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(252 U. S. 364)
COLLINS v. MILLER, U. S. Marshal.
CARLISLE, British Consul General, v. COLLINS.
1. COURTS 385 (6)—QUESTIONS AS TO CONSTRUCTION OF TREATY REVIEWABLE BY SUPREME COURT ON DIRECT APPEAL.
A judgment to be appealable to federal Su(Argued Dec. 9, 1919. Decided March 29, 1920.) preme Court should be final, not only as to all
parties, but as to the whole subject-matter and all the causes of action involved.
Nos. 350 and 351.
5. HABEAS CORPUS
113(3)—JudgMENT ON HAREAS CORPUS TO REVIEW EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS NOT FINAL.
Where, in a habeas corpus proceeding to review extradition proceedings instituted on three separate affidavits, the court denied or rather dismissed the writ as to the commitment on one of the affidavits, but granted the writ as to the commitments on the other affidavits, remanded the case for further hearing before the judge making the commitments, and remanded the petitioner to the house of detention to await further proceedings on such affidavits, the judgment was not final, so as to support an appeal, as the writ had not been disposed of so far as concerned the detention on two of the affidavits.
6. EXTRADITION 17-PROCEEDINGS BEFORE COMMITTING MAGISTRATE NOT REVIEWABLE BY APPEAL.
Proceedings before a committing magistrate in international extradition are not subject to correction by appeal.
7. HABEAS CORPUS 30(1)—Errors not obDINARILY CORRECTIBLE.
It is ordinarily beyond the scope of the review afforded by a writ of habeas corpus to correct error in the proceedings.
8. APPEAL AND ERROR
TO BE APPEALABLE TO FEDERAL SUPREME COURT MUST BE FINAL AS TO ALL MATTERS INVOLVED.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
[1-4] These are appeals from a single judgment entered by the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana on a petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari. The relator had been arrested on extradition proceedings. Each party asks to have reviewed the construction given below to provisions of our treaty with Great Britain, proclaimed August 9, 1842 (8 Stat. 572, 576), and of the supplementary treaty proclaimed April 22, 1901 (32 Stat. 1864). The questions presented are therefore of a character which may be reviewed upon direct appeal under section 238 of the Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1215) Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U. S. 447, 33 Sup. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 397. But this court has jurisdiction on writ of error and appeal under that section, as under others, only from final judgments. McLish v. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 12 Sup. Ct. 118, 35 L. Ed. 893; Heike v. United States, 217 U. S. 423, 30 Sup. Ct. 539, 54 L. Ed. 821. And the rule applies to habeas corpus proceedings. Hark
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rader v. Wadley, 172 U. S. 148, 162, 19 Sup. er with a copy of the record in all the proCt. 119, 43 L. Ed. 399. The fundamental ques-ceedings was transmitted to the Secretary of
This petition for writs of habeas corpus and certiorari was filed by Collins, in said District Court, on January 8, 1919. It set forth the proceedings before Judge Foster on the three affidavits, and alleged that his detention was illegal and in violation of rights secured to him by the treaty; among other reasons because he was refused permission to introduce evidence as above mentioned. District Judge Grubb ordered that the writs issue; and the marshal made return setting forth in substance the facts above recited. The case was heard before Judge Grubb on February 21, 1919, the record before Judge Foster being introduced. On the same day Judge Grubb, without delivering an opinion, entered an order which declared that "relator's application for habeas corpus is denied" so far as concerned the charge of obtaining the pearl button from Mohamed Alli Zaimel ali Raza, and that "the writs of habeas corpus are granted" so far as the detention was based on the other two charges, but that the relator be remanded to the House of Detention to await further proceedings in said last two named affidavits.
