(40 Sup.Ct.) FECTING JURISDICTION IS IMMATERIAL, WHERE CREDITOR APPEARED IN SUIT. Whether a debt due from the United States was necessary to make them equal to, and | 4. APPEARANCE 23—SItus of debt as afgreater than that for which they were assessed for taxation; that for many months before that date it was the legal duty of the executors to make such payment; and that for a like time the legatees had a statutory right to institute suit to compel payment. It is obvious that legacies which it was *553 to a claimant, for the payment of whose claim situs in the District of Columbia, was immateCongress had made an appropriation, had a rial on the question of whether a suit to establish an equitable lien for attorney's fees on the fund was within the jurisdiction of the courts of the District, where claimant voluntarily ap and jurisdiction did not depend upon publication of process against her as a nonresident, under Code of Laws D. C. 1901, § 105. thus the legal *duty of the executors to pay before July 1, 1902, and for compelling pay-peared and answered the bill without objection, ment of which statutory remedy was given to the legatees before that date, were vested in possession and enjoyment, within the meaning of the Act of June 27, 1902, as it was interpreted in United States v. Fidelity Trust Co., 222 U. S. 158, 32 Sup. Ct. 59, 56 L. Ed. 137, McCoach v. Pratt, 236 U. S. 562, 567, 35 Sup. Ct. 421, 59 L. Ed. 720, and in Henry, Ex'r, v. United States, decided February 2, 1920. The case would be one for an increased assessment, rather than for a refund, if the War Revenue Act had not been repealed. Affirmed. Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS did not participate in the discussion or decision of this case. (232 U. S. 469) HOUSTON, Secretary of the Treasury, et al. v. ORMES. Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. Suit by De Forest L. Ormes, administrator David F. Houston, Secretary of the Treasury, of Belva A. Lockwood, deceased, against John Burke, Treasurer of the United States, and another. A decree in favor of plaintiff was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia (McAdoo v. Ormes, 47 App. D. C. 364), and the defendants named appeal. Affirmed. Mr. Solicitor General King, for appellants. Miss Mary O'Toole, of Washington, D. C., for appellee. *471 *Mr. Justice PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court. This was a suit in equity, brought by the late Belva A. Lockwood in her lifetime in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, (Argued Jan. 23, 1920. Decided April 19, to establish an equitable lien for attorney's 1920.) No. 86. 1. UNITED STATES 118-PAYMENT OF MONEY APPROPRIATED FOR PAYMENT OF CLAIM IS MINISTERIAL ACT. Where a fund has been appropriated by Congress for payment to a specified person in satisfaction of a finding of the Court of Claims, the Treasury officials are charged with the ministerial duty to make payment on demand to the person designated. 2. UNITED STATES 125-SUIT TO ESTABLISH ATTORNEY'S LIEN ON A FUND APPROPRIATED NOT A SUIT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. Where Congress appropriated money for the payment of a claim allowed by the Court of Claims, a suit against the claimant and the Treasury officials to establish an equitable lien for attorney's fees on the fund, in which a receiver was appointed to collect and receive the fund, was not a suit against the United States. 3. UNITED STATES 111-STATUTE DOES NOT PREVENT GIVING EFFECT TO ASSIGNMENT BY OPERATION OF LAW OF ALLOWED CLAIM. Rev. St. 3477 (Comp. St. § 6383), regulating the assignment of claims against the United States, does not prevent giving effect to an assignment by operation of law after the claim has been allowed. fees upon a fund of $1,200 in the treasury of the United States, appropriated by Congress (Act of March 4, 1915, c. 140, 38 Stat. 962, 981) to pay a claim found by the Court of Claims to be due to one Susan Sanders, who was made defendant together with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Treasurer of the United States. There were appropriate prayers for relief by injunction and the appointment of a receiver. Defendant Sanders voluntarily appeared and answered, denying her indebtedness to plaintiff; the other defendants answered, admitting the existence of the fund, and declaring that as a matter of comity and out of deference to the court it would be retained under their control to await the final disposition of the case, but objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the cause upon the ground that debts due from the United States have no situs in the District of Columbia, that there was nothing to show that either the United States or the defendant Sanders had elected to make the sum alleged to be due from the United States payable to her in the District, and that in the absence of personal service upon her the court could make no decree that would protect the United States. There 472 was a final decree adjudging that *the sum For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes 40 SUP.CT.