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BAIL ON SUBSEQUENT PROCESS DURING HEAR-
(D. C. Mass.) 131 Fed. 121, 124, it was found | 3. HABEAS CORPUS 10-PETITIONER GIVING
In re Ballou (D. C. Ky.) 215 Fed. 810, 813, 814; and In re Overholzer (referee's opinion) 23 Am. Bankr. Rep. 10.
The point appears to have been overlooked in Studley v. Boylston Nat. Bank, 200 Fed. 249, 118 C. C. A. 435; Id., 229 U. S. 523, 525, 526, 33 Sup. Ct. 806, 57 L. Ed. 1313. Other cases cited throw no useful light upon the question.
1. CRIMINAL LAW 242(10) — EXTRADITION 37-FUGITIVE FROM ANOTHER STATE OR DISTRICT MAY BE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARBANT, EXCEPT THAT OF THE OTHER DISTRICT. Since a peace officer in the state in which a fugitive from another state is found may arrest the fugitive without warrant and detain him for the reasonable time necessary for requisition proceedings, a marshal of the District of Columbia can arrest there a fugitive indicted in another district on the warrant issued in the other district, which at least would serve as an evidence of reasonable cause to believe a felony had been committed.
Where a petitioner for habeas corpus to review the legality of his arrest to answer an indictment in another district, pending the hearing on the writ, voluntarily gave bail for his appearance in the other district to answer the charge, he cannot be discharged in the habeas
The fact that prisoner is in the custody of the court by virtue of a writ of habeas corpus does not give him immunity from arrest for a different offense or under proceedings for his removal to the district in which he was charged with committing the offense for which he was originally arrested, which proceedings must be brought within a reasonable time after his arrest.
4. HABEAS CORPUS 10-GIVING BAIL FOR
APPEARANCE IN DISTRICT OF OFFENSE TER-
Habeas corpus proceedings to determine the legality of petitioner's arrest without warrant t to answer an indictment in another district are fully terminated by giving bail to answer the charges in that district, which accomplishes the purpose for which the arrest was made and entitles petitioner to release.
5. UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS 4-AU
THORIZED TO RECEIVE FEES AND COMMISSIONS
Since the duties of officers can be prescribed by rule, a United States commissioner is charged with the duty of receiving fees and commissions on applications by land entrymen, to be transmitted to the register and receiver, under Rev. St. § 2294, as amended by Act
March 4, 1904 (Comp. St. § 4546), giving affi
davits before commissioners the same effect as those before the register and receiver, when transmitted to them with the fees and commissions allowed and required by law, and the Land Office rule, directing proof taken by commissioners to be transmitted to the receiver with the necessary fees and commissions.
6. CRIMINAL LAW 242(6)-DOUBTS AS TO INDICTMENT NOT DECIDED BY COMMITTING MAGISTRATE IN PROCEEDINGS FOR REMOVAL.
Doubts as to the validity of an indictment in another district are not to be resolved by the committing magistrate in proceedings for removal to that district, but by the court which found the indictment after the removal.
Appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia.
Habeas corpus proceedings by Leslie C. Stallings against Maurice Splain, United States Marshal in and for the District of Columbia. An order of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, dismissing the petition for habeas corpus, and a petition for certiorari in aid thereof, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the District
2. HABEAS CORPUS 69-DOES NOT GIVE IM- (49 App. D. C. 38, 258 Fed. 510), and petitioner appeals. Affirmed.
MUNITY FROM ARREST ON OTHER PROCESS.
*Mr. William B. Jaynes, of Washington, D. C., for appellant.
Mr. Solicitor General King, for appellee.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Stallings was indicted in the District Court of the United States for the District of For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
 First. The original arrest and detention were lawful. A person, duly charged with a felony in one state, may, if he flees to another, be arrested, without a warrant, by a peace officer in the state in which he is found, and be detained for the reasonable time necessary to enable a requisition to be made. Burton v. New York Central Railroad, 245 U. S. 315, 318, 38 Sup. Ct. 108, 62 L. Ed. 314. See Kurtz v. Muffitt, 115 U. S. 487, 504, 6 Sup. Ct. 148, 29 L. Ed. 458. The rule is not less liberal where the fugitive stands charged by an indictment found in one federal district and flees to another.
