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(40 Sup.Ct.)

ployers' Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400, 39 | pation of the field by Congress, which excluded Sup. Ct. 553, 63 L. Ed. 1058; Bowersock v. state action and rendered valid a telegraph Smith, 243 U. S. 29, 34, 37 Sup. Ct. 371, 61 L. company's contract limiting to a refund of the Ed. 572. It is said that legislation cannot price for transmission any liability on account of an unrepeated message, despite the state's prohibition of a contract against liability for negligence.

*56

*change the standard of conduct, which is matter of law in its nature into matter of fact, and this may be conceded; but the material element in the constitutional enact

On Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme

ment is not that it called contributory negli-
gence fact but that it left it wholly to the
jury. There is nothing, however, in the Con-
stitution of the United States or its Amend-
ments that requires a State to maintain the
line with which we are familiar between the
functions of the jury and those of the Court.
It may do away with the jury altogether,
Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90, 23 L. Ed.
678; modify its constitution, Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U. S. 581, 20 Sup. Ct. 448, 494, 44 L. Ed.
597; the requirements of a verdict, Minne-
apolis & St. Louis R. R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 both of Jackson, Miss., for petitioner.

Court of the State of Mississippi.

Action by the Warren-Godwin Lumber Company against the Postal Telegraph-Cable Company. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Mississippi, which reversed, and entered judgment for plaintiff (116 Miss. 660, 77 South. 601), and defendant brings certiorari. Judgment of the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed, and cause remanded for further proceedings.

U. S. 211, 36 Sup. Ct. 595, 60 L. Ed. 961, L.
R. A. 1917A, 86, Ann. Cas. 1916E, 505; or the
procedure before it, Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78, 111, 29 Sup. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97;
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U. S. 309, 340, 35 Sup.
Ct. 582, 59 L. Ed. 969. As it may confer leg-
islative and judicial powers upon a commis-
sion not known to the common law, Prentis
v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29
Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150; it may confer
larger powers upon a jury than those that
generally prevail. Provisions making the jury
judges of the law as well as of the facts in
proceedings for libel are common to England
and some of the States, and the controversy
with regard to their powers in matters of law
more generally as illustrated in Sparf v.
United States, 156 U. S. 51, 715, 15 Sup. Ct.
273, 39 L. Ed. 343, and Georgia v. Brailsford,
3 Dall. 1, 4, 1 L. Ed. 483, shows that the no-
tion is not a novelty. In the present instance
the plaintiff in error cannot complain that
its chance to prevail upon a certain ground
is diminished when the ground might have
been altogether removed.
Judgment affirmed.

(251 U. S. 27)

POSTAL TELEGRAPH-CABLE CO. v.

WARREN-GODWIN LUMBER

CO.

Messrs. Ellis B. Cooper and J. N. Flowers,

Mr. Wm. D. Anderson, of Tupelo, Miss., for respondent.

Mr. Chief Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.

In Primrose v. Western Union Telegraph

Company, 154 U. S. 1, 14 Sup. Ct. 1098, 38 L. Ed. 883, the court passed upon the validity of a contract made by a telegraph company with the sender of a message by which, in case the message was missent, the liability of the company was limited to a refunding of the price paid for sending it, unless, as a means of guarding against mistake, the repeating of the message from the office to which it was directed to the office of origin was secured by the payment of an additional sum. It was held that such a contract was not one exempting the company from *liability for its negligence, but was merely a reasonable condition appropriately adjusting the charge for the service rendered to the duty and responsibility exacted for its performance. Such a contract was therefore decided to be valid and the right to recover for error in transmitting a message which was sent subject to it was accordingly limited.

*28

In Western Union Telegraph Company v. Showers, 112 Miss. 411, 73 South. 276, the Supreme Court of that state was called upon to consider the validity of a contract by a telegraph company limiting its responsibility

(Argued and Submitted Nov. 17, 1919. Decided for missending an unrepeated message es

Dec. 8, 1919.)
No. 91.

COMMERCE 8(7)-FEDERAL REGULATION OF
TELEGRAPH LINES EXCLUDES STATE LAWS AS
TO LIMITING LIABILITY.

Act Cong. June 18, 1910, was an assertion by Congress of its authority to bring under federal control the interstate business of telegraph companies, and therefore was an occu

sentially like the contract which was considered and upheld in the Primrose Case. The court decided that as the Act of Congress of June 18, 1910, c. 309, 36 Stat. 539, 545, had operated to exert the power of Congress over telegraph companies as to their interstate business and contracts, Congress had taken possession of the field and thus excluded state legislation and hence such a contract was valid and enforcible in accord

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

ance with the rule laid down in the Primrose U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct. 148, 57 L. Ed. 314, 44 Case. In holding this, however, the court L. R. A. (N. S.) 257; Western Union Telepointed out that but for the act of Congress graph Company v. Brown, 234 U. S. 542, 34 a different rule would apply, as under the state law such a contract was invalid because it was a stipulation by a carrier limiting its liability for its negligence.

