Wilson v. Soper, 13 B. Mon. 411, re-reported, 56 Am. Dec. 573, and note; Loeschigk v. Hatfield, 51 N. Y. 660; Cushman v. Addison, 52 N. Y. 628; Williams v. Whedon, 109 N. Y. 333, 12 Cent. Rep. 227, decided in 1888 and re-reported in 4 Am. S. R. 460; French v. Lovejoy, 12 N. H. 458, 65 Am. Dec. 295–303, note; Barry v. Briggs, 22 Mich. 201. In the very recent case of Williams v. Whedon, supra, the New York Court of Appeals reviews many prior cases, and refers to Emerson v. Senter as conclusive. In the case of French v. Lovejoy, supra, the Court of Appeals of New Hampshire says (p. 459): "The property of the partnership might be lawfully appropriated to the payment of the partnership debts, and F. Lovejoy, as surviving partner, had the right to prefer A. Lovejoy, a creditor of the firm, in that way." In Barry v. Briggs, supra, Chief Justice Campbell, speaking for the Michigan court, says: "A sole surviving partner has the entire legal title to all the partnership assets. He has a right, acting honestly and with reasonable discretion and diligence, to dispose of them as he pleases; to settle all debts against the concern, to make any compromise he may deem necessary, and to turn the assets into an avail able and distributable form." Bates on Partnership, 2d vol., § 732, says: "As the surviving partner has the entire title and sole control of the property, and represents the power of all the former partners, and they all could have assigned the property for the benefit of creditors, so the surviving partner has, at least in the case of insolvency, in order to wind up, the same power, and can transfer the property to an assignee for the benefit, not of his separate creditors, but of the partnership creditors. And as he (the surviving part ner) can pay some creditors in full, to the prejudice of others, so it has been held that, if the local law does not forbid, in case of other assignments for creditors, he can assign with preferences; " and for this last proposition the author cites, among others, the case of Emerson v. Senter. The cases of Fitzpatrick v. Flannagan, 106 U. S. 648 [27 L. ed. 211], and Case v. Beauregard, 99 U. S. 119 [25 L. ed. 370], are cited in the recent case decided by this court of Robinson v. Allen, 13 Va. L. J. 235. See the case of Beste v. Burger, 13 Cent. Rep. 146, 110 N. Y. 644. Even real estate, bought with partnership funds, the title of which is taken in the name of the deceased partner, is so completely in the control of the surviving partner that where he assigned to a trustee, and the trustee sold, the purchaser of this equitable title can, in equity, compel the heirs of the deceased partner to convey the legal title to him. Shanks v. Klein, 104 U. S. 18 [26 L. ed. 635]. The cases referred to in the brief of counsel for appellant, Salsbury v. Ellison, 7 Colo. 167 and Anderson v. Norton, 15 Lea, 14, are rested on the ground that the surviving partner is a trustee for the benefit of the firm creditors, and is governed by the rules applying to ordinary trustees, and that, as in the case of ordinary trustees, "equality is equity," the surviving partners, being trustees, cannot give any preference among the creditors. But surviving partners are not trustees in the ordinary sense, though they are loosely so called by some judges and law writers. Lord Chancellor Westbury, in Knox v. Gye, L. R. 5 H. L. 656 and 675, citing 2 Pomeroy, p. 618, note 2, says that the trust of a surviving partner is limited by the extent of his obligation, and that it is most important to mark this again and again, for there is not a more fruitful source of error in law than the inaccuracy of language. The application to a man who is, improperly and by metaphor only, called a trustee, of all the consequences which would follow if he were a trustee by express declaration-in other words, a complete trustee, holding the property exclusively for the benefit of the cestui que trust-well illustrates the remark of Lord Macclesfield, that "nothing in law is so apt to mislead as metaphor." But, conceding that a surviving partner is a trustee in a general sense, what is the extent of his trust? Certainly not beyond his obligation: first, to collect all the assets of the firm; second, to apply them to the firm debts; third, to distribute the surplus, if any, among the surviving partners and the representatives of those who are dead. This is the full extent and duty of his trust, such as it is. In paying the debts of the firm there is no limitation or restriction on his power to pay one social creditor, or to secure one, in preference to another, if he act honestly. In this regard he has the same right and power that any other debtor has. The representative of the deceased partner is not injured by a preference given to one firm creditor over another; and it is quite immaterial to him, if the assets of the firm be insufficient to pay all the social creditors, whether they be applied ratably to all the debts, or be applied to some, to the exclusion of the others. The burden upon the estate of the decedent is precisely the same in either event. The creditor has no other equity than the partners have inter se; and the whole extent of a partner's equity is that the partnership assets shall be applied to the payment of the partnership debts, to the exclusion of the separate debts of the several partners; but this right of equity does not extend or operate to the prevention of giving preference among partnership creditors. The case of Offutt v. Scott, 47 Ala. 104, cited in the petition for appeal, is not in conflict with this principle. Nor is the Virginia case of Lindsey v. Corkery, 29 Gratt. 650. In that case each of the partners had gone into bankruptcy, and it was, among other things, held that, by the bankruptcy-the going into bankruptcy of the several partners, the social assets stood appropriated to all the social creditors alike, and the rule of administration of the assets, thus appropriated, was the same, whether the bankrupt assets were administered in the bankrupt court or in a court of equity. The lien or equitable right existing among the partners, by, through and under which the social creditors may only claim, extends no further than to require the social assets to be applied to the social debts, and, until they are paid, that the individual debts of the partners shall be excluded from participation in the social fund; but it does not prohibit preferences from being given in the payment, or securing the payment, of partnership debts out of partnership property. In the absence of a statute to the contrary-and there is none such in Vir- | to refuse to order the needless costs and delay ginia-every debtor has the right to prefer one of accounts, when the trustee had reported of his creditors to another; and the case of a that the assets were all in hand, and were insurviving partner, who is a debtor as such, is sufficient to satisfy even the preferred debts. no exception to the general rule. We do not think it was error in the Circuit Court of Bedford County to dismiss the bill, when there was no proof of its allegations, nor The judgment of this court is that the decree appealed from is right, and that it is affirmed. Decree affirmed. Richardson, J., dissents. NOTE.-Right to use of land, surface water, dam- | nel in which it is accustomed to and does flow with num absque injuria. Neither damnum absque injuria uor injuria absque damnum constitutes a good cause of action. Deobold v. Oppermann, 2 L. R. A. 644, 111 N. Y. 542; Hutchins v. Hutchins, 7 Hill, 104; Michigan v Phœnix Bank, 33 N. Y. 9. Damage to land from surface water, as an incidental consequence of the lawful and rightful use of its easement by a railroad company, is damnum absque injuria. Bell v. Norfolk Southern R. Co. 101 N. C. 21. A land owner has no right of action against the owner of adjoining higher land, who, in the ordinary course of husbandry, causes surface water to flow on his land with increased velocity or in a more contracted channel, if no damage is caused thereby. Peck v. Goodberlett, 12 Cent. Rep. 199, 109 N. Y. 180. Every citizen holds his property subject to the implied obligation that he will use it in such a way as not to prevent others from enjoying the use of their property. State v. Yopp, 97 N. C. 477. A man has a right to cultivate his land in the usual and reasonable way, as well upon a hill as in the plain, and cannot be restrained from doing so because a mill-pond below may be injured by the washing down of the soil. Middlesex,Co. v. McCue, 149 Mass. 103. A land owner has the right in good faith to improve and till his farms, to fill up sag holes, so that water will not accumulate and stay in them, even if the water arising from rainfalls or melting snow should thereby find its way into a ravine and upon the land of another, and incidentally increase the flow thereon. Gregory v. Bush, 7 West. Rep. 172, 64 Mich. 37. "Surface water" is defined as that which is diffused over the surface of the ground, derived from falling rains and melting snows, and continues to be such until it reaches some well-defined chan other waters, whether derived from surface or springs. Crawford v. Rambo, 4 West. Rep. 446, 44 Ohio St. 279. The doctrine of the common law, and not of the civil law, in reference to surface water, prevails in Missouri. Martin v. Benoist, 2 West. Rep. 541, 20 Mo. App. 262. No change in the distribution of surface water from a superior to an inferior tenement is material, unless injury is done. Peck v. Goodberlett, 12 Cent. Rep. 199, 109 N. Y. 180. Where the normal flow of surface water over the plaintiff's land was but slightly increased by the diversion, which caused no damage, he cannot recover. Jeffers v. Jeffers, 9 Cent. Rep. 845, 107 N. Y. 650. See generally, as to right to use of one's land, Moellering v. Evans, ante, p. 449. General and special verdicts defined. General