v. Earle, 13 Pet. 579, 589–591, 10 L. Ed. 274; | exactly as required by the Alabama statute

was not to have the respect due to other judgments of a sister State.

cited 191 U. S. 375, 24 Sup. Ct. 92, 48 L. Ed. 225. Moreover no doubt there is truth in the proposition that the Constitution does not require the State to furnish a Court. But it also is true that there are limits to the power of exclusion and to the power to consider the

*415 nature of the cause of action before the foreign judgment based upon it is given effect.

In Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039, it was held that the Courts of Mississippi were bound to enforce a judgment rendered in Missouri upon a cause of action arising in Mississippi and illegal and void there. The policy of Mississippi was more actively contravened in that case than the policy of Illinois is in this. Therefore the fact that here the original 1. COURTS 344-GENERAL FEDERAL STATcause of action could not have been maintained in Illinois is not an answer to a suit upon the judgment. See Christmas v. Russell, 5 Wall. 290, 18 L. Ed. 475; Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U. S. 243, 32 Sup. Ct. 415, 56 L. Ed. 749, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 1292. But this being true, it is plain that a State cannot escape its constitutional obligations by the simple device of denying jurisdiction in such cases to Courts otherwise competent. The assumption that it could not do so was the basis of the decision in International Text Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 111, 112, 30 Sup. Ct. 481, 54 L. Ed. 678, 27 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 1103, and the same principle was foreshadowed in General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 216, 220, 228, 28 Sup. Ct. 475, 52 L. Ed. 754, and in Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U. S. 230, 235, 236, 28 Sup. Ct. 641, 52 L. Ed. 1039. See Keyser v. Lowell, 117 Fed. 400, 54 C. O. A. 574; Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 148, 28 Sup. Ct. 34, 52 L. Ed. 143, and cases cited. Whether the Illinois statute should be construed as the Mississippi Act was construed in Fauntleroy v. Lum was for the Supreme Court of the State to decide, but read as that Court read it, it attempted to achieve a result that the Constitution of the United States forbade.

[3, 4] Some argument was based upon the fact that the statute of Alabama allowed an action to be maintained in a court of competent jurisdiction within the State "and not elsewhere." But when the cause of action is created the invalidity of attempts to limit the jurisdiction of other states to enforce it has been established by the decisions of this 'Court. Tennessee Coal, Iron & R. R. Co. v. George, 233 U. S. 354, 34 Sup. Ct. 587, 58 L. Ed. 997, L. R. A. 1916D, 685; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé Ry. Co. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55, 29 Sup. Ct. 397, 53 L. Ed. 695; and had

*416

[5] As the judgment below upheld a statute that was invalid as construed the writ of error was the proper proceeding and the writ of certiorari must be dismissed. Judgment reversed.

these decisions been otherwise they would not have imported that a judgment rendered

(252 U. S. 504) FIRST NAT. BANK OF CANTON, PA., v. WILLIAMS, Comptroller of the Currency.

(Argued March 3, 1920. Decided April 19,
1920.)
No. 618.

UTE AS TO DISTRICT OF SUIT DISPLACED BY
STATUTES RELATING TO SUITS BY NATIONAL
BANKS AGAINST COMPTROLLER.

Under Judicial Code, § 24, subd. 16 (Comp. St. § 991), giving District Court jurisdiction of suits by national banking associations, established in the district for which the court is held, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, as provided by the title of the Revised Statutes relating to national banks, and section 49 (Comp. St. § 1031), requiring proceedings to enjoin the Comptroller under the provision of any law relating to such associations to be had in the district where such association is located, which suits may be brought, is displaced pro section 51 (section 1033), as to the district in tanto, and process may be served on defendant wherever found.

2. COURTS 274-SUIT BY NATIONAL BANK

AGAINST COMPTROLLER PROPERLY BROUGHT
IN DISTRICT WHERE BANK IS LOCATED.

Under Judicial Code, § 24, subd. 16 (Comp.
St. § 991), and sections 49 and 51 (sections
1031, 1033), a suit by a national bank to en-
join the Comptroller of the Currency from doing
threatened unlawful, arbitrary, and oppressive
acts under color of his office, is properly brought
in the district in which the bank is located.
3. COURTS 284-WHEN CAUSE OF ACTION
ARISES UNDER THE LAWS OF THE UNITED
STATES STATED.

A cause of action arises under the laws of

the United States, so as to give jurisdiction, where an appropriate statement by plaintiff, unaided by any anticipation or avoidance of defenses, discloses that it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of an act of Congress.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(40 Sup.Ct.)