tion whether the judgment appealed from *is a final one within the meaning of the rule has suggested itself to the court; and it must be answered, although it was not raised by either party. Defiance Water Co. v. Defiance, 191 U. S. 184, 194, 24 Sup. Ct. 63, 48 L. Ed. 140. In order to answer the question it is necessary to describe the proceedings before the committing magistrate as well as those in the District Court on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
In October and November, 1918, the British consul general at New Orleans filed with the Honorable Rufus E. Foster, District Judge of the United States for the Eastern District of Louisiana, three separate affidavits, each charging that Charles Glen Collins, who was then within the jurisdiction of that court, had committed at Bombay, India, the crime therein described as obtaining property under false pretenses, and that he stood charged therewith in the Chief Presidency Magistrate's Court at Bombay, and asking that he be committed as a fugitive from justice for the purpose of having him returned to India for trial. Warrants of arrest issued, and Collins moved, as to each affidavit, to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, contending that the transactions in question were commercial dealings in which he had merely failed to pay debts incurred. Hearings, entitled "In the Matter of Extradition Proceedings of Charles Glen Collins," were had before Judge Foster, at which the consul general and Collins appeared by counsel. Evidence in support of each of the three affidavits was introduced by the consul general. Then Collins, who was sworn at his request, admitted his identity and that he had been present in India at the times each of the alleged crimes were committed. As to one of the charges, that of obtaining a pearl button from Mohamed Alli Zaimel ali Raza, he was allowed to testify further. But he was not permitted to testify as to matters concerning the other two which had been consolidated. And he was not permitted to introduce other witness
Neither party took any action in respect to such further proceedings before Judge Foster. On March 3, 1919, Collins petitioned for leave to appeal, contending that he should have been discharged on all three affidavits and his appeal was allowed. This is case No. 350 on the docket of this court. Later the British consul general petitioned for leave to appeal on the ground that Collins' application should have been definitely denied also as to the commitment on the other two affidavits. His appeal, being No. 351 on the docket of this court, was allowed March 28,
es in defense of any of the three *affidavits. After the hearings were concluded Judge Foster made two orders or judgments signed by him as Judge of said United States District Court and entitled in said court. In these orders he found, as to each of the affidavits, that he deemed the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the law and the treaty, and as to each he ordered Collins recommitted to the House of Detention in the custody if it had stood alone. McNamara v. Henkel, of the United States marshal for that district | 226 U. S. 520, 523, 33 Sup. Ct. 146, 57 L. Ed. to await the order of the President of the 330. But the judgment appealed from dealt United States. The two proceedings (which also with the detention on the other two affiincluded the three affidavits) were then con- davits. It declared that "the writs of habeas solidated. Under date of November 27, 1918, corpus are granted" as to the commitments a certificate setting forth his findings togeth- on the other two affidavits, and ordered that
[5-7] First. Was the judgment appealed from a final one? A single petition for a writ of habeas corpus thus sets forth detention of the relator on three separate affidavits. As to the commitment on one of these, the judgment entered by Judge Grubb directed that the writ be "denied." Such denial, or more appropriately dismissal, of the writ would obviously have been a final judgment,
the case be remanded for further hearing before Judge Foster.
What was thus called granting the writ was not a discharge of the prisoner, deferred as in In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 10 Sup. Ct. 384, 33 L. Ed. 835, and in In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242, 14 Sup. Ct. 323, 38 L. Ed. 149; or made conditional as in United States v. Petkos, 214 Fed. 978, 131 C. C. A. 274; Billings v. Sitner, 228 Fed. 315, 142 C. C. A. 607, and Ex Parte Romano (D. C.) 251 Fed. 762; or coupled with other disposition of him as in
der the authority of the District Court (see Mr. Justice Nelson in In re Kaine, 14 How. 103, 133, 134, 14 L. Ed. 345); and as the writ of habeas corpus had not been disposed of there, so far as concerned the detention on two of the three affidavits, the decision below on that branch of the case was not final.
