take such private property for such object, the courts cannot review the exercise of the legal discretion exercised by them and conferred by law, if the persons acting under State authority proceed in good faith in discharging their public duties. But that, if there were gross invasions of private rights, unjustified by any semblance of public necessity, that then the courts might interfere and protect them; but that the case must be very clear to warrant such judicial interference.

The same doctrine is held by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. (4 Cushing's R. 60.)

The above principles with regard to eminent domain have been sanctioned in the Court of Appeals of NewYork. (3 Selden, 314.)

In Moore vs. The Mayor, &c., of New-York, (4 Selden's N. Y. Ap. R. 110, 113, 114,) the Court of Appeals of New-York held, that where the legislature authorized a corporation to take lots and lands in fee simple absolute, for a public purpose, and its full value was appraised according to the law and paid to the owner, his wife not being a party to the proceeding, that, upon his subsequent death, she could not recover dower in the premises, as, at the time of the taking and appraisal, she had no fixed and appraisable right in the land.

Whenever the State authorizes the taking of land in fee, by virtue of eminent domain, upon taking and paying for it, the absolute fee vests in the State or corporation for whom it is condemned. (1 Kernan's N. Y. Ap. R. 314.)

In Chace vs. Sutton Manuf. Co. (4 Cush. R. 152) it was decided, that where dams are authorized as part of canals or other works, by associations or corporations, that flow back water upon the lands or mill-seats of any person, or create reservoirs there, to his injury, he is entitled to damages. (lb. pp. 155, 161, 162.)

It was also held, that a grant by law of power to use the water of such reservoirs for mills, as well as for a canal, was valid, and that the canal company, having paid full damages for a perpetual easement and right of flowing of plaintiff's land, for purposes of a public or quasi public nature, for canaling and milling, that an abandonment of the canal and transfer of it to a rail-road company, pursuant to a State law, did not deprive defendants and others owning mill privileges and water-power, dependent on such reservoirs, of their rights, and that the owner of the lands was not entitled to a second assessment of damages, or to repossess himself of his land and water, as it was before the construction of the canal. (pp. 167-169.)

The court held, that the law allowing the sale of the canal to the rail-road was valid, and that the legislature had authority, by right of eminent domain, for the creation of water-power for public mills, to allow a man, on his own land, to erect dams and flow another's land, on making full compensation for damages. (pp. 169–171.)

In Harris vs. Thompson, the case of the Fort Miller dam, erected originally by the State of New-York, as part of the Champlain Canal, and afterwards continued in aid of mills, pursuant to State laws, they were held valid, and the rights of the mill-owners were held, by the Supreme Court, protected by law. (9 Barb. S. C. R. 350.) In this case the canal use had been, by law, abandoned, and the dam was kept up for the mills in use, and the State paid the damages arising from flowing or wetting the lands of individuals.

The court held, that the legislature alone was the judge of the necessity or expediency of appropriating private property to public use; and that the court could not revise its decision. That the court had simply power to

inquire whether private property is taken for a public or private purpose. (p. 362.)

SEC. 13. A nation, a State of our Union or the United States, within the District of Columbia or the territories of the Union, by the law of nations, have the right to tax the property of resident foreigners, by virtue of their sovereignty, as a compensation for protection. All property of non-residents, as well as residents, are subject to dues and customs on importation into a country, unless exempted by its laws. (8 How. 493, 494. 5 Ib. 523.) In the internal taxation of a nation or State, natural equity demands equality of taxation; and it is a principle of American law applicable to national and State taxation. (Const. U. S. art. 1, § 2; art. 4, § 2. Const. Wis. art. 8, § 1. Ord. 1787, art. 4, ante, §§ 1, 2, 3. Act ad. California Acts Cong. 1850, p. 452, and other Acts ad. States, and ante, ch. 1, § 15.)

In our Union, a State, by virtue of its municipal sovereignty, cannot tax persons or property coming into it by sea or land, from any foreign country, or from another State. It may levy charges absolutely necessary to support its inspection laws on property, but no duty on tonnage on exports or imports can be levied by a State, unless authorized by Congress, and then, except as herein stated, they go to the treasury of the Union. (Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10, sub. 2.)

