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have been received, but actually were not. It is seeking to have the aggregate of premiums actually received within the year reduced by an amount which the company paid
 If the terms of the noninclusion clause (c), above, standing alone, permitted of a doubt as to its proper construction, the doubt would disappear when it is read in connection with the deduction clause (d), above. The deduction there prescribed is of "the sums other than dividends paid within the year on policy and annuity contracts." This is tantamount to a direction that dividends shall not be deducted. It was argued that the dividends there referred to are "commer
cial" dividends like those upon capital stock, and that those here involved are dividends of a different character. But the dividends which the deduction clause says, in effect, shall not be deducted, are the very dividends here in question; that is, dividends "on policy and annuity contracts." None such may be deducted by any insurance company except as expressly provided for in the act, in clauses quoted above (a), (b), and (c); that is, clauses (a), (b), and (c) are, in effect, exceptions to the general exclusion of dividends from the permissible deductions as prescribed in clause (d) above.
 In support of the company's contention that the interpolation of the words "within the year" is necessary in order to support the construction given to the act by the Circuit Court of Appeals we are asked to consider the legislative history of the Revenue Act of 1918 (enacted February 24, 1919, [40 Stat. 1057, c. 18]), and specifically to the fact that in the bill as introduced in and passed by the House the corresponding section-233 (a); Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 8 6336p contained the words "within the taxable year," and that these words were stricken out by the Conference Committee (Report No. 1037, Sixty-Fifth Congress, Third Session). The legislative history of an act uay, where the meaning of the words used
(252 U. S. 553) CANADIAN NORTHERN RY. CO. v. EGGEN.
out within the year, and which it paid out
TION OF ONE YEAR FOR PERSONAL INJURY
*538 is doubtful, be resorted to as an aid to construction. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 490, 37 Sup. Ct. 192, 61 L. Ed. 442, L. R. A. 1917F, 502, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1168. But no aid could possibly be derived from the legislative history of another act passed nearly six years after the one in question. Further answer to the argument based on the legislative history of the later act would, therefore, be inappropriate.
We find no error in the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals.
It is affirmed.
(Argued March 1, 1920. Decided April 19,
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 207(3)—LIMITA-
when a cause of action arises outside the state
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Action by Gus Eggen against the Canadian Northern Railway Company. A judgment for defendant was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit (Eggen v. Canadian Northern Ry. Co., 255 Fed. 937, 167 C. C. A. 229), and defendant brings certiorari. Reversed, and judgment of the District Court affirmed.
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
See, also, Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. j enacted for the purpose of creating an arbiEggen, 249 U. S. 594, 39 Sup. Ct. 259, 63 L. trary or vexatious discrimination against Ed. 793. nonresidents of Minnesota. *560
Mr. Wm. D. Mitchell, of St. Paul, Minn., for *It has been in force ever since the state petitioner. was admitted into the Union in 1858; it is Mr. Ernest A. Michel, of Minneapolis, in terms precisely the same as those of sevMinn., for respondent.
eral other states, and in substance it does not differ from those of many more. It gives a
*Mr. Justice CLARKE delivered the opin- nonresident the same rights in the Minnesota ion of the Court. courts as a resident citizen has, for a time equal to that of the statute of limitations where his cause of action arose. If a resident citizen acquires such a cause of action after it has accrued, his rights are limited precisely as those of the nonresident are, by the laws of the place where it arose. If the limitation of the foreign state is equal to or longer than that of the Minnesota statute, the nonresident's position is as favorable as that of the citizen.
The only question presented for decision in this case is as to the validity of section 7709 of the Statutes of Minnesota (General Statutes of Minnesota 1913), which reads:
"When a cause of action has arisen outside of this state, and, by the laws of the place where it arose, an action thereon is there barred by lapse of time, no such action shall be maintained in this state unless the plaintiff be a citizen of the state who has owned the cause of action ever since it accrued."
The Circuit Court of Appeals, reversing the
District Court, held this statute invalid for the reason that the exemption in favor of citizens of Minnesota rendered it repugnant to article 4, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, which declares that
"The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states."
The action was commenced in the District Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, Second Division, by the respondent, a citizen of North Dakota, against the petitioner, a corporation organized under the laws of the Dominion of Canada, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by him on November 29, 1913, when employed by the petitioner as a switchman in its yards at Humboldt, in the province of Saskatchewan. The respondent, a citizen and resident of North Dakota, went to Canada and entered the employ of the petitioner as a switchman a short time prior to the accident complained of. He remained in Canada for six months after the accident and then re
It is only when the foreign limitation is shorter than that of Minnesota, and when the nonresident who owns the cause of action from the time when it arose has slept on his rights until it is barred in the foreign state (which happens to be the respondent's case), that inequality results-and for this we are asked to declare a statute unconstitutional which has been in force for 60 years.
