PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

those dealing with him must look to his authority, or abide the consequences.

Ib.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETIES.

1. The failure of the obligee in a bond to probate the claim against the estate of
the deceased obligor, whereby the claim is barred by the statute of non-claim,
does not discharge the sureties in the bond. Ashby vs. Johnston, 163.

2. The obligation of principals to reimburse to securities the money paid by them,
is not founded on the bonds which securities give for their principals, but on
the express contracts of indemnity which the parties make, or upon the implied
promises raised by the law upon the payment of money for another at his re-
quest Wright vs. Williams, 530.

PUBLIC ACTS.

1. The 19th section, chapter 154, Gould's Digest, Acts of 1854, page 109, Acts of
1852, page 42, are public acts in their character and subject matter, though
local in their application, and the courts are bound to take judicial notice of
them, Bevens vs. Baxter, 387.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATOR.

1. The court conclude, with much hesitation that, notwithstanding the execution of
a special administration bond in each estate taken by the public administrator,
the "sheriff and his securities shall be responsible on his official bond, for mis-
conduct in discharging his duties as public administrator." State use, etc. vs
Watts, 304.

2. The office of public administrator continues with the person to whom it was com-
mitted, unless a regular administrator be appointed, and the responsibility of
the securities in the bond existing when the possession of the estate was taken,
continues until the public administrator shall be discharged, whether he be re-
elected and give a new bond, or another person be elected sheriff. Ib.

3. The authority of the Probate Court to make an order requiring the sheriff to take
charge of the estate of a deceased person, is not to be questioned: nor need
such order state the reason that moved the court to make it. Ib.
4. If the breach in a declaration upon the official bond of the sheriff, as public
administrator, charge that he did not deliver bonds, choses in action and
assets, belonging to the estate, and in his hand, to his successor, it is suffi-
cient such successor is not an administrator de bonis non. 1b.

PUBLIC LANDS.

HARVARE

1. Where a person enters the lands of the United States, he becomes the owner
of everything then attached to the freehold—such as growing crops and fences.
Graham vs. Rourk, 19.

RECOGNIZANCE.

1. Where parties voluntarily enter into a recognizance before a person acting as
a justice of the peace, they will not be permitted, on a scire facias on the recog
nizance, to deny, by plea, his right to execute the office of justice of the peace.
Pack vs. State, 235.

2. To a scire facias on a recognizance to appear at the next term of the Circu
Court to answer to the state upon an indictment for an assault and battery, etc.,
and not depart from the court without leave thereof, a plea denying the exist
ence of any indictment for assault and battery, either when the recognizance was
made or when the plea was filed, is no defence-unless the principal appeared
when called, his recognizance was forfeited. 1b.

3. Instead of being a defence to a scire facias on a forfeited recognizance, the fact
that the principal, instead of being indicted for an assault and battery,
for which offence he was recognized to appear, was indicted for murder, it is a
stronger reason why his securities should have him before the court until dis-
charged by the direct order of court.

Ib.

4. A recognizance or bail bond taken without authority, is void. Cooper vs.
State, 278.

5. A scire facias upon a forfeited recognizance must show that the recognizance
was entered into before a court or officer authorized to take it. (Darby et al.
vs. State, 21 Ark.) State vs. Sartain, 541. Hogan et al vs. State, 636.

RECOUPMENT.

1. A bill of sale of negroes containing a warranty of soundness, and providing a
particular mode of compensation in case of unsoundness-as that the unsound
negroes shall be returned and others substituted-the purchaser cannot, in a suit
for the purchase money, recoup the damages suffered on account of the unsound-
ness of any of the negroes, without showing a return of, or offer to return the
unsound negroes-the mode of compensation under such a contract being exclu-
sively and mutually binding upon the parties: nor is the non-residence of the
vendor a sufficient excuse for not returning or offering to return the unsoand ne-
groes-the vendee having the means of knowing where to return them.
sions vs. Hartsook, 519.

Ses-

2. Waiving the question, whether, in a suit upon a note given for the purchase
money of negroes, the defendant could recoup the damages sustained by such
negroes communicating disease to his other negroes, the facts must be shown by

RECOUPMENT-CONTINUED.

uncontradicted and legal evidence to entitle him to the defence here, after an ad-
verse finding by the jury. Ib.

REPLEVIN.

1. No demand is necessary before the commencement of a suit in Replevin, where
the defendant has treated the property as his own and exercised acts of owner-
ship over it. (17 Ark., 172-4.) Henry vs. Fine, 417.

ROADS.

1. On the trial of an indictment against an overseer of a road, for neglect of
duty, if the State fails to prove that the road is a public road, as defined by the
statute, the jury must acquit. State vs. Moore, 550.

2. An order of the county court appointing an overseer for a particular road or
district, is evidence that, during the term of the appointment, the road described
is a public road. Ib.