ther absolutely *or conditionally except upon a rehearing before the commissioner with the consent of the President--this question, we are not required to consider at this time. For the proceeding ordered by Judge Grubb had not been taken; nor had the power sought to be exercised by him been challenged. Nor need we consider whether Judge Grubb, having found that a proper hearing had been denied by the committing magistrate on the two affidavits, might have heard the case de novo, and have determined thereIn re Gut Lun (D. C.) 84 Fed. 323, and *Ex on whether the prisoner should be discharg parte Gytl (D. C.) 210 Fed. 918, 924. It ed (compare Chin Yow v. United States, 208 more nearly resembles the kind of an order U. S. 8, 13, 28 Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369; which an appellate tribunal enters on reversWhitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745, 746, 138 C. ing and remanding the judgment of a low- C. A. 199; United States v. Williams [D. C.] er court upon finding error in its proceedings. 193 Fed. 228), for Judge Grubb did not unBut the proceeding before a committing mag-dertake to do so. The prisoner remained unistrate in international extradition is not subject to correction by appeal. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 714, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905; Sternaman v. Peck, 80 Fed. 883, 26 C. C. A. 214. Compare United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48, 14 L. Ed. 42; The United States, Petitioner, 194 U. S. 194, 24 Sup. Ct. 629, 48 L. Ed. 931. And it is ordinarily beyond the scope of the review afforded by a writ of habeas corpus to correct error in the proceedings. In re Kaine, 14 How. 103, 122, 14 L. Ed. 345; Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 784, 7 Sup. Ct. 780, 30 L. Ed. 824; Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U. S. 447, 457, 33 Sup. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 397; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 228, 35 Sup. Ct. 54, 59 L. Ed. 203. The order resembles, also, that which might be entered by a District Judge after having reviewed the proceedings taking place before a United States commissioner, under the court's authority to assume control in the preliminary stages of matters of which it has the final decision under the law. United States v. Berry (D. C.) 4 Fed. 779, 781; In re Chin K. Shue (D. C.) 199 Fed. 282, 284; The Mary (D. C.) 233 Fed. 121, 124. Compare Todd v. United States, 158 U. S. 278, 282, 15 Sup. Ct. 889, 39 L. Ed. 982; United States v. Allred, 155 U. S. 591, 594, 15 Sup. Ct. 231, 39 L. Ed. 273; In re Perkins (D. C.) 100 Fed. 950, 954. For an extradition commissioner is an officer of the court which appoints him. See Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 181, 187, 23 Sup. Ct. 98, 47 L. Ed. 130; In re Grin (C. C.) 112 Fed. 790, 794. But here the extradition commissioner had certified his findings to the Secretary of State before the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed. Whether, for this reason, the time had not passed when the court could correct the action of its commissioner, except upon reopening of the proceeding before him with the consent of the executive (see 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 91)—or, in other words, whether in such a case the power of the court is not limited to ordering the discharge of the prisoner ei
 Second. A case may not be brought here by appeal or writ of error in fragments. To be appealable, the judgment must be, not only final, but complete. United States v. Girault, 11 How. 22, 32, 13 L. Ed. 587; Holcombe v. McKusick, 20 How. 552, 554, 15 L. Ed. 1020; Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, 4, 1 Sup. Ct. 15, 27 L. Ed. 73; Grant v. Phœnix Ins. Co., 106 U. S. 429, 431, 1 Sup. Ct. 414, 27 L. Ed. 237; Dainese v. Kendall, 119 U. S. 53, 7 Sup. Ct. 65, 30 L. Ed. 305; Covington v. Covington First National Bank, 185 U. S. 270, 277, 22 Sup. Ct. 645, 46 L. Ed. 906; Heike v. United States, 217 U. S. 423, 429, 30 Sup. Ct. 539, 54 L. Ed. 821; Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U. S. 339, 346, 33 Sup. Ct. 515, 57 L. Ed. 864. And the rule requires that the judgment to be appealable should be final not only as to all the parties, but as to the whole subject-matter and as to all the causes of action involved. Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 226 U. S. 99, 101, 33 Sup. Ct. 78, 57 L. 119 C. C. A. 330. The seeming exception to Ed. 138; Sheppy v. Stevens, 200 Fed. 946, this rule by which an adjudication final in
its nature of *matters distinct from the general subject of the litigation, like a claim to property presented by intervening petition in a receivership proceeding, has been treated as final, so as to authorize an appeal without awaiting the termination of the general litigation below (Trust Co. v. Grant Locomotive Works, 135 U. S. 207, 224, 10 Sup. Ct. 736, 34 L. Ed. 97; Williams v. Morgan, 1i1 U. S. 684, 699, 4 Sup. Ct. 638, 28 L. Ed. 559; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 26 L. Ed. 1157), has no application here. Nor have cases like Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, 204, 21 L. Ed. 404, and Thomson v. Dean, 7 Wall
342, 345, 19 L. Ed. 94, where decrees finally the United States, to demand one-half of the
wages then earned at every port, and declaring void stipulations in the contract to the contrary, is not invalid as destructive of contract rights, as it is for this government to determine countries may be permitted to enter our harbors. upon what terms and conditions vessels of other
disposing of property which the successful party was entitled to have carried into execution immediately, were held appealable, although certain accounts pursuant to the decree remained to be settled. Here a single judgment deals with the detention on three affidavits. Only one branch of the case has been finally disposed of below; therefore none of it is ripe for review by this court.
