and entered into by any Indian, for the payment of money or goods, shall be deemed and held to be null and void, and of no binding effect whatever," has no limitation, but is general in its character; that it applies to all contracts made with an Indian, and that the contract, when made with an Indian by a white man, may be taken advantage of by either, when sued on in this State, and will be declared to be a nullity, according to the decision of Clark vs. Crosland, 17 Ark. R. 43.

Contracts in violation of a statute are utterly void. Story on Con. 740; Hunl vs. Russell, 17 Mass. 258.

The statute, sccs. 1, 2, chap. 4, Gould's Digest, prescribes in what cases, and by whom, letters of administration shall be granted; and the second plea in this case effectually shows that the court granting the letters of administration had nothing under its jurisdiction to administer upon, and that David Barnett died in the Creek Nation, and not in the State of Arkansas. That administration granted in this State by the Probate Court of a county having no estate in the county of the deceased, and where he had no residence, and where he did not die, would be void, is too plain a proposition to admit of a difference of opinion among lawyers. See 9 Mass. R. 5-43; Cutts, etc. vs. Haskins; Griffith vs. Frazier, 8 Cranch 28; Toller (3d) 52, 120; et seq. 7, Bac. Abr. 65; title Void, etc.; Welch vs. Nash, 8 East 394; Smith vs. Rice, 11 Mass. R. 512; Williams vs. Whiting, 11 Mass. R. 432; Holyoke vs. Thomas Haskens, 5 Pickering R. 20; Harvard College vs. Gore, 5 Pick. R. 369; Sigourney vs. Sibley, 21st Pick. R. 101.

GARLAND & RANDOLPH, for the defendant

The positions of the defendant, in regard to the first plea, are these: 1st. That a white man who makes a contract to pay an Indian money or goods, cannot avoid it by reason of the act of Congress; 2d. That the statute was not intended to affect contracts made within the jurisdiction of the State of Arkansas; and 3d. That if it was so intended, it is unconstitutional, and therefore cannot affect them.

As to the second plea: This is not a plea of ne unques administrator. It does not pretend to deny the defendant's appointment as administrator, but sets up facts going to show that the Probate Court of Sebastian county had no authority to make the appointment. The granting of letters of administration is within the jurisdiction of the Probate Court (5 Ark 385; 14 Ark. 298; sec. 2, chap. 48, Gould's Dig. sec. chap. 4, ib.), and no enquiry can be made as to the correctness of the judgment of the court in granting administration, in a collateral proceeding like this. 19 Ark. 499.

Mr. Justice FAIRCHILD delivered the opinion of the court.

To an action brought by Duval, administrator of David Barnett, Rogers pleaded that the bond sued on was given by him to Barnett, who was a Creek Indian, and a resident in the Creek Nation, and that the bond was null for being in opposition to acts of Congress, which protect Indians from the payment of money on executory contracts. The legislation of Congress upon this subject, has been the subject of three cases before this court. In Clark vs. Crosland, 17 Ark. 43, it was held that a contract made by an Indian, in the Indian country, to pay money at a future day, could not be enforced in the courts of this State, because prohibited by act of Congress. In Hicks vs. Euhartonah, 21 Ark. 106, the law was held not to defeat a contract for the payment of goods, made in Sebastian county. And in Taylor vs. Drew, 21 Ark. 485, the plea of exoneration by the statute was adjudged bad on demurrer, because it did not allege that the note sued on was executed in the Indian country. That case would have been decisive of this, if the bond here sued on had been given by an Indian, instead of to one, for the plea under consideration only avers that Barnett resided in the Indian country when the bond was executed, not that it was there inade. But the act of Congress could not, under any circumstances, release Rogers from the payment of the money he bound himself to pay, as it was not

intended to relieve white men from the discharge of their obligations to Indians.

Rogers pleaded, secondly, that Duval was not the administrator of Barnett, because Barnett lived and died in the Creek Nation, and had nothing in Arkansas for administration. Notwithstanding the plea, Duval might have obtained letters of administration upon the goods and effects of Barnett, and if he had, they could not be questioned by plea in the Circuit Court. The facts alleged in the plea might have been good grounds for the refusal of letters of administration by the proper authority; perhaps, upon such facts, the Probate Court that may have granted letters would revoke them, but the plea is no answer to the declaration in its averment of the issuance of letters of administration.

