« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »
the case be remanded for further hearing before Judge Foster.
What was thus called granting the writ was not a discharge of the prisoner, deferred as in In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 10 Sup. Ct. 384, 33 L. Ed. 835, and in In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242, 14 Sup. Ct. 323, 38 L. Ed. 149; or made conditional as in United States v. Petkos, 214 Fed. 978, 131 C. C. A. 274; Billings v. Sitner, 228 Fed. 315, 142 C. C. A. 607, and Ex Parte Romano (D. C.) 251 Fed. 762; or coupled with other disposition of him as in
der the authority of the District Court (see Mr. Justice Nelson in In re Kaine, 14 How. 103, 133, 134, 14 L. Ed. 345); and as the writ of habeas corpus had not been disposed of there, so far as concerned the detention on two of the three affidavits, the decision below on that branch of the case was not final.
ther absolutely *or conditionally except upon a rehearing before the commissioner with the consent of the President--this question, we are not required to consider at this time. For the proceeding ordered by Judge Grubb had not been taken; nor had the power sought to be exercised by him been challenged. Nor need we consider whether Judge Grubb, having found that a proper hearing had been denied by the committing magistrate on the two affidavits, might have heard the case de novo, and have determined thereIn re Gut Lun (D. C.) 84 Fed. 323, and *Ex on whether the prisoner should be discharg parte Gytl (D. C.) 210 Fed. 918, 924. It ed (compare Chin Yow v. United States, 208 more nearly resembles the kind of an order U. S. 8, 13, 28 Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369; which an appellate tribunal enters on reversWhitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745, 746, 138 C. ing and remanding the judgment of a low- C. A. 199; United States v. Williams [D. C.] er court upon finding error in its proceedings. 193 Fed. 228), for Judge Grubb did not unBut the proceeding before a committing mag-dertake to do so. The prisoner remained unistrate in international extradition is not subject to correction by appeal. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 714, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905; Sternaman v. Peck, 80 Fed. 883, 26 C. C. A. 214. Compare United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48, 14 L. Ed. 42; The United States, Petitioner, 194 U. S. 194, 24 Sup. Ct. 629, 48 L. Ed. 931. And it is ordinarily beyond the scope of the review afforded by a writ of habeas corpus to correct error in the proceedings. In re Kaine, 14 How. 103, 122, 14 L. Ed. 345; Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 784, 7 Sup. Ct. 780, 30 L. Ed. 824; Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U. S. 447, 457, 33 Sup. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 397; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 228, 35 Sup. Ct. 54, 59 L. Ed. 203. The order resembles, also, that which might be entered by a District Judge after having reviewed the proceedings taking place before a United States commissioner, under the court's authority to assume control in the preliminary stages of matters of which it has the final decision under the law. United States v. Berry (D. C.) 4 Fed. 779, 781; In re Chin K. Shue (D. C.) 199 Fed. 282, 284; The Mary (D. C.) 233 Fed. 121, 124. Compare Todd v. United States, 158 U. S. 278, 282, 15 Sup. Ct. 889, 39 L. Ed. 982; United States v. Allred, 155 U. S. 591, 594, 15 Sup. Ct. 231, 39 L. Ed. 273; In re Perkins (D. C.) 100 Fed. 950, 954. For an extradition commissioner is an officer of the court which appoints him. See Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 181, 187, 23 Sup. Ct. 98, 47 L. Ed. 130; In re Grin (C. C.) 112 Fed. 790, 794. But here the extradition commissioner had certified his findings to the Secretary of State before the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed. Whether, for this reason, the time had not passed when the court could correct the action of its commissioner, except upon reopening of the proceeding before him with the consent of the executive (see 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 91)—or, in other words, whether in such a case the power of the court is not limited to ordering the discharge of the prisoner ei
