(40 Sup.Ct.)

the case be remanded for further hearing before Judge Foster.

What was thus called granting the writ was not a discharge of the prisoner, deferred as in In re Medley, 134 U. S. 160, 10 Sup. Ct. 384, 33 L. Ed. 835, and in In re Bonner, 151 U. S. 242, 14 Sup. Ct. 323, 38 L. Ed. 149; or made conditional as in United States v. Petkos, 214 Fed. 978, 131 C. C. A. 274; Billings v. Sitner, 228 Fed. 315, 142 C. C. A. 607, and Ex Parte Romano (D. C.) 251 Fed. 762; or coupled with other disposition of him as in

*369

$370

ther absolutely *or conditionally except upon a rehearing before the commissioner with the consent of the President--this question, we are not required to consider at this time. For the proceeding ordered by Judge Grubb had not been taken; nor had the power sought to be exercised by him been challenged. Nor need we consider whether Judge Grubb, having found that a proper hearing had been denied by the committing magistrate on the two affidavits, might have heard the case de novo, and have determined thereIn re Gut Lun (D. C.) S4 Fed. 323, and *Ex on whether the prisoner should be dischargparte Gytl (D. C.) 210 Fed. 918, 924. It ed (compare Chin Yow v. United States, 208 more nearly resembles the kind of an order U. S. 8, 13, 28 Sup. Ct. 201, 52 L. Ed. 369; which an appellate tribunal enters on revers- Whitfield v. Hanges, 222 Fed. 745, 746, 138 C. ing and remanding the judgment of a low- C. A. 199; United States v. Williams [D. C.] er court upon finding error in its proceedings. 193 Fed. 228), for Judge Grubb did not unBut the proceeding before a committing mag-dertake to do so. The prisoner remained unistrate in international extradition is not sub- der the authority of the District Court (see ject to correction by appeal. See Fong Yue Mr. Justice Nelson in In re Kaine, 14 How. Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 714, 13 103, 133, 134, 14 L. Ed. 345); and as the writ Sup. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905; Sternaman v. of habeas corpus had not been disposed of Peck, 80 Fed. 883, 26 C. C. A. 214. Compare there, so far as concerned the detention on United States v. Ferreira, 13 How. 40, 48, 14 two of the three affidavits, the decision below L. Ed. 42; The United States, Petitioner, 194 on that branch of the case was not final. U. S. 194, 24 Sup. Ct. 629, 48 L. Ed. 931. And it is ordinarily beyond the scope of the review afforded by a writ of habeas corpus to correct error in the proceedings. In re Kaine, 14 How. 103, 122, 14 L. Ed. 345; Ex parte Harding, 120 U. S. 782, 784, 7 Sup. Ct. 780, 30 L. Ed. 824; Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U. S. 447, 457, 33 Sup. Ct. 945, 57 L. Ed. 1274, 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 397; Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 228, 35 Sup. Ct. 54, 59 L. Ed. 203. The order resembles, also, that which might be entered by a District Judge after having reviewed the proceedings taking place before a United

United

Com

States commissioner, under the court's authority to assume control in the preliminary stages of matters of which it has the final decision under the law. States v. Berry (D. C.) 4 Fed. 779, 781; In re Chin K. Shue (D. C.) 199 Fed. 282, 284; The Mary (D. C.) 233 Fed. 121, 124. pare Todd v. United States, 158 U. S. 278, 282, 15 Sup. Ct. 889, 39 L. Ed. 982; United States v. Allred, 155 U. S. 591, 591, 15 Sup. Ct. 231, 39 L. Ed. 273; In re Perkins (D. C.) 100 Fed. 950, 954. For an extradition commissioner is an officer of the court which appoints him. See Grin v. Shine, 187 U. S. 181, 187, 23 Sup. Ct. 98, 47 L. Ed. 130; In re Grin (C. C.) 112 Fed. 790, 794. But here the extradition commissioner had certified his findings to the Secretary of State before the petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed. Whether, for this reason, the time had not passed when the court could correct the action of its commissioner, except upon reopening of the proceeding before him with the consent of the executive (see 6 Op. Atty. Gen. 91)-or, in other words, whether in such a case the power of the court is not limited to ordering the discharge of the prisoner ei

