Cunningham et al. vs. Brumback et al. [JANUARY at law, I think that the bill on its face is sufficient, and I shall overrule the demurrer. In the examination of the facts I am struck, at the first, with the length of time that the defendants have severally and successively occupied the lands in question. We hear of Mrs. Brumback being in possession of them, as early as the year 1827, and continually and persistently have the Brumbacks. remained in possession up to the present time. They have also made improvements upon it; and although they do not appear to be costly or extensive, yet no doubt they are such as their estate would permit. The conveyance to Fowler must have given him, as to the lot that he purchased, the same right that was held by his vendor. The statute of limitations is made to cut off stale claims. The law wisely holds that there shall come a time when even the wrongful possessor shall have peace; and that it is better that ancient wrongs should go unredressed, than that ancient strife should be renewed. The statute of limitations is adopted in equity, so far as the same is applicable; and it runs against mere equitable demands; except in certain cases of fraud and trust, which are foreign to the enquiry in this court. Ewell vs. Tidwell, 20 Ark. 136. I do not think that the Brumbacks can be considered as affected by the suit between Cunningham and Ashley. It is a familiar principle that decrees only affect parties and privies. They were not parties to that suit, nor do they claim under any of the parties; but on the contrary, we find them in possession more than ten years before the patent issued to Beebe, and ever since that time they have been claiming against the world, and having maintained their possession for so long a time, if they are now to be ejected, it must be by force of some rigid rule of law, or the sway of some strong and superior equity. It is contended for the plaintiffs that the pendency of the suit between Cunningham and Ashley & Beebe, and the outstanding legal title in them during a protracted litigation, amounted to such a disability to sue as ought in equity to pre TERM, 1861.] Cunningham et al. vs. Brumback et al. vent the statute from running against them; and in support of this position I am referred to the case of Burnett vs. Colby, 5 Simons 181, and other cases based on the same facts of this, for it is based on the relation of tenant for life and remainderman. During the estate of the tenant for life, the remainderman has no present right, either legal or equitable, to the possession; and if the tenant for life see fit to let a third person remain on the land, the remainderman can have no remedy either in law or equity until the life estate has expired; and this for the simple reason that until that time he is not injured, and consequently can have no redress. And I apprehend that nothing more than this is stated in the 370th to 374th section of Angell on Limitation. But such was not the case between the Brumbacks and Cunningham, for if the land rightfully belonged to Cunningham, and he had equitably the right to the possession, the act of the Brumbacks in remaining upon the land was an injury for which there must somewhere have been means of redress. It is true that the outstanding legal title was in Beebe and Ashley, and that Cunningham could not have maintained an ejectment; but that is nothing more than to say that his right to relief lay in equity, and not at law. It was not necessary for Cunningham to prosecute a suit against Beebe and Ashley, and thus obtain from them the legal title before he could come into equity for relief against the defendants in this suit. In this court the mere legal title is of no avail when set up against the equitable estate, but is made subordinate and subservient to it, and if a suit had been brought in equity against the Brumbacks, they could not have defended it by saying that the plaintiff did not have the legal title: or if they had claimed under the holders of the legal title they could not have a better right than was in the patentee himself: nor could the simple fact that the plaintiffs have acquired the legal title cause them to be more favorably regarded than they would have been with their superior equity over the holders of the legal title, and no reason is seen why the Brumbacks might not have been em Cunningham et al. vs. Brumback et al. [JANUARY braced in the same suit wherein Cunningham asserted his right against Ashley and Beebe. Nor do I think that the position of the plaintiffs, that there has not been sufficient continuity of possession by the defendants, is well taken. The principal authority relied on in support of this principle is from Angell on Limitations 413, where it is said: if one merely enters and commits a trespass, and then goes off, and another comes after him and commits a trespass, it is not to be denied that there is no privity between these persons, nor can the possession be said to be continued from one to another. This has express reference to cases where the land has been totally abandoned by the trespasser, where there has been a distinct interval between the going off of one trespasser and the coming of another, during which interval, for want of an occupant, the seizin is restored to the true owner. In such case, of course, the entry of the next trespasser is a new wrong, and is a new disseizin. But in this case the circumstances are very different. Christian Brumback, sr., and Mrs. Brumback were originally in possession: when Christian Brumback, sr., removed, he left Mrs. Brumback and her son in possession, and when Mrs. Brumback left, her son still remained: and so the continuity of the adverse possession has never been for one moment broken. Christian Brumback, jr., who was born on the land, is now in the prime of life, and has always resided on the land up to this day. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the statute bar does not attach because there has been no continuity of adverse possession. Fanning vs. Wilcox, 3 Day 258; Mc Coy vs. Dickinson College, 5 Serg. & Rawle 254; Shannon vs. Kinney, 1 Marsh. 4; Herd vs. Walton, 2 ib. 620; Peak vs. Chambers, 7 B. Mon. 565. As to whether Christian Brumback or his mother has the best title to the land, is not a question to be passed upon in this suit; the only question being as to whether the plaintiff's remedy is barred by lapse of time; and having considered the facts of the case, I am of opinion that originally the defendants had no right, but that they, the plaintiffs, have delayed until they have no remedy. I shall therefore order the bill to be dismissed for want of equity, at the cost of the plaintiffs. WOODRUFF Vs. CORE. The complainant being entitled to a pre-emption from having an improvement upon a quarter section of swamp land, filed his bill to set aside the legal title of a purchaser at public sale, but failed to show by other than weak and suspicious evidence, that the proof of his pre-emption right and the application to enter swamp land-the written proof and application not being produced-were for the land in controversy, whilst there was strong counteracting evidence to the contrary: Decree that his bill be dismissed. The rule in Conway vs. State Bank held not to restrain this court from reviewing the decree of a court of chancery, brought here by appeal, which opens the whole case, as if it had never been tried, as to all the points made in the court below. Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court. Hon. URIAH M. Rose, chancellor.. STILLWELL & WOODRUFF, for appellant. JORDAN for appellee. Mr. Justice FAIRCHILD delivered the opinion of the court. tiff in the court below, was entitled to a pre-emption from having an improvement upon the west half of the north-west quarter of section eight, in township two south of range ten west, by declaring and proving his claim according to the provisions of the law. The 14th section of the act of 13th January, 1857, would also give the appellee a pre-emption right by making proof of his cultivation of the land under the previous law, for that act did not restrict the right to such persons as wished to pay for lands by leveės, ditches or drains, but only gave to preemptors the privilege of paying in these works of reclamation. We say that the appellee was entitled to a pre-emption of the land in controversy, if he had proved it under the acts referred to, as we think that his improvement on, and cultivation of the land entitled him to the privilege of being a preferred purchaThe only other point in the case is a question of fact, is whether the appellee took the steps, under the act of 16th January, 1855, to change his claim into a pre-emption right, so that it will overthrow the legal title of Woodruff, which is conceded to be perfect unless overshadowed by the appellee's prior equity. ser. On the 12th of March, 1859, the land agent at Little Rock advertised that the land in controversy would be sold on the 23d of May, 1859, and it then became the duty of the appellee to secure the benefit of his pre-emption within those times, by making an entry of the lands in the state land office at Little Rock. Robinson testifies that, about the 26th of March, 1859, he prepared a written declaration of the appellee of his right to a pre emption to a piece of land which he believes to be the one in controversy, but that belief is founded upon an inspection of a paper purporting to be a copy of the original, prepared by Robinson, and which we may suppose, from the argument for the appellee, to have been prepared by his attorney. Robinson swore to his statement, and also took and reduced to writing the supporting affidavits of Martin and Puckett, who identified the land and proved that the appellee had an improve |