Wyoming for embezzling moneys intrusted were without jurisdiction, since he could to him as United States commissioner. not legally be rearrested for the same offense ing in the District of Columbia, he was until the habeas corpus proceeding had been arrested there by Splain, marshal for the disposed of; (b) because the affidavit and District, and was detained to await the the indictment fail to charge a crime against institution of proceedings for his removal. the United States. In making the arrest Splain had relied, not upon a warrant issued by a commissioner for the District, but upon a bench warrant issued to the marshal for the district of Wyoming on the indictment. Stallings filed immediately in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia a petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending, for this reason apparently, that the arrest and detention were illegal. The writ issued, Splain produced the body, the hearing on the writ was postponed, and Stallings was admitted to bail. While he was at large on bail, awaiting a hearing in the habeas corpus proceedings, an affidavit of complaint was filed before a United States commissioner for the District, setting forth the same offenses charged in the indictment. A warrant issued thereon, but Stallings was not arrested. He appeared voluntarily before the commissioner, admitted his identity and that he held the office named at the times the offenses were charged to have been committed, declined to offer any evidence, and moved that he be discharged. The commissioner denied the motion. Then, certified copies of the indictment and other papers having been introduced, he found probable cause. No order was made that Stallings be held to await an application for his removal. He requested that he be admitted to bail for his appearance in Wyoming to answer the charges *against him. The bail was fixed at $2,000 and was furnished.
See 2 Moore on Extradition, § 540. If the bench warrant issued in Wyoming was not effective as a warrant within the District of Columbia, the possession of it did not render illegal an arrest which could lawfully have been made without it. It would, at least, serve as evidence that Splain had reasonable cause to believe that a felony had been committed by Stallings. Commonwealth v. Phelps, 209 Mass. 396, 404, 95 N. E. 868, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 566.
 Second. The pendency of the habeas corpus proceeding did not deprive the commissioner of jurisdiction to entertain the application for arrest on the affidavit of comwrit, brought Stallings before the court, he plaint. When Splain, in obedience to the passed from the custody of the marshal into that of the court, and he remained under its protection and control, although enlarged on bail. Barth v. Clise, 12 Wall. 400, 20 L Ed. 393. But he did not thereby become immune from all other process until the habeas corpus proceedings should have been finally disposed of. Commonwealth v. Hall, 9 Gray (Mass.) 262, 69 Am. Dec. 285. Lack of jurisdiction in the commissioner did not follow from the fact that the court had acquired, by virtue of the habeas corpus proceedings, the custody of and control over Stallings. Even if the affidavit of complaint
After this Splain filed a return to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, setting up the above facts, and Stallings demurred. He also secured, in aid of the habeas corpus proceeding, a writ of certiorari, by which all proceedings before the United States commissioner were certified to the Supreme Court of the District. The case was then heard both upon the demurrer to the petition for writ of habeas corpus and upon the return to the writ of certiorari. The demurrer was overruled; and, Stallings electing | had related to another indictment brought to stand thereon, the court dismissed the in a different district, the commissioner petition for a writ of habeas corpus and would have had jurisdiction to entertain it. discharged the writ issued thereon. The The question would merely have been whethpetition for a writ of certiorari and the writer a second arrest could properly be made issued thereon were also dismissed, and the where it conflicted with the first. Peckham proceedings were remanded to the commis- v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 483, 30 Sup. Ct. 255, sioner for further action. Stallings appealed 54 L. Ed. 579; In re Beavers (D. C.) 125 to the Court of Appeals for the District, Fed. 988; Id. (C. C.) 131 Fed. 366. Here which affirmed the final order below. 49 there could be no conflict; for the second App. D. C. 38, 258 Fed. 510. It is contended arrest, if it had been made, would have been here that Stallings should be discharged: merely for the purpose of carrying out the a) Because the original arrest and detention first. The government was not precluded on the bench warrant were illegal and the from taking such additional proceedings as later proceedings before the commissioner it might deem necessary or advisable to sup
plement or perfect those originally instituted. (8 Fed. 904. And likewise the question whethIf the original arrest was lawful, the deten- er there was a right then to remove him. tion would remain legal only for the reason- Compare Cheong Ah Moy v. United States, 113 U. S. 216, 5 Sup. Ct. 431, 28 L. Ed. 983; Ex parte Baez, 177 U. S. 378, 20 Sup. Ct. 673, 44 L. Ed. 813.
