1889. ROLLER V. BEAM. the purpose of subjecting the real and personal | of H. 68 Tex. 361; Bursinger v. Bank of Water- Messrs. John T. Harris, Jr., and William B. Compton, for appellees: The assignment to Gen. Roller is unlawful, because it is totally lacking in a lawful subject Gen. Roller had no insurmatter of contract. able interest whatever in the life of James H. Moore. As an original transaction, he could not take out a policy upon his life for his own benefit. The existence of an insurable interest is an absolute prerequisite to support a policy This of insurance upon the life of another. principle is applicable, not only to parties to the transaction, but to assignees as well, the law wisely prohibiting the accomplishment by indirection of that which it forbids to be done directly. May, Ins. § 398, p. 599; Cammack v. Lewis, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 643 (21 L. ed. 244); Page v. Burnstine, 102 U. S. 669, 670 (26 L. ed. 270); Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U. S. 498 (27 L. ed. 800); Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457 (24 L. ed. 251); Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775 (26 L. ed. 924); New York Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 597 (29 L. ed. 999); Mo. Valley L. Ins. Co. v. McCrum, 36 Kan. 146; Cooper v. Shaeffer (Pa.) 9 Cent. Rep. 601; Price v. Supreme Lodge K. He paid premiums on the last policy to the amount of $293. The insured died within a year. It was held there was no disproportion of which the debtor's administrators could take advantage. Ibid. The insurance of the life of a debtor for the sum of $2,000, in favor of a creditor, where the amount of indebtedness was uncertain when insurance was effected, but afterwards ascertained to be between $500 and $750, was held, under the facts of the case, to be no evidence of bad faith, or that the contract was a wager. Corson v. Garnier, supra. A person has an insurable interest in his own life, and has a right to procure a policy thereon, and make it payable, in case of his death, to any person whom he may desire. Bloomington Mut. L. Ben. Asso. v. Blue, 8 West. Rep. 642, 120 Ill. 121. Act 1862, chap. 9, amendatory of Code, art. 45, § 8, provided that a husband might insure his life for the sole use of his wife, and assign to her any policy on his life. There is no restriction, qualification or provision excepting from its operation the case of a husband who is unable to pay his debts. Elliott v. Bryan, 1 Cent. Rep. 491, 64 Md. 368. A young unmarried woman without property, who for several years has been supported and educated by her brother, who stood to her in loco parentis, was held to have an insurable interest in his life. Corson v. Garnier, supra. A stepson has no insurable interest in the life of his stepfather. United Brethren Mut. Aid Society v. McDonald, 122 Pa. 324. A son-in-law has no insurable interest in the life of his mother-in-law, who has no visible means of support and whom he keeps and maintains. Stambaugh v. Blake (Pa.) 22 W. N. C. 407. A grandchild has not an insurable interest in the life of a grandfather merely by virtue of the relationship. Burton v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. 119 Ind. 207. This assignment is unlawful, because it is against public policy, coming within the scope of transactions prohibited by law for sound reasons of public policy. Cammack v. Lewis, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 643 (21 L. ed. 244); May, Ins. 398, p. 599; Price v. Supreme Lodge K. of H. 68 Tex. 361. Lacy, J., delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Rockingham County, rendered The case is as follows: James H. Moore havon the first day of August, 1887. ing died, the appellee, Herod Homan filed a creditor's bill against the appellee D. M. Beam, his administrator, his widow and heirs, to have an account of the debts, and to subject the real and personal assets to the payment of the debts. The administrator, Beam, answered, and claimed that among the assets of the decedent, Moore, was a policy of insurance for $5,000 in the Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, which had been collected by the appellant, John E. Roller, under an alleged assignment, asking that the answer be treated as a cross-bill, and that said Roller be made a Wagering policies are void. An insurable interest is not necessarily a definite pecuniary interest, such as is recognized and protected at law; it may be contingent, restricted as to time, or indeterminate in amount, but it must be actual, and not merely to put a wager upon human life. Corson v. Garnier, 4 Cent. Rep. 307, 113 Pa. 438; Amick v. Butler, 9 West. Rep. 843, 111 Ind. 578. The essential point is that the transaction be bona fide, and not a device to evade the law. Amick v. Butler, supra. Where one procures insurance on the life of another in whom he has no insurable interest, the policy is void. Ibid.; Lamont v. Grand Lodge Iowa Legion of Honor, 31 Fed. Rep. 180. A person who has no insurable interest in another's life cannot recover upon a policy on such life, which is purchased during the lifetime of the insured, as the policy so obtained is a mere wager, and void. Mo. Valley L. Ins. Co. v. McCrum, 36 Kan. 146. Policies held by one not a relative or creditor are speculative: and the proceeds, over expenditure, cannot be held by such persons against representatives of the insured, notwithstanding assignment Pa. 251. by heirs. Ruth v. Katterman, 2 Cent. Rep. 776, 112 A policy taken upon the life of another for speculative purposes is regarded as nothing more than a wager. Amick v. Butler, supra. A life insurance policy for $3,000 as security for a $100 debt is a wager. Cooper v. Shaeffer (Pa.) 9 Cent. Rep. 601, 20 W. N. C. 123. In the absence of any insurable interest of the beneficiary, the law will presume that a policy was taken out for the purpose of a wager or speculation. United Brethren Mut. Aid Society v. McDonald, 122 Pa. 324. party defendant and required to answer, the oath being waived. And it is concerning this policy of insurance that this controversy is before this court. The administrator of Moore claims that the assignment of Moore, although absolute on its face, was intended to be only conditional, and that the interest of Roller was confined to the four premiums which he had paid quarterly, of $62.50 each, and $1 fee. premium, and on the 12th of August the second policy lapsed. And on the 20th of September following Roller obtained the assignment of the policy, which is absolute in its terms. Roller paid the fourth premium, and on the 12th of February following Moore died. And on the 25th of May Roller collected the policy and claims it as his own. The circuit court held that the assignment was not a new contract on the 20th of September between the parties and an absolute assignment, but that it bore the impress of the original transactions, and stood merely as a security for the advances made by Roller; and, follow [26 L. ed. 268], required Roller to account to the administrator of Moore for the policy, after deducting the premiums paid by him. And also, as this policy made Moore's estate solvent, Roller was allowed to retain another debt which Moore's estate owed him, all the debts of Moore being amply provided for. The policy was taken out by Moore with Messrs. Lupton Bros., general agents of the company at Harrisonburg, the county seat of Rockingham County; but not having the money to pay the premium, he gave his note to Luping the case of Page v. Burnstine, 102 U. S. 664 ton Bros. for $63.50-the premium, $62.50, and $1 fee. This note Lupton Bros. carried to Roller and sold at 20 per cent discount, and handed the policy, made out in the name of Moore, to Roller, as a further security for the debt of Moore for $63.50. This policy and note of Moore were carried to Roller because Lupton knew that Roller had business transactions with Moore. This transaction, in its origin, was simply the purchase by Roller of the note of Moore at 20 per cent discount and the holding of the policy as collateral security. Moore failing to pay the note, Roller began to press him for the money, and then to insist upon an assignment of the policy, drawing up a paper to that effect and authorizing Roller to collect the policy with the proviso: "Provided that in the mean time this assignment and power be not canceled and annulled." Moore held, but did not execute, this paper, this paper being dated March 31, 1884. On the 10th of June following Roller wrote to Moore a letter urging the matter and referring to the paper of March 31, 1884, thus: "I sent you a paper showing the contract under which I paid the first premium for you--that is, as long as I paid the premiums the policy was to be mine and you were to assign it to me." From this decree Roller appealed. He insists that under the assignment the policy was his, and that it vested in him the absolute ownership; that he had, as the creditor of Moore, an insurable interest in his life, and that the policy was not therefore a wager policy. The case of Page v. Burnstine, supra, relied on by the circuit court and followed in its decision, is very similar to this case. From the opinion in that case we find that the transactions between Page and Burnstine had their origin in a loan of money by Burnstine to Page. To secure that loan an assignment was made of Page's interest in the policy to the extent of the sum borrowed. Each subsequent assignment showed upon its face a similar arrangement until that of January 7, 1873, was executed. The latter assignment by itself imputed an absolute transfer to Burnstine of all the right, title and interest of the assured in the policy, and to the payments made therefor, and all benefits and advantages to be derived The second quarterly premium was due on therefrom. "But," says the opinion, “the cirthe 10th of June. Lupton, the agent, not hear-cumstances disclosed in the record indicated ing from Moore about it, collected it of Roller, and Moore, not noticing the agent, paid the premium directly to the company in New York and Lupton received the company's receipt for it. policy. with reasonable certainty that the real and only object of the execution of the assignment of January 7, 1873, was to invest Burnstine with the entire control of the policy, to the end that thereafter the company might deal directly In the mean time Moore, on the 12th of May, with him, and, upon the death of the assured, had applied for a second policy of $5,000 in that he might be invested with full authority to the same company, and Lupton applied the re-receive the proceeds of the policy and apply ceipt for the premium paid by Moore on the | them in repayment of such sum or sums as he first policy to the first premium on this second had loaned to Page upon the security of the policy, and had it issued, he having received payment of Roller of the second premium on the first policy as stated. After this Roller wrote the letter referred to of that date, saying further as to the paper of March 31: "You have never returned that paper to me. I do not like that way of doing business, and write now to say that it must be attended to at once. You must not fail to attend to this at once." On the 27th of June following Roller sent an absolute assignment to Moore, without any proviso. This not being replied to by Moore, Roller wrote again on the 4th of August: "You have never signed that assignment to me of that insurance policy. It must be done without delay. You are not treating me right in this matter." On the 10th of September Roller paid the third "In other words, the last assignment may be construed as simply appoirting Burnstine, upon the death of the assured, to receive from the company such sum as would then be due on the policy, and, after reimbursing himself to the extent of his loan to Page, to pay the balance to the persons entitled thereto. A different construction of that instrument would place Burnstine in the position of being pecuniarily interested in the death of Page. Unless compelled to do so, we should not suppose that he had any desire or purpose to speculate upon the life of Page, or to do more than secure the repayment of the money actually loaned by him to the assured." It is certainly true in this case, if not conced ed, that the original assignment prepared by | able consideration equally with any other Roller was an absolute assignment, and author- chose in action when the assignment is not izes Roller to collect the policy with due proviso, made to cover a mere speculative risk, and "provided that in the mean time this assign- thus evade the law against wager policies, and ment and power be not canceled and annulled." payment thereof may be enforced for the benThis was all that Roller asked at first. efit of the assignee.' In the 10th of June note, as stated, Roller claimed that this was the original agreement, as he believed, saying: "I sent you a paper showing the contract under which I paid the first premium for you-that is, as long as I paid the premium the policy was to be mine, and you were to assign it to me." Subsequently Roller, in a personal interview, procured an assignment absolute on its face. The circuit court held that this assignment bore the impress of the original transaction, and stood merely as a security for the advances made by Roller. If the assignment was absolute, as it appeared upon its face to be, and was so intended to operate between the parties, we must consider whether Roller held such an insurable interest in the life of Moore as would render such an assignment valid. The policy as taken out by Moore was a valid contract, and as such was assignable by the assured to Roller as security for any sums lent to him or advanced for the premium and assessments upon it. But was it assignable to Roller for any other purpose? 66 As was said by Mr. Justice Field in a similar case (Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 779, 26 L. ed. 926): "The association had no insurable interest in the life of the deceased, and could not have taken out a policy in its own name. Such a policy would constitute what is termed a wager policy, or a mere speculation contract upon the life of the assured, with a direct interest in its early termination. It is not easy to define with precision what will, in all cases, constitute an insurable interest. It may be stated generally, however, to be such an interest arising from the relations of the party obtaining the insurance, either as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation, for a parent has an insurable interest in the life of his child, and a child in the life of his parent; a husband in the life of his wife, and a wife in the life of her husband. The natural affection in cases of this kind is considered as more powerful, as operating more efficaciously, to protect the life of the insured, than any other consideration. But in all cases there must be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary, or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured." The assignment of a policy, however, to a party not having an insurable interest, is as objectionable as the taking out of a policy in his name. To the extent in which the assignee stipulates for the proceeds of the policy be yond the sums advanced by him, he stands in the position of one holding a wager policy. The law might be readily evaded if the policy, or an interest in it, could, in consideration of paying the premiums and assignments upon it, and the promise to pay upon the death of the assured a portion of its proceeds to his representatives, be transferred, so as to entitle the assignee to retain the whole insurance money. Warnock v. Davis, supra; Franklin L. Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116; Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564; Cammack v. Lewis, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 643 [21 L. ed. 244]; Cooper v. Shaeffer (Pa.) 9 Cent. Rep. 601; Corson v. Garnier, 113 Pa. 438, 4 Cent. Rep. 307; Lamont v. Hotel-Men's Mut. Ben. Asso. 30 Fed. Rep. 817; Batdorff v. Fehler (Pa.) 8 Cent. Rep. 230; Shugar v. Garman (Pa.) 3 Cent. Rep. 558; Ruth v. Katterman, 112 Pa. 251, 2 Cent. Rep. 776; Price v. Supreme Lodge K. of H. 68 Tex. 361; Mo. Valley L. Ins. Co. v. McCrum, 36 Kan. 146, and cases cited. While the foregoing is in accordance with the weight of authority, the decisions are not uniform, and we are referred to numerous decisions to the contrary as to assigned policies. St. John v. Am. Mut. L. Ins. Co. 13 N. Y. 31; Valton v. Nat. Fund L. Assur. Co. 20 N. Y. 32; Ashley v. Ashley, 3 Sim. 149. The New York Court of Appeals holds that a valid policy of insurance effected by a person upon his own life is assignable like an ordinary chose in action, and that the assignee is entitled, upon the death of the assured, to the full sum, payable without regard to the consideration given by him for the assignment, or to his possession of any insurable interest in the life of the assured. But we are of opinion to follow the decisions on this subject of the Supreme Court of the United States, and those of other courts in'accord therewith. And we are of opinion that if there be any sound reason for holding a policy invalid when taken out by a party who has no interest in the life of the assured (which will not be denied), it is difficult to see why that reason is not as cogent and operative against a party taking an assignment of a policy upon the life of a person in which he has no interest. The same ground which should invalidate the one should invalidate the other, so far, at least, as to restrict the right of the assignee to the sums actually advanced by him. In the conflict of decisions on this subject The foregoing was approved in the subse- we are free to follow those which seem more quent case of Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Luchs, fully in accord with the general policy of the 108 U. S. 503 [27 L. ed. 801], and again in law against speculative contracts upon human N. Y. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 597 life. Justice Field, in Warnock v. Davis, [29 L. ed. 999], the same learned justice say-supra. Of the dangerous and pernicious ing in that case, as to an assignment: A tendencies of such policies, where one person policy of life insurance, without restrictive is enabled to hold a money interest in the words, is assignable by the assured for a valu-death of another, and, for gain, to desire and bring about the death of another by felonious means, is forcibly illustrated by the case of N. Y. Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, supra, where Hunter induced his friend Armstrong to insure his life in his own name and assign the policy to him, and within six weeks waylaid him on the highway at night, and slew him with blows inflicted from behind, for which he was afterwards hanged. think, without error. The transactions between the parties were rightly considered as a whole, each supporting the other; but, if the assignment is absolute in the first place, the decree is still right, because Roller had no greater insurable interest in the life of the assured than is decreed him. The decree of the Circuit Court of Rockingham appealed from here must, therefore, be The decision of the circuit court is, we affirmed. ALABAMA SUPREME COURT. Otto STOELKER, Appt., v. Claude S. THORNTON et al. (.... Ala.....) 1. A sale for a valuable consideration of certificates of a mutual benefit society insuring a member's life, made by such member during his life, is void, not only by force of the society's regulations, where they prohibit such sales, but also as against public policy. 2. The next of kin of a person who has sold his benefit certificates by a contract which is void as against public policy cannot compel a purchaser to account to them for the proceeds, where the society recognized the sale and issued new certificates to the assignee, and paid over the money to him on the death of the in sured. 3. The disposal by will of benefit certificates insuring testator's life is not invalid because of his previous attempt to transfer them to the legatee by a sale which is void as against public policy. 