[8] Second. A case may not be brought here by appeal or writ of error in fragments. To be appealable, the judgment must be, not only final, but complete. United States v. Girault, 11 How. 22, 32, 13 L. Ed. 587; Holcombe v. McKusick, 20 How. 552, 554, 15 L. Ed. 1020; Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3, 4, 1 Sup. Ct. 15, 27 L. Ed. 73; Grant v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 106 U. S. 429, 431, 1 Sup. Ct. 414, 27 L. Ed. 237; Dainese v. Kendall, 119 U. S. 53, 7 Sup. Ct. 65, 30 L. Ed. 305; Covington v. Covington First National Bank, 185 U. S. 270, 277, 22 Sup. Ct. 645, 46 L. Ed. 906; Heike v. United States, 217 U. S. 423, 429, 30 Sup. Ct. 539, 54 L. Ed. 821; Rexford V. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 228 U. S. 339, 346, 33 Sup. Ct. 515, 57 L. Ed. 864. And the rule requires that the judgment to be appealable should be final not only as to all the parties, but as to the whole subject-matter and as to all the causes of action involved. Louisiana Navigation Co. v. Oyster Commission, 226 U. S. 99, 101, 33 Sup. Ct. 78, 57 L.

119 C. C. A. 330. The seeming exception to Ed. 138; Sheppy v. Stevens, 200 Fed. 946, this rule by which an adjudication final in

*371

its nature of *matters distinct from the general subject of the litigation, like a claim to property presented by intervening petition in a receivership proceeding, has been treated as final, so as to authorize an appeal without awaiting the termination of the general litigation below (Trust Co. v. Grant Locomotive Works, 135 U. S. 207, 224, 10 Sup. Ct. 736, 34 L. Ed. 97; Williams v. Morgan, lil U. S. 684, 699, 4 Sup. Ct. 638, 28 L. Ed. 559; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U. S. 527, 26 L. Ed. 1157), has no application here. Nor have cases like Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201, 204, 21 L. Ed. 404, and Thomson v. Dean, 7 Wall

342, 345, 19 L. Ed. 94, where decrees finally the United States, to demand one-half of the disposing of property which the successful wages then earned at every port, and declaring party was entitled to have carried into exe- void stipulations in the contract to the concution immediately, were held appealable, al- trary, is not invalid as destructive of contract though certain accounts pursuant to the de- rights, as it is for this government to determine cree remained to be settled. Here a single upon what terms and conditions vessels of other countries may be permitted to enter our harbors. judgment deals with the detention on three affidavits. Only one branch of the case has 5. SEAMEN 24 DEMAND FOR WAGES DUE been finally disposed of below; therefore none of it is ripe for review by this court.

the end of the voyage. At the time of the demand for one-half wages, and at the time of the beginning of the action, the period of the voyage had not been reached. The articles provided that no cash should be advanced abroad or liberty granted other than at the pleasure of the master. This, it is admitted, was a valid contract for the payment of wages under the laws of Great Bri

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(40 Sup.Ct.)

ed to to aid in construction in cases of doubt. I foreign as well as domestic vessels. Upon Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U. S. 418, 530, 24 Sup. the authority of that case, and others cited Ct. 383, 48 L. Ed. 504, and cases cited. in the opinion therein, we have no doubt as Apart from the text, which we think plain, it to the authority of Congress to pass a statute *355 of this sort, applicable to foreign vessels in our ports and controlling the employment and payment of seamen as a condition of the right of such foreign vessels to enter and use the ports of the United States,

