(40 Sup.Ct.) (253 U. S. 495) No. 912. Joseph BIVENS, Sr., petitioner, v. UNITED TIMBER CORPORATION. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 308. Messrs. Julian Mitchell, of Charleston, S. C., Thomas M. Boulware, of Barnwell, S. C., and Charles A. Douglas and Hugh H. Obear, both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Messrs. Legare Walker, of Summerville, S. C., and L. D. Lide, of Marion, S. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 495) No. 913. Joseph BIVENS, Sr., petitioner, v. UNITED TIMBER CORPORATION. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 308. Messrs. Julian Mitchell, of Charleston, S. C., Thomas M. Boulware, of Barnwell, S. C., and Charles A. Douglas and Hugh H. Obear, both of Washington, D. C., for petitioner. Messrs. Legare Walker, of Summerville, S. C., and L. D. Lide, of Marion, S. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 495) No. 919. Orville ANDERSON, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 75. Messrs. Joe Kirby, Joe H. Kirby and Thos. H. Kirby, all of Sioux Falls, S. D. for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 495) No. 925. Day AMMERMAN, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 262 Fed. 124. Mr. Robert S. Morrison, of Denver, Colo., (Messrs. O. N. Hilton, of Denver, Colo., John E. Kelley and Caesar A. Roberts and Leslie M. Roberts, both of Denver, Colo., of counsel), for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Mr. Raymond S. Norris, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 482) No. 926. EUGENE SOL LOUIE, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 264 Fed. 295. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted. (253 U. S. 482) No. 932. JOHN SIMMONS COMPANY, petitioner, v. The GRIER BROTHERS COMPANY. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 265 Fed. 481. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit granted. (253 U. S. 496) No. 940. John WHITE, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 17. Mr. G. F. Eshenroder, of Sandusky, Ohio, for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, and Mr. W. C. Herron, of Washington, D. C., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 496) No. 942. ETNA LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, v. Walter N. BRAND. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 265 Fed. 6. Messrs. Stewart F. Hancock and William H. Foster, both of Syracuse, N. Y., for petitioner. Messrs. Louis L. Waters and David F. Costello, both of Syracuse, N. Y. for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 496) No. 945. W. B. TREDWELL, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 266 Fed. 350. Messrs. H. L. Lowry and Harry K. Wolcott, both of Norfolk, Va., for petitioner. Mr. Robert P. Stewart, Asst. Atty. Gen., and W. C. Herron, of Washington, D. C., for the United States. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 496) No. 946. Mary L. Greer CONKLIN, appellant, v. The AUGUSTA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING COMPANY. June 7, 1920. Mary L. Greer Conklin, of Augusta, Ga., in pro. per. Petition for a writ of certiorari herein denied. (253 U. S. 497) No. 947. George E. VANDENBURGH, petitioner, V. ELECTRIC WELDING COMPANY. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 95. Messrs. E. A. Lawrence, of Pittsburgh, Pa., and Carlos P. Griffin, of San Francisco, Cal., for petitioner. Mr. Frederick W. Winter, of Pittsburgh, Pa., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 496) No. 928. COMMERCIAL CREDIT COM- (253 U. S. 497) No. 949. G. SANDAA, Master and Claimant, et al., petitioners, v. The UNITED STATES of America et al. June 7. 1920. For opinion below, see 265 Fed. 921. Messrs. Henry H. Little and Leon T. Seawell, both of Norfolk, Va. (Messrs. Hughes, Little & Seawell, of Norfolk, Va., of counsel) for petitioners. Mr. Thomas J. Spellacy, Asst. Atty. Gen. and Messrs. J. Frank Staley and James W. Ryan, Special Assts. Atty. Gen. for respondents. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United (253 U. S. 497) No. 957. PECK, STOW & WILCOX COMPANY, petitioner, v. The H. D. SMITH & COMPANY. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 262 Fed. 415. Messrs. Frederick P. Fish, of Boston, Mass., and Harrie E. Hart. of Hartford, Conn., for petitioner. Messrs. Archibald Cox. of New York City, and Henry E. Rockwell, of New Haven, Conn., for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 497) No. 959. Thomas PENNACCHIO, petitioner, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 66. Mr. John B. Golden, of New York City, for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 497) No. 960. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, v. HAGEMEYER TRADING COMPANY; and No. 961. ST. PAUL FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, petitioner, v. Hugo A. THOMSEN et al. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 266 Fed. 14. Messrs. D. Roger Englar and Oscar R. Houston, both of New York City, for petitioner. Mr. Van Vechten Veeder, of New York City, for respondents. Petition for writs of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 498) No. 965. ROXFORD KNITTING PANY, petitioner, v. MOORE & TIERNEY (Inc.). June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 265 Fed. 177. Mr. Walter S. Hilborn, of New York City (Mr. David J. Gallert, of New York City, of counsel), for petitioner. Mr. Thos. O'Connor, of Waterford, N. Y., (Mr. George E. O'Connor, of Waterford, N. Y., of counsel), for respondent. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 498) No. 966. ROXFORD KNITTING COMPANY, petitioner, V. WILLIAM MOORE KNITTING COMPANY. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 265 Fed. 177. Mr. Walter S. Hilborn, of New York City, for petitioner. Petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit denied. (253 U. S. 498) No. 971. Pete MORGAN, petitioner, v. The STATE OF LOUISIANA. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 84 South. 589. Messrs. R. E. Milling, of New Orleans, La., Allan Sholars, of Monroe, La., W. J. Hammon, of Jonesboro, La., and J. B. Roberts, of Colfax, La., for petitioner. Petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana denied. No. 970. AMERICAN COLUMN & LUMBER COMPANY et al., appellants, v. The UNITED STATES of America. June 7, 1920. For opinion below, see 263 Fed. 147. Motion for an order staying or superseding during the pendency of this appeal of a part of the final decree of the district court herein denied. | *407 *Mr. Justice CLARKE (dissenting). I concur in the first seven paragraphs and in the tenth paragraph of the announced "ConCOM-clusions" of the Court, but I dissent from the remaining three paragraphs. The eighth, ninth and eleventh paragraphs, taken together, in effect, declare the Volstead Act (41 Stat. 305) to be the supreme law of the land-paramount to any state law with which it may conflict in any respect. Such a result, in my judgment, can be arrived at only by reading out of the second section of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution the word "concurrent," as it is used in the grant to Congress and the several states of "concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." This important word, which the record of Congress shows was introduced, with utmost deliberation, to give accurate expression to a very definite purpose, can be read out of the Constitution only by violating the sound and wise rule of constitutional construction early announced and often applied by this Court that in expounding the Constitution of the United States no word in it can be rejected as superfluous or unmeaning, but effect must be given to every word to the extent that this is reasonably possible. This rule was first announced in 1824 in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. Ed. 23; (40 Sup.Ct.) The authoritative dictionaries, general and law, and the decided cases, agree, that "concurrent" means "joint and equal authority," "running together, having the same authority," and therefore the grant of concurrent power to the Congress and the states should it was applied with emphasis in 1840 in [tracts and agreements between states, which Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540, 570, 10 L. without it would be unconstitutional and The Wilson Act of 1890 (Comp. St. Ed. 579; and in the recent case of Knowlton void. v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 Sup. Ct. 747, 44 L. § 8738), the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913 (Comp. Ed. 969, it is referred to as an elementary St. § 8739), and the Reed Amendment of canon of constitutional construction. 1917 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 8739a, 10387a-10387c), are familiar examples of co-operative legislation on the Other insubject of intoxicating liquors. stances could readily be supplied. When to this we add that the Volstead Act is obviously in very large part a compilation from the prohibition codes of various states and is supposed to contain what is best in each of them, there is every reason to believe that if concurrent legislation were insisted upon, the act would be promptly approved by the Legislatures of many of the states and would thereby become the concurrent law of the state and nation throughout a large part of the Union. *408 give to each equal, the same, *authority to rejected by Congress (Cong. Rec. July 30, Such a construction should not be given the Amendment if it can reasonably be avoided, as it very clearly may be, I think, with a resultant giving of a large and beneficent effect to the grant, as it is written. Giving to the word "concurrent" its usual and authoritative meaning would result in congressional legislation under this grant of power being effective within the boundaries of any state only when concurred in by action of Congress and of such state, which, however, could readily be accomplished by the approval by either of the legislation of the other or by the adoption of identical legislation by both. Such legislation would be concurrent in fact and in law, and could be enforced by the courts and officers of either the nation or the state, thereby insuring a more general and satisfactory observance of it than could possibly be obtained by the federal authorities alone. It would, to a great extent, relieve Congress of the burden and the general government of the odium to be derived from the antagonism which would certainly spring from enforcing within states federal laws which must touch the daily life of the people very intimately and often very irritatingly. *409 *Such co-operation in legislation is not unfamiliar to our Constitution or in our practical experience. By section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United States the states are deprived of power to do many things without the consent of Congress, and that consent has frequently been given, especially to con Under this construction, which I think should be given the Amendment, there would large scope also for its operation even in states which might refuse to concur in congressional legislation for