-24 of $90 was due from the defendant Sanders to In the present case it is conceded, and propMrs. Lockwood, with costs, and appointing erly conceded, that payment of the fund in a receiver to collect and receive from the question to the defendant Sanders is a minSecretary of the Treasury the $1,200 ap- | isterial duty, the performance of which could propriated in favor of Sanders, directing be compelled by mandamus. But from this the Secretary to pay the latter sum to the it is a necessary consequence that one who receiver, and decreeing that his receipt should has an equitable right in the fund as against be a full acquittance to the United States for Sanders may have relief against the officials any and all claims and demands of the par- of the Treasury through a mandatory writ ties arising out of or connected with said of injunction, or a receivership which is its claim. The Secretary of the Treasury and the equivalent, making Sanders a party so as Treasurer appealed to the Court of Appeals to bind her and so that the decree may of the District of Columbia; the defendant afford a proper acquittance to the governSanders not appealing. That court affirmed ment. The practice of bringing suits in equity the decree (McAdoo v. Ormes, 47 App. D. C. for this purpose is well established in the 364), and a further appeal, taken by the courts of the District. Sanborn v. Maxwell, officials of the Treasury under section 250, 18 App. D. C. 245; Roberts v. Consaul, 24 App. Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1227), brings the D. C. 551, 562; Jones v. Rutherford, 26 App. case here. D. C. 114; Parish v. McGowan, 39 App. D. C. 184, s. c. on appeal McGowan v. Parish, 237 U. S. 285, 295, 35 Sup. Ct. 543, 59 L. Ed. 955. Confined, as it necessarily must be, to cases where the officials of the government have only a ministerial duty to perform, and one in which the party complainant has a particular interest, the practice is a convenient one, well supported by both principle and precedent. [1, 2] The principal contention is that, because the object of the suit and the effect of the decree were to control the action of the appellants in the performance of their official duties, the suit was in effect one against the United States. But since the fund in question has been appropriated by act of Congress for payment to a specified person in satisfaction of a finding of the Court of Claims, it is clear that the officials of the Treasury are charged with the ministerial duty to make payment on demand to the person designated. It is settled that in such a case a suit brought by the person entitled to the performance of the duty against the official charged with its performance is not a suit against the government. So it has been declared by this court in many cases relating to state officers. Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531, 541, 23 L. Ed. 623; Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711, 727, 2 Sup. Ct. 128, 27 L. Ed. 448; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 506, 8 Sup. Ct. 164, 31 L. Ed. 216. In Minnesota v. Hitchcock, 185 U. S. 373, 386, 22 Sup. Ct. 650, 655 (46 L. Ed. 954), while holding that a suit against officers of the United States might be in effect a suit against the United States, the court said: "Of course, this statement has no reference to and does not include those cases in which officers of the United States are sued, in ap *473 propriate *form, to compel them to perform some ministerial duty imposed upon them by law, and which they wrongfully neglect or refuse to perform. Such suits would not be deemed suits against the United States within the rule that the government cannot be sued except by its consent, nor within the rule established in the Ayers Case." And in Parish. MacVeagh, 214 U. S. 124, 29 Sup. Ct. 556, 53 L. Ed. 936, the court upheld the right of a claimant, in whose favor an appropriation had been made by Congress, to have a mandamus against the Secretary of the Treasury requiring him to pay the claim. To the same effect, Roberts, Treasurer, v. United States, 176 U. S. 221, 231, 20 Sup. Ct. 376, 44 L. Ed. 443. [3] Section 3477, Rev. Stat. (Comp. St. § 6383), regulating the assignment of claims against the United States, is not an obstacle. As has been held many times, the object of $474 Congress in this legislation was to protect the government, not the claimant; and it does not stand in the way of giving effect to an assignment by operation of law after the claim has been allowed. Erwin v. United States, 97 U. S. 392, 397, 24 L. Ed. 1065; Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556, 560, 26 L. Ed. 229; Price v. Forrest, 173 U. S. 410, 423-425, 19 Sup. Ct. 434, 43 L. Ed. 749. In support of the contention that a court of equity may not control the action of an officer of the United States within the scope of his authority, Wells v. Roper, 246 U. S. 335, 38 Sup. Ct. 317, 62 L. Ed. 755, is cited; but it is not in point. The official duty sought to be subjected to control in that case was not ministerial, but required an exercise of official discretion, as the opinion shows. 