In Dickerson v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 114 Miss. 115, 74 South. 779, the validity of a like contract by a telegraph company for the sending of an unrepeated message once again arose for consideration. In passing upon it the court declared that the ruling previously made in the Showers Case, as to the operation of the act of Congress of 1910, was erroneous. Coming therefore anew to reconsider that subject, it was held that the act of Congress of 1910 had not extended the power of Congress over the rates of telegraph companies for interstate business and the contracts made by them as to such

*30

Sup. Ct. 955, 58 L. Ed. 1457), but content *ourselves with saying that we are of opinion that the effect which was given to them was a mistaken one. We come at once therefore to state briefly the reasons why we conclude that the court below mistakenly limited the act of Congress of 1910 and why therefore its judgment was erroneous.

In the first place, as it is apparent on the face of the act of 1910 that it was intended to control telegraph companies by the act to regulate commerce, we think it clear that the act of 1910 was designed to and did subject such companies as to their interstate business to the rule of equality and uniformity of rates which it was manifestly the dominant purpose of the act to regulate commerce to establish, a purpose which would be wholly destroyed if, as held by the court below, the subject, and hence the *Showers Case, in so validity of contracts made by telegraph comfar as it held to the contrary, was overruled. panies as to their interstate commerce busiThus removing the contract from the opera-ness continued to be subjected to the control tion of the national law and bringing it of divergent and it may be conflicting local under the state law, the court held that the contract was void and not susceptible of being enforced because it was a mere contract exempting the telegraph company from the consequences of its negligence.

$29

The case before us involving the extent of the liability of the Telegraph Company for an unrepeated interstate message governed by a contract like those considered in the previous cases, was decided by a state circuit court after the decision in the Showers Case and before the overruling of that case by the Dickerson Case. Presumably therefore the court, because of the Showers decision upheld the validity of the contract and accordingly limited the recovery. The appeal which took the case to the court below, however, was there heard after the decision in the Dickerson Case. In view of that situation the court below in disposing of the case expressly declared that the only issue which was open was the correctness of the ruling in the Dickerson Case, limiting the operation and effect of the act of Congress of June 18, 1910. Disposing of that issue, the ruling in the Dickerson Case was reiterated and the contract, although it concerned the transmission of an interstate message, was declared not affected by the act of Congress and to be solely controlled by the state law and to be therefore void. That subject, presents then, the only federal question, and indeed the only question in the case.

For the sake of brevity, we do not stop to review the cases which perturbed the mind of the court below in the Dickerson Case as to the correctness of its ruling in the Showers Case (Pennsylvania R. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477, 24 Sup. Ct. 132, 48 L. Ed. 268; Western Union Telegraph Company v. Crovo, 220 U. S. 346, 31 Sup. Ct. 399, 55 L. Ed. 498; Adams Express Company v. Croninger, 226

laws.

In the second place, as in terms the act empowered telegraph companies to establish reasonable rates, subject to the control which the act to regulate commerce exerted, it follows that the power thus given, limited of course by such control, carried with it the primary authority to provide a rate for unrepeated telegrams and the right to fix a reasonable limitation of responsibility where such rate was charged, since as pointed out in the Primrose Case the right to contract on such subject was embraced within the grant of the primary rate-making power.

In the third place, as the act expressly provided that the telegraph, telephone or cable messages to which it related may be "classified into day, night, repeated, unrepeated, letter, commercial, press, government and such other classes as are just and reasonable and different rates may be charged for the different classes of messages," it would seem unmistakably to draw under the federal

*31

control the very power which the construction given below to the act necessarily excluded from such control. Indeed, the conclusive force of this view is made additionally cogent when it is considered that as pointed out by the Interstate Commerce Commission (Clay County Produce Company v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 44 Interst. Com. R. 670), from the very inception of the telegraph business, or at least for a period of 40 years before 1910, the unrepeated message was one sent under a limited rate and subject to a limited responsibility of the character of the one here in contest.

But we need pursue the subject no further, since, if not technically authoritatively controlled, it is in reason persuasively settled by the decision of the Interstate Commerce Com

(40 Sup.Ct.)