Both pleas were bad; and the court in deciding them to be bad on demurrer is sustained.

CHEATHAM Vs. PHILLIPS.

The endorsement made by a land agent upon the plats of lands furnished him by the auditor, of the time at which he received them, is not to be treated as a solemn record that cannot be disputed or disproven, but it may be proven that he received them at a time different from that endorsed by him.

The swamp land commissioners could not delegate the power vested in them by the statutes to sell lands, and a sale by a sub-commissioner appointed by them, while they had power to sell, and ratified by them after their power to sell ceased, and the power vested in the land agent, was invalid.

The purchaser did not perfect his title under the act of 20th January, 1855, by surrendering the certificate issued to him by the commissioners, to the land agent, and taking out a new certificate of purchase, the land agent having in the meantime sold the land to another person. (Deloach vs. Brownfield et al., ante.)

Appeal from Hempstead Circuit Court in Chancery.

Hon. LEN B. GREEN, Circuit Judge.

GALLAGHER and KNIGHT, for the appellant.

The equities of this case are all with appellant. He was the first purchaser. He purchased in good faith, according to the routine of the commissioners, and paid for the land in the same mode. He received his certificate of purchase, and took possession of the land—and this was done long prior to the inception of appellee's title. /

Conceding that appellant's purchase was made before the land agent received the maps and plats-and it is conclusively established that it was-any irregularities that might have existed, in respect of that purchase, were cured by the statute of 20th January, 1855, which, in effect, confirms the title in the purchaser at that date, and provides for the land agent to issue a new certificate. The appellant's title was certainly made good and valid in equity against any subsequent purchaser. See, also, Act of 17th February, 1859, and Opinion of Solicitor General, to the effect that it confirms and makes good the purchase from the date thereof, by relation.

HEMPSTEAD, for appellee.

When the maps and plats were received by the land agent at Washington, the power of the swamp land commissioners to sell ceased at that precise point of time, and the land agent was invested with the exclusive power of sale. Hempstead vs. The Auditor, 16 Ark. 67; Hempstead, Land Agent, vs. Underhill's Heirs, 20 Ark. 354.

Every plat and map in the land agent's office is shown to be marked as follows: "Mailed 20th, and received December 22d,

1853. B. F. Hempstead, Land Agent." The reception of the maps and plats was an act pertaining to the duties of his office, and was known to him, and was official; and therefore the indorsement of the time they were received, is conclusive upon all persons, and cannot be impeached. That the land agent was required to do by law, and like the official return of an officer, it cannot be brought into question collaterally. It can only be impeached in a direct proceeding where the officer is a party. Trigg vs. Lewis, 3 Litt. 130, 132; Wilson vs. Hurst's Ex'r., 1 Peters C. C. R. 441; 4 Phil. Ev., Cowen & Hill's Notes, note 602, p. 1847; note 741, pp. 1,083, 1,087.

The board of swamp land commissioners alone possessed the power of selling swamp lands up to the time of furnishing the maps and plats to the land agents. It was a power they could not delegate and sub-commissioners are unknown to the law. 20 Ark. 354.

Even if a sub-commissioner had authority to receive applications to purchase, the application and purchase must necessarily date from the time of its allowanee by the board of commissioners, and could have no relation back to an anterior period. It was the board of commissioners, as a board consisting of three persons, that had the power to sell, in the respective districts, until the maps were furnished to the agent, and then the power ceased. Hempstead vs. Auditor, 16 Ark., 68; Hempstead, Land Agent, vs. Underhill's Heirs, 20 Ark. 354.

The act of 17th February, 1859, does not apply to cases where the final title has issued; but only to cases where a certificate of purchase has been lawfully granted by the swamp land commissioners or agents, or any person acting under their authority; and the holder desires to obtain a patent and holding certificate, and with which he may re-enter the land.

Mr. Chief Justice ENGLISH delivered the opinion of the court. The subject of controversy in this suit is the east fractional half of the north-east fractional quarter of section 31, town