and special verdicts are not consistent in the same case; the one finds both the law and the facts, the other the facts only. Louisville, N. A. & C. R. Co. v. Balch, 2 West. Rep. 286, 105 Ind. 93. A special verdict should find all the facts essential to a recovery. Indiana, B. & W. R. Co. v. Barnhart, 13 West. Rep. 425, 115 Ind. 399; Kerkhof v. Atlas Paper Co. 68 Wis. 674. A general verdict is not rendered special by merely designating the ground on which it is based. Shifflet v. Morelle, 68 Tex. 382. The practice of requiring of the jury a general verdict, and also special findings on issues submitted, is not authorized by statute. Dwyer v. Kalteyer, 68 Tex. 554. A general verdict will frequently, and perhaps ordinarily, ascertain and fix the rights and obligations of parties; and when this is manifest general verdicts are proper. Johnson v. Higgins, 1 New Eng. Rep. 179, 53 Conn. 236. A verdict for plaintiff on the general issue, which Even with legislative authority a party obstructing a stream is liable for injury resulting from want of due care or skill in arranging works so as to avoid danger reasonably to be expected from habits of the stream and its liability to flood. 52. Bellinger v. New York Cent. R. Co. 23 N. Y. A party doing damage must justify his acts by showing that he employed a competent engineer. Rochester White Lead Co. v. Rochester, 3 N. Y. 463. One who brings upon his land anything which would not naturally come upon it, and which is in itself dangerous, and may become mischievous if not kept under control, although in so doing he may act without personal willfullness or negligence, will be liable for all damages occasioned. Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 Hurl. & C. 774; Lapham v. Curtis, 5 Vt. 371. See Shrewsbury v. Smith, 12 Cush. 177. A person must take every precaution reasonable in the necessary improvement of his own premises in digging excavations to prevent the water breaking out. Bellinger v. New York Cent. R. Co. supra, Rau v. Minnesota Valley R. Co. 13 Minn. 442; Pye v. Mankato, 36 Minn. 373. See also Hogenson v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 31 Minn. 224. Messrs. M. D. Grover and W. E. Dodge for respondent. Gilfillan, Ch. J., delivered the opinion of the court: From the course of the trial in this case, as shown by the settled statement of the case, it is apparent that the parties did not, by consent, enter upon the trial of any other than the issues made by the pleadings. This makes it necessary to refer to the complaint to ascertain what issues it presents, that is, what act of the defendant it alleges as wrongful. It alleges that the defendant wrongfully, unlawfully, wantonly, negligently and maliciously cut, dug and made, and caused to be dug, cut and made, two certain large ditches about six miles in length, one on each side of its roadbed, parallel with and about ten feet from it, and connected them by means of five large culverts, the locations of which are given, the ditches running through large quantities of low and wet land, and which ditches did and do gather could not have been found if a special plea had | Kansas City, St. J. & C. B. R. Co. 5 West. Rep. 109, 23 been sustained, is in effect a verdict also for plain- | Mo. App. 12. tiff on the special plea. Authorities cited in Almy v. Daniels, 4 New Eng. Rep. 917, 15 R. I. 318. A jury cannot return two special or general verdicts in the same action. Baughan v. Baughan, 12 West. Rep. 925, 114 Ind. 73. Where the jury respond affirmatively or negatively to the issues submitted to them, it is a general verdict, although there be several issues; when they state the facts and leave the court to apply the law arising upon them, it is a special verdict. Porter v. Western N. C. R. Co. 97 N. C. 66. A general verdict must be regarded in the first instance as affirming the truth of each and every proposition of fact necessary to support the general conclusion arrived at; and every reasonable presumption will be indulged in its favor, while nothing will be inferred or presumed in aid of the special findings [as against the general verdict. Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Hedges, 118 Ind. 5. Verdicts are to receive reasonable construction, and are not to be voided unless from necessity. Cattell v. Dispatch Pub. Co. 3 West. Rep. 843, 88 Mo. 356. All reasonable presumptions must be indulged in favor of the general verdict, while nothing will be presumed in aid of the special findings of facts. McComas v. Haas, 5 West. Rep. 689, 107 Ind. 512; Redelsheimer v. Miller, 5 West. Rep. 619, 107 Ind. 485; Baltimore, O. & C. R. Co. v. Rowan, 1 West. Rep. 914, 104 Ind. 88. A general verdict finding two thirds of certain property to be separate property of a wife, and one third subject to execution as community; and a special finding that the property was a homestead, are contrary and unintelligible, and cannot support a judgment upon the