unauthorized acts of an agent may afterwards be ratified by the principal, either expressly or by implication, so as to bind the principal. If there was testimony sufficient to submit the case to the jury, none of the assignments of error are well taken. It is true that no positive and direct evidence has been introduced by the plaintiff that he made a contract with one having authority to make it. Nor is there any positive and direct evidence that the contract made between him and Tozer, the freight agent, was ratified by the detective department of the defendant's road, whose duty it was to look after crimes committed against the property of the road or property intrusted to its care. Suppose the station agent of defendant company had agreed with a farmer that, if he would furnish the road with a thousand oak ties, he should be paid what they were worth, and the agent introduced the farmer to a man who was said to be a tie inspector of the road, and the inspector informed the farmer about the lengths and sizes the ties should be and where to deliver them; that later the farmer, acting upon such instruction, delivered the ties, and they were put into the defendant's roadbed. Suppose, further, that the bill for the ties was never paid, and the farmer sued to recover for their value, and was unable to make direct and positive proof of the authority of the station agent and the inspector to buy ties for the road,-would counsel claim that his case must fail for that reason, and that there was no evidence, either of authority to make the contract or of its ratification by the company, and that the company should have the ties and not pay for them? There was evidence tending to show that defendant company was greatly annoyed by thefts of merchandise at Delray; that plaintiff was consulted by the station agent in relation to discovering the thieves; that Tozer undertook to make an arrangement with Somerville by which the latter should contribute to the road his services, and should be paid what they were reasonably worth; that Somerville was intro duced to detectives of the road, and was advised with by them in relation to the work the defendant road wanted done by him. There was also testimony tending to show that he did the work he was employed to do; that it resulted, in connection with the work done by the detectives of the road, in accomplishing just what the company wanted done. It was claimed that the thieving in Delray was stopped; the defendant company recovered eight bags of coffee stolen; and the thieves were arrested, and one of them convicted, and sent to prison. If the jury found these to be established facts, do they not tend to show ratification by the company of the contract made with Somerville? Is it the law, or is it right, that the company should have these services, appropriate them to its own use, and profit by them, and yet not be required to pay for them? As we understand the law, it is to the effect that the authority of agents may be established by acts, facts, and circumstances, as well as by direct proof. Lyell v. Sanbourn, 2 Mich. 109; Van Vranken v. Union News Co., 78 Mich. 218; Peine v. Weber, 47 Ill. 41. It is also a rule of law that the acts of an agent assuming to have authority may be ratified, and this ratification proved by evidence that the principal has accepted the benefits of the contract made by the agent. Bacon v. Johnson, 56 Mich. 182; Heyn v. O'Hagen, 60 Mich. 150; Busch v. Wilcox, 82 Mich. 315. The charge of the trial judge, bearing upon this portion of the case, reads as follows: "The evidence in this case on the part of the plaintiff shows that the plaintiff, having received information that if a reward was offered he might procure information which would lead to the arrest of some party or parties who were thieving from the Wabash Railroad, communicated that fact to Mr. Tozer, the local freight agent at Detroit. He (Somerville) was bound to know at that time, or bound to ascertain, the position of Mr. Tozer, and was bound to know that there was no presumption of authority that Mr. Tozer might make a contract with him with reference to that. And if, gentlemen of the jury, there was nothing more in this case than these facts, then I should charge you that your verdict in this case should be for the defendant. However, gentlemen, as I said before, corporations can act only through agents, and if a contract is made with an agent who has no authority, and is afterwards communicated to those who are authorized to make such contract, there can be what we call in law a 'ratification,' and if a party making a contract without authority is afterwards recognized by those authorized to ratify the contract, and the contract is entered upon, the jury may imply such ratification. Now, in the case at bar I do not say, nor do I mean to intimate, that there is a ratification, but there is evidence to go to the jury upon which, I think, the jury may or may not infer, as they in their good judgment must determine, whether the unauthorized contract of Mr. Tozer was or was not ratified by the company. The evidence in this case shows that Mr. Tozer said, I think, that he would send for detectives, and afterwards wrote Mr. Somerville, or communicated with Mr. Somerville, to meet the detectives of the road. I think, gentlemen of the jury, that from these facts, if you find from the facts that the secret service or the detective department of the road-those in charge of that-Mr. Furlong, or whosoever was in charge of that, had a knowledge of what Mr. Tozer had done, and afterwards sent the detectives to carry out the arrangement that Mr. Tozer had made, there would be such a ratification of the contract as would enable Mr. Somerville to recover. But, of course, before you could imply a ratification, you must be satisfied from the evidence in this case that those who were authorized to make a contract of that kind had a full knowledge of what Mr. Tozer had done; because, gentlemen of the jury, there can be no ratification unless there is a full knowledge of that which is to be ratified." We think this charge was a correct statement of the law as applicable to the facts; that there was sufficient evidence to warrant the trial judge in submitting the case to the jury. The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. MONTGOMERY, J., concurred with MOORE, J. 109 302 137 +367 LEBEAU v. TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CONSTRUCTION CO. 1. EVIDENCE-MAPS. In a personal injury case, there was proof that a map of the scene of the accident, which was offered in evidence, was approximately correct, and one witness stated that it was accurate. Held, that its admission was not error. 2. SAME-SCENE OF ACCIDENT. It is competent, in a personal injury case, to show the en- 3. PERSONAL INJURIES-EVIDENCE OF PHYSICAL CONDITION. 4. TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS IN ABSENCE OF COUNSEL-WAIVER. 5. CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE-QUESTION FOR JURY. Whether one who, in passing along a sidewalk, and while absorbed in watching the workmen in an excavation being made from the street into an area under the sidewalk, walks into a manhole left open for the purpose of hoisting through it the material excavated from the area, without seeing a barrel which had been placed beside the manhole as a means of guarding it, is guilty of contributory negligence, preventing a recovery for the resulting injury, is a question for the jury. Error to Wayne; Lillibridge, J. Submitted April 7, 1896. Decided May 19, 1896. Case by McCurdy C. LeBeau against the Telephone & Telegraph Construction Company for personal injuries. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiff brings error. Affirmed. Philip T. Van Zile, for appellant. Keena & Lightner, for appellee. MOORE, J. On the morning of May 19, 1893, plaintiff walked down Clifford street, in the city of Detroit, on the way to his office. Near Park Place his attention was attracted to the workmen of the defendant company, who were engaged in tearing up the pavement preparatory to putting in underground wires. The plaintiff continued to watch the workmen, as he walked along, in their attempts to cut through the wall into the area at the corner of Clifford street and Washington avenue. At that corner, defendant's workmen had been hoisting dirt through a manhole from the area below, and letting material down into the area, but were not so engaged when plaintiff came along. The manhole was also used to let in light to the workmen. The sidewalk was of stone, 11 feet wide. The manhole was about 10 feet east of the westerly end of the walk, nearly in the center of the walk, and in line with the cross-walk across Washington avenue, and was 22 inches in diameter. It was open, and upon the east edge of it was a barrel. The iron cover of the manhole was on the north side of it. The work done by the defendant was under a permit by the municipal authorities. Plaintiff failed to see the hole, and stepped into it, and fell, striking upon his chin upon the edge of the barrel, receiving severe injuries. Plaintiff sued to recover $10,000 damages for the injuries received by him. The case was tried and submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict in favor of the defendant. Plaintiff appeals, and assigns error upon the admis sion of testimony. A map was introduced in evidence, which plaintiff |