This court has never attempted to formulate a comprehensive list of the rights included within the "privileges and immunities" clause of the Constitution (article 4, § 2), but it has repeatedly approved as authoritative the statement by Mr. Justice Washington, in 1825, in Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380, Fed. Cas. No. 3,230 (the first federal case in which this clause was considered), saying:
"We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental." Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 75, 21 L. Ed. 394; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 248, 19 Sup. Ct. 165, 43 L. Ed. 432; Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 207 U. S. 142, 155, 28 Sup. Ct. 34, 52 L. Ed. 143.
In the Corfield Case the court included in a partial list of such fundamental privileges "the right of a citizen of one state to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of" another.
turned to live in North Dakota. He commenced this action on October 15, 1915, almost two years after the date of the accident. By the laws of Canada, where the cause of *561 action arose, an action of this kind must be *The state of Minnesota, in the statute we commenced within one year from the time are considering, recognized this right of citiinjury was sustained. If the statute of zens of other states to institute and maintain Minnesota, above quoted, is valid, it is appli- suits in its courts as a fundamental right, cable to the action, which, being barred in protected by the Constitution, and for one Canada, cannot be maintained in Minnesota year from the time his cause of action acby a nonresident plaintiff. If, however, the crued the respondent was given all of the statute is invalid, the general statute of lim-rights which citizens of Minnesota had under itations of Minnesota, allowing a period of it. The discrimination of which he complains six years within which to commence action, could arise only from his own neglect. would be applicable. The record properly presents the claim of the petitioner that the Circuit Court of Appeals erred in holding the statute involved unconstitutional and void.
[1-3] This is not disputed, nor can it be fairly claimed that the limitation of one year is unduly short, having regard to the likelihood of the dispersing of witnesses to accidents such as that in which the respondent
It is plain that the act assailed was not
was injured, their exposure to injury and 174, 24 L. Ed. 610; Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 death, and the failure of memory as to the U. S. 769, 774, 2 Sup. Ct. 91, 27 L. Ed. 468. minute details of conduct on which questions A like result to that which we are announcof negligence so often turn. Thus, the hold-ing was reached with respect to similar ståting of the Circuit Court of Appeals comes to utes, in Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 this, that the privilege and immunity clause U. S. 72, 23 L. Ed. 806; by the Circuit Court of the Constitution guarantees to a nonresi- of Appeals, Second Circuit, in Aultman & dent precisely the same rights in the courts Taylor Co. v. Syme, 79 Fed. 238, 24 C. C. A. of a state as resident citizens have, and that 539; in Klotz v. Angle, 220 N. Y. 347, 116 N. any statute which gives him a less, even E. 24; and in Robinson v. Oceanic Steam though it be an adequate, remedy is uncon- Navigation Co., 112 N. Y. 315, 325, 19 N. E. stitutional and void. 625, 627 (2 L. R. A. 636).
In this last case the Court of Appeals of New York pertinently says:
Such a literal interpretation of the clause cannot be accepted.
From very early in our history, requirements have been imposed upon nonresidents in many, perhaps in all, of the states as a condition of resorting to their courts, which have not been imposed upon resident citizens. For instance, security for costs has very generally been required of a nonresident, but not of a resident citizen, and a nonresident's property in many states may be attached under conditions which would not justify the attaching of a resident citizen's property. This court has said of such requirements:
"Such a regulation of the internal affairs of a state cannot reasonably be characterized as hostile to the fundamental rights of citizens of #562 other states. *It has never been supposed that regulations of that character materially interfered with the enjoyment by citizens of each state of the privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution to citizens of the several states." Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 256, 19 Sup. Ct. 165, 172 (43 L. Ed. 432).
*"A construction of the constitutional limitation [the one we are considering] which would apply it to such a case as this would strike down a large body of laws which have existed in all the states from the foundation of the government, making some discrimination between residents and nonresidents in legal proceedings and other matters."
This is the principle on which this court has repeatedly ruled that contracts were not impaired in a constitutional sense by change in limitation statutes which reduced the time for commencing actions upon them, provided a reasonable time was given for commencing suit before the new bar took effect. Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wall. 596, 21 L. Ed. 737; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632, 24 L. Ed. 365; Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69,
 The laws of Minnesota gave to the nonresident respondent free access to its courts, for the purpose of enforcing any right which he may have had, for a year-as long a time as was given him for that purpose by the laws under which he chose to live and work -and having neglected to avail himself of that law, he may not successfully complain because his expired right to maintain suit elsewhere is not revived for his benefit by the laws of the state to which he went for the sole purpose of prosecuting his suit. The privilege extended to him for enforcing his claim was reasonably sufficient and adequate and the statute is a valid law.