its enforcement. In nry judgment the law in such a state would be as if no special grant of concurrent power for the enforcement of the first section had been made in the second section, but, nevertheless, the first section, prohibiting the manufacture, sale, transportation, importation or exportation, of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes, would be the supreme law of the land within the nonconcurring states and they would be powerless to license, tax, or otherwise recognize as lawful anything violating that section, so that any state law in form attempting such recognition would be unconstitutional and void. Congress would have full power under the interstate com *410 merce clause, and it would be its duty, to Doubtless such a construction as I am pro- quire the eye of a seer to see contention at | Fourteenth Amendment which would have the bar of this Court against liberal, para- radically changed the whole constitutional mount, congressional definition of intoxicat- theory of the relations of our state and ing liquors as strenuous and determined as federal governments by transferring to the that which we have witnessed over the strict general government that police power, definition of the Volstead Act. through the exercise of which the people of With respect to the eleventh conclusion of the various states theretofore regulated their the Court, it is enough to say that it ap- local affairs in conformity with the widely proves as valid a definition of liquor as in- differing standards of life, of conduct and of toxicating which is expressly admitted not duty which must necessarily prevail in a counto be intoxicating in each of the cases in try of so great extent as ours, with its variewhich it is considered. This is deemed war- ties of climate, of industry and of habits of ranted, I suppose, as legislation appropriate the people. But this Court, resisting the to the enforcement of the first section and pressure of the passing hour, maintained the precedent is found for it in prohibition legis- integrity of state control over local affairs lation by states. But I cannot agree that to the extent that it had not been deliberatethe prohibition of the manufacture, sale, etc., ly and clearly surrendered to the general govof intoxicating liquors in the first section of ernment, in a number of decisions which came the Eighteenth Amendment gives that ple- to command the confidence even of the gennary power over the subject which the Legis-eration active when they were rendered and latures of the states derive from the people which have been regarded by our succeeding or which may be derived from the war generation as sound and wise and highly fortunate for our country. *411 powers of the Constitution. Believing, as I do, that the scope of the first section cannot constitutionally be enlarged by the language contained in the second section, I dissent from this conclusion of the Court. In the Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall 36, 21 L. Ed. 394, and other cases, this Court was urged to give a construction to the The cases now before us seem to me to again present questions of like character to, and of not less importance than, those which were presented in those great cases, and I regret profoundly that I cannot share in the disposition which the majority of my Associates think should be made of them. END OF CASES IN VOL. 40. CASES CITED Abbott Bros. v. U. S., 242 Fed. 751, 339 Page 155 C. C. A. 292 127 Abraham v. Ordway, 158 U. S. 416, 420, 15 Sup. .211, 263 151 Adams v. New York, 192 U. S. 585, 24 Sup. Ct. 372, 48 L. Ed. 575.. 183 Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662, 61 L. Ed. 1336, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973... Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. Sup. Ct. 148, 57 L. Ed. 314, 44 L. R. A. 257 478 491, 33 (N. S.) Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S. 194, .70, 505 Sup. Ct. 305, 41 L. Ed. 683; 560 302 63 Sup. Ct. 96, 44 L. Ed. 136.. Adirondack R. Co. v. New York, 176 U. S. 335, 349, 20 Sup. Ct. 460, 44 L. Ed. 492. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U. S. 76, 91, 11 Sup. Ct. 720, 35 L. Ed. 371.. Aktieselskabet Korn-Og Foderstof Kompagniet v. Rederiaktiebolaget Atlanten, D. C., 232 Fed. 403; 250 Fed. 935, 163 C. C. A. 185, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 491... 87 333 Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206, 26 Sup. Ct. 161, 50 L. Ed. 441, Ann. Cas. 1147... 53, 61, Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. Alaska, 249 U. S. 255 366 American Diamond Drill Co. v. Sullivan Mach. Co. (C. C.) 32 Fed. 552; 131 U. S. 428, 9 Sup. 548 American Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U. S. 617, 37 150 215 856 518 577 232 American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 221 U. S. 106, 31 443 383 286 Page Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. O'Connor, 223 U. S. 280, 37 254 521 404 Austin v. The Aldermen, 7 Wall. 694, 699, 19 L. 554 370 132 65 Babbitt v. Dutcher, 216 U. S. 102, 113, 30 Sup. Ct. 536 853.. 513 Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169 U. 539 173 71 7 Balbas v. U. S., 257 Fed. 17, 168 C. C. A. 229... 266 384 Ball v. Halsell, 161 U. S. 72, 82, 84, 16 Sup. Ct. 46 Co., No. 1, 191 U. S. 373, 24 Sup. Ct. 92, 48 L. Ball Engineering Co. v. J. G. White & Co., 250 404 256 Anthony v. Jillson, 83 Cal. 296, 23 Pac. 419..... Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 579, 589-591, 60 Bank of Newport v. Cook, 60 Ark. 288, 30 S. W. 40 SUP.CT. (591) |