(40 Sup.Ct.)

No. 635. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY, petitioner, v. James B. CONNORS. Jan. 12. No. 220. The UNITED STATES, appellant. 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 303. Messrs. C. D. Hine and Paul J. Jones, both of See, also, Archer v. Archer, 53 Ct. Cl. 405. v. George F. ARCHER et al. Jan. 13, 1920. Youngstown, Ohio, for petitioner. Mr. W. J.The Attorney General, for the United States. Kenealy, of Youngstown, Ohio, for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

Fed. 802. Mr. C. J. St. John, of Bristol, Tenn., | for a writ of certiorari to the United States Cirfor appellants. cuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied.

(251 U. S. 559)

PER CURIAM. Dismissed for want of jurisdiction upon the authority of Courtney v. Pradt, 196 U. S. 89, 91, 25 Sup. Ct. 208. 49 L. Ed. 398; Farrugia v. Philadelphia & Reading No. 664. JEONG QUEY HOW, petitioner, v. Ry. Co., 233 U. S. 352, 353, 34 Sup. Ct. 591, Edward WHITE, as Commissioner of Immigra58 L. Ed. 996; Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co tion at the port of San Francisco. Jan. 19, v. Western Union Tel. Co., 234 U. S. 369, 371-1920. For opinion below, see 258 Fed. 618, 170 372, 34 Sup. Ct. 810, 58 L. Ed. 1356; Male v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Ry. Co., 240 U. S. 97, 99, 36 Sup. Ct. 351,.60 L. Ed. 544.

No. 660. The AMERICAN GUARANTY

C. C. A. 72. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied.

(251 U. S. 543)

No. -. Harmon P. McKNIGHT v. The UNITED STATES. Jan. 20, 1920. Application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis for the purposes of a petition for certiorari to and an appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts.

PER CURIAM. The prayer to be allowed to proceed in forma pauperis for the purpose of an application for certiorari to review the judgment below, as well as for the purpose of an appeal asked to review a refusal to release on habeas corpus, made to the Chief Justice and by him submitted to the court for its action is hereby denied.

(251 U. S. 566) No. 174. SEABOARD AIR LINE RAIL

COMPANY, petitioner, v. AMERICAN FI-WAY COMPANY, petitioner, v. Mrs. Lessie DELITY COMPANY. Jan. 19, 1920. For opinion below, see 260 Fed. 897. Petition for HORTON, administratrix, etc. Jan. 21, 1920. a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied.

(251 U. S. 559)

No. 663. MORRIS & CUMINGS DREDGING COMPANY, petitioner, v. CORNELL STEAMBOAT COMPANY. Jan. 19, 1920. For opinion below, see 261 Fed. 897. Petition

On writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the State of North Carolina. For opinion below,
see 175 N. C. 472, 95 S. E. 883. See, also, 248
U. S. 553, 39 Sup. Ct. 8, 63 L. Ed. 418; 39
Sup. Ct. 21, 64 L. Ed.
Mr. Thaddeus A.
Adams, of Charlotte, N. C., for petitioner.
Mr. Robert W. Winston, of Raleigh, N. C.,
for respondent. Dismissed with costs, on mo-
tion of counsel for the petitioner.

(251 U. S. 382)

(40 Sup.Ct.)

REX v. UNITED STATES et al.

so that in all claims for property of citizens or inhabitants of the United States taken or destroyed by Indians belonging to any tribe

(Argued Jan. 13, 1920. Decided Jan. 26, 1920.) in amity with and subject to the jurisdiction

COURTS 456

No. 126.

STATUTE REINSTATES ONLY THOSE CLAIMS FOR INDIAN DEPREDATIONS DISMISSED FOR ALIENAGE OF CLAIMANT.

of the United States, &c., the alienage of the claimant shall not be a defence to said claims, with provisos to be mentioned. The present petition, filed September 21, 1917, alleges that

United States.

The amendment of Act March 3, 1891, § 1, the tribe of Utes was in amity with the giving jurisdiction to Court of Claims over claims for property of "citizens" taken by Indians of a "band, tribe or nation" in amity with the United States, by Act Jan. 11, 1915, so that, in claims for property of "citizens or inhabitants" taken by Indians belonging to any "tribe" in amity with the United States, the alienage of the claimant shall not be a defense, and reinstating claims that had been dismissed for want of proof of citizenship, or for alienage, of claimant, does not, as is necessary to prevent the claim being barred by limitations, reinstate a claim dismissed because the Blackhawk "band" of Utes, taking the property, was not in amity with the United States.