special verdict. Blum v. Rogers, 71 Tex. 668. Special verdict, when to control. Where a special finding of facts is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former shall control the latter, and the court shall give judgment accordingly. Rev. Stat. § 547; Perry v. Makenson, 1 West. Rep. 271, 103 Ind. 300; Baltimore, O. & C. R. Co. v. Rowan, 1 West. Rep. 914, 104 Ind. 88; Frank v. Grimes, 2 West. Rep. 642, 105 Ind. 346; Turner v. If a special finding can, upon any hypothesis, be reconciled with the general verdict, the former will not control the latter. It is only when the facts specially found, construed together, are, in their legal effect, inconsistent with the general verdict. that they will control. Rev. Stat. 1881, § 547: Redelsheimer v. Miller, 5 West. Rep. 619, 107 Ind. 485; McComas v. Haas, 5 West. Rep. 689, 107 Ind. 512. Special findings, when manifestly inconsistent with each other, will not control the general verdict; but the latter must stand and a judgment be rendered thereon. Rice v. Manford, 9 West. Rep. 84, 110 Ind. 596; Greenfield v. State, 12 West. Rep. 713, 113 Ind. 597. Where the answers to special questions are so insufficient and evasive that it cannot be determined whether they accord or conflict with the general verdict, they ought not to be allowed to stand. Fisk v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 74 Iowa, 424. It is only where there is a direct conflict between the general verdict and the answers to interrogatories, and where the facts found by these answers entitle a party to a judgment, that a motion for judgment on them, notwithstanding the general verdict, will be sustained. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Crunk, 119 Ind. 542; McKinley v. Crawfordsville First Nat. Bank, 118 Ind. 375; Chicago & E. I. R. Co. v. Hedges, 118 Ind. 5. Where facts specially found by the jury are so inconsistent with the general verdict that they cannot be reconciled therewith on any reasonable hypothesis, the facts so found will control the general verdict. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Ellison, 117 Ind. 234. In an action to enforce a debt revived by a new promise, a general verdict will be overruled by a special finding of the new promise. Meech v. Lamon, 1 West. Rep. 587, 103 Ind. 515. If there is any reasonable hypothesis whereby a general verdict and the special finding can be reconciled, judgment must follow the general verdict. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. v. Ellison, 117 Ind. 234; Stringer v. Frost, 2 L. R. A. 614, 116 Ind. 477; New York, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Grand Rapids & I. R. Co. 15 West. Rep. 548, 116 Ind, 60; Indianapolis & V. R. Co. v. Lewis, 119 Ind. 218; Bevins v. Smith (Kan.) 21 Pac. Rep. 1064. and accumulate large quantities of water by | which, so far as involved in this case, the dedraining said low and wet lands, and did and fendant's road runs, is prairie country, with do at certain seasons of the year convey large depressions in the surface, such as are found and enormous quantities of surface water from in every prairie district in this State, along said culverts and from said two ditches, which which surface waters, especially when subwater, by reason of and on account of said siding, flow until they find an outlet, or until ditches and culverts, was unnecessarily made they are absorbed in the soil, or pass off by and forced to run in large and destructive cur- evaporation. rents through the ditches and culverts over large quantities of land, including that of plaintiff, whereby plaintiff's land was overflowed and covered with water, damaging his crops. It is not alleged that there was anything wrongful in the mode of constructing the ditches or culverts; that the former were (if properly there) either too large or too small, or were unskillfully or badly constructed; or that the latter were badly constructed, or were insufficient in capacity or number, or improperly located; or that either ditches or culverts as constructed were unnecessary to the proper construction of the railroad. The complaint really calls in question only the right of the defendant to have the ditches and culverts there, even though necessary to the railroad, if their effect would be to accumulate surface water, and cause it to flow on plaintiff's land, where it would not otherwise flow. The jury rendered a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff, and also returned answers to sixteen specific questions of fact, which the court submitted to them to find upon. The plaintiff moved to set aside one of the special findings on the ground that it was contrary to the evidence, which motion was denied; and the defendant moved to set aside the general verdict, because inconsistent with the special findings, and for judgment on the special findings, which motion was granted, and judgment was accordingly entered, and the plaintiff appealed. Where there