any ground for declaring that In view of this, and there being no specific the allowance prescribed by the 1916 amendfinding of such impairment in these cases, ment exceeds the constitutional limitations it is proper to say that in our opinion the upon state power. "due process of law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require the states to base compulsory compensation solely upon loss of earning power.

The New York law as at first enacted, the Washington, and the Arizona laws presented for our consideration three different methods adopted for the purpose of imposing upon the industry the burden of making some compensation for the human wastage attributa-553, 63 L. Ed. 1058. ble to the hazards of the work. We were unable to find that any of these ran counter to the "due process" clause. Nor does that

Judgments affirmed.

[2] Whether an award for such disfigurement should be made in combination with or independent of the compensation allowed for the mere inability to work is a matter of detail for the state to determine. The same is true of the question whether the compensation should be paid in a single sum, or in installments. Arizona Employers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 429, 39 Sup. Ct.

Mr. Justice MCREYNOLDS dissents.

(40 Sup.Ct.)

(251 U. S. 1)

District Court found that the charge was UNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN PAC. CO. true and entered a decree of cancellation, et al.

(Argued March 5 and 6, 1919. Decided Nov. 17, 1919.)

No. 179.

[1] "All mineral lands" other than those

"MINERAL LANDS"

BARS OIL

EXCLUDING
LANDS.

The exclusion from a railroad land grant of "all mineral lands," other than those containing coal or iron, embraces oil lands.

1. PUBLIC LANDS 78 RAILROAD GRANT Containing coal or iron were excluded from the grant, and this exclusion embraced oil lands. Burke v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 234 U. S. 669, 676-679, 34 Sup. Ct. 907, 58 L. Ed. 1527. As will be seen presently, there can be no doubt that the patent was procured by representing that the lands were not mineral. Whether this representation was false turns upon the character of the lands as known when the patent was sought and obtained. If they then were known to be valuable for oil, as the government asserts they were, they were mineral in the sense of the granting act.

To compensate for losses to the grant within its primary limits the railroad company was entitled to select other lands of like area within the indemnity limits, approval by the Secretary of the Interior being essential to passing the selections to patent. The established mode of making the selections was by presenting at the local land office selection lists designating the lands lost and those selected, with supporting affidavits showing, among other things, that the lands selected were of the character

contemplated, that is to say, were not mineral but agricultural. These lists and affida

vits would then be examined in that office

and in the General Land Office, and ultimately the selections would be passed to the Secretary of the Interior for his action. That course was followed here.

The original list was presented November 14, 1903, but it encountered obstacles which

led to the presentation of a substituted list

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[Ed. Note. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Mineral Land.]

2. PUBLIC LANDS 120-CANCELLATION OF RAILROAD GRANT OF LANDS KNOWN AS OIL

LANDS.

Evidence in suit by the government to cancel for fraud a patent to a railroad company for indemnity lands held to entitle it to the relief, as showing that, when the patent was sought and obtained on affidavit that the lands were nonmineral, they were known by the company's officers to be valuable for oil; that is, that the then known conditions were such as to reasonably engender the belief that the lands contained oil of such quality and in such quantity as would render its extraction profitable and justify expenditures to that end.

Appeal from the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Suit by the United States against the Southern Pacific Company and others. De

cree of District Court for the United States

was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals (249 Fed. 785, 162 C. C. A. 19), and the United States appeals. Decree of Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, and decree of District Court affirmed.

#2

*Messrs. J. Crawford Biggs, of Raleigh, N. C., and Assistant Attorney General Kearful, for the United States.

Messrs. Charles R. Lewers, and William F. Herrin, both of San Francisco, Cal., for appellee.

*6

*8

covering the same lands on Septem*ber 6, 1904. Both lists were presented by the company's land agent, Mr. Eberlein, and were accompanied by affidavits made by him stating that the lands selected "are not inter

*Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered dicted mineral," but "are of the character contemplated by the grant," and that "he the opinion of the Court. has caused" them "to be carefully examined by the agents and employés of said company as to their mineral or agricultural character, and that to the best of his knowledge and belief none of the lands returned in said list are mineral lands." In acting

on the substituted list the officers of the Land Department relied upon and gave effect to the statements in the supporting affidavits, and the selections were accordingly approved and passed to patent.

and this was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, one judge dissenting. Southern Pac. Co. v. United States, 249 Fed. 785, 162 C. C. A. 19.

This is a suit by the United States to cancel a patent issued December 12, 1904, to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company for eight full and two partial sections of land within the indemnity limits of the grant made to that company by an act of Congress (Act July 27, 1866, c. 278, 14 Stat. 292), it being charged in the bill that the railroad

*7

In truth Mr. Eberlein had not examined the lands or caused them to be examined by others. Nor had any examination of them For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

company *fraudulently obtained the patent by falsely representing to the land department that the lands were not mineral but agricultural, when it was known that they were mineral. From the evidence presented the

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