to agree to give him power as Regent, which his advisers, whoever they should be, might induce him to misuse. Should the House give the whole power, it might be affirmed that they went beyond the necessity of the case; sacrificed their right and their duty to the prospect of resuming what they might not afterwards be able to resume; and violated that sacred maxim of law which was not lightly taken up, nor supported by vague authorities, but founded on the practice of ages, and the soundest principles of the constitution.

Mr. Fox said, he had never asserted that the name of the King could not be used without the will. For a person possessing the exercise of discretion, and consequently the power of assenting or dissenting, to use it was a laudable fiction; but for a person set up by Parliament to do a particular act or acts, without the liberty of exercising discretion, or dissenting if he thought proper, to use it was an extravagant fiction. In the one case, there were three branches of the legislature, in the other there were only two. On no occasion had he denied the force of necessity; but in case of necessity they ought to do as little as possible; and however paradoxical it might seem, he insisted, that by giving part of the prerogative, they did more than by giving it entire. He maintained still, that no parliament could legislate, unless the king on the throne has the power to dissolve them, and challenged any lawyer to prove, that a parliament, not liable to dissolution, can legislate.

Mr. Burke complained, that Mr. Pitt had alluded to some expressions of his, as implying that the King could never recover his full power, which, in their literal meaning, implied no more than the uncertainty of what the issue of his Majesty's disorder might be.

Mr. Sheridan thought he understood, and could remove, the doubts that had been stated by some gentlemen respecting the effect of the address proposed by the amendment. It was conceived by some, that by voting for the amendment, they decided on the question of a limited or unlimited regency; but the case was not so, for if they voted in favour of the original resolution, they virtually admitted, that limitations were necessary. Which ever way they proceeded, the opportunity and the security of making limitations were precisely the same. The Chancellor

of the Exchequer had said, that the long disuse of the royal negative was no security that it would not be revived. The right hon. gentleman knew, from his own experience, that the powers of the prerogative might be abused, and therefore it became him to be on his guard. If you doubt the fact, he might say, look at my conduct: recollect under what circumstances I dissolved a parliament, how lavish I have been of the honours of the peerage, and say, that the powers of the prerogative may not be abused if you can. The right hon. gentleman observes, that the prince may dissolve the parliament, without consenting to limitations. The first act of his regency ought to be, to consent to limitations; and was there a man who believed he would not? But in imposing restrictions, some delicacy was requisite, for every restriction that was not necessary, was not a limitation, but an insult. Was the right hon. gentleman in such haste to impose restrictions, because he feared that he could not carry the limitations which he meant to propose, unless he were minister? Or was he apprehensive that parliament or the prince would forget to do their duty? From some such fear, or unworthy suspicion, his haste must proceed. What provision was made, if the prince should refuse to be regent, on the right hon. gentleman's terms? Supposing him not to refuse, would he withhold his consent from restrictions when regent, under which he would consent to accept the trust? Would any one advise him to say, I accept the regency under the limitations you propose, which I think are improper, and which I hope parliament will annul? The House divded:

Dec. 26. The House having resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House, to take into consideration the State of the Nation, the first Resolution was put and agreed to. On the second Resolution being put,

The Earl of Hopetoun adverted to the several topics which had come under the notice of the two Houses. He said that whether the right of the Prince of Wales to the Regency, which had been contended for by some, and resisted by others, were founded or not, or whether the right of appointing a Regent lay with the two Houses, it was the unanimous opinion of all, that the Prince was the person who ought to be named Regent, with such powers as the two Houses should think that the exigency of the case might require. He sincerely lamented that the right of the two Houses had been forced to a decision; yet, as this circumstance had occurred, he thought that the Resolutions of the Commons were entitled to his support.

The Earl of Abingdon said: My lords; Upon the present doleful occasion, I have heard of doctrines, that whilst I recount them in my mind, I stand almost petrified with astonishment. Animus meminisse horret. It has been said, that deliberation in the two Houses of Parliament, at this awful crisis is not of necessity; that the moment it was established by the report of the physicians, that his Majesty's health would not at present permit him to discharge the duties of his trust, the Prince of Wales, de jure, succeeded to that trust; and that although deliberation for form sake might be tolerated, deliberation was matter not of essence, but of form only, and must end in nothing else. And these, good gracious God! my lords, are the doctrines of that very man who but a while ago was plucking the crown off the head of the monarch, and subdividing it between himself and a self-formed heptarchical junto with himself in this and the other House of Parliament. Of that very man, who calls himself a Whig; of him, who, whilst he is in the very act of erecting a monumental pillar in honour and to the memory of the glorious Revolution, is, by his doctrines, tearing up from the very centre of the earth, the sole and only ground upon which that Revolution stands. Such are these doctrines, my lords, and being such, I will not reason upon the subject; I will assert dogmatically, I will say, that the Prince of Wales, by the laws