is a general verdict, and also special findings, we do not think it proper practice to move to set aside one of the special findings upon an essential fact on the ground that it is contrary to evidence, without asking to have a new trial, either of the whole issue or of the particular question of fact. If such a finding could be set aside on that ground, leaving the general verdict and other special findings to stand, then, if setting it aside would require a judgment different from what would be required if it were retained, the setting it aside on the ground stated would have the effect of a trial by the court without the jury. In this instance, however, within the issues, whether the special finding was set aside or retained would make no difference with the right to judgment. It was only to the effect that the rainfall on the occasion referred to in the complaint was extraordinary and unusual. Whether it was ordinary or extraordinary would make no difference with defendant's liability upon the issues presented by the complaint. Two of the questions submitted to the jury were as follows: (1) Were the excavations by the railroad made by excavating the earth therefrom for the purpose of constructing the defendant's railroad, and not for the purpose of drainage? (2) [Was the defendant's railroad properly constructed, and in the usual and ordinary manner of constructing railroads in prairie countries], and with culverts so placed as to equalize the ordinary flow of surface water?" The first question, and that part of the second which we have placed in brackets, were answered in the affirmative; that part of the second not in brackets in the negative. As we have seen, no question is presented by the complaint as to the proper location of the culverts. The finding as to them is therefore outside of the issues, and must be disregarded. And it is the same as to the last question submitted, referring to the sufficiency of the ditches to carry off ordinary surface water. No other of the special findings modifies in any degree the finding on the two questions we have quoted. The case is therefore one where a railroad company, for the purpose of properly constructing its roadbed, takes earth from one part of its premises and uses it upon the roadbed, thus leaving an excavation or ditch along each side of it, which is the usual and ordinary way of constructing railroads in prairie countries. It is evident that in a flat country, if it be desirable to raise the roadbed above the natural surface of the ground, the earth must be taken, as was done in this case, from alongside of the roadbed, and that so taking it will necessarily leave an excavation or ditch from which the earth has been taken. The right of one land owner to use and improve his own land for the purpose for which similar land is ordinarily used, and that he may do what is necessary for that purpose and that he may build upon it, or raise or lower its surface, even though the effect may be to prevent surface water which before flowed upon it from coming upon it, or to draw from adjoining land surface water which would otherwise remain there, or to shed surface water over land on which it would not otherwise go, is in accordance with the common-law rule as to surface waters, and is fully recognized in this State. Lee v. Minneapolis, 22 Minn. 13; O'Brien v. St. Paul, 25 Minn. 331; Henderson v. Minneapolis, 32 Minn. 319; Rowe v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 43 N. W. Rep. 76. It is conceded that the defendant had a The right to so use and improve one's own right to construct and maintain its railroad, land does not, however, include the right to do and that its acts were done upon its right of so merely by transferring from it surface waters way, rightfully acquired. It is to be regarded, naturally resting upon it to the land of another. therefore, as an owner doing the acts com- It is only where such shifting of the burden plained of on its own premises; and its duty follows as an incident to using or improving and liability are to be measured by the rule as his land as such land is ordinarily used or imto the duty and liability in respect to surface proved, that it can be justified. Kobs v. Minwaters that attaches in the case of an owner in neapolis, 22 Minn. 159; O'Brien v. St. Paul, suthe use of his own land. The district through|pra; Hogenson v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 31 Minn. 224; Blakely Trop. v. Devine, 36 Minn. 53; Pye v. Mankato, 36 Minn. 373; Olson v. St. Paul, M. & M. R. Co. 38 Minn. 419. This case comes within the rule of the cases first above cited. Judgment affirmed. INDIANA SUPREME COURT. Edward HANCOCK et al., Appts., v. William P. YADEN (....Ind.....) 1. A contract by an employe to accept something other than money in payment for his services is valid in the absence of any statutory provisions to the contrary. 