 Third. In what has been said we must not be understood as recognizing the British consul general as the party entitled to appeal from a decision in Collins' favor. For the writ of habeas corpus was directed to the United States marshal, who held Collins in custody, and the marshal was the party in whom rested the right to appeal, if Collins prevailed on final judgment. See Charlton v. Kelly, supra.
Both appeals are
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
(252 U. S. 348)
STRATHEARN S. S. CO., Limited, v.
(Argued and Submitted Dec. 9, 1919. Decided March 29, 1920.)
1. SEAMEN 24-STATUTE AUTHORIZING DEMAND FOR HALF WAGES IN EACH PORT APPLIES TO FOREIGN SEAMEN.
Rev. St. 4530, as amended by Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8322), authorizing every seaman on a vessel of the United States to receive one-half of the wages then earned at every port, and providing that such section shall apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States, is not limited to American seamen.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 70 (3)—INQUIRY
INTO WISDOM OF LEGISLATION NOT WITHIN THE PROVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
If Congress had authority to enact Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, § 4 (Comp. St. 8 8322), entitling seamen to demand one-half of their wages at each port, and declaring void all stipulations in the contract to the contrary, it is not within the province of the Supreme Court to inquire whether consideration for contractual rights under engagements legally made in foreign countries would suggest a different course. 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 89 (1) SEAMEN 4-LAW AS TO PAYMENT OF SEAMEN's
WAGES NOT INVALID.
5. SEAMEN 24 DEMAND FOR WAGES DUE
SEAMAN ON FOREIGN VESSEL MAY BE MADE WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER ARRIVAL IN PORT.
Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8322), authorizing every seaman, including seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of
(Comp. St. § 8322) authorizing seamen, includUnder Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, § 4 ing seamen on foreign vessels while in American harbors, to demand one-half of the wages then earned at every port, a seaman on a foreign vessel need not wait five days after arrival in an American port before demanding the half of his wages, nor is the amount demandable limited to the wages earned in American ports.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Libel by John Dillon against the Strathearn Steamship Company, Limited. A judgment for defendant was reversed by the Cireuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (256 Fed. 631, 168 C. C. A. 25), and defendant brings certiorari, Affirmed.
See, also, 250 U. S. 638, 39 Sup. Ct. 491, 495, 63 L. Ed. 1184.
Mr. R. J. M. Bullowa, of New York City, for petitioner.
Messrs. George Sutherland, of Washington, D. C., and W. J. Waguespack, of New Orleans, La., for respondent.
the end of the voyage. At the time of the
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Messrs. Frederic R. Coudert and Howard Thayer Kingsbury, both of New York City, for British Embassy, by special leave.
Mr. Solicitor General King, for the United States, by special leave.
*Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents questions arising under
the Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1164. It appears that Dillon, the respondent, was a British subject, and shipped at Liverpool on the eighth of May, 1916, on a British vessel. The shipping articles provided for a voyage of not exceeding three years, commencing at Liverpool and ending at such port in the United Kingdom as might be required by the master, the voyage including ports of the United States. The wages which were fixed by the articles were made payable at
States, and the courts of the United States are open to such seamen for enforcement of the act.
tain. The ship arrived at the Port of Pen-1 foreign vessels while in harbors of the United sacola, Florida, on July 31, 1916, and while she was in that port, Dillon, still in the employ of the ship, demanded from her master one-half part of the wages theretofore earned, and payment was refused., Dillon had received nothing for about two months, and after the refusal of the master to comply with his demand for one-half wages, he filed in the District Court of the United States a libel against the ship, claiming $125.00, the amount of wages earned at the time of demand and refusal.
The District Court found against Dillon upon the ground that his demand was premature. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, and held that Dillon was entitled to recover. 256 Fed. 631, 168 C. C. A. 25. A writ of certiorari brings before us for review the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
In Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U. S. 185, 39 Sup. Ct. 84, 63 L. Ed. 200, and Neilson v. Rhine Shipping Co., 248 U. S. 205, 39 Sup. Ct. 89, 63 L. Ed. 208, we had occasion to deal with section 11 of the Seamen's Act (Comp. St. § 8323), and held that it did not invalidate advancement of seamen's wages in foreign countries when legal where made. The instant case requires us to consider now section 4 of the same act. That section amends section 4530, U. S. Revised Statutes, and so far as pertinent provides:
"Section 4530. Every seaman on a vessel of the United States shall be entitled to receive on demand from the master of the vessel to which he belongs one-half part of the wages which he shall have then earned at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is ended and all stipulations in the contract to the contrary shall be void: Provided, such a demand shall not be made before the expiration of, nor oftener than once in five days. Any failure on the part of the master to comply with this demand shall release the seaman from his contract and he shall be entitled to full payment of wages earned. * • * And provided further, that this section shall apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement." Comp. St. § 8322.
This section has to do with the recovery of wages by seamen, and by its terms gives to every seaman on a vessel of the United States the right to demand one-half the wages which he shall have then earned at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the end of the voyage, and stipulations in the contract to the contrary are declared to be void. A failure of the master to comply with the demand releases the seaman from his contract, and entitles him to recover full payment of the wages, and the section is made applicable to seamen on
[19 This section is an amendment of section 4530 of the Revised Statutes; it was intended to supplant that section, as amended by the act of December 21, 1898, which provided:
"Every seaman on a vessel of the United States shall be entitled to receive from the master of the vessel to which he belongs onehalf part of the wages which shall be due him at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is ended unless the contrary Comp. St. § 8323. be expressly stipulated in the contract," etc.
The section, of which the statute now under consideration is an amendment, expressly excepted from the right to recover onehalf of the wages those cases in which the
*contract otherwise provided. In the amended section all such contract provisions are expressly rendered void, and the right to recover is given the seamen notwithstanding contractual obligations to the contrary. The language applies to all seamen on vessels of the United States, and the second proviso of the section as it now reads makes it applicable to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States. The proviso does not stop there, for it contains the express provision that the courts of the United States shall be open to seamen on foreign vessels for its enforcement. The latter provision is of the utmost importance in determining the proper construction of this section of the act. It manifests the purpose of Congress to give the benefit of the act to seamen on foreign vessels, and to open the doors of the federal courts to foreign seamen. No such provision was necessary as to American seamen for they had the right independently of this statute to seek redress in the courts of the United States, and if it were the intention of Congress to limit the provision of the act to American seamen, this feature would have been wholly superfluous.
[2, 3] It is said that it is the purpose to limit the benefit of the act to American seamen, notwithstanding this provision giving access to seamen on foreign vessels to the courts of the United States, because of the title of the act in which its purpose is expressed "to promote the welfare of American seamen in the merchant marine of the United States." But the title is more than this, and not only declares the purposes to promote the welfare of American seamen but further to abolish arrest and imprisonment as a penalty for desertion and to secure the abrogation of treaty provisions in relation thereto; and to promote safety at sea. But the title of an act cannot limit the plain meaning of its text, although it may be look