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this case. I assume, for the purpose of this case, that the land lying intermediate between the defendants' land and that which the plaintiffs desire to protect is remaining in the hands of other persons than the plaintiffs or the defendants, and I assume that if the defendants work under their own lands they will cause damage to the plaintiffs' land, which the plaintiffs desire to protect, and I further assume that if the defendants should not work under their land no damage will occur to the plaintiffs' land, so that in one sense it will be the act of the defendants which will cause the damage to the plaintiffs' land. But then, as against that, I take the finding to be, that if there had been no working under that intermediate land, no working under the defendants' land would damage the plaintiffs' land, and it is upon that last finding that I think this case must be determined, because upon that last finding the defendants' land is brought within this proposition, that it is land which, in its natural state and in the natural state of the plaintiffs' land and of the intermediate land, would be no support to the plaintiffs' land at all. It seems to me to follow from that that if the defendants worked in their own land up to the boundary when there were no workings in either the plaintiffs' land or the intermediate land, their workings would have had no effect whatever upon the plaintiffs' land. They would have had a perfect right, therefore, to work up to the limit of their own land. Then can that right of theirs which they have under these circumstances be diminished by any act done either by the plaintiffs or by any one for whose acts the defendants are not otherwise responsible? It seems to me that their right cannot be so diminished. As for their right being diminished by any act of the plaintiffs themselves, I do not see that the case of Partridge v. Scott, 3 M. & W. 220, decides that the right cannot be so diminished; but I think the reasoning of Mr. Baron Alderson, in Partridge v. Scott, is conclusive to show that the defendants' right could not be diminished under such circumstances by reason of any thing which the plaintiffs have themselves done on their own land. Well, if that be the case with regard to the plaintiffs, and we have authority so far, we have only to go the additional step of saying that the defendants' right shall not be diminished by the act of an intermediate owner, that is, the act of a person for whose action they are otherwise not at all responsible. They could not prevent that owner working in any way he pleased; they had no remedy against him for doing so, and, therefore, according to ordinary principles of law, it seems to me that their right ought not to be diminished by the acts of those persons. Those are the reasons why I think the Master of the Rolls' proposition is a correct one, that the only acts of the defendants in mining for which they can be responsible with regard to adjacent and neighboring owners are workings under land which, if it remained in its natural state, and the other lands remained in their natural state, would be a support to the land of the person complaining. I can hardly think that this is a question of dominant and servient tenements. I would rather, for myself, put it that this is a relation between adjacent owners, although something analogous to that which exists between dominant and servient tenements; but in whatever relation we regard the reciprocal acts of the parties, we are led to the same conclusion as that which we have already arrived at. Although, therefore, this is a case of first impression, that is to say, a case in which

we have, after the Master of the Rolls, for the first time to decide what is the proper definition of “adjacent lands," I think the Master of the Rolls has given a very happy definition of them, and one which we ought to accept.

JAMES, L. J. The appeal will be dismissed, with costs.

COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

CONSIDERATION.

1. What sufficient to support contract: submitting to suspension from board of brokers. — Plaintiff, a member of the Board of Brokers, was a party to a stock transaction for the benefit of defendant, whose interest was undisclosed. A demand was made by the other parties, and approved by the arbitration committee of the board, for a deposit of $10,000. Defendant denied the right to call for a margin, but a refusal to furnish it would cause the suspension of plaintiff from the board and the loss to him of a lucrative business dependent upon his remaining there. Defendant therefore agreed that if plaintiff would refuse to pay the margin and refuse to appear before the arbitration committee of the board when summoned, and should on that account be suspended from the board, he would pay him a specified amount to reimburse him for his loss of business. Plaintiff refused the deposit, etc., and was suspended from the board. Held, that there was a valid consideration for defendant's promise to reimburse, and it was immaterial whether the $10,000 margin was legally demandable or not. Plaintiff had a right for his own protection to put up the margin, defendant being liable therefor only in case it was rightfully demandable. Judgment below affirmed. White v. Baxter. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

2. When agreement not void for want of mutuality. – The agreement was not void for want of mutuality. When one acting on the faith of a promise performs the consideration upon the faith of which the promise was made, the promise attaches to the consideration so performed, and renders the promisor liable. (Addison on Cont. 13; 1 Parsons on Cont. 451; Sands v. Crook, 46 N. Y. 564, 570;) Ib. [Decided Nov. 20, 1877.]