*384

The claimant contends that the amendment had two purposes-not merely to give inhabitants the same rights as citizens, but also to admit claims for damage done by hostile bands from a tribe that maintained its amity, subject to a proviso that suit had been brought upon them *theretofore in the Court of Claims. It is said that claims of that nature that still were pending in the Court have been awarded judgment under the new jurisdiction. Another proviso in the Act is that claims that have been dismissed by the Court for want of proof of citizenship or alienage shall be reinstated, and the petition prays that the former claim be consolidated with this suit, and that judgment be awarded upon

the evidence filed in the former case. It is

pointed out as an anomaly that the case of

a neighbor of the intestate who suffered damage from the same band on the same day was reinstated and passed to judgment, his claim having been dismissed at an earlier date because he was not a citizen at the time. But we are of opinion that the judgment of the Court of Claims was plainly right. The

Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opin- emphasis and primary intent, at least, of the ion of the Court.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims dismissing the appellant's petition upon demurrer. The claim is for depredations committed on June 10, 1866, by a band of the Ute tribe of Indians, known as Blackhawk's band. The Act of March 3, 1891, c. 538, § 1, 26 Stat. 851, gave jurisdiction to the Court of Claims over all claims for property of citizens taken or destroyed by Indians belonging to any band, tribe, or nation in amity with the United States. See Rev. Stat. § 2156 (Comp. St. § 4159). Act of June 30, 1834, c. 161, § 17, 4 Stat. 729, 731. The appellant's intestate filed his claim but on June 13, 1898, the Court of Claims held that the Blackhawk band of Utes was not in amity with the United States and dismissed the petition. The present petition relies upon the Act of January 11, 1915, c. 7, 38 Stat. 791, amending the first section of the Act of 1891

Act of 1915 was to remove the defence of alienage. When it goes on by an express proviso to reinstate claims dismissed upon that ground and says nothing as to the other class it is impossible to extend the words. According to the claimant's necessary argument Congress had claims for damage by hostile bands before its eyes. On the face of the act it had before them also the matter of reinstatement. Yet it did not purport to reinstate claims of the present class. According to the claimant's account there was something for the act to operate on in the way of damage by hostile bands and the words cannot be carried further than they go. The Court of Claims rightly held that the old claim was not reinstated and that considered as a new claim the present suit was barred by the three years' limitation in the original act.

Judgment affirmed.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(251 U. S. 385)

tioned, they both were arrested at their SILVERTHORNE LUMBER CO., Inc., et al.| homes early in the morning of February 25,

v. UNITED STATES.

and were detained in custody a number of hours. While they were thus detained rep

(Argued Dec. 12, 1919. Decided Jan. 26, 1920.) resentatives of the Department of Justice

No. 358.

1. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

7-KNOWLEDGE GAINED BY GOVERNMENT'S WRONG MAY NOT

BE USED.

Knowledge gained by government's wrongful search and seizure may not, on return by order of the court, of the original articles, be used to call on the owners by subpoenas to produce them; so that they may not be punished for disobeying an order to comply with the subpœnas.

and the United States marshal without a shadow of authority went to the office of their company and made a clean sweep of all the books, papers and documents found there. All the employés were taken or directed to go to the office of the District Attorney of the United States to which also the books, &c., were taken at once. An application was made as soon as might be to

*391

the District *Court for a return of what thus had been taken unlawfully. It was opposed

2. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES 7-CORPORA- by the District Attorney so far as he had TION TO BE PROTECTED.

The rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected, even if the same result might be achieved by the government in a lawful way.

found evidence against the plaintiffs in error, and it was stated that the evidence so obtained was before the grand jury. Color had been given by the District Attorney to the approach of those concerned in the act

The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Pitney, by an invalid subpoena for certain documents dissenting.

In Error to the District Court of the United States for the Western District of New York.

relating to the charge in the indictment then on file. Thus the case is not that of knowledge acquired through the wrongful act of a stranger, but it must be assumed that the Government planned or at all events ratified the whole performance. Photographs and copies of material papers were made and a new indictment was framed based upon the knowledge thus obtained. The District Court ordered a return of the originals but impounded the photographs and copies. Subpœnas to produce the originals then were

Judgment for contempt was rendered against the Silverthorne Lumber Company, Incorporated, and another for disobedience of an order to comply with subpoenas to produce papers in a prosecution by the United States, and they bring error. Reversed. Messrs. Frederic D. McKenney and Myer served and on the refusal of the plaintiffs Cohen, both of Washington, D. C., and Wil-in error to produce them the Court made liam D. Guthrie, of New York City, for plain

tiffs in error.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Stewart, for the United States.

*390

an order that the subpoenas should be com

plied with, although it had found that all the papers had been seized in violation of the parties' constitutional rights. The refusal to obey this order is the contempt alleged. The Government now, while in form repudiating and condemning the illegal sei

*Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opin-zure, seeks to maintain its right to avail ion of the Court.

This is a writ of error brought to reverse a judgment of the District Court fining the Silverthorne Lumber Company two hundred and fifty dollars for contempt of court and ordering Frederick W. Silverthorne to be imprisoned until he should purge himself of a similar contempt. The contempt in question was a refusal to obey subpoenas and an order of Court to produce books and documents of the company before the grand jury to be used in regard to alleged violation of the statutes of the United States by the said Silverthorne and his father. ground of the refusal was that the order of the Court infringed the rights of the parties under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

itself of the knowledge obtained by that means which otherwise it would not have had.

[1, 2] The proposition could not be presented more nakedly. It is that although of course its seizure was an outrage which the Government now regrets, it may study the papers before it returns them, copy them, and then may use the knowledge that it has gained to call upon the owners in a more regular form to produce them; that the protection of the Constitution covers the physical possession but not any advantages that the Government can gain over the object of its pursuit by doing the forbidden act. Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177, to be sure, had established that laying the papers directly

⚫392

before the grand jury was *unwarranted, but

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(40 Sup.Ct.)

it is taken to mean only that two steps are required instead of one. In our opinion such is not the law. It reduces the Fourth Amendment to a form of words. 232 U. S.

public an interest in the use of the railroad, it may withdraw its grant by discontinuing the use when that use can be kept up only at a loss.

3. COURTS 107-RECITAL OF OPINION NOT

A FINDING OF FACT.

393, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177. The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisi- Railroad Commission requiring plaintiff to opRecital of opinion after sustaining order of tion of evidence in a certain way is that not erate its railroad, on the ground that plaintiff's merely evidence so acquired shall not be other business of lumbering was successful used before the Court but that it shall not enough to stand a loss on the road, that the be used at all. Of course this does not mean commission's order calls on plaintiff "to submit that the facts thus obtained become sacred a new schedule for transportation which may be and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is operated at a profit for plaintiff," cangained from an independent source they may not be considered as a finding that such a schedbe proved like any others, but the knowledge ule can be submitted; there being no evidence gained by the Government's own wrong can-warranting such a finding.

NOT AUTHORIZE CONSTITUTIONALLY RAILROAD
OPERATION AT LOSS.

Whatever may be the forms required by local law of a company desiring to discontinue its railroad business, it cannot authorize the Railroad Commission or the court to do what the federal Constitution forbids, which is the effect of an order of the one and an injunction of the other compelling it to operate, though at

a loss.

not be used by it in the way proposed. The 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 297-STATE CANnumerous decisions, like Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575, holding that a collateral inquiry into the mode in which evidence has been got will not be allowed when the question is raised for the first time at the trial, are no authority in the present proceeding, as is explained in Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383, 394, 395, 34 Sup. Ct. 341, 58 L. Ed. 652, L. R. A. 1915B, 834, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 1177. Whether some of those decisions have gone too far or have given wrong reasons it is unnecessary to inquire; the principle applicable to the present case seems to us plain. It is stated satisfactorily in Flagg v. United States, 233 Fed. 481, 483, 147 C. C. A. 367. In Linn v. United States, 251 Fed. 476, 480, 163 C. C. A. 470, it was thought that a different rule applied to a corporation, on the ground that it was not privileged from producing its books and papers. But the rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to be protected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way. Judgment reversed.

The CHIEF JUSTICE and Mr. Justice PITNEY dissent.

(251 U. S. 396)

BROOKS-SCANLON CO. v. RAILROAD
COMMISSION OF LOUISIANA.

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana.

Suit by the Brooks-Scanlon Company against the Railroad Commission of Louisi

ana.

Judgments adverse to defendant were reversed by the Supreme Court of Louisiana (144 La. 1086, 81 South. 727), and plaintiff brings certiorari. Reversed.

Messrs. J. Blanc Monroe, of New Orleans, La., Robert R. Reid, of Hammond, La., and Monte M. Lemann, of New Orleans, La., for petitioner.

Mr. Wylie M. Barrow, of Baton Rouge, La., for respondent.

⚫397

*Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit by the Brooks-Scanlon Company, a Minnesota corporation organized to manufacture and deal in lumber and to carry on other incidental business, against the Railroad Commission of Louisiana. It seeks

(Argued Jan. 6, 1920. Decided Feb. 2, 1920.) to set aside an order (Number 2228) of the

No. 386.

1. RAILROADS 57 CANNOT BE REQUIRED.

A company cannot be compelled to operate its railroad where it cannot do so without loss therefrom, though its other business of lumbering be sufficiently remunerative to absorb the loss and make returns on its entire business.

Commission requiring the plaintiff either directly or through arrangements made with OPERATION AT LOSS the Kentwood and Eastern Railway Company, to operate its narrow gauge railroad between Kentwood and Hackley in Louisiana upon schedules and days to be approved by the Commission. The plaintiff alleges that the order cannot be complied with except at a loss of more than $1,500 a month, and that to compel compliance would deprive the plaintiff of its property without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, with

2. RAILROADS 57-MAY DISCONTINUE OPERATION AT LOSS.

If a company operating a lumber business and a railroad be taken to have granted to the

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMEER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes