a show window, was thereby rendered helpless and bedridden, and that a surgical operation was necessary to save her life because of a pin near the base of the brain, was an "unusual circumstance," warranting commutation of future weekly payments into a lump sum, within Act April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 143) § 2, par. 21, as amended by Act April 1, 1913 (P. L. p 309) § 6. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385[20].) 2. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -REVIEW-QUESTIONS OF FACT. On appeal in a workmen's compensation case from a judgment of the court of common pleas commuting an award to a lump sum, the findings of fact in the common pleas are conclusive, if there be any evidence to support them. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 412.) 3. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION -COMMUTATION OF AWARD-STATUTES. That the concluding provision of Act April 4, 1911 (P. L. p. 143) § 2, par. 21, as amended by Act April 1, 1913 (P. L p. 309), § 6, relating to Workmen's Compensation, provides that commutation of an award shall not be allowed for the purpose of enabling the injured employee to satisfy a debt or to make payment to physicians, lawyers, or any other persons, does not defeat commutation, where unusual circumstances exist, requiring payment to physician to save the employee's life. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec. Dig. § 385[20].) Appeal from Supreme Court. Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Tressa M. Jensen against the F. W. Woolworth Company. From a judgment of the Supreme Court upon certiorari, affirming the judgment of the Morris county court of common pleas commuting an award for plaintiff to a lesser sum, defendant appeals Affirmed. In the Supreme Court the following per curiam was filed: "The certiorari in this case was allowed to review the determination of the Morris county court of common pleas commuting a judgment under the Workmen's Compensation Act from $1,410, payable in installments. at $5 per week, to $1,247.25, in addition to $590 already accrued and $50 allowed for medical and hospital services and medicines. petitioner was injured on May 21, 1915, while in the employ of the defendant, accidentally swallowing pins, while assisting in trimming a show window, on May 21, 1915. The "The rule to be followed by the courts for commutation of compensation is laid down by the Legislature in P. L. 1913, p. 309. The order of commutation was made in accordance with the provisions of the statute, and there was sufficient evidence before the court to support the order under review. These are the two points argued in the prosecutor's brief "The judgment of the Morris county court of common pleas is affirmed, with costs. M. Casewell Heine, of Newark, for appellant. PER CURIAM. The judgment under review will be affirmed, for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court. More amplified views will be set forth in an opinion to be filed. Amplified Opinion. This case came up on certiorari to the Supreme Court to review the judgment, order, and proceedings of the Morris county court of common pleas upon a petition praying for commutation of an award of compensation granted to petitioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Petitioner's injury resulted from the accidental swallowing of pins on March 21, 1915, while in the employ of respondent. The court of common pleas of Morris county determined in the compensation proceedings that petitioner suffered a disability total in character and permanent in quality, and decreed compensation payable at the rate of $5 a week for not more than 400 weeks. On September 21, 1917, petitioner filed a verified petition, praying for commutation into a lump sum payment of balance of compensation by respondent to petitioner. The court thereupon, after hearing the testimony of Dr. James F. Horn, on behalf of the petitioner, filed findings of fact and an order commuting into a lump sum payment the balance due under the original award. The Supreme Court affirmed this order of the court, and from this order and judgment an appeal is taken to this court. WALKER, Ch. The appellant makes four points on this appeal, and argues them under two heads, namely: (1) That the order commuting the award of compensation is contrary to the provisions of the statute (P. L. 1911, p. 134, § 2, par. 21, amended P. L. 1913, p. 302, § 6); and (2) that there is no evidence to support the finding of the common pleas upon which commutation was based. The Supreme Court in a per curiam remarked that the order of commutation was made in accordance with the provisions of the statute, and that there was sufficient evidence before the court to support the order reviewed, and affirmed the judgment of the Morris pleas. Dr. Horn, who gave evidence for the petitioner on this application, testified that she was in bed in a helpless condition, and has required the constant attention of nurses; there is a pin near the base of her brain, and that in his opinion an operation will have to be performed to save her life; she is in need of constant care and attention, and unless she receives the same her life cannot be saved. [1, 2] The statute provides, among other things, that, as commutation is a departure from the normal method of payment, it is to be allowed only when it clearly appears that some unusual circumstances warrant such a departure. If to be bedridden, with the requirement of a surgical operation to save the patient's life, is not an unusual circumstance, and