It results that the judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals must be reversed and that of the District Court affirmed.
The principle on which this holding rests is that the constitutional requirement is satisfied if the nonresident is given access to the courts of the state upon terms which in themselves are reasonable and adequate for the enforcing of any rights he may have, even though they may not be technically and precisely the same in extent as those accorded to resident citizens. The power is in the courts, ultimately in this court, to determine the adequacy and reasonableness of such terms. A man cannot be said to be de- (Argued March 17, 1920. Decided April 19, nied, in a constitutional or in any rational sense, the privilege of resorting to courts to enforce his rights when he is given free access to them for a length of time reasonably sufficient to enable an ordinarily diligent man to institute proceedings for their protection.
(252 U. S. 388) CUYAHOGA RIVER POWER CO. V. NORTHERN OHIO TRACTION & LIGHT CO. et al.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
129-POWER COMPANY BY INCORPORATION HELD TO ACQUIRE NO CONTRACT RIGHTS TO LANDS INCLUDED IN DEVELOPMENT SCHEME.
A hydroelectric power company, incorporated under Gen. Code Ohio, §§ 10128, 10134, did not, by filing its articles of incorporation, specifying the streams across which dams were to be built and maintained, acquire contract rights, protected by the federal Constitution, to have lands embraced in its subsequently adopted plan for the development and sale of power subjected to its public use, rights of way, and franchises, exclusive of all other persons or corporations.
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
2. COURTS 284-FEDERAL QUESTION IN SUBSTANCE NECESSARY TO GIVE JURISDICTION.
To give jurisdiction to the federal courts, where diversity of citizenship does not exist, there must be a federal question, not in mere form, but in substance, and not in mere assertion, but in essence and effect.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129-ACTION OF COMPANY NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO STATE AS
IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT RIGHTS.
The acts or claims of a traction company whose incorporation antedated plaintiff's incorporation could not be attributed to the state as an impairment of plaintiff's contract rights under its charter.
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 129-INCORPORA-
The incorporation of a power company un-
129-COMMISSION'S APPROVAL OF CONVEYANCE BY POWER COMPANY NOT IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACT OF ANOTHER POWER COMPANY CLAIMING THE RIGHT TO USE THE LANDS.
Where a power company acquired title to lands which another power company claimed the right to acquire, as covered by its plan for the deve opment of power, an approval by the Public Utilities Commission, of a conveyance of the first power company's lands, rights, and franchises to a traction company, whether a necessary condition to the conveyance or not, did not impair the second power company's asserted contract right to acquire such lands.
Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of
Suit by the Cuyahoga River Power Company against the Northern Ohio Traction & Light Company and another. From a decree dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction and equity, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.
*The appeal is direct to this court, the laws and Constitution of the United States being asserted to be involved. Upon motion of defendants (appellees) the bill was dismissed for want of jurisdiction and equity. Its allegations, therefore, become necessary to consider.
Plaintiff (appellant) was incorporated as a hydroelectric power company on May 29, 1908, for the purposes specified in the act of the Legislature of Ohio, passed in 1904, and contained in sections 10128 and 10134 of the Ohio General Code of 1910.
The articles of incorporation filed May 29, 1908, with the Secretary of State, specified the streams across which the dams were to be built and maintained; that is, the
streams in controversy, the Big Cuyahoga river and certain of its tributaries.
By said incorporation a contract was duly made and entered into between the state and plaintiff whereby the state granted to plain
tiff a right of way over and along the *Cuyahoga river between the designated termini and a vested right and franchise to construct, maintain, and operate, within the limits of the right of way, a hydroelectric plant for the development of electric current and energy from the waters of the river, together with a right or franchise to exercise the state's power of eminent domain in order to appropriate and acquire property necessary to carry out and perform the grant and make it effective. The grant has not been repealed.
The grants were accepted and are of great value, and upon the faith of that the capital large expenditures and investments made stock of plaintiff was subscribed for, and and obligations incurred, including bonds of the par value of $150,000, and stock to the value of $210,000, all in a large part prior to December, 1910.
June 5, 1908, the plaintiff instituted a suit in the court of proper jurisdiction, to constatutes of Ohio, the parcels of land mendemn or appropriate in accordance with the tioned in the resolution, and the persons owning the same were made parties. The suit was continuously pending until a date subsequent to July 18, 1911, but at the instance and request of one of the owners of the parcels and of the Northern Ohio Traction & Light Company, called the Traction Company, the suit was not pressed for trial against them until January, 1911, up to which date certain negotiations in regard to the improvement of the company were proposed, but finally terminated in the refusal of the owner of the land and the Traction Company to sell the land to plaintiff.