4. If the omission to enter a testamentary direction disposing of the beneficial interest in benefit certificates insuring testator's life "upon the record of the supreme master of exchequer," as required by the certificates, is material, no one but the society can object thereto. (November 7, 1889.) PPEAL by defendant from a decree of the tiffs in a suit to bring an executor to a settlement of testator's estate, and to have certain described funds distributed among his next of kin. Reversed. The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. Messrs. Tompkins & Troy, for appellant: The unquestioned right of a party to be queath the proceeds of his benefit certificates to anyone he sees fit has been frequently decided. Williams v. Corson, 2 Tenn. Ch. 269; Weil V. Trafford, 3 Tenn. Ch. 108; Rison v. Wilker son, 3 Sneed, 565; Tennessee Lodge v. Ladd, 5 Lea, 716; Highland v. Highland, 13 Bradw. 510, 109 Ill. 366. Very clear and binding provisions must be shown to deprive a person of the right given him by the laws of the land to dispose of such a fund by will. Catholic Mut. Ben. Asso. v Priest, 46 Mich. 429; Williams v. Corson, 2 Tenn. Ch. 269. Where a member of a benevolent order has a benefit certificate issued to him, and names at the time the person who is to receive the benefit thereof at his death, and the rules of the order permit him to change the beneficiary, or dispose of the fund by will, and such member in the exercise of this right disposes of the same by will to others than those named in the certificate, the first designation is void either as regards the order or the first-named beneficiary. Clark v. Durand, 12 Wis. 223; Gambs v. Conn. Mut. L. Ins. Co. 50 Mo. 44; Swift v. Railway Pass. Asso. 96 Ill, 309; Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Stevens, 19 Fed. Rep. 671; Bickerton v. Jaques, 28 Hun, 119. See Weil v. Trafford, 3 Tenn. Ch. 108. The power of selection is unlimited as to persons and is limited in time only by the death of the member; the right of the free exercise of the power of appointment given to the member requires its continuance until death, and over that power no other person has any control. Barton v. Providence Mut. Relief Asso. 63 N. H. 535, 1 New Eng. Rep. 856; Bacon, Benefit Societies, 306, note 1; Highland v. Highland and Catholic Mut. Ben. Asso. v. Priest, supra; Gentry v. Supreme Lodge K. of H. 23 Fed. Rep. 718, 20 Cent. L. J. 393; Splawn v. Chew, 60 Tex. 532; Holland v. Taylor, 111 Ind. 121, 9 West. Rep. 606. The right to change the beneficiary is not affected by the fact that the first beneficiary paid the assessments of the member and the change was made without his consent. Bacon, Benefit Societies, 306; Masonic Mut. Rep. 92; Fisk v. Equitable Aid Union (Pa.) 9 Cent. Rep. 403; Splawn v. Chew, 60 Tex. 534; Barton v. Providence Mut. Relief Asso. 63 N. H. 535, 1 New Eng. Rep. 856. At the time of Watson's death the certificate in that order provided for the payment of the fund to Stoelker; so if Stoelker is not entitled to the excess over the sum due him, appellees are entitled to no part of it. See Turner v. Stetts, 28 Ala. 420. was The substitution by Watson of the appellant as the beneficiary in the certificate issued by the United Workmen, instead of his "estate," a legitimate transaction, and not intended as a cover for speculation and wager; and the disproportion between the amount due at the time of the transfer and the amount called for by the certificate will not render it invalid. Grant v. Kline, 115 Pa. 618, 7 Cent. Rep. 626; Baldorff v. Fehler (Pa.) 8 Cent. Rep. 230; Bacon, Benefit Societies, § 249, and authorities cited. Messrs. Watts & Son, for appellees: 1889. STOELKER V. THORNTON. Stone, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: The present bill seeks to bring Stoelker, the executor, to a settlement of the estate of Charles J. Watson, deceased, and to have certain described funds distributed to complainants, who Stoelker resists the are next of kin to Watson. recovery, and insists that the entire funds in controversy are his property. This is $5,000; $2,000 of it being a benefit secured to Watson in a benevolent society known as the "Ancient Order of United Workmen," and the other $3,000 being the sum of two like benefits or policies due to Watson from the society known as the "Knights of Pythias." Each of these sums was payable on the death of Watson, with certain provisos, which were complied with. After the death of Watson and the probate of the will, the two societies severally paid to Stoelker the amounts called for in the policies. Stoelker was the only creditor, and his claim, exclusive of the funeral and administration expenses, was a little less than $1,000. The one certificate declared that Watson was "entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership in 'Ancient Order of United Work men,' and to participate in the beneficiary fund of the order to the amount of $2,000," payable to his estate at his death, with conditions which, as we have said, we need not state here. The other two certificates or policies, aggregating $3,000, were issued by the society or order known as the "Knights of Pythias." These, also, had conditions not necessary