such an one as warrants commutation of future weekly payments into a lump sum, to enable the patient to procure the services of a surgeon and the proper medical attention and nursing, it is hard to conceive of circumstances that would call for the making of an order for commutation. It is plain, therefore, that there was sufficient evidence before the Morris pleas to support the order, as was said by the Supreme Court, and it is familiar doctrine that on appeal in these cases the findings of fact in the common pleas are conclusive, if there be any evidence to support them. Sexton v. Newark Dist. Tel. Co., 84 N. J. Law, 85, 86 Atl. 451; Hulley v. Moosbrugger, 88 N. J. Law, 161, 95 Atl. 1007, L. R. A. 1916C, 1203. That Dr. Horn's testimony was at least some evidence to support the finding of the pleas is too plain for argument. The only other contention is that the order commuting the award is contrary to the provisions of the statute. So much of the section (P. L. 1911, p. 134, § 2, par. 21, amended P. L. 1913, p. 302, § 6) as applies, reads as follows: "The compensation herein provided may be commuted by said court of common pleas, * * * if it appear that such commutation will be for the best interest of the employee * * * or that it will avoid undue expense or undue hardship to either party. * In determining whether the commutation asked for will be for the best interest of the employee, ** * or that it will avoid undue expense or undue hardship to either party, the judge of the court of common pleas will constantly bear in mind that it is the intention of this act that the compensation payments are in lieu of wages, and are to be received by the injured employee * ** in the same manner in which wages are ordinarily paid. Therefore commutation is a departure from the normal method of payment, and is to be allowed only when it clearly appears that some unusual circumstances warrant such a departure. Commutation shall not be allowed for the purpose of enabling the injured employee * * * to satisfy a debt, or to make payment to physicians, lawyers, or any other persons." Many, if not all, of the statutes have statutory provisions for the commutation of weekly payments into gross sums; but we have pointed to none, nor have we found any, which is similar to ours, nor has ours been construed with reference to any given circumstances making a case falling within its provisions. We are therefore confronted in the case at bar with a question of novel impression. Going now to the letter and spirit of section 6 of the act of 1913, amending section 2, par. 21, of the act of 1911, we find that the court may order commutation if it appear that it will be for the best interest of the employee. Surely it will be for the best interest of Miss Jensen to be placed in funds which it appears may save her life, rather than that she be compelled to take the chance of almost certain death without them. Then, too, commutation may be made to prevent undue hardship. The same reasoning applies. Bearing in mind that it is the intention of the act that compensation payments are in lieu of wages, and are to be received by the injured employee in the same manner in which wages are ordinarily paid, that is, in installments, and while commutation is a departure from the normal method of payment, to be allowed only when it clearly appears that some unusual circumstances are present in the case sub judice, namely, that the life of the employee appears to be at stake, and that, at least in all probability, it can only be saved by a surgical operation, by the attendance of a physician, by nursing. and by medicines, all of which will require the expenditure of moneys, which the patient does not possess and cannot raise. [3] Commutation in these circumstances is not to be defeated by the concluding provision of the statute that it shall not be made to enable the employee to satisfy a debt, or to make payment to physicians, lawyers, or other persons. Of course, if the exception ended with the clause that commutation shall not be made to enable the party to pay a debt, it would be too plain for argument that no order could be made to enable an employee to discharge a sum already due and payable, and, when it goes on to provide that it shall not be made to enable payment to physicians, lawyers, or other persons, it might seem at first blush to prohibit the very thing sought to be accomplished here, namely, to enable this unfortunate woman to secure the essentials to save her life. And such a construction may seem plausible, because the prohibition against paying debts-that is, past-due obligations-is followed disjunctively, "or to make payment to physicians," etc.; for, if a physician's bill had been already incurred, it would be comprehended under the term "debt" and there would be no reason for the further provision prohibiting payment to physicians. A literal construction, therefore, of this last provision, would nullify the earlier provisions of the section, and deny the suffering employees the evidently intended benefits provided for in the section. If commutation could not be made to enable payment to any person for anything, it manifestly could not be made at all. This inhibition against commutation for payment to physicians, lawyers, or other persons is evidently meant to protect the employee in the enjoyment of the periodical payments, by making it impossible for him to yield to importunities of creditors for the discharge of their already due obligations, or to raise money to be spent in enterprises of a doubtful or hazardous nature, or