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 303 - ENFORCE

MENT OF RATE FOR CARRIER BY PENALTIES
NOT A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

Where a common carrier is afforded op-
portunity to test the validity of a prescribed
rate in an appropriate judicial proceeding be-
fore any liability for penalties attaches, and
the rate is adjudged valid, or the carrier fails
ble for the state, so far as due process is con-
to avail itself of the opportunity, it is permissi-
cerned, to enforce adherence to the rate by
imposing substantial penalties for deviation.
3. EVIDENCE 20(2)-JUDICIAL NOTICE OF

mission in dealing in the case above cited | of law, where no adequate opportunity is affordwith the very question here under considera- ed the carrier to test safely, in an appropriate tion as the result of the power conferred by judicial proceeding, the validity of the ratethe act of Congress of 1910; by the careful that is, to determine whether it is confiscatory opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the or otherwise before any liability for the penalties attaches. Eighth Circuit dealing with the same subject (Gardiner v. Western Union Telegraph Com-2. pany, 231 Fed. 405, 145 C. C. A. 399); and by the numerous and conclusive opinions of state courts of last resort which in considering the act of 1910 from various points of view reached the conclusion that that act was an exertion by Congress of its authority to bring under federal control the interstate business of telegraph companies and therefor was an occupation of the field by Congress which excluded state action (Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bank of Spencer, 53 Okl. 398, 156 Pac. 1175; Haskell Implement Co. v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 114 Me. 277, 96 Atl. 219; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Bilisoly, 116 Va. 562, 82 S. E. 91; Bailey v. Western Union Tel. Co., 97 Kan. 619, 156 Pac. 716; Durre v. Western Tel. Co., 165 Wis. 190, 161 N. W. 755; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Schade, 137 Tenn. 214, 192 S. W. 924; Meadows v. Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 173 N. C. 240, 91 S. E. 1009; Norris v. Western Union Tel. Co., 174 N. C. 92, 93 S. E. 465; Bateman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 174 N. C. 97, 93 S. E. 467, L. R. A. 1918A, 803; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lee,

*32

174 *Ky. 210, 192 S. W. 70, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 1026; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 224 Mass. 365, 113 N. E. 192; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hawkins, 14 Ala. App. 295, 70 South. 12).

It is indeed true that several state courts of last resort have expressed conclusions concerning the act of Congress applied by the court below in this case. But we do not stop to review or refer to them as we are of opinion that the error in the reasoning upon which they proceed is pointed out by what we have said and by the authorities to which we have just referred.

It follows that the judgment below was erroneous, and it must be reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings, not inconsistent with this opinion.

And it is so ordered.

Mr. Justice PITNEY dissents.

(251 U. S. 63)

ST. LOUIS, I. M. & S. RY. CO. v. WIL-
LIAMS et al.

METHOD FOR CARRIER TO SECURE RELIEF FROM
CONFISCATORY RATE.

that, if a common carrier really regarded as
The Supreme Court has judicial knowledge
confiscatory a rate prescribed by the state, the
way was open to it to secure determination of
the question by a suit in equity against the
Railroad Commission of the state, during pen-
dency of which operation of the penalty provi-
sion of the rate statute could have been suspend-
ed by injunction.

4. CARRIERS 20(4)-PENAL CHARACTER OF

RATE ENFORCEMENT STATUTE.

A state statute subjecting a common carrier, for every offense of demanding or collecting a greater rate than prescribed, to a penalty of not less than $50 nor more than $300 and costs, is essentially penal in such provision, though the penalty goes to the aggrieved passenger, and is to be enforced by private suit, being intended primarily to punish the carrier for taking more than the prescribed rate.

5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 303-RECOVERY OF PENALTY BY PASSENGER FROM RATE BREAKING CARRIER.

It is not contrary to due process of law that a state statute, intended to enforce adherence to prescribed rates by common carriers, provides that a penalty recoverable by private suit shall go to the aggrieved passenger, and not the state. 6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 303 PENALTY

FOR RATE BREAKING BY CARRIER NOT CON-
TRARY TO DUE PROCESS.

To avoid violation of the constitutional requirement of due process, it is not necessary that a state statute, giving an aggrieved passenger the right to recover by private suit a penalty from a carrier which has not adhered to a prescribed rate, should confine or proportion the penalty to the passenger's loss or damages. It being imposed as punishment for a violation of public law, the Legislature may adjust its

(Argued Nov. 11, 1919. Decided Dec. 8, 1919.) amount to the public wrong rather than the pri

No. 66.

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

303-IMPOSITION OF PENALTY ON CARRIER TO ENFORCE RATE AS VIOLATIVE OF DUE PROCESS.

The imposition of severe penalties upon a common carrier as a means of enforcing a prescribed rate is in contravention of due process

vate injury.