RETROSPECTIVE LAWS.

SEC. 14. Nations, Congress and our States, within their several jurisdictions, may pass retrospective laws to confirm titles and transactions according to their intent, though defective in some legal form or evidence.

Such laws, divesting any legal vested right or title, are unjust, and in violation of that great elementary principle

of natural equity-that no man shall be deprived of any right without due process of law, and an opportunity of being heard in defence of it before a competent tribunal. (1 Kent's Com. 455, n. e. 8 Wheat. 493. 6 How. 331. 14 Pet. 365. 10 Ib. 294. Hamp. R. 199. 2 Pet. 657, 395. 6 Barb. S. C. R. 213. State Consts. 16 How. 369.) principle of American law.

4 Serg. & Rawle, 401. 1 N. 8 lb. 108. 10 How.

658.

8 Ib. 108.

Const. U. S. art. 5, and

That natural equity is a

In our republic the courts of the respective States alone have jurisdiction to pass upon retrospective State laws, and determine their effect and validity, unless they are in conflict with a treaty or act of Congress, or impair the obligation of a valid contract, or unless the State law is a bill of attainder or ex post facto law, which are retrospective statutes, and inflict penalties or punishments not enacted at the commission of the offence. (10 How. 399, 400. 8 Pet. 110.) A bill of attainder is a special act for punishing one or more particular offenders for past acts or omissions. Congress and the State legislatures are, by the Constitution of the Union, prohibited from passing such penal and criminal laws. They do not relate to civil suits or proceedings, but to penal and crimi nal only. (Const. U. S. art. 1, § 10. 8 Pet. 110. 7 Ib. 247. 11 Zb. 538, 540.)

The Constitution of the French Republic of 1848 has adopted our prohibition of bills of attainder, by declaring "the power of confiscation shall never be re-established."

A State may lawfully pass recording laws, by which one class of deeds, mortgages or contracts may take precedence of others and in effect annul them. (3 Peters' U. S. R. 280, 290.)

A State may pass usury laws, if not retroactive. Wheat. 207.) It can pass new recording laws, and shorten

or lengthen statutes of limitations. (6 How. 331. 5 Pet. 437.)

A State may also pass statutes of limitations, and when a right is confirmed or barred by such law, it ought to be so held, it seems, in all other States and nations, by all our State courts and by the Supreme Court of the Union. (13 Pet. R. 312, 326, 327. 6 How. 61, 62. 4 Wheat. 206. 12 Pet. 33. 5 Ib. 151, 402, 441. 1 How. 51. 8 Pet. 361.)

A statute of limitations begins to run on the repeal of a proviso on excepted debts from the date of the repeal, unless otherwise provided. (7 How. 779.)

State recording laws are valid as to past as well as future contracts, if opportunity is allowed to comply with them. (3 Pet. 280, 290.)

State tribunals have decided variously with regard to foreign statutes of limitations. We have given the effect of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States.

Where a State passes recording laws or statutes of limitations, they must give the holders of contracts or deeds, mortgages, &c., an opportunity to comply with the law or enforce their rights to be valid-otherwise they would violate contracts and fall within the constitutional prohibition on that subject. An act instantly destroying all remedy or right would be against natural equity, and would be in effect a taking away from a man his property without compensation, and transferring it to another. (13 Pet. 45, 62, 64. 8 Mass. R. 430. 2 Greenl. 294. 2 Gall. 141. 4 Wheat. 207. 8 Ib. 84. 8 Ib. 84. 316. 3 Ib. 717.)

3 Pet. 290.
3 Pet. 290. 1 How.

No repeal of any laws, or the making of new rules of evidence by a State legislature, can divest a man's right or property already perfect under existing laws. (16 Pet. 492; post, ch. 5. 8 Wend. 661. Fletcher vs. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87. 1 How. U. S. R. 311, 315. 4 Wheat. 207.