to be noticed here. They severally secured the sums of $1,000 and $2,000, to be paid "to the estate of the said Charles J. Watson, as directed by said brother in his application, or to such other person or persons as he may subsequently direct, by will or otherwise, and entered upon the records of the supreme master of the exchequer, upon due notice and proof of death and good standing in the rank at the time of the death." These several certificates or policies were issued in 1880; and by their terms, and by the rules of said societies, the member holding them was bound to make certain payments when called on, as a condition of keeping them alive. It is neither averred nor shown that Watson, when he made his application for membership in the society known as "Knights of Pythias," directed or designated therein any person to whom the benefit money was to be paid at his death, nor is it averred or shown that any direction, given by will or otherwise, was ever "entered upon the records of the supreme master of the exchequer." Until 1883, Watson paid all the calls made upon him, and kept each of said policies alive. At that time, his health having failed, and desiring to travel as a means of restoring it, he entered into the following agreement with Stoelker: He owed Stoelker over $400, and, in payment of said indebtedness, and in consideration of other $500, paid, and agreed to be paid, by Stoelker to him, he agreed to sell said three policies or benefit certificates to Stoelker, he (Stoelker) assuming to pay all calls that might thereafter be made on said policies or benefit certificates. Pursuant to this agreement, Watson petitioned the two societies to have Stoelker substituted as the beneficiary in each of the policies. The society known as the " Ancient Order of United Workmen " conformed to Watson's directions, and substituted Stoelker as the beneficiary in the policy it had issued. The Knights of Pythias had a regulation that policies issued by that society could not become the subject of sale for a valuable consideration, but could pass to a beneficiary for love and affection only. It refused to recognize the sale and transfer to Stoelker, and refused to substitute him as the beneficiary. In March, 1884, Watson executed his last will and testament, and therein bequeathed to Stoelker said two policies issued by the Knights of Pythias, describing him as a friend who had befriended him, and making no allusion to the debt, nor to the transfer. It appointed Stoelker executor; and, Watson dying in June afterwards, the will was proven and established. There is no averment or proof that Watson was not mentally capable of making a will, nor is there imputation of fraud or undue influence in its procurement. The assault made upon it will be stated further It is not charged or pretended that Stoelker on. did not perform all he promised, and did not pay the $500 to Watson, and did not meet all calls that were made a condition on which the vitality of said policies was to be preserved. Each society paid the amount of the policies to Stoelker; and, as we have said, the present suit was instituted to obtain the distribution of the fund among Watson's next of kin. He died without lineal descendants. The right of recovery in this case is based on the following propositions: That the benefit certificates are, in substance, life insurance policies on Watson's life; that a stranger, such as Stoelker was, has no insurable interest, and can neither sue out, nor lawfully acquire, insurance on his life, while he (Watson) was living; that, as a consequence, the attempted sale of the policies to Stoelker in 1883 was against public policy, and was void; and that the transaction shows on its face that the will of 1884 was executed simply as a means of carrying into effect the illegal agreement of sale made in 1883. On these grounds it is contended that Stoelker can only claim to the extent he was a creditor of We will first consider this Watson, for to that extent only had he an insurable interest. case on the agreement of sale made in 1883, and independently of the will. It is very clear that the attempted contract of sale of the benefit certificate issued by the society of the Knights of Pythias was inoperative and void. It was against public policy for Stoelker to insure Watson's life, and it was equally so for him to purchase and hold such insurance while Watson was in life. An additional reason is found in that society's regulation, that its benefit certificates cannot be sold for a valuable consideration. So, if this controversy rested alone on the agreement of 1883, not recognized as valid by the Knights of Ruse Pythias, Stoelker had no valid claim which he could have asserted against that society. v. Mut. Ben. Ins. Co. 23 N. Y. 516; Stevens v. Warren, 101 Mass. 564; Franklin L. Ins. Co. v. Hazzard, 41 Ind. 116; People v. Golden Rule, 114 Ill. 34; Mo. Valley L. Ins. Co. v. Sturges, 18 Kan. 93; Mo. Valley L. Ins. Co. v. McCrum, 36 Kan. 146; Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775 [26 L. ed. 924]; Helmetag v. Miller, 76 Ala. 183; |