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

303-PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF STATE STATUTE CONSTITUTING DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.

Though the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution in its due process of law clause limits the power of the states to pre

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

scribe penalties for violations of their laws, the states still possess a wide latitude of discretion, and their enactments transcend the limitation only where the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned

to the offense, and obviously unreasonable.

8. CARRIERS 2-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
303-PENALTY PROVISION FOR RATE ENFORCE-
MENT NOT CONTRARY TO DUE PROCESS.

Laws Ark. 1887, p. 227 (Kirby's Dig. 1904, § 6620), and Laws 1915, p. 365 (Kirby & Castle's Dig. 1916, § 8094), subjecting any railroad company, for every offense of demanding or collecting a greater compensation than prescribed for the transportation of passengers, to a penalty of not less than $50 nor more than $300 and costs of suit, recoverable by the aggrieved passenger, held not violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution; the penalty not being so severe and oppressive as to be unreasonable.

Mr. Justice McReynolds dissents.

provision for the penalty was repugnant to the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; but the Supreme Court of the state sustained the provision and affirmed the judgments. 131 Ark. 442, 199 S.

W. 376. To obtain a review of that decision the company prosecutes this writ of error.

The grounds upon which the provision is said to contravene due process of law are, first, that the penalty is "so severe as to deprive the carrier of the right to resort to the courts to test the validity" of the rate prescribed, and, second, that the penalty is "arbitrary and unreasonable, and not proportionate to the actual damages sustained."

[1] It is true that the imposition of severe penalties as a means of enforcing a rate, such as was prescribed in this instance, is in contravention of due process of law, where no adequate opportunity is afforded the carrier for safely testing, in an appropriate judicial

*65

In Error to the Supreme Court of the State whether it is confiscatory or otherwise-beproceeding, the validity *of the rate—that is,

of Arkansas.

Consolidated actions by Dicksey Williams and Lucy Williams against the St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company. From judgments for plaintiffs, defendant appealed to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, which affirmed (131 Ark. 442, 199 S. W. 376), and defendant brings error. Affirmed. Messrs. Robert E. Wiley. and Edgar B. Kinsworthy, both of Little Rock, Ark., for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.

By a statute of Arkansas, regulating rates for the transportation of passengers between 64

points within the state, *any railroad company that demands or collects a greater compensation than the statute prescribes is subjected "for every such offense" to a penalty of "not less than fifty dollars nor more than three hundred dollars and costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee," and the aggrieved passenger is given a right to recover the same in a civil action. Act April 4, 1887 (Laws 1887, p. 227; Kirby's Digest, 1904, § 6620); Act March 4, 1915 (Laws 1915, p. 365; Kirby & Castle's Digest, 1916, § 8094).

fore any liability for the penalties attaches. The reasons why this is so are set forth fully and plainly in several recent decisions and need not be repeated now. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 147, 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S. 19, 53, 29 Sup. Ct. 192, 53 L. Ed. 382, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1134, 15 Ann. Cas. 1034; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 217 U. S. 196, 207, 208, 30 Sup. Ct. 461, 54 L. Ed. 727, 18 Ann. Cas. 989; Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Tucker, 230 U. S. 340, 33 Sup. Ct. 961, 57 L. Ed. 1507; Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, 235 U. S. 651, 659, et seq., 35 Sup. Ct. 214, 59 L. Ed.

405.

[2] And it also is true that where such an opportunity is afforded and the rate is adjudged valid, or the carrier fails to avail itself of the opportunity, it then is admissible, so far as due process of law is concerned, for the state to enforce adherence to the rate by imposing substantial penalties for deviations from it. Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Georgia, supra, 235 U. S. p. 667 et seq., 35 Sup. Ct. 214, 59 L. Ed. 405; Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Ry. Co. v. Texas, 246 U. S. 5S, 62, 38 Sup. Ct. 236, 62 L. Ed. 574.