 Second. A case may not be brought here by appeal or writ of error in fragments. To be appealable, the judgment must be, not only final, but complete. United States v. Girault, 11 How. 22, 32, 13 L. Ed. 587; Holcombe v. McKusick, 20 How. 552, 554, 15 L. Ed. 1020; Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, 4, 1 Sup. Ct. 15, 27 L. Ed. 73; Grant v. Phœnix Ins. Co., 106 U. S. 429, 431, 1 Sup. Ct. 414, 27 L. Ed. 237; Dainese v. Kendall, 119 U. S. 53, 7 Sup. Ct. 65, 30 L. Ed. 305; Covington v. Covington First National Bank, 185 U. S. 270, 277, 22 Sup. Ct. 645, 46 L. Ed. 906; Heike v. United States, 217 U. S. 423, 429, 30 Sup. Ct. 539, 54 L. Ed. 821; Rexford v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U. S. 339, 346, 33 Sup. Ct. 515, 57 L. Ed. 864. And the rule requires that the judgment to be appealable should be final not only as to all the parties, but as to the whole subject-matter and as to all the causes of action involved. Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 226 U. S. 99, 101, 33 Sup. Ct. 78, 57 L. 119 C. C. A. 330. The seeming exception to Ed. 138; Sheppy v. Stevens, 200 Fed. 946, this rule by which an adjudication final in
its nature of *matters distinct from the general subject of the litigation, like a claim to property presented by intervening petition in a receivership proceeding, has been treated as final, so as to authorize an appeal without awaiting the termination of the general litigation below (Trust Co. v. Grant Locomotive Works, 135 U. S. 207, 224, 10 Sup. Ct. 736, 34 L. Ed. 97; Williams v. Morgan, 1i1 U. S. 684, 699, 4 Sup. Ct. 638, 28 L. Ed. 559; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 26 L. Ed. 1157), has no application here. Nor have cases like Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, 204, 21 L. Ed. 404, and Thomson v. Dean, 7 Wall
342, 345, 19 L. Ed. 94, where decrees finally the United States, to demand one-half of the disposing of property which the successful wages then earned at every port, and declaring party was entitled to have carried into exe- void stipulations in the contract to the concution immediately, were held appealable, al- trary, is not invalid as destructive of contract though certain accounts pursuant to the de- rights, as it is for this government to determine cree remained to be settled. Here a single upon what terms and conditions vessels of other countries may be permitted to enter our harbors. judgment deals with the detention on three affidavits. Only one branch of the case has 5. SEAMEN 24 DEMAND FOR WAGES DUE been finally disposed of below; therefore none of it is ripe for review by this court.
 Third. In what has been said we must not be understood as recognizing the British consul general as the party entitled to appeal from a decision in Collins' favor. For the writ of habeas corpus was directed to the United States marshal, who held Collins in custody, and the marshal was the party in whom rested the right to appeal, if Collins prevailed on final judgment. See Charlton v. Kelly, supra.
Both appeals are
Dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
(252 U. S. 348)
STRATHEARN S. S. CO., Limited, v.
(Argued and Submitted Dec. 9, 1919. Decided March 29, 1920.)
1. SEAMEN 24-STATUTE AUTHORIZING DEMAND FOR HALF WAGES IN EACH PORT APPLIES TO FOREIGN SEAMEN.
Rev. St. 4530, as amended by Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8322), authorizing every seaman on a vessel of the United States to receive one-half of the wages then earned at every port, and providing that such section shall apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States, is not limited to American seamen.
2. STATUTES 211 TITLE CANNOT LIMIT TEXT, THOUGH IT MAY BE LOOKED TO IN CASE OF DOUBT.
The title of an act cannot limit the plain meaning of the text, though it may be looked to in aid of construction in cases of doubt. 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 70 (3)-INQUIRY INTO WISDOM OF LEGISLATION NOT WITHIN THE PROVISION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
If Congress had authority to enact Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8322), entitling seamen to demand one-half of their wages at each port, and declaring void all stipulations in the contract to the contrary, it is not within the province of the Supreme Court to inquire whether consideration for contractual rights under engagements legally made in foreign countries would suggest a different course. 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 89 (1) · SEAMEN 4-LAW AS TO PAYMENT OF SEAMEN's
WAGES NOT INVALID.
Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8322), authorizing every seaman, including seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of
SEAMAN ON FOREIGN VESSEL MAY BE MADE WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER ARRIVAL IN PORT.
Under Seamen's Act March 4, 1915, § 4 (Comp. St. § 8322) authorizing seamen, including seamen on foreign vessels while in American harbors, to demand one-half of the wages then earned at every port, a seaman on a foreign vessel need not wait five days after arrival in an American port before demanding the half of his wages, nor is the amount demandable limited to the wages earned in American ports.