able time required to enable appropriate removal proceedings to be instituted. Unless the lawful arrest was promptly followed by such proceedings, the prisoner would be entitled to his discharge. In the Matter of Fetter, 23 N. J. Law, 311, 321, 57 Am. Dec. 382. On the other hand, if the original arrest and detention had been illegal, Stallings would not be entitled to his discharge, if before final hearing in the habeas corpus proceedings legal cause for detaining him had arisen through the institution of removal proceedings. Where it appears that sufficient ground for detention exists a prisoner will not be discharged for defects in the original arrest or commitment. Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, 12 Sup. Ct. 336, 35 L. Ed. 1146; Iasigi v. Van de Carr, 166 U. S. 391, 17 Sup. Ct. 595, 41 L. Ed. 1045; Kelly v. Griffin, 241 U. S. 6, 13, 36 Sup. Ct. 487, 60 L. Ed. 861.
 Fourth. Stallings' contention that he should be discharged, because the indictment failed to charge a crime under the laws of the United States, is also unfounded. He was indicted under section 97 of the Penal Code, which declares that any officer of the United States who shall embezzle any money which may have come into his possession in the execution of such office or under claim of authority as such officer shall be punished. The indictment charges Stallings with having received as commissioner divers sums of money from persons named, to be paid over to the receiver of the land office at Cheyenne, and embezzling the same. It is contended that the money could not have been received as commissioner for transmission, because it is not among the statutory duties of a
 Third. The admission to bail by the commissioner to answer the indictment in the district of Wyoming was upon his own request on advice of counsel. When this bail was given no application had been made to the court for his removal, and there had not even been an order of the commissioner that he be held to await such application. He ceased, therefore, to be in the position ordinarily occupied by one who is contesting the validity of his detention and who has been released on bail pending the habeas corpus proceeding. Sibray v. United States, 185 Fed. 401, 107 C. C. A. 483. Stallings' position was thereafter no better than if he had applied for the writ after he had given bail. It is well settled that under such circumstances a petitioner is not entitled to be discharged on habeas corpus. Respublica v. Arnold, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 263; Dodge's Case, 6 Mart. O. S. (La.) 569; State v. Buyck, 1 Brev. (S. C.) 460. Being no longer under actual restraint within the District of Columbia he was not entitled to the writ of habeas corpus. Wales v. Whitney, 114 U. S. 564, 5 Sup. Ct. 1050, 29 L. Ed.
(40 Sup. Ct.)
 Furthermore by voluntarily giving bail to appear in Wyoming, the purpose of the removal proceedings had been accomplished, and all questions in controversy in the habeas corpus and in the removal proceedings ter
#344 minated. Whether his arrest and detention had originally been valid was thereby rendered immaterial. In re Esselborn (C. C.)
commissioner. But section 2294 of the Revised Statutes, as amended by Act March 4, 1904, c. 394, 33 Stat. 59 (Comp. St. § 4546), provides that, where applicants for the benefit of the homestead and other land laws make the required affidavits before commissioners of the United States, the proof so made shall have the same effect as if made before the register and receiver, "when transmitted to them with the fees and commissions allowed and required by law." The circular issued by the Land Office in 1905 (33 Land Dec. 480, 481), containing "Suggestions to United States Commissioners," etc., directs that the proofs so taken be "transmitted to the register and receiver with the necessary fees and commissions." And the circular issued in 1915 (44 Land Dec. 350, 352) directs that in "no case should the transmittal thereof be left to the claim. ant."