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
On June 4, 1908, plaintiff by its board of directors adopted a specific and detailed plan for the development of the power and sale of the same to the public, and definitely located its proposed improvements for that purpose upon specifically described lands, which had previously been entered upon and surveyed by its engineers, and then and there declared and resolved that the parcels of land were necessary to carry out the purpose of the plaintiff's organization and that it thereby appropriated and demanded them for its corporate purposes. The parcels of land described in the resolution include all that were necessary for the purpose of the corporation, and the location of the improvement so fixed by the resolution was permanent and irrevocable, and conclusive upon plaintiff and all other persons, except as the same might be altered by further act of the
December 20, 1910, pending the suit and [ clusive of all other persons and corporations; negotiations, the landowner executed a deed that such rights and franchises were granted of the lands to the Northern Realty Com- to plaintiff by the state of Ohio under and by pany, conveying to it a fee-simple title. authority of plaintiff's contract with the January 20, 1911, after unsuccessful nego-state, and for the protection of which plaintiations with the Realty Company, plaintiff tiff is entitled to, and claims, the protection instituted another suit for the condemnation of the Constitution of the United States and of the land, which suit was prosecuted in the of the amendments thereof, as well as secprobate court (the court of jurisdiction) and tion 5 of article 13 of the Constitution of the is now pending in the Supreme Court of the state of Ohio. United States, undetermined, to which court it was carried by a writ of error from the Court of Appeals of Ohio.
The effect and result of the Traction Company's use of the designated parcels of land and of the waters of the river is an appropriation by it of the rights and franchises of plaintiff and the deprivation of its property for private use without compensation and without due process of law, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and an impairment of the contract of plaintiff with the state of Ohio within the meaning of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States.
Plaintiff has at all times, and since its incorporation, actively and diligently and in good faith proceeded to carry out and accomplish its corporate purpose.
In April, 1909, the plaintiff amended its res
Prior to January 20, 1911, no location or improvement upon the lands above designated was made for the purpose of utilizing them in the development of power and they were actually employed for no use whatso-olution of June 4, 1908, and enlarged its proever, except a small wooden structure in- posed plant and the output and product tended and occasionally used for dances and thereof and obtained a grant from the state roller skating, a small portion of which over the additional portion or section of the structure was within all of the parcels. Cuyahoga river, so as to carry out the amended plan, and it provides for the utilization of the designated parcels of land necessary to the plaintiff's rights and franchises. (The additional capacity is alleged.)
Between January 31, 1911, and February
The prayer is that plaintiff's rights and franchises be established and adjudged; that the proceedings complained of be decreed a violation of the plaintiff's rights, and of the Constitution of Ohio and the Constitution of the United States, and a taking of its prop(There is an allegation of the capacity of erty without due process of law, and that an the plants which may be omitted. Other injunction be granted against their further allegations in regard to the various compa- exercise, that defendants be required to renies and the powers they possess and do not move the structures and devices already possess also may be omitted. It is only nec- erected upon the lands, or to convey them to essary to say that it is alleged that the Pow- the plaintiff, and that a receiver be appointer Company had not, and the Traction Com-ed to take possession of the lands and struc pany has not, power to use the designated tures. An accounting is also prayed, and lands or the waters of the river to operate general relief. the steam power plant and the hydroelectric plant, or for the development of such powers, and therefore neither company had power to exercise eminent domain for such purposes, though asserting its right and intention to do so, and, if it should do so, it would invade and injure rights of plaintiff, "inflicting upon the plaintiff and the persons interested therein a continuing and irreparable injury, for which there is no adequate remedy at law.")
From and after the time of the adoption of the resolution of June 4, 1908, the designated parcels of land were subjected to plaintiff's public use and its rights and franchises, ex
January 31, 1911, and while the suit above mentioned was pending, the Realty Company conveyed the land, that had been conveyed to
it, to the Northern Ohio Power Company, and the latter company conveyed that and other land which it had acquired, and all of its properties, rights, and franchises, to the Traction Company, and the latter company entered upon the lands, and now holds possession of them and of the improvements
24, 1914, there was erected upon the lands designated a power house and other appliances for the generation of electric current and energy by means of steam power, also a dam, a powerhouse, and other appliances for the generation of electric current and energy by the flow and fall of the waters of the river.
Mr. Carroll G. Walter, of New York City, for appellant.
Messrs. John E. Morley, of Cleveland, Ohio, J. S. Clark, of Philadelphia, Pa., and S. H. Tolles and Thomas H. Hogsett, both of Cleveland, Ohio, for appellees.
*394 *Mr. Justice McKENNA after stating the case as above, delivered the opinion of the Court.
As we have said, a motion was made to dismiss the bill. The grounds of the motion were that there was no jurisdiction in the court, the controversy not arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States,