is by no means clear that if the act were given a construction to limit its application to American seamen only, the purposes of Congress would be subserved, for such limited construction would have a tendency to [5] But, it is insisted, that Dillon's action prevent the employment of American seawas premature as he made a demand upon men, and to promote the engagement of those the master within less than five days after who were not entitled to sue for one-half the vessel arrived in an American port. This wages under the provisions of the law. But, contention was sustained in the District taking the provisions of the act as the same Court, but it was ruled otherwise in the are written, we think it plain that it mani- Court of Appeals. Turning to the language fests the purpose of Congress to place Ameri- of the act, it enacts in substance that the can and foreign seamen on an equality of demand shall not be made before the expiraright in so far as the privileges of this section of five days, nor oftener than once in tion are concerned, with equal opportunity five days. Subject to such limitation, such to resort to the courts of the United States demand may be made in the port where the vessel stops to load or deliver cargo. It is true that the act is made to apply to seamen on foreign vessels while in United States

for the enforcement of the act. Before the amendment, as we have already pointed out, the right to recover one-half the wages could not be enforced in face of a contractual obligation to the contrary. Congress, for reasons which it deemed sufficient, amended the act so as to permit the recovery upon the con

ditions named in the statute. In the case of

Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U. S. 185, 39 Sup. Ct. 84, 63 L. Ed. 200, supra, we found no purpose manifested by Congress in section 11 to interfere with wages advanced in foreign ports under contracts legal where made. That section dealt with advancements, and contained no provision such as we find in section 4. Under section 4 all contracts are avoided which run counter to the purposes of the statute. Whether consideration for

contractual rights under engagements legally made in foreign countries would suggest a different course is not our province to inquire. It is sufficient to say that Congress has otherwise declared by the positive terms of this enactment, and if it had authority to do so, the law is enforceable in the courts. [4] We come then to consider the contention that this construction renders the statute unconstitutional as being destructive of contract rights. But we think this contention must be decided adversely to the petitioner upon the authority of previous cases in this

*356

court. The matter was fully considered in Patterson v. Bark Eudora. 190 U. S. 169, 23 Sup. Ct. 821, 47 L. Ed. 1002, in which the previous decisions of this court were reviewed, and the conclusion reached that the jurisdiction of this government over foreign merchant vessels in our ports was such as to give authority to Congress to make provisions of the character now under consideration; that it was for this government to determine upon what terms and conditions vessels of other countries might be permitted to enter our harbors, and to impose conditions upon the shipment of sailors in our own ports, and make them applicable to

ports, but this is far from requiring that the wages shall be earned in such ports, or that the vessels shall be in such ports five days before demand for one-half the Wages earned is made. It is the wages of the voyage for which provision is made. with the limitation of the right to demand one-half of the amount earned not oftener than once in five days. The section permits

*357

no *demand until five days after the voyage has begun, and then provides that it may be made at every port where the vessel stops to load or deliver cargo, subject to the fiveday limitation. If the vessel must be five days in port before demand can be made, it would defeat the purpose of the law as to vessels not remaining that long in port, and would run counter to the manifest purpose of Congress to prevent a seaman from being without means while in a port of the United States.

We agree with the Circuit Court of Anpeals of the Fifth Circuit, whose judgment we are now reviewing, that the demand was not premature. It is true that the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held in the case of The Italier, 257 Fed. 712, 168 C. C. A. 662, that demand, made before the vessel had been in port for five days, was premature; this was upon the theory that the law was not in force until the vessel had arrived in a port of the United States. But, the limitation upon demand has no reference to the length of stay in the domestic port. The right to recover wages is controlled by the provisions of the statute and includes wages earned from the beginning of the voyage. It is the right to demand and recover such wages with the limitation of the intervals of demand as laid down in the statute, which is given to the seaman while the ship is in a harbor of the United States.

(40 Sup.Ct.)

We find no error in the decree of the Cir- | Order Granting Injunction and Appointing Recuit Court of Appeals and the same is

Affirmed.

(252 U. S. 358)

THOMPSON v. LUCAS et al.

THE WESTMEATH.

ceiver.