2. A statute prohibiting employes from making any contracts in advance to accept anything else than lawful money of the United States is not unconstitutional. 3. No special privileges are conferred, nor any unjust discrimination made, by a statute requiring all persons, firms, corporations, etc., engaged in mining or manufacturing, to pay their employés at least once every two weeks, and prohibiting all contracts by such employés to accept anything but lawful money of the United States in payment. The Statute operates alike upon all who enter the classes named, and leaves all citizens free to enter them. (January 7, 1890.) APPEAL from a judgment of the Sullivan Circuit Court in favor of the plaintiff in an action to recover wages, including a statutory penalty for delay in payment and attorney's fees for prosecuting the action. Affirmed. The services were performed under a contract by which plaintiff agreed to receive his pay monthly, and to accept it or any part thereof at the option of his employers in goods and merchandise, and expressly waived all rights that he might have under the statutes of the State to payment at any other time or in any other manner. The Statutes of February 14, 1887, and March 6, 1889, declare that employés of persons, firms, companies, associations or corporations engaged in mining or manufacturing shall be paid at least once in every two weeks in lawful money of the United States, and that any contract to the contrary or to waive the provisions of the Statute shall be null and void. It is also provided by the Act of 1887 that a penalty of $1 per day, not exceeding double the amount of wages due, may be recovered by the employé for delay in payment, and also a reasonable attorney's fee. Judgment was rendered for plaintiff for $48 due for work and labor, with $10 for penalty and $20 attorney's fees, making a total of $78. Messrs. Beasley & Williams and George A. Knight, for appellants: Questions of power do not depend upon the degree to which it may be exercised. Brown v. State, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 419 (6 L. ed. 678). The rights of personal liberty and private property should be held sacred. Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. pp. 199, foot-note 1, p. 486; Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209. NOTE.-See State v. Fire Creek Coal & Coke Co. ante, p. 359; State v. Goodwill, post, 621. Privileges and immunities include the right by the usual modes to acquire and hold property and to protect and defend the same in law. Cooley, Const. Lim. pp. 491, 492. Depriving an owner of property of one of its attributes is depriving him of his property within the constitutional provision. People v. Otis, 90 N. Y. 48; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, 398; Re Jacobs, 98 N. Y. 98. Liberty means the right, not only of freedom from actual servitude in all lawful ways, but to live and work where one will, to earn his livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or vocation. Butcher's Union Co. v. Crescent City Co. 111 U. S. 746 (28 L. ed. 585); Bertholf v. O'Reilly, 74 N. Y. 509, 30 Am. Rep. 323; People v. Marx, 99 N. Y. 377, 52 Am. Rep. 34. To place the working classes under special protection against the aggression of capital, beyond the careful and strict enforcement of their rights, is to change the government from a government of freedom to a paternal gov ernment, or a despotism, which is the same thing. Tiedeman, Pol. Powers, 571, §§ 93, 96. The laborer may sell his labor for what he thinks best, whether money or goods, just as his employer may sell his iron or coal, and every and any law that proposes to prevent him from so doing is an infringement of his constitutional privileges, and consequently vicious and void. Godcharles v. Wigeman, 4 Cent. Rep. 887, 113 Pa. 431. A statute which provides that all contracts for the mining of coal, in which the weighing of coal, as provided for in that Act, shall be dispensed with, shall be void, is unconstitutional. Millett v. People, 5 West. Rep. 155, 117 Ill. 294, 57 Am. Rep. 869. Statutes passed against plain and obvious principles of common right and common reason are absolutely null and void, so far as they are calculated to operate against those principles. Ham v. McClaws, 1 Bay, 98. See also what is said by Story, J., in Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U. S. 9 Cranch, 43 (3 L. ed. 650); Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 627 (7 L. ed. 542). Messrs. W. S. Maple and Holliday & Byrd for appellee. Elliott J., delivered the opinion of the court: It is alleged in the complaint that the appellee was employed by the appellants to render service for them as a miner in a coal mine of which they were the owners; that, under this employment, he did render service for them in mining coal; that his services were reasonably worth $5 per day; that he demanded payment for his services in lawful money of the United States, and that payment was refused. |