[3] Here it does not appear that the carrier In June, 1915, a company operating a line had not been afforded an adequate opportuniof railroad within the state demanded and ty for safely testing the validity of the rate, collected 66 cents more than the prescribed or that its deviation therefrom proceeded fare from each of two sisters carried over from any belief that the rate was invalid. part of its line when returning to their home On the contrary, it is practically concededfrom a school commencement elsewhere in and we judicially know-that if the carrier the state; and in suits separately brought for really regarded the rate as confiscatory, the the purpose, and afterwards consolidated, way was open to secure a determination of these passengers obtained judgments against that question by a suit in equity against the the company for the overcharge, a penalty of Railroad Commission of the state, during the seventy-five dollars and costs of suit, includ-pendency of which the operation of the penaling an attorney's fee of twenty-five dollars. ty provision could have been suspended by inThe company appealed, asserting that the junction. Wadley Southern Ry. Co. v. Geor

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

(40 Sup.Ct.)

gia, supra. See, also, Allen v. St. Louis, Iron, reasonable. Coffey v. Harlan County, 204 U. Mountain & Southern Ry. Co., 230 U. S. 553, S. 659, 662, 27 Sup. Ct. 305, 51 L. Ed. 666; 33 Sup. Ct. 1030, 57 L. Ed. 1625; Rowland v. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U. S. St. Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co., 244 U. | 73, 78, 28 Sup. Ct. 28, 52 L. Ed. 108; WatersS. 106, 37 Sup. Ct. 577, 61 L. Ed. 1022; St. Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 86, 111, 29 Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. | Sup. Ct. 220, 53 L. Ed. 417; Collins v. Johnv. McKnight, 244 U. S. 368, 37 Sup. Ct.ston, 237 U. S. 502, 510, 35 Sup. Ct. 649, 59 L. 611, 61 L. Ed. 1200. And the record shows Ed. 1071. that at the trial the carrier not only did not raise any question about the correct fare, but proposed and secured an instruction to the jury wherein the prescribed rate was recognized as controlling.

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Of this penalty and the need for it the Supreme Court of the State says:

"It is commonly known that carriers are not prone to adhere uniformly to rates lawfully prescribed and it is necessary that deviation from such rates be discouraged and prohibited by adequate liabilities and penalties, and we regard the penalties prescribed as no more than reasonable and adequate to accomplish the purpose of the law and remedy the evil intended to be reached." Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Davis, 114 Ark. 519, 525, 170 S. W. 245, 246.

The second branch is more strongly urged, and we now turn to it. The provision assailed is essentially penal, because primarily intended to punish the carrier for taking more than the prescribed rate. Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 106, 15 S. W. 18, 11 L. R. A. 452; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Ry. Co. v. Waldrop, 93 Ark. 42, 45, 123 S. W. 778. True, the penalty goes to the aggrieved passenger and not the state, and is to be enforced by a private and not a public suit. But this is not contrary to due process of law; for, as is said in Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 523, 6 Sup. Ct. 110, 114 (29 L. Ed. 463), "the power of the state to impose fines and penalties for a violation of its statutory requirements is coeval with government; and the mode in which they shall be enforced, whether at the suit of a private party, or at the suit of the public, and what disposition shall be made of the amounts collected, are merely matters of legislative discretion." Nor does giving the penalty to the aggrieved passenger require that it be confined or proportioned to his loss or damages; for, as it is imposed as a punishment for the violation of a public law, the (Argued Nov. 19 and 20, 1919. Decided Dec. 8, Legislature may adjust its amount to the public wrong rather than the private injury, just as if it were going to the state. See Marvin v. Trout, 199 U. S. 212, 225, 26 Sup. Ct. 31, 50 L. Ed. 157.

[8] When the penalty is contrasted with the overcharge possible in any instance it of course seems large, but, as we have said, its validity is not to be tested in that way. When it is considered with due regard for the interests of the public, the numberless opportunities for committing the offense, and the need for securing uniform adherence to established passenger rates, we think it properly cannot be said to be so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense or obviously unreasonable.

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[7] That this clause places a limitation upon the power of the states to prescribe penalties for violations of their laws has been fully recognized, but always with the express or tacit qualification that the states still possess a wide latitude of discretion in the matter, and that their enactments transcend the lim67 itation only where the penalty *prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously un

Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS dissents.

(251 U. S. 104) OKLAHOMA RY. CO. v. SEVERNS PAVING CO. et al.

1919.) No. 106.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 514(12) PRESERVATION OF STREET RAILWAY'S RIGHT TO HEARING ON ASSESSMENT OF PROPERTY.

a

Where a strip of land along the center of boulevard was dedicated to a street railway by the owners, and an assessment for its proportionate part of the cost of paving was erroneously made against the railway, instead of the property, judgment in proceedings by the city and paving contractor to procure reassessment, directing a reassessment against the land itself, will be modified and corrected to preserve the right of the railway to a new and adequate hearing in respect of the assessment. 2. MUNICIPAL

CORPORATIONS

434(6) FRANCHISE PROVISIONS OF STREET RAILWAY NOT APPLICABLE TO DEFEAT ASSESSMENT FOR PAVING COST.

Terms in original franchise granted by Oklahoma City to a street railway, requiring it, under given conditions, to pave or pay for paving

For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes

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