This cause coming on to be heard on the motion of the United States for leave to intervene herein for an injunction and for the appointment of a receiver, and on the responses made to such motion by the state of Oklahoma and the state of Texas, respectively, and the court

(Argued Dec. 8, 1919. Decided March 29, 1920.) being fully advised in the premises,

No. 391. October Term, 1919. On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Suit by Peter Lucas and another against the Steamship Westmeath, J. M. Thompson, master and claimant. A decree for the libelants was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (258 Fed. 446, 169 C. C. A. 462), and the claimant brings certiorari. Affirmed.

It is now considered, ordered, and decreed as follows, until the further order of the court: 1. That said motion for leave to intervene herein be, and the same is hereby, granted. 2. The defendant, the state of Texas, her officers and agents, are hereby enjoined from selling any purported rights or making or issuing any grants, licenses or permits to any person, corporation or association covering or affecting any lands, or any part of the bed of Red river, lying north of the line of the south bank of such river as said south bank existed

See, also, 250 U. S. 369, 39 Sup. Ct. 495, 63 at the date of the ratification of the treaty of L. Ed. 1184.

Messrs. L. de Grove Potter, of White Plains, N. Y., and John M. Woolsey, of New York City, for petitioners.

Mr. W. J. Waguespack, of New Orleans, La., for respondent.

*363

1819 between the United States and Spain; and between the one hundredth degree of west that is to say, on the 22d day of February, 1821, longitude and the southeastern corner of the state of Oklahoma.

+373

3. Jacob M. Dickinson, Esq., of Chicago, Ill., *is hereby appointed receiver of all the lands *Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the described in paragraph 2 of the said intervener's Court.

This case was argued at the same time as No. 373, just decided.1 In this case the libelants shipped as part of the crew of the British Steamer Westmeath for a voyage not to exceed one year, before the expiration of which time the vessel arrived in the harbor of New York, where she loaded and discharged cargo. A demand was made for one-half wages under section 4 of the Seamen's Act of 1915 (Comp. St. § 8322). The demand was refused, and an action was begun for full wages. A defense was set up that the libelants were deserters, and, therefore, not entitled to recover. The District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the libelants' case was made out under the statute. 258 Fed. 446, 169 C. C. A. 462. +364

The case is controlled by principles which

governed the disposition of No. 373. The dif-
ference being that it appears in this case that
demand was made more than five days after
the vessel had arrived in the United States
port. In all other respects as to the consti-
tutionality and construction of the statute our
judgment in the former case is controlling. It
follows that the decree of the Circuit Court of
Appeals must be affirmed.
Affirmed.

(252 U. S. 372)

STATE OF OKLAHOMA V. STATE OF
TEXAS (UNITED STATES, Intervener).
(Submitted March 29. Decided April 1, 1920.)
No. 27, Original.

Original action by the State of Oklahoma against the State of Texas. On motion by the United States for leave to intervene for an injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Motion granted.

1 252 U. S. 348, 40 Sup. Ct. 350, 64 L. Ed. —. 40 SUP.CT.-23

motion, to wit:

Bounded on the north by the mid-channel of the Red river, as the mid-channel is hereinafter defined; on the east by extension south of the west boundary line of range 10 west between township 4 south, range 10 west, and township 4 south, range 11 west, in Cotton county, Okl., crossing the remaining portion of said Red river and to the foot of the Texas bluffs as the south bank; thence up said river along the foot of the Texas bluffs as the south bank, through ranges 11, 12, 13, and through range 14 as follows: Commencing at a point on the east is 116.50 chains from the original meander corboundary line of range 14 extended which point ner of fractional section 31, township 4 south, range 13 west and section 36, township 4 south,

range 14 west; thence

N. 79° 00′ W. 26.75 chs.
N. 71° 15′ W. 33.00"
N. 75° 15′ W. 28.25 "
N. 85° 30′ W. 22.60"
S. 85° 15' W. 52.20 "
S. 85° 30′ W. 8.90
N. 82° 00′ W. 21.40 "
S. 82° 15′ W. 11.50"
S. 71° 30′ W. 66.70 "

66

S. 69° 00′ W. 59.25"