 Duties of an officer may be prescribed by rule. If the validity of the indictment
was open to reasonable doubt, it was to be resolved, not by the committing magistrate, but, after the removal, by the court which found the indictment. Beavers V. Henkel, 194 U. S. 73, 83, 24 Sup. Ct. 605, 48 L. Ed. 882; Benson v. Henkel, 198 U. S. 1, 10, 11, 12, 25 Sup. Ct. 569, 49 L. Ed. 919; Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 481, 30 Sup. Ct. 249, 54 L. Ed. 569, 17 Ann. Cas. 1112.
1 Comp. St. § 10265.
§ 1404); section 844, R. S. (Comp. St. § 1414).
*Messrs. George T. Buckingham and Marquis Eaton, both of Chicago, Ill., for defendants in error.
*The controversy originated by a suit commenced by the United States against the defendants in error as clerk of the District Court of the United States for the Northern District
of Illinois, Eastern Division, and the surety on his official bond to recover $3,861.05. The right to the relief was based upon averments that during the period from December 27, 1905, to January 27, 1910, the clerk had collected the sum named as interest on the average daily balances of his bank accounts resulting from the deposit by him of the fees and emoluments of his office and of moneys placed by litigants with him to meet payments for costs or otherwise which they might lawfully be required to make during the course of the litigation.
It was further alleged that although the interest thus received constituted a fee or emolument of the office of the clerk, or money held in trust by him for the United States, for the receipt of which he was bound by law semiannually to account, he had failed to do so and was therefore liable.
By plea the defendants admitted the col
lection by the clerk of the amount sued for as interest on the average daily balances of his bank accounts made up as alleged of moneys derived from fees and emoluments and deposits by litigants under the rules or orders of court. The plea averred that, as required by law, the clerk had made his semiannual accountings in which, although he did not charge himself with the interest allowed him on his bank balances as stated, he had charged himself with every item constituting a fee or emolument of his office from whatever source due, and after debiting the charge thus made with the proper proportion of his salary and the expenses of his office, had turned the balance, if any there was, into the Treasury of the United States. There was annexed to the plea a copy of the rules of court relating to the placing by litigants of money with the clerk, and the plea alleged that whenever, out of such money, any
*charge whether for a fee or emolument or otherwise became due, it was at once paid,
Mr. Chief Justice WHITE delivered the so that the amount of that deposit always opinion of the Court. solely represented money belonging to and held for the account of the depositing litigant to meet payments due by him which might thereafter arise.
The relation of the United States to moneys alleged to have been collected by a clerk of a District Court of the United States as fees or emoluments of his office and To this plea the United States demurred the scope of his duty to account semi- as stating no defense and, after hearing, its annually for the same to the Attorney Gen- demurrer was overruled. 209 Fed. 266. In eral so as to fix, if any there was, the surplus consequence of an election by the United due to the United States after paying the ex- States to plead no further, the case was subpenses of the clerk's office and the clerk's sal-mitted for judgment on the petition and plea. ary as fixed by law, is the general subject At that time the court had under advisehere arising for consideration. Section 833, ment eight other cases involving the quesR. S. (Comp. St. § 1394); Act June 28, 1902, 32 tions arising in this, five being suits by the Stat. 475, 476; section 839, R. S. (Comp. St. United States against the clerks of other
For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes
United States courts and three, in addition | terest was allowed him were public moneys to this, being against the clerk who is defendant here, covering interest collected for different periods. The court disposed of the nine cases in one opinion. It held that as there was no contention as to a default by the clerk concerning any money deposited with him by litigants, that subject would be put out of view. Carefully considering the pleadings, it held that the claim of the United States to the interest rested upon one or
of the United States, thus entitling the United States to the interest as an increment of its ownership. That it was not is so completely foreclosed as to cause it to be only necessary to consider the previous ruling on the subject.