and constitution of the land, has no more right, as Prince of Wales, to exercise the functions of the Crown, than any other subject of the realm; and I challenge the stoutest lawyer of you all to controvert this position. His right is hereditary, and hereditary only, and that right is posthumous; and let us even see what this posthumous right is. The crown of England is hereditary, but it is hereditary under limitations, restrictions, and provisions. The inheritance, says sir William Blackstone, is conditional; and it is so by the express law of the land; for by the statute of the 1st of William and Mary, s. 2, c. 2, it is enacted, "That every person who should be reconciled to, or hold communion with the see of Rome, should profess the Popish religion, or should marry a Papist, should be excluded, and be for ever incapable to inherit, possess, or enjoy the Crown; and that in such case the people should be dissolved from their allegiance, and the Crown should descend to such persons, being Protes tants, as would have inherited the same, in case the person so reconciled, holding communion, professing, or marrying, were naturally dead."-Now suppose, my lords, a case to occur within the provision of this statute, and then let me ask your lordships, who is to be the judge of the person so incapacitated and excluded by this statute? Is it the Parliament (as it has been craftily and subtlely said, in order to avoid the energy of this statute), because the King is one of the constituent parts of a parliament? Will a king exclude himself? No, no, my lords, that exclusion appertains to us, and to the other House of Parliament exclusively. It is to us it belongs, it is our duty. It is true, the power to alter or new-model the succession, is by law given to the King and Parliament; and it is likewise true, that by the Act of the 6th of queen Anne, c. 7, any person who shall maintain the contrary of this shall be guilty of the penalties of a premunire. But what is the supposition of law in these cases? It is, my lords, that that King, so standing at the head of his Parliament, has not fallen under the disabilities of the afore-mentioned Act of William and Mary, that he sits on his throne under the laws and constitution of the country, that he is a King de jure, as as well as de facto; but if he has fallen under the disabilities of that statute, then, I say, my lords, that the right to newmodel or alter the succession vests in the

Parliament of England, without the King, in the Lords and Commons of Great Britain solely and exclusively. This is Revolution doctrine, my lords; this is my doctrine, though I do not profess myself a Whig, though I am not a member of the Whig-club, nor have I subscribed to the intended politico-patriotic obelisk that is to be at Runnymead. Neither am I a Tory, but I am what I glory in, and will end my life in, I am a well wisher to, and a supporter of, the British constitution. And if this be so where there is an hereditary right, where that right has taken place, and when the crown is already on the head of the King, what shall we say where there is no right at all? My lords, I do again assert, that the Prince of Wales has no more right to the Regency of this country, otherwise than as the two Houses of Parliament shall be pleased, out of their grace and favour, to bestow it upon him, than I have: he may have pretensions superior to others, he may have a claim, but he has no right. His right to govern is hereditary only, and the demise of the Crown, thank God of Heaven, has not yet taken place! May the King live for ever, my lords, and let the Established Church of England, let the hierarchy of this country say, Amen!-But, my lords, when I have said this, I do not mean to say, that the Prince of Wales should not be invested with this authority. What I mean to say is, that the right is yours in conjunction with the other House of Parliament, and you will do with it as you shall think best. But in that doing, let me conjure you to be wary, to be circumspect; the concern is weighty; the case is magnitudinous, and of importance infinite. Feel for yourselves, my lords, feel for the nation; but, above all, feel with the pity of men, for the unhappy state of the monarch himself. Remember, he may be restored to his health, and let us never give up the idea, that" old Lear shall be King again." Remember too, my lords, that by a vote of ours, we are now about to dethrone a King. But will his restoration to the Throne depend upon our vote? Here, my lords, pause and think for a moment. I trust it may. But what has been, may be again. I have read a little of history, and have there found, it is easier to give, than it is to revoke power when given; and especially too, when placed as it may be, in the hands of those who are for or against the rights of the Crown, as it best suits with the views of

their own ambition. Again, in cases of common lunacy, the next heir is not entrusted, from the wisdom of the law, with the guardianship of the lunatic. In the case before us, who are to be the responsible conservators of his Majesty's health, and what the conduit pipes through which this intelligence is to be conveyed to us? My lords, the greatness of the subject calls for united wisdom, and exceeds individual ability to discuss. But insomuch I have discharged my duty.-A single word more, my lords. Let the Prince of Wales reflect, that he, as George the 4th, may of himself have a son, who will be Prince of Wales, so making the case of his father his own; and then let him judge who are, upon the present occasion, his best and truest friends; the ministers who act as they do, or the opposition who advise and lay down the doctrines they have done. It is said that his Royal Highness is a man of sense and discernment. To the wise therefore, my lords, a word is enough.

Lord Rawdon said, that if his declaration on a former day, that he would be the person to stand forward and singly take the sense of their lordships on the question of right, should any attempt be made to discuss it in that House, he could at that time have thrown him under the necessity of making an apology, such a necessity was now completely done away by the speech which the House had just heard. It was now evident, that the vague and extravagant conjectures of the ignorant and uninformed, had made such an impression that they had even found their way into that House, and helped to furnish subjects for parliamentary declamation. For his own part, he would make no farther remarks on the subject, but would proceed to declare his objection to the second proposition, and also to the third, which was so connected with it, that it would be impossible not to consider them both at one and the same time. Both those propositions appeared to him to be equally unnecessary and unwarrantable. From the former of the two, it would be imagined, that some claim, denying the admitted right of all free men, in all times, to choose their own form of government, and in contradistinction to the right of the two Houses, had been set up in a regular way so as to render a declaration of the right of the two Houses necessary. That no such claim of right had been brought forward in any regular way, in either House no noble lord would