Mr. John B. Stanchfield, of New York City, [ any such bank; and of all suits brought by any for appellant. banking association established in the district

for which the court is held, under the provisions of title 'National Banks,' Revised Statutes, to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided

*508

*Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS delivered the by said title. And all national banking associations established under the laws of the United opinion of the Court. tions by or against them, real, personal, or mixed, States shall, for the purposes of all other acand all suits in equity, be deemed citizens of the states in which they are respectively located."

"

Messrs. Solicitor General King and La Rue Brown, of Boston, Mass., for appellee.

Appellant, whose place of business is within the Middle district of Pennsylvania, brought this suit in the United States District Court for that district, seeking an injunction to prevent John Skelton Williams, Comptroller of the Currency, from doing certain things under color of his office declared to be threatened, unlawful, arbitrary, and oppressive.

The bill alleges that, in order to injure complainant's president, towards whom he entertained personal ill will, the Comptroller determined to destroy its business, and to that end he had maliciously persecuted and oppressed it for three years, in the following ways, among others: By often demanding special reports and information beyond the powers conferred upon him by law; by disclosing confidential and official information concerning it to banks, members of Congress, representatives of the press, and the public generally; by inciting litigation against it and its officers; by publishing and disseminating false statements, charging it with unlawful acts and improper conduct and reflecting upon its solvency; and by distributing to depositors, stockholders and others alarming statements intended to affect its credit, etc., etc.—and further that, unless restrained, he would continue these and similar malicious and oppressive practices.

Williams is a citizen of Virginia, officially stationed at Washington. He was not summoned while in the Middle district of Pennsylvania, but a subpoena was served upon him in Washington by the United States

*509

marshal. Having specially appeared, he successfully challenged the jurisdiction of the court; and the cause is here upon certificate to that effect.

Generally, a District Court cannot acquire jurisdiction over an individual without service of process upon him while in the district for which it is held. But here a national

bank seeks to enjoin the Comptroller, and the claim is that by statutory direction the proceeding must be had in the district where the association is located, and not elsewhere. The court below took the contrary view. 260 Fed. 674.

Determination of the matter requires consideration of three sections of the Judicial Code.

*

"Sec. 24. The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: "Sixteenth. Of all cases commenced by the United States, or by direction of any officer thereof, against any national banking association, and cases for winding up the affairs of

"Sec. 49. All proceedings by any national banking association to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, under the provisions of any law be had in the district where such association relating to national banking associations, shall is located."

"Sec. 51. Except as provided in the five succeeding sections, no person shall be arrested in

*510

one district for trial in another, in any civil provided in the six succeeding sections, no civil action before a District Court; and, except as suit shall be brought in any district court against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action be brought only in the district of the residence is between citizens of different states, suit shall of either the plaintiff or the defendant."

Comp. St. §§ 991, 1031, 1033.

[1] If sections 24 and 49 properly construed restrict this proceeding to the district where the bank is located, they displace section 51 pro tanto and authorize service of process upon defendant wherever found. United States v. Congress Construction Co., 222 U. S. 199, 203, 32 Sup. Ct. 44, 56 L. Ed. 163.

[2] It is said for appellee that both sections 24 and 49 relate to injunction proceedings brought under the National Banking Law-such proceedings as are thereby expressly authorized and no others. And fur ther that such law only authorizes suit by a bank to enjoin the Comptroller when he undertakes to act because of its alleged refusal to redeem circulating notes. R. S. 5237 (Comp. St. § 9824).

The Act of February 25, 1863, establishing national banks (12 Stats. 665, 681, c. 58):

"Sec. 59. And be it further enacted, that suits, actions, and proceedings by and against any association under this act may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such assocaition may be established."

An act to provide a national currency, secured by a pledge of United States bonds, approved June 3, 1864 (13 Stats. 99, 116, c. 106):

"Sec. 57. And be it further enacted, that suits, actions and proceedings, against any association under this act, may be had in any circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States held within the district in which such association may be established; or in any state,

*511

county, or *municipal court in the county or city in which said association is located, having jurisdiction in similar cases: Provided, however, that all proceedings to enjoin the Comptroller under this act shall be had in a circuit, district, or territorial court of the United States, held in the district in which the association is located."

In Kennedy v. Gibson (1869), 8 Wall. 498, 506 (19 L. Ed. 476) this court ruled that section 57 should be construed as if it read: "And be it further enacted, that suits, actions and proceedings by and against," etc., the words "by and" having been accidentally omitted. "It is not to be supposed that Congress intended to exclude the associations from suing in the courts where they can be sued." "Such suits may still be brought by the associations in the courts of the United (Argued March 12, 1920. States." And it further held "that receivers

1920.)