In United States v. Mason, 218 U. S. 517, 31 Sup. Ct. 28, 54 L. Ed. 1133, the court was called upon to determine the validity of the #202 action of a *Circuit Court of the United States
the other of two propositions: (1) That the money deposited by the clerk and upon which the interest was allowed was public moneys of the United States and therefore the interest belonged to the United States; (2) that without reference to whether the deposits were public moneys, the interest paid was an emolument for which the clerk was bound to account. Elaborately considering these questions the court decided both against the
in quashing three indictments against the clerk of a Circuit Court of the United States for the "embezzlement of certain moneys of the United States," which moneys were a portion of the surplus of fees and emoluments of his office over and above the compensation and allowances authorized by law to be retained by him. The indictments were based, and the sole reliance to sustain them and thus
reverse the court below was rested, upon sections 5490 and 5497, Revised Statutes (Comp. St. §§ 10257, 10264), with the amendments made by Act Feb. 3, 1879, c. 42 (20 Stat. 280 [Comp. St. § 10265]), each of which sections exclusively dealt with embezzlement of "public moneys." Whether, therefore, the particular moneys which were there in question, being derived from fees and emoluments of the clerk, were public moneys required necessarily to be decided. Reviewing historically the legislation covering clerks of courts of the United States which had been previously recapitulated in United States v. Hill, 120 U. S. 169, 7 Sup. Ct. 510, 30 L. Ed. 627, it was pointed out, first, that originally clerks of
Reviewing on error one of the cases against this defendant which was decided, as we have seen, by the trial court along with this, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a brief per curiam opinion in which it approved the analysis of the case as made by the trial court and concurred in
holding decisive the cases in this *court which the trial court relied upon. Subsequently when the case now before us came to be heard the ruling in the case just stated was applied to this and the judgment was therefore also affirmed.
In argument here it is suggested by the courts were not salaried, but were remuneratUnited States that as the defendant clerked by the right to collect and retain establishwas by exceptional legislation an officer ed fees and emoluments and that under such whose salary was specifically appropriated legislation the sums collected by the clerks for (Act July 31, 1894, 28 Stat. 162, 204; Act were in no sense public moneys of the United March 2, 1895, 28 Stat. 764, 806; Act Aug. 24, States, but were moneys of the clerks held by 1912, 37 Stat. 417, 465), therefore the princi- them in their personal capacity in payment ples passed upon below are not necessarily for their official services. decisive. But aside from the disregard of the admissions resulting from the pleadings which the suggestion involves and the entire absence of even an intimation that such a contention was raised in either of the courts below, we put the belated suggestion out of view, since as it is not disputed that the defendant clerk was under obligation to meet the expenses of his office from the fees and emoluments thereof and to pay over to the United States only the surplus resulting, we think the distinction assumed to arise from "The plain object of this statute was to limit the proposition stated makes no difference the amount which the clerk was to retain and in the application of the principles which the to require an accounting, an audit of expenses, court below held to be conclusive and the and a payment of the surplus. Otherwise the soundness of which we are now therefore re-established method of administering the office quired to pass upon. was not changed. The fees were to be recovered as theretofore; and to the extent of the amount of the fixed compensation of the he was entitled to use and to pay as formerly. clerk and the necessary expenses of his office, The statute suggests no other course. What, if anything, should be paid into the public treasury at the end of the half year, when
 As we agree with the lower court that the two propositions decided by the trial court embraced the whole case, we are thus brought, first, to determine whether the fees and emoluments collected by the clerk and deposited by him in bank and upon which in
Coming to state the evolution in the situation by which in time it came to pass that a limit was placed on the amount of compensation which a clerk should annually receive and consequently making it his duty to account for his fees and emoluments and to turn over to the United States the surplus, if any, remaining after the payment of his compensation and the expenses of his office, the court observed (218 U. S. 523, 524, 31 Sup. Ct. 31, 54 L. Ed. 1133):