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
Libel by John Dillon against the Strathearn Steamship Company, Limited. A judgment for defendant was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (256 Fed. 631, 168 C. C. A. 25), and defendant brings certiorari. Affirmed.
See, also, 250 U. S. 638, 39 Sup. Ct. 494, 495, 63 L. Ed. 1184.
Mr. R. J. M. Bullowa, of New York City, for petitioner.
Messrs. George Sutherland, of Washington, D. C., and W. J. Waguespack, of New Orleans, La., for respondent.
Messrs. Frederic R. Coudert and Howard Thayer Kingsbury, both of New York City, for British Embassy, by special leave.
Mr. Solicitor General King, for the United States, by special leave.
*Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case presents questions arising under the Seamen's Act of March 4, 1915, 38 Stat. 1164. It appears that Dillon, the respondent, was a British subject, and shipped at Liverpool on the eighth of May, 1916, on a British vessel. The shipping articles provided for a voyage of not exceeding three years, commencing at Liverpool and ending at such port in the United Kingdom as might be required by the master, the voyage including ports of the United States. The wages which were fixed by the articles were made payable at
the end of the voyage. At the time of the demand for one-half wages, and at the time of the beginning of the action, the period of the voyage had not been reached. The articles provided that no cash should be advanced abroad or liberty granted other than at the pleasure of the master. This, it is admitted, was a valid contract for the payment of wages under the laws of Great Bri
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
tain. The ship arrived at the Port of Pensacola, Florida, on July 31, 1916, and while she was in that port, Dillon, still in the employ of the ship, demanded from her master one-half part of the wages theretofore earned, and payment was refused., Dillon had received nothing for about two months, and after the refusal of the master to comply with his demand for one-half wages, he filed in the District Court of the United States a libel against the ship, claiming $125.00, the amount of wages earned at the time of demand and refusal.
The District Court found against Dillon upon the ground that his demand was premature. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, and held that Dillon was entitled to recover. 256 Fed. 631, 168 C. C. A. 25. A writ of certiorari brings before us for review the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
In Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U. S. 185, 39 Sup. Ct. 84, 63 L. Ed. 200, and Neilson v. Rhine Shipping Co., 248 U. S. 205, 39 Sup. Ct. 89, 63 L. Ed. 208, we had occasion to deal with section 11 of the Seamen's Act (Comp. St. § 8323), and held that it did not invalidate advancement of seamen's wages in foreign countries when legal where made. The instant case requires us to consider now section 4 of the same act. That section amends section 4530, U. S. Revised Statutes, and so far as pertinent provides:
"Section 4530. Every seaman on a vessel of the United States shall be entitled to receive on demand from the master of the vessel to which he belongs one-half part of the wages which he shall have then earned at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is ended and all stipulations in the contract to the contrary shall be void: Provided, such a demand shall not be made before the expiration of, nor oftener than once in five days. Any failure on the part of the master to comply with this demand shall release the seaman from his contract and he shall be entitled to full payment of wages earned. And provided further, that this section shall apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States shall be open to such seamen for its enforcement." Comp. St. § 8322.
This section has to do with the recovery of wages by seamen, and by its terms gives to every seaman on a vessel of the United States the right to demand one-half the wages which he shall have then earned at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the end of the voyage, and stipulations in the contract to the contrary are declared to be void. A failure of the master to comply with the demand releases the seaman from his contract, and entitles him to recover full payment of the wages, and the section is made applicable to seamen on
foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States, and the courts of the United States are open to such seamen for enforcement of the act.
 This section is an amendment of section 4530 of the Revised Statutes; it was intended to supplant that section, as amended by the act of December 21, 1898, which provided:
"Every seaman on a vessel of the United States shall be entitled to receive from the master of the vessel to which he belongs onehalf part of the wages which shall be due him at every port where such vessel, after the voyage has been commenced, shall load or deliver cargo before the voyage is ended unless the contrary be expressly stipulated in the contract," etc. Comp. St. § 8323.
The section, of which the statute now under consideration is an amendment, expressly excepted from the right to recover onehalf of the wages those cases in which the *354
*contract otherwise provided. In the amended section all such contract provisions are expressly rendered void, and the right to recover is given the seamen notwithstanding contractual obligations to the contrary. The language applies to all seamen on vessels of the United States, and the second proviso of the section as it now reads makes it applicable to seamen on foreign vessels while in harbors of the United States. The proviso does not stop there, for it contains the express provision that the courts of the United States shall be open to seamen on foreign vessels for its enforcement. The latter provision is of the utmost importance in determining the proper construction of this section of the act. It manifests the purpose of Congress to give the benefit of the act to seamen on foreign vessels, and to open the doors of the federal courts to foreign seamen. No such provision was necessary as to American seamen for they had the right independently of this statute to seek redress in the courts of the United States, and if it were the intention of Congress to limit the provision of the act to American seamen, this feature would have been wholly superfluous. [2, 3] It is said that it is the purpose to limit the benefit of the act to American seamen, notwithstanding this provision giving access to seamen on foreign vessels to the courts of the United States, because of the title of the act in which its purpose is expressed "to promote the welfare of American seamen in the merchant marine of the United States." But the title is more than this, and not only declares the purposes to promote the welfare of American seamen but further to abolish arrest and imprisonment as a penalty for desertion and to secure the abrogation of treaty provisions in relation thereto; and to promote safety at sea. But the title of an act cannot limit the plain meaning of its text, although it may be look
ed to to aid in construction in cases of doubt. I foreign as well as domestic vessels. Upon Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418, 530, 24 Sup. the authority of that case, and others cited Ct. 383, 48 L. Ed. 504, and cases cited. in the opinion therein, we have no doubt as Apart from the text, which we think plain, it to the authority of Congress to pass a statute *355 of this sort, applicable to foreign vessels in our ports and controlling the employment and payment of seamen as a condition of the right of such foreign vessels to enter and use the ports of the United States,
is by no means clear that if the act were given a construction to limit its application to American seamen only, the purposes of Congress would be subserved, for such limited construction would have a tendency to  But, it is insisted, that Dillon's action prevent the employment of American seawas premature as he made a demand upon men, and to promote the engagement of those the master within less than five days after who were not entitled to sue for one-half the vessel arrived in an American port. This wages under the provisions of the law. But, contention was sustained in the District taking the provisions of the act as the same Court, but it was ruled otherwise in the are written, we think it plain that it mani- Court of Appeals. Turning to the language fests the purpose of Congress to place Ameri- of the act, it enacts in substance that the can and foreign seamen on an equality of demand shall not be made before the expiraright in so far as the privileges of this section of five days, nor oftener than once in tion are concerned, with equal opportunity five days. Subject to such limitation, such to resort to the courts of the United States demand may be made in the port where the vessel stops to load or deliver cargo. It is true that the act is made to apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in United States
for the enforcement of the act. Before the amendment, as we have already pointed out, the right to recover one-half the wages could not be enforced in face of a contractual obligation to the contrary. Congress, for reasons which it deemed sufficient, amended the act so as to permit the recovery upon the con
ditions named in the statute. In the case of
Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U. S. 185, 39 Sup. Ct. 84, 63 L. Ed. 200, supra, we found no purpose manifested by Congress in section 11 to interfere with wages advanced in foreign ports under contracts legal where made. That section dealt with advancements, and contained no provision such as we find in section 4. Under section 4 all contracts are avoided which run counter to the purposes of the statute. Whether consideration for
contractual rights under engagements legally made in foreign countries would suggest a different course is not our province to inquire. It is sufficient to say that Congress has otherwise declared by the positive terms of this enactment, and if it had authority to do so, the law is enforceable in the courts.  We come then to consider the contention that this construction renders the statute unconstitutional as being destructive of contract rights. But we think this contention must be decided adversely to the petitioner upon the authority of previous cases in this
court. The matter was fully considered in Patterson v. Bark Eudora. 190 U. S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002, in which the previous decisions of this court were reviewed, and the conclusion reached that the jurisdiction of this government over foreign merchant vessels in our ports was such as to give authority to Congress to make provisions of the character now under consideration; that it was for this government to determine upon what terms and conditions vessels of other countries might be permitted to enter our harbors, and to impose conditions upon the shipment of sailors in our own ports, and make them applicable to
ports, but this is far from requiring that the wages shall be earned in such ports, or that the vessels shall be in such ports five days before demand for one-half the Wages earned is made. It is the wages of the voyage for which provision is made. with the limitation of the right to demand one-half of the amount earned not oftener than once in five days. The section permits
no *demand until five days after the voyage has begun, and then provides that it may be made at every port where the vessel stops to load or deliver cargo, subject to the fiveday limitation. If the vessel must be five days in port before demand can be made, it would defeat the purpose of the law as to vessels not remaining that long in port, and would run counter to the manifest purpose of Congress to prevent a seaman from being without means while in a port of the United States.