246 U. S. 338, 38 Sup Ct. 317, 62 L. Ed. 755. [4] It is further objected that debts due from the United States have no situs at the seat of government, and Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Pet. 1, 6, 10 L. Ed. 639, Mackey v. Cox, 18 How. 100, 105, 15 L. Ed. 299, and Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654, 657, 3 Sup. Ct. 417, 27 L. Ed. 1068, are cited. But in the present case the question of situs is not material. If the jurisdiction as to the defendant Sanders had depended upon publication of process against her as a nonresident under section 105 of the District Code (Act of March 3, 1901, c. 854, 31 Stat. 1189, 1206), upon the theory that her claim against the (40 Sup.Ct.) the plea was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Illinois (285 Ill. 188, 120 N. E. 631, 4 A. L. R. 964), and plaintiff brings error and certiorari. Judgment reversed, and writ of certiorari dismissed. government was "property within the Dis- | preme Lodge of the World, Loyal Order of trict," the point would require consideration. Moose. A judgment quashing a demurrer to But the jurisdiction over her rests upon her having voluntarily appeared and answered the bill without objection. Hence there is no question that the decree binds her, and so constitutes a good acquittance to the United States as against her. The decree will be Affirmed. (252 U. S. 411) KENNEY v. SUPREME LODGE OF THE 1. JUDGMENT Nos. 269 and 303. See, also, 249 U. S. 597, 39 Sup. Ct. 390, 63 L. Ed. 795. Mr. Griffith R. Harsh, of Birmingham, Ala., for petitioner and plaintiff in error. Messrs. E. J. Henning, of San Diego, Cal., and Ralph C. Putnam, of Aurora, Ill., for respondent and defendant in error. *413 *Mr. Justice HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court. This is an action of debt brought in Illi926-STATUTE DENYING nois upon a judgment recovered in Alabama. COURTS JURISDICTION OF ACTIONS ON FOR- A state statute prohibiting actions for death occurring in other states, construed as depriving the courts of the state of jurisdiction of an action on a judgment obtained in another state on a cause of action for death, violates Const. U. S. art. 4, § 1, requiring full faith and credit to be given in each state to the judicial proceedings of other states. 2. COURTS366(23)-CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE OF STATE A QUESTION FOR THE STATE COURTS. Whether an Illinois statute prohibiting actions for death occurring in other states should be construed as permitting actions on judgments rendered in other states on causes of action for death was a question for the Supreme Court of the state to decide. 3. DEATH 35-STATUTE CREATING CAUSE OF ACTION CANNOT PROHIBIT ENFORCEMENT. IN OTHER STATES. When a state creates a cause of action for death occurring therein, it cannot limit the jurisdiction of the courts of other states to enforce it. 4. JUDGMENT *414 The defendant pleaded to the jurisdiction that the judgment was for negligently causing the death of the plaintiff's intestate in Alabama. The plaintiff demurred to the plea, setting up Article IV, sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution of the United States. A statute of Illinois provided that no action should be brought or prosecuted in that State for damages occasioned by death occurring in another State in consequence of wrongful conduct. The Supreme Court of Illinois held that as by the terms of the statute the original action could not have been brought there, the Illinois Courts had no jurisdiction of a suit upon the judgment. The Circuit Court of Kane County having ordered that the demurrer be quashed its judgment was affirmed. 285 Ill. 188, 120 N. E. 631, 4 A. L. R. 964. [1, 2] In the Court below and in the argument before us reliance was placed upon Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., No. 1, 191 U. S. 373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92, 48 L. Ed. 225, and language in Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co., 127 U. S. 265, 8 Sup. 816-ENTITLED ΤΟ FULL FAITH AND CRedit, though ACTION COULD Ct. 1370, 32 L. Ed. 239, the former as show NOT BE MAINTAINED IN OTHER STATES. A provision of a state statute creating a cause of action for death, that the action may be maintained in a court of competent jurisdic tion within the state "and not elsewhere," does not deprive a judgment on such cause of action of the right to be accorded full faith and credit in other states. 5. COURTS 391(1)-JUDGMENT UPHOLDING INVALID STATUTE REVIEWABLE ON WRIT OF ERROR. A judgment of a state court upholding a statute that was invalid as construed is reviewable by writ of error. ing that the clause requiring full faith and credit to be given to judgments of other State does not require a State to furnish a Court, and the latter as sanctioning an inquiry into the nature of the original cause of action in order to determine the jurisdiction of a court to enforce a foreign judgment founded upon it. But we are of opinion that the conclusion sought to be built upon these premises in the present case cannot be sustained. Davis Provision Co. v. Anglo-American Provision Co. was a suit by a foreign corporation on a foreign judgment against a foreign corporation. The decision is sufficiently explained without more by the views about foreign corporations that had pre On Writ of Certiorari and Writ of Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois. Action by Thomas P. Kenney, administrator of Donald E. Kenney, against the Su- vailed unquestioned since Bank of Augusta For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes v. Earle, 13 Pet. 579, 589-591, 10 L. Ed. 274; | exactly as required by the Alabama statute cited 191 U. S. 375, 24 Sup. Ct. 92, 48 L. Ed. was not to have the respect due to other 225. Moreover no doubt there is truth in the judgments of a sister State. proposition that the Constitution does not [5] As the judgment below upheld a statrequire the State to furnish a Court. But itute that was invalid as construed the writ also is true that there are limits to the power of error was the proper proceeding and the of exclusion and to the power to consider the writ of certiorari must be dismissed. Judgment reversed. *415 nature of the cause of action before the foreign judgment based upon it is given effect. (252 U. S. 504) FIRST NAT. BANK OF CANTON, PA., v. WILLIAMS, Comptroller of the Currency. (Argued March 3, 1920. Decided April 19, 1920.) In Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039, it was held that the Courts of Mississippi were bound to enforce a judgment rendered in Missouri upon a cause of action arising in Mississippi and illegal and void there. The policy of Mississippi was more actively contravened in that case than the policy of Illinois is in this. Therefore the fact that here the original 1. COURTS 344-GENERAL FEDERAL STAT cause of action could not have been maintained in Illinois is not an answer to a suit upon the judgment. See Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 18 L. Ed. 475; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1292. But this being true, it is plain that a State cannot escape its constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to Courts otherwise competent. The assumption that it could not do so was the basis of the decision in International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 111, 112, 30 Sup. Ct. 481, 54 L. Ed. 678, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103, and the same principle was foreshadowed in General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 216, 220, 228, 28 Sup. Ct. 475, 52 L. Ed. 754, and in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 235, 236, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039. See Keyser v. Lowell, 117 Fed. 400, 54 C. C. A. 574; Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 148, 28 Sup. Ct. 34, 52 L. Ed. 143, and cases cited. Whether the Illinois statute should be construed as the Mississippi Act was construed in Fauntleroy v. Lum was for the Supreme Court of the State to decide, but read as that Court read it, it attempted to achieve a result that the Constitution of the United States forbade. [3, 4] Some argument was based upon the fact that the statute of Alabama allowed an action to be maintained in a court of competent jurisdiction within the State "and not elsewhere." But when the cause of action is created the invalidity of attempts to limit the jurisdiction of other states to enforce it has been established by the decisions of this 'Court. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587, 58 L. Ed. 997, L. R. A. 1916D, 685; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 29 Sup. Ct. 397, 53 L. Ed. 695; and had 416 these decisions been otherwise they would not have imported that a judgment rendered No. 618. UTE AS TO DISTRICT OF SUIT DISPLACED BY STATUTES RELATING TO SUITS BY NATIONAL BANKS AGAINST COMPTRoller. Under Judicial Code, § 24, subd. 16 (Comp. St. § 991), giving District Court jurisdiction of suits by national banking associations, esheld, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, as provided by the title of the Revised Statutes relating to national banks, and section 49 (Comp. St. § 1031), requiring proceedings to enjoin the Comptroller under the provision of any law relating to such associations to be had in the district where such association is located, which suits may be brought, is displaced pro section 51 (section 1033), as to the district in tanto, and process may be served on defendant wherever found. tablished in the district for which the court is 2. COURTS 274-SUIT BY NATIONAL BANK AGAINST COMPTROLLER PROPERLY BROUGHT IN DISTRICT WHERE BANK IS LOCATED. Under Judicial Code, § 24, subd. 16 (Comp. St. § 991), and sections 49 and 51 (sections 1031, 1033), a suit by a national bank to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency from doing threatened unlawful, arbitrary, and oppressive acts under color of his office, is properly brought in the district in which the bank is located. 3. COURTS 284-WHEN CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES STATED. A cause of action arises under the laws of the United States, so as to give jurisdiction, where an appropriate statement by plaintiff, unaided by any anticipation or avoidance of defenses, discloses that it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of an act of Congress. United States for the Middle District of Appeal from the District Court of the Pennsylvania. Suit by the First National Bank of Canton, Pa., against John Skelton Williams, Comptroller of the Currency. From a decree dismissing the suit for want of jurisdic tion (260 Fed. 674), plaintiff appeals. Reversed. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (40 Sup.Ct.) Mr. John B. Stanchfield, of New York City, for appellant. Messrs. Solicitor General King and La Rue Brown, of Boston, Mass., for appellee. *508 any such bank; and of all suits brought by any banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under the provisions of title 'National Banks,' Revised Statutes, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided *Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the by said title. And all national banking associaopinion of the Court. Appellant, whose place of business is within the Middle district of Pennsylvania, brought this suit in the United States District Court for that district, seeking an injunction to prevent John Skelton Williams, Comptroller of the Currency, from doing certain things under color of his office declared to be threatened, unlawful, arbitrary, and oppressive. The bill alleges that, in order to injure complainant's president, towards whom he entertained personal ill will, the Comptroller determined to destroy its business, and to that end he had maliciously persecuted and oppressed it for three years, in the following ways, among others: By often demanding special reports and information beyond the powers conferred upon him by law; by disclosing confidential and official information concerning it to banks, members of Congress, representatives of the press, and the public generally; by inciting litigation against it and its officers; by publishing and disseminating false statements, charging it with unlawful acts and improper conduct and reflecting upon its solvency; and by distributing to depositors, stockholders and others alarming statements intended to affect its credit, etc., etc.—and further that, unless restrained, he would continue these and similar malicious and oppressive practices. Williams is a citizen of Virginia, officially stationed at Washington. He was not summoned while in the Middle district of Pennsylvania, but a subpoena was served upon him in Washington by the United States Generally, a District Court cannot acquire jurisdiction over an individual without service of process upon him while in the district for which it is held. But here a national bank seeks to enjoin the Comptroller, and the claim is that by statutory direction the proceeding must be had in the district where the association is located, and not elsewhere. The court below took the contrary view. 260 Fed. 674. Determination of the matter requires consideration of three sections of the Judicial Code. "Sec. 24. The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: "Sixteenth. Of all cases commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof, against any national banking association, and cases for winding up the affairs of tions established under the laws of the United tions by or against them, real, personal, or mixed, States shall, for the purposes of all other acand all suits in equity, be deemed citizens of the states in which they are respectively located." "Sec. 49. All proceedings by any national banking association to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, under the provisions of any law be had in the district where such association relating to national banking associations, shall is located." *510 "Sec. 51. Except as provided in the five succeeding sections, no person shall be arrested in one district for trial *in another, in any civil action before a District Court; and, except as provided in the six succeeding sections, no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different states, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant." Comp. St. §§ 991, 1031, 1033. [1] If sections 24 and 49 properly construed restrict this proceeding to the district where the bank is located, they displace section 51 pro tanto and authorize service of process upon defendant wherever found. United States v. Congress Construction Co., 222 U. S. 199, 203, 32 Sup. Ct. 44, 56 L. Ed. 163. [2] It is said for appellee that both sections 24 and 49 relate to injunction proceedings brought under the National Banking Law-such proceedings as are thereby expressly authorized and no others. And fur ther that such law only authorizes suit by a bank to enjoin the Comptroller when he undertakes to act because of its alleged refusal to redeem circulating notes. R. S. § 5237 (Comp. St. § 9824). The Act of February 25, 1863, establishing national banks (12 Stats. 665, 681, c. 58): "Sec. 59. And be it further enacted, that suits, actions, and proceedings by and against any association under this act may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such assocaition may be established." An act to provide a national currency, secured by a pledge of United States bonds, approved June 3, 1864 (13 Stats. 99, 116, c. 106): "Sec. 57. And be it further enacted, that suits, actions and proceedings, against any association under this act, may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established; or in any state, |