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the debtor had expressed no desire as to the size of the parcels to be offered, the
inadequacy of the prices paid, and the accidental detention, from the sale, of a
man with whom the execution debtor had made arrangements to pay the execu-
tions, are not sufficient grounds to set aside the sales, in the absence of any
charge or suspicion of fraud on the part of the sheriff in selling the property,
or of the purchasers in buying it. Randolph et al. vs. Thomas, 69.
2. Corn is embraced by the clause of the statute wbich exempts from execution
“all such provisions as may be on hand for family use." Atkinson vs. Gat-
3. The court properly left it to the jury to determine whether the whole of the
corn which the defendant in the execution had on hand at the time of the levy
was necessary for family use. Ib.
4. The defendant did not waive the benefit of the exemption by executing a de-
livery bond, he claiming the benefit of the statute at the time of the levy and
sale, and protesting against both, Ib.
5. Provisions on hand for family use are exempt, whether the defendant bave
other property subject to execution or not, and he is not obliged to furnish the
officer with an inventory of his provisions. Ib. .
6. If a constable sell corn which is exempt from execution, against the consent of
the defendant, he is a trespasser, and so is the plaintiff in the execution, if he
direct the levy or sale. Ib.
7. Where an execution is directed to the constable of one township, and by order
of the justice who issued it, the direction is changed, and the execution directed
and delivered to the constable of another township, the amendment though
irregularly made, does not render the process null and void. Ib.
8. Where an execution, regular upon its face, is directed to and placed in the
hands of a constable of a township other than that in which the judgment is
rendered, he has power, under the statute, to execute it any where in the
9. A constable who levies an execution upon property claimed by another per.
son than the defendant, is justified in selling it, as against the claimant, if upon
the trial of the right of property, the verdict is that the property belongs to
the defendant; such verdict is, however, no justification, under the statute, of
the plaintiff, or other person interfering in the sale: but if there be a levy,
which is a valid and subsisting lien upon the property, and the defendant then
sell the property, a sale under the execution is legal and a justification to all
concerned: And so, in an action of trespass, in such case, against the pur-
chaser of the property, the plaintiff in the execution and his agents, if the
defendants file a notice of justification setting up, not only the trial and ver-
diet, but a legal and valid sale, the court may well refuse to instruct the jury
that the facts set up in the notice will only justify the constable. Tricker vs.
10. The verdict of the jury on the trial of the right of property levied upon under
execution, being that the execution is a "lien upon, and bound the property”–
this is within the spirit and intention of the statute, and equivalent to a find.
ing it to be the property of the defendant in the execution.
11. The return of an officer upon an execution that he had levied it upon certain
property is prima facie evidence that the levy.was in fact made, and in such
manner as to make it effectual. Ib.
12. If an execution be levied upon property, and, by direction of the plaintiff, the
sheriff permits it to remain in possession of the defendant, and returns the exe-
cution without sale, the levy will not continue a lien against intervening rights
of other persons. Ib.
$3. But the return of the execution without sale by the officer, under the impres-
sion that he had no power to sell—that his successor had qualified, and that it
was his duty to make the sale-does not postpone the levy to the claims of pur-
chasers or junior executions; nor does the fact of leaving the property in the
possession of the defendant for a reasonable time, and without any fraudulent
motive-the defendant retaining possession as agent of the officer. 16.
14. Where property levied upon is left in the possession of the defendant in the
under licenses, a short distance above the place where B. had kept it, and
where he owned both banks of the river, but for the same uses and at tbe cross-
ing of the same road: From the time N. took charge of the ferry, B. procured
no license, nor exercised any ferry privilege: Held, that B. had relinquished his
right, and that N. was entitled to an exclusive right to keep the ferry. Brearly
vs. Norris, 614.
2. Where a ferry had been kept by the husband in his life time, the landing of
which is on the farm attached to the mansion, and the widow's dower has not
been assigned, she is entitled to the ferry as appertaining to her possessory
See Administration, 3; Chancery, 13,
1. Though a sale of property be fraudulent on the part of the vendor, being made
to defraud bis creditors, the purchaser cannot be affected by the fraud, uplees he
participated in it, with a knowledge of the fraudulent design, and with intent
to further the accomplishment of such design. Christian vs. Greenwood, 260.