where it does not appear that commutation will otherwise be for the best interest of the employee, or is not needed to avoid undue expense or hardship, or when it does not appear that some unusual circumstances warrant a departure from the normal method of periodical payments. Let it be borne in mind that the statute empowers the court to commute the compensation in certain circumstances, and then provides that it shall not be allowed in order to make a payment to any person. If no payment for anything to any person could be made, for what could the lump sum be used? For nothing. If commutation be ordered, it would certainly be for the purpose of use by the person to whom it was awarded, and it could not be used by any such person without passing it on to others. If effect is to be given to the provision that commutation may be made, effect cannot be given to the provision that it shall not be made to enable payment by the employee to anybody, without compelling the recipient to hoard it, or give it away, things too absurd for serious mention. [4, 5] The rules of construction prevent any of the words of this section from defeating the obvious intent of the Legislature. In construing a statute, where literal interpretation may lead to absurd results, resort may be had to the principle that the spirit of the law controls the letter. Mendles v. Danish, 74 N. J. Law, 333, 65 Atl. 888. The intended benefits to be derived by an injured employee from commutation of periodical payments into a lump sum, in proper circumstances, is not to be defeated by the provision that commutation shall not be allowed to make payment to physicians, lawyers, or other persons-not if unusual circumstances call for payments to any of them. If, however, the provision last mentioned is so plain as not to admit of construction which will harmonize it with the other provisions of the section, then it is void; for where a saving clause, if good, would render a statute of no effect or operation, the saving clause is void; a saving totally repugnant to the body of an act is void. 1 Bl. Com. 89. Either upon a liberal construction of the provision in question, or by treating it as inoperative, the petitioner is entitled to prevail. In our opinion the Supreme Court reached the right result in this case, and its judgment should be affirmed, for the reasons above expressed. "TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY." Where an employee's arm is so seriously fractured that it creates a total disability, which will be permanent unless the arm be amputated, award under the Workmen's Compensation Act (Laws 1911, *Decision rendered, May 15, 1919. 107 Atl. Rep. 36. p. 134, as amended by Laws 1913, p. 309) is not limited to that for the loss of an arm, since a "total and permanent disability" may exist without loss or injury to any specific member. (For other cases, see Master and Servant, Dec Dig. § 385[18].) (For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Second Series, Totally and Permanently Disabled.) The Chancellor and Williams and Taylor, JJ., dissenting. Appeal from Supreme Court. Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by William Simpson, opposed by the New Jersey Stone & Tile Company, employer. Judgment for petitioner, and employer appeals. Affirmed. On appeal from the Supreme Court in which the following per curiam was filed: "This is a workman's compensation case, and the main point raised relates to the finding by the trial court of total and permanent disability. "The original injury was a very bad fracture of the arm, which was compound, and became infected and discharged pus for a long period. Amputation was seriously considered, but the arm was saved. There was, however, a poor recovery, and the patient had several abscesses, and at the time of the hearing was suffering, as the court found, with a severe neuritis caused perhaps by minor nerves being involved with the callous of the fracture, which, in the opinion of his physician, made him totally unfit for work, and there was evidence to support the finding that this condition would continue indefinitely unless the arm were amputated. Cases "Prosecutor's claim is that the award cannot exceed that authorized for the loss of an arm, but to this we do not agree. are readily conceivable in which total and permanent disability exists without the loss of or injury to any specific member. If the physical conditions in the present case as the court found them to exist at the time of the hearing created a total disability which was permanent unless the arm were amputated (and we think the evidence justified a finding of such a condition), the case of Feldman v. Braunstein, 87 N. J. Law, 20, 93 Atl. 679, controls. Petitioner is not required to undergo a serious operation such as amputation of the arm at the shoulder. The court therefore properly dealt with the condition as actually existent. "Another point is made: That the order permits review within one year, whereas the act says review may be had after one year. This looks like a mere slip of the pen. The conclusions of the judge properly follow the statute, but the judgment does not. If necessary, the case may be remanded for correction of the judgment, which is merely an amendment to conform to the statute and the court's conclusions. In other respects the award is affirmed." Clarence L. Cole, of Atlantic City, for appellant. PER CURIAM. The judgment under review will be affirmed for the reasons set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court. The Chancellor and Williams and Taylor JJ., dissent. |