3. Although, if a private person cut a ditch across a public road and bridge it,
he may be liable for not keeping it in repair, that would not excuse an overseer
for allowing a dangerous bridge over the ditch to remain in the road. 13.
4. On an indictment against an overseer, although the State may prove that he
was appointed overseer, she must also prove that he received notice of his ap-
pointment: and if he worked on the road, it is a circumstance from which it
may be inferred that he had notice. Ib.

5. An order of the county court appointing an overseer for a particular road or
district, is evidence that, during the term of the appointment, the road described
is a public road. State vs. Hagood, 553.

6. On the trial of an indictment against an overseer of a public road, the State
having shown, by record evidence, that a particular road, by a name other than
that given to the one in the indictment, was duly established by order of the
county court, may show by parol evidence the identity of the two roads. 16

SALES.

See Chancery, 1, 8; Contracts, 6.

SCHEDULE.

See Conveyance, 1.

SCIRE-FACIAS.

See Recognizance,

SEPARATE PROPERTY.

See Husband and Wife.

SET-OFF.

1. In a suit against the executor of his deceased partner, he may set off a debt
due from the plaintiff to the partnership under the principle decided in Leach
vs. Lambeth, (14 Ark., 668.) Burke vs. Stillwell, 294.

See, also, Partnership, 5.

SHERIFFS, ACTIONS AGAINST.

1. The declaration in a suit upon a sheriff's bond for a tresspass committed in selling
the plaintiff's property, under an execution issued by the clerk of the Circuit
Court upon a judgment of a justice of the peace, having alleged in the breach
that the plaintiff in the execution did not cause a transcript of the judgment and
proceedings of the justice to be filed in the clerk's office, such allegation be-
comes material and traversable. Crow et al. vs. State use, 684.

2. In an action against a sheriff, on his official bond, for abusing the process of exe-
cution whereby the defendant in the execution has suffered injury, it is within
the province of the jury to allow interest on the value of the property injured by
way of increasing the damages: but it is error in the court to instruct them to
allow interest. Ib.

3. For the tortious sale of a steamboat by a sheriff, under execution, the owner is
entitled to recover the actual value of the boat as property, though she may
have been unriver worthy at the time of the sale. Ib.

See, also, Public Administrator.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

See Chancery, 11; Contracts, 17, 18.

STAKE-HOLDER.

See Bailment, 2.

STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. It is a rule, in the construction of statutes, that an existing statute shall not be
repealed by a subsequent enactment, unless the repeal be expressed in words of
revocation, or unless there is such a manifest repugnance between the statutes that
both cannot be in force: and also, that all statutes upon the same subject matter

STATUTES, CONSTRUCTION OF-CONTINUED.

shall be so construed that all shall continue in force, if that construction is pos-
sible. State use, &c., vs. Watts, 304.

2. There is no such repugnance between the 7th sectim, of chapter 120, Rev. Stat.,
[sec. 8, ch. 6, Gould's Dig.] and the act of 18th December, 1840, subsequently
passed, as to require the court to hold, under the principles governing the con-
struction of statutes, that the former was repealed by the latter. Ib.

SURPRISE.

See New Trials, 1; Practice in Circuit Court, 18.

SWAMP LANDS.

1. The endorsement made by a land agent upon the plats of lands furnished him
by the auditor, of the the time at which he received them, is not to be treated
as a solemn record that cannot be disputed or disproven, but it may be proven
that he received them at a time different from that endorsed by him.
vs. Phillips, 80.

Cheatham

2. The swamp land commissioners could not delegate the power vested in them
by the statutes to sell lands, and a sale by a sub-commissioner appointed by
them, while they had power to sell, and ratified by them after their power
to sell ceased, and the power vested in the land agent, was invalid. lb.
3. The purchaser did not perfect his title under the act of 20th January, 1855, by snr-
rendering the certificate issued to him by the commissioners, to the land agent
and taking out a new certificate of purchase, the land agent having in the
meantime sold the land to another person. (Deloach vs. Brownfield et al., ante.)

4. On the 4th of June, 1851, the defendant obtained a levee contract in part upon
his own land, with the intention of securing a preferred right, under the
4th section of the act of 11th of January, 1851, to purchase the lands in the
rear-made application for the purchase in payment of his levee work in 1852,
obtained the acceptance of his work after the act of 12th January, 1853, and
was paid in levee scrip, with which he made application to enter the
lands, which was refused because they were not then confirmed-in May, 1856,
after the confirmation, he entered the land, without its having been offered
for sale, with his levee scrip, and upon a patent being issued to the state,
obtained the deed of the governor. On the 9th of August, 1855, immediately
after the lands, embraced in the same confirmation as those in controversy, were
advertised and offered for sale-though the land agent did not offer these
lands, having previously permitted their entry by the defendant-the com-
plainant made application to enter the lands at private sale, which being
refused, he filed his bill to divest the defendant of the legal title, and vest
it in himself: Held, that the entry of the lands by the defendant was within