2. One creditor has the same right to purchase, with bis debt, the property of his
debtor, that another creditor has to sell it under execution; and this, though he
knows that the debtor's object in selling to him, is to deprive the other creditor
of the means of making his debt-the effect is but preferring one creditor to
3. But, in such case, the creditor must allow a fair price for the property and not buy
more than is necessary for his own protection—at least it would be a suspicious
fact, if, unless there be shown good reasons for the property not to be sold
separately, he includes several parcels of property when one would pay the debt,
and pay the overplus in money. Ib.
4. A purchaser from a fraudulent vendor will be held to be a participator in the fraud,
if he have notice of it, and still deal with him, and thereby afford him the
means to make his fraudulent efforts against his creditors successful; and this,
though he may have paid a full price for the property. Ib.
5. And so, where a purchaser of negroes knew that his vendor had run them off-
had been told that the vendor had acknowledged that he had run them off to
avoid the debts sought to be enforced against them-bought them after he knew
they had been run off, and while they were absent, paying mostly in cash, he
does not present such a case as entitles him to the protection of a court of equity,
but will be held responsible for the fraud of his vendor to the extent of his
dealing with him, on the presumption of a fradulent intent on his part, as well
as on the part of the vendor. Ib.
6. The voluntary conveyance of a party to his wife or child, though he be in.
debted at the time, is prima facie only, and not conclusively fraudulent in re-
spect to the claim of an existing creditor; and the presumption thus raised may
be met and repelled by proof on the other side. The question of fraud must
depend on all the circumstances of the case, looking to the state and condition
of the grantor, the extent of the property conveyed, and the direct tendency
of the conveyance respecting the claims of creditors. Bertrand vs. Elder. 494.
7. And so, where at the time of a gift to the wife, the husband was largely in-
debted, was embarrassed, and though not insolvent his circumstances were
doubtful, and his solvency dependent, in a great degree, upon the skilful man-
agement of embarrassed mercantile operations, the gift is fraudulent and void
as against the prior creditors of the husband. Ib.
1. The statute (secs. 9, 10, p. 371, Gould's Dig.) prohibiting the betting of money
at "any game of hazard or skill,” was not intended to embrace horse racing.
State vs. Rorie et al., 726.
1. Where a father-in-law, upon or after the marriage of a daughter, sends slaves
home with her, which are permitted to remain, free from his own control or
claim, a gift of the slaves sent is presumed to have been intended by the father
to his daughter, unless the contrary is established by proof. Henry vs. Harbi.
1. Guardians should be held to account strictly and faithfully for the trust funds
that come into their hands; and no compensation should be allowed them where
they have neglected their duties, mismanaged the property of their wards, per-
petrated positive wrong and injustice towards them. Reed vs. Ryburn, 47.
2. Unless there be fraud in the final settlement of a guardian's account-made upot
the report of an auditor, and in which all parties seemed to acquiesce--there is no
reason to disturb the adjudication of the probate court. 16.
3. Where a guardian presents his account for settlement, and after being examined
the Probate Court refuses to confirm it, this is not such final action and judgment
as to prevent the court, at a subsequent term, from again examining the account
and then affirming it. Rightor vs. Gray, 228.
4. It is the duty of the Probate Court, on the presentation of a guardian's account
for settlement, after the public notice required by law, to examine it, and cause
any errors in it to be corrected, whether exceptions be filed to it or not. Ib.
5. An order of the Probate Court requiring a second guardian to pay to the first an
amount found to be due him on the settlement and confirmation of his account
against the ward, without notice to, or the voluntary appearance of, the second
guardian, is an irregularity, for which such order will be quashed. Ib.
1. A homestead is not subject to attachment any more than it is to an execution.
Grubbbs vs. Ellyson, 287.
1. Gift of a slave, by a mother, to a trustee, for the use and benefit of her daughter,
a married woman, and the heirs of her body-to be held by the trustee for her
use and benefit-to remain hers during her life, and at her death to go to the heirs
of her body-lo remain in her possession, but not to be subject to the debts or
disposition of her husband. The husband died, the wife married again; and the
judgment creditors of the second husband levied upon the slave : Held, on bill
by the wife to enjoin the sale of the slave, claiming it to be her separate pro.
perty, that from the terms of the deed of gift, being but for a life interest, and
appointing a trustee, even without the words that free the property from the
disposition of the husband and from his debts, the life interest of the wife was
sole and separate property: That the property was subject to absolute dispo-
sition by her, to the extent of her interest, while she was a widow: That when
she entered into the second marriage, the slave continued her separate proper.
ty not subject to the control of her second husband, nor liable for his debts.
Phillips vs. Grayson, 769.
See, also, Chancery, 18, 19.
See Pleas and Pleading, 10.