EVIDENCE.

Admission of evidence upon appeal to support judgment. - Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was appointed to an office under the provisions of a certain act, but no proof was given of such appointment at the trial, and attention was in no way called to the defect. Held, that in support of the judgment formal record proof of the appointment might be introduced on the argument of an appeal. (Rockwell v. Merwin, 45 N. Y. 166; Stillwell v. Carpenter, 62 id. 639; Jarvis v. Sewell, 40 Barb. 449.) Judgment below affirmed. Wines v. Mayor of New York. Opinion by Earl, J.

[Decided Sept. 25, 1877.]

FRAUD.

What necessary to appear in action for false representations, and in action for conspiracy. — In a case submitted to the jury under two aspects, first as an action for a conspiracy to defraud the plaintiffs, by imposing upon them worthless checks of one Stern, in exchange for their property, and second, as an action for false and fraudulent representations as to the pecuniary responsibility of Stern, by which the plaintiffs were induced to part with their property on his

credit. The court at trial charged, that if Stern was irresponsible and his checks worthless, and the defendant falsely represented him to be solvent, knowing or having reason to believe that this was untrue, and with intent to defraud, the action would lie for the fraudulent representations, and charged further in substance, that, if with knowledge of the fraudulent combination of other parties to deprive plaintiffs of their property, defendant became a party to it, and aided in accomplishing the fraudulent purpose, by making representations which he knew, or had reason to believe, was false, he was liable for the damages sustained by the plaintiffs thereby. Held, no error. Judgment below affirmed. Morehouse v. Yeager. Opinion by Allen, J. [Decided Oct. 9, 1877.]

LIFE INSURANCE.

1. Condition against suicide: avoids policy except when insanity is shown.-When a life insurance policy by its terms is to become void if the insured shall die by his own hand, the policy is avoided by suicide, unless the mind of the insured at the time was so impaired that he did not understand the consequences of his action, and that death would ensue. (Van Zandt v. Mut. Ben. Life Ins. Co., 55 N. Y. 169; McClure v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., id. 651.) Judgment below affirmed. Weed v. Mut. Ben Life Ins. Co. Opinion by Allen, J.

2. Sanity presumed: burden of proof: acts showing neither sanity nor insanity.-The presumption is in favor of sanity, and suicide alone is not proof of insanity, consequently in case of suicide of one whose life is insured the burden of proving insanity is upon those claiming the benefit of the policy. Acts and appearances which are consistent with a sane condition, such as occasional severe pains in the head, etc., are not sufficient to warrant a submission of the case to the jury upon the question of insanity. Ib. [Decided Sept. 25, 1877.]

MORTGAGE.

Conditional deed not: when deed not required to be recorded as: priority of lien.-One Mrs. Tracy made a mortgage to plaintiff upon land owned by her, which plaintiff, at her request, neglected to have recorded. Subsequently Mrs. Tracy conveyed the land by deed to defendant, who had no knowledge of plaintiff's mortgage, at the price of $2,500, of which he paid $1,300 in cash, and $1,200 by assuming another mortgage, and had his conveyance recorded as a deed. He also lent her $500 on her note at one year. At the same time he executed back to Mrs. Tracy an instrument under seal, wherein the deed and consideration and the note were recited, and it was provided that in consideration of the sale and conveyance defendant should pay her $1,300 in cash, etc., and should at her discretion and his sell the property within one year and divide the profits equally between them, that he should loan her $500 and take her note, to be paid within the year "if the property is sold. If the property be sold within four months for $4,000, I will cancel the note and surrender it to her. The premises may be sold at the option of either party for not less than $4,000. If not sold within one year from date all interest of Mrs. Tracy in the premises shall cease." The property was found by the court to be worth $3,500. Held, that the conveyance to defendant was not a mortgage and required to be recorded as such in order to make it effectual and valid against plaintiff's mortgage, and

that, as to defendant, plaintiff's mortgage was invalid. (Palmer v. Gurnsey, 7 Wend. 248, distinguished.) Judgment below affirmed. Macaulay v. Porter. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

[Decided Nov. 13, 1877.]