Angeles, 202 U. S. 313, 26 Sup. Ct. 652, 50 L.
Ed. 1046; Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74,
34 Sup. Ct. 724, 58 L. Ed. 1218; Hopkins v.
Walker, 244 U. S. 486, 489, 37 Sup. Ct. 711,
61 L. Ed. 1270. Clearly the plaintiff's bill
discloses a case wherein his right to recover
turns on the construction and application of
the National Banking Law; and we think
the proceeding is one to enjoin the Comp-
troller under provisions of that law within
the true intendment of the Judicial Code.
The decree below must be
Reversed.

"Sec. 629. The Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows:

*

"Tenth. Of all suits by or against any banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under any law providing for national banking associations.

(252 U. S. 512)

tained by one construction of the law, or defeated by another, the case is one arising under that law. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 14 Sup. Ct. 654, 38 L. Ed. 511; Boston & Montana Mining Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co., 188 U. S. 632, 23 Sup. Ct. 434, 47 L. Ed. 626; Devine v. Los

BURNAP v. UNITED STATES.

also may sue in the courts of the United States by virtue of the act, without reference

(No. 228.)

to the locality of their personal citizenship." 1. UNITED STATES 35-CONGRESS MAY VEST

The Revised Statutes:

POWER OF APPOINTMENT IN DESIGNATED OF-
FICERS.

Decided April 19,

Notwithstanding Const. art. 2, § 2, subd. 2, providing for the appointment of officers by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, Congress may vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in courts of law, or in the heads of departments. 7-POWER OF REMOVAL OB

"Eleventh. Of all suits brought by (or against) any banking association established in the district for which the court is held, under the provisions of title "The National Banks,' to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, or any receiver acting under his direction, as provided by said title."

"Sec. 736. All proceedings by any national banking association to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, under the provisions of any law relating to national banking associations, shall be had in the district where such association is located."

Parts of the foregoing subsections 10 and

#512

11 were joined in subsection 16, § 24, Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 991), and section 736 became section 49, Judicial Code (Comp. St. § 1031).

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Head of Department.]

4. UNITED STATES

36—“EMPLOYÉS” IN BUREAU OR DIVISION ARE EMPLOYÉS IN THE DEPARTMENT.

[3] What constitutes a cause arising "under" the laws of the United States has been often pointed out by this court. One does so arise where an appropriate statement by the plaintiff, unaided by any anticipation or avoidance of defenses, discloses that it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of an act of Congress. If the plain- as to the appointment of clerks and other emtiff thus asserts a right which will be sus-ployés by heads of departments, persons employed in a bureau or division of a department are as much "employés" in the department as clerks or messengers working under the immediate supervision of the Secretary in charge of the department.

Within Rev. St. § 169 (Comp. St. § 248),

2. OFFICERS
SUSPENSION IS INCIDENT OF OTHER POWERS.
in the absence of statutory provision to the
The power to remove an inferior officer is,
contrary, an incident of the power to appoint,
the power of removal.
and the power of suspension is an incident of

3. UNITED STATES 36 "HEAD OF DEPARTMENT," RESPECTING POWER OF APPOINTMENT, DEFINED.

Within Rev. St. § 169 (Comp. St. § 248), authorizing heads of departments to employ clerks and other employés, "the head of a department" is the Secretary in charge of one of the great divisions of the executive branch of the government, who is a member of the Cab inet, and does not include heads of bureaus or lesser divisions.

[Ed. Note.-For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Employé.]

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(40 Sup.Ct.)

5. UNITED STATES 36-"EMPLOY" IS EQUIV-3287), prohibiting removals of persons in the ALENT OF "APPOINT." classified service except for cause and for reasons given in writing, and civil service rule 12, and where no requirement of such act or rule was disregarded, there was no irregularity in the suspension or removal of such employé.

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

Congress to vest the appointment of inferior 588; United States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. officers either in the President alone, in the 483, 6 Sup. Ct. 449, 29 L. Ed. 700; United courts of law, or in the heads of departments States v. Mouat, 124 U. S. 303, 8 Sup. Ct. (6 Op. Attys. Gen. 1). The power to remove 505, 31 L. Ed. 463; United States v. Hendee, is, in the absence of statutory provision to 124 U. S. 309, 8 Sup. Ct. 507, 31 L. Ed. 465; the contrary, an incident of the power to United States v. Smith, 124 U. S. 525, 8 Sup. appoint. Ex parte Hennen, 13 Pet. 230, 259, | Ct. 595, 31 L. Ed. 534; Auffmordt v. Hedden,

137 U. S. 310, 11 Sup. Ct. 103, 34 L. Ed. 674; United States v. Schlierholz (D. C.) 137 Fed. 616; Martin v. United States, 168 Fed. 198, 93 C. C. A. 484.

260, 10 L. Ed. 138; Blake v. United States, 103 U. S. 227, 231, 26 L. Ed. 462; United States v. Allred, 155 U. S. 591, 594, 15 Sup. Ct. 231, 39 L. Ed. 273; Keim v. United States, 177 U. S. 290, 293, 294, 20 Sup. Ct. 574, 44 L. Ed. 774; Reagan v. United States, 182 U. S. 419, 426, 21 Sup. Ct. 842, 45 L. Ed. 1162; Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U. S. 311, 316, 23 Sup. Ct. 535, 47 L. Ed. 828. And the power of suspension is an incident of the power of removal.

Second. The powers and duties of the office of public buildings and grounds had their origin in the Act of July 16, 1790, c. 28, 1 Stat. 130, § 2, which authorized the President to appoint three Commissioners to lay out a district for the permanent seat of the government. By Act of May 1, 1802, c.

*517

Section 169 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. 41, 2 Stat. 175, the offices of Commissioners St. § 248) provides that: were abolished and their duties devolved upon a Superintendent, to be appointed by the President. By Act of April 29, 1816, c. 150, 3 Stat. 324, the office of Superintendent was abolished and his duties devolved upon a Commissioner of Public Buildings. By Act of March 2, 1867, c. 167, § 2, 14 Stat. 466, the office of Commissioner was abolished and his duties devolved upon the Chief of Engineers. [3-6] The term "head of a department" By section 1797 of the Revised Statutes, as means, in this connection, the Secretary in amended by Act of April 28, 1902, c. 594, 32 charge of a great division of the executive Stat. 152 (Comp. St. § 3308), it is declared branch of the government, like the State, that the Chief of Engineers has "charge of Treasury, and War, who is a member of the the public buildings and grounds in the DisCabinet. It does not include heads of bu-trict of Columbia, under such regulations as reaus or lesser divisions. United States v. Germaine, 99 U. S. 508, 510, 25 L. Ed. 482. Persons employed in a bureau or division of a department are as much employés in the department within the meaning of Section 169 of the Revised Statutes as clerks or messengers rendering service under the imme diate supervision of the Secretary. Manning's Case, 13 Wall. 578, 580, 20 L. Ed. 706; United States v. Ashfield, 91 U. S. 317, 319, 23 L. Ed. 396. The term "employ" is used as the equivalent of appoint. 21 Op. Attys. Gen. 355, 356. The term "clerks and other employés," as there used, is sufficiently broad to include persons filling positions which require technical skill, learning and professional training. 29 Op. Attys. Gen. 116, 123; 21 Op. Attys. Gen. 363, 364; 20 Op. Attys. Gen. 728. The distinction between officer and employé in this connection does not rest upon differences in the qualifications necessary to fill the positions or in the character of the service to be performed. Whether the incumbent is an officer or an employé is determined by the manner in which Congress has specifically provided for the creation of the several positions, their duties and appointment thereto. 15 Op. Attys. Gen. 3; 17 Op. Attys. Gen. 532; 26 Op. Attys. Gen. 627; 29 Op. Attys. Gen. 116; United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 18 L. Ed. 830; United States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 762, 24 L. Ed.

516

"Each head of a department is authorized to employ in his department such number of clerks of the several classes recognized by law, and such messengers, assistant messengers, copyists, watchmen, laborers, and other employés, and at such rates of compensation, respectively, as may be appropriated for by Congress from year to year."

may be prescribed by the President through the War Department." And section 1812 (Comp. St. § 3327) requires the Chief of Engineers, as Superintendent of Public Buildings and Grounds, to submit annual reports to the Secretary of War to accompany the annual message of the President to Congress.

Third. There is no statute which creates an office of landscape architect in the office of public buildings and grounds nor any which defines the duties of the position. The only authority for the appointment or employment of a landscape architect in that office is the legislative, executive, and judicial appropriation Act of June 17, 1910, c. 297, 36 Stat. 504 (and later appropriation acts in the same form, 36 Stat. 1207; 37 Stat. 388, 766; 38 Stat. 482, 1024; 39 Stat. 93), which reads as follows:

"Public Buildings and Grounds.

"Office of Public Buildings and Grounds: Assistant engineer, two thousand four hundred dollars; assistant and chief clerk, two thousand four hundred dollars; clerk of class four; clerk of class three; clerk and stenographer, one thousand four hundred dollars; messenger; landscape architect, two thousand four hundred dollars; surveyor and draftsman, one thousand five hundred dollars; in all, fourteen thousand three

hundred and forty dollars."

Then follow the foremen and night and day watchmen in the parks.