We agree with the Circuit Court of Anpeals of the Fifth Circuit, whose judgment we are now reviewing, that the demand was not premature. It is true that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in the case of The Italier, 257 Fed. 712, 168 C. C. A. 662, that demand, made before the vessel had been in port for five days, was premature; this was upon the theory that the law was not in force until the vessel had arrived in a port of the United States. But, the limitation upon demand has no reference to the length of stay in the domestic port. The right to recover wages is controlled by the provisions of the statute and includes wages earned from the beginning of the voyage. It is the right to demand and recover such wages with the limitation of the intervals of demand as laid down in the statute, which is given to the seaman while the ship is in a harbor of the United States.
We find no error in the decree of the Cir- | Order Granting Injunction and Appointing Recuit Court of Appeals and the same is
(252 U. S. 358)
THOMPSON v. LUCAS et al.
This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of the United States for leave to intervene herein for an injunction and for the appointment of a receiver, and on the responses made to such motion by the state of Oklahoma and the state of Texas, respectively, and the court
(Argued Dec. 8, 1919. Decided March 29, 1920.) being fully advised in the premises,
No. 391. October Term, 1919. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Suit by Peter Lucas and another against the Steamship Westmeath, J. M. Thompson, master and claimant. A decree for the libelants was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (258 Fed. 446, 169 C. C. A. 462), and the claimant brings certiorari. Affirmed.
See, also, 250 U. S. 369, 39 Sup. Ct. 495, 63 L. Ed. 1184.
Messrs. L. de Grove Potter, of White Plains, N. Y., and John M. Woolsey, of New York City, for petitioners.
Mr. W. J. Waguespack, of New Orleans, La., for respondent.
It is now considered, ordered, and decreed as follows, until the further order of the court: 1. That said motion for leave to intervene herein be, and the same is hereby, granted. 2. The defendant, the state of Texas, her officers and agents, are hereby enjoined from selling any purported rights or making or issuing any grants, licenses or permits to any person, corporation or association covering or affecting any lands, or any part of the bed of Red river, lying north of the line of the south bank of such river as said south bank existed at the date of the ratification of the treaty of 1819 between the United States and Spain; that is to say, on the 22d day of February, 1821, and between the one hundredth degree of west longitude and the southeastern corner of the state of Oklahoma.
3. Jacob M. Dickinson, Esq., of Chicago, Ill., *is hereby appointed receiver of all the lands *Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the described in paragraph 2 of the said intervener's Court.
This case was argued at the same time as No. 373, just decided.1 In this case the libelants shipped as part of the crew of the British Steamer Westmeath for a voyage not to exceed one year, before the expiration of which time the vessel arrived in the harbor of New York, where she loaded and discharged cargo. A demand was made for one-half wages under section 4 of the Seamen's Act of 1915 (Comp. St. § 8322). The demand was refused, and an action was begun for full wages. A defense was set up that the libelants were deserters, and, therefore, not entitled to recover. The District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the libelants' case was made out under the statute. 258 Fed. 446, 169 C. C. A. 462.
motion, to wit:
Bounded on the north by the mid-channel of the Red river, as the mid-channel is hereinafter defined; on the east by extension south of the west boundary line of range 10 west between township 4 south, range 10 west, and township 4 south, range 11 west, in Cotton county, Okl., crossing the remaining portion of said Red river and to the foot of the Texas bluffs as the south bank; thence up said river along the foot of the Texas bluffs as the south bank, through ranges 11, 12, 13, and through range 14 as follows: Commencing at a point on the east boundary line of range 14 extended which point is 116.50 chains from the original meander corner of fractional section 31, township 4 south, range 13 west and section 36, township 4 south, range 14 west; thence
N. 79° 00′ W. 26.75 chs.