NEW YORK CITY.

Salaries of Marine Court officers: power of supervisors to regulate.-By Laws 1870, chap. 382, § 3, which took effect April 26, 1870, it was provided that "the board of supervisors of the county of New York are hereby prohibited from creating any new office or department, or increasing the salaries of those in office or their successors." Plaintiff at that time was an attendant in the Marine Court, at a salary of $1,200 per annum. By Laws 1870, chap. 582, passed May 2, 1870, it was provided in reference to the Marine Court, that "the court shall have power to appoint such other assistants, etc., and attendants as the board of supervisors may from time to time authorize, etc., who shall be respectively paid such rates as may be fixed by said board of supervisors. The board, by resolution thereafter passed, authorized the appointment of additional assistants and attendants in the Marine Court, and fixed the salaries of attendants of the court at $1,500 per annum. Held, that the resolution of the board of supervisors was valid, and plaintiff was thereafter entitled to $1,500 per annum. Judgment below affirmed. Wines v. Mayor of New York. Opinion by Earl, J. [Decided Sept. 25, 1877 ]

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT ABSTRACT.

OCTOBER TERM, 1877.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

Law impairing obligation of contract: what is not.— A statute passed by a State legislature prescribing a mode of service of judicial process upon a corporation different from that provided for in its charter, held, not in conflict with the provision of the Federal constitution forbidding laws impairing the obligation of a contract. Judgment below affirmed. Cairo & Fulton R. R. Co. v. Hecht. Opinion by Waite, C. J.

DURESS.

1. What does not constitute.-To constitute the coercion or duress which will be regarded as sufficient to make a payment involuntary, there must be some actual and threatened exercise of power possessed or believed to be possessed by the party exacting or receiving the payment over the person or property of another, from which the latter has no other means of immediate relief than by making the payment. A payment is not to be regarded as compulsory unless made to emancipate the person or property from an actual and existing duress imposed upon it by the party to whom the money is paid. (Brumagim v. Tillinghast, 18 Cal. 266: Mayor of Baltimore v. Jefferman, 4 Gill, 425; Mays v. Cincinnati, 1 Ohio St. 268.) Judgment below affirmed. Radich v. Hutchins. Opinion by Field, J.

2. Payment of money to Confederate officer in compliance with Confederate law.-Plaintiff, a foreigner, resident in the State of Texas and engaged in business there, during the late war, had procured a quantity of cotton for the purpose of exportation to Mexico. Defendant, an officer in the Confederate service, and having troops to enforce his orders, by public notice forbade the exportation of cotton from Texas except by a permit from his office, which was to be issued only on

condition that the one desiring to export should sell to the Confederate government an equal quantity of cotton at an arbitrary price. Plaintiff, fearing to risk the export of his cotton without complying with the requirement of the notice, applied for and obtained the permit, furnished the required amount of cotton, which he afterward redeemed by paying a certain sum. Held, not duress on the part of defendant so as to render him liable to plaintiff for the amount paid by him to redeem the cotton. Ib.

EVIDENCE.

1. What presumptive evidence of ownership of stock in corporation: what conclusive evidence of ownership. Where the name of an individual appears in the stock-book of a corporation as stockholder, the prima facie presumption is, that he is the owner of the stock. In a case where there is nothing to rebut the presumption, and in an action against him as stockholder the burden of proving that he is not such is cast upon the defendant. (Hoagland v. Bell, 36 Barb. 56; Turnpike Road v. Van Ness, 2 Crauch, C. C. 451; Mudgett v. Morrell, 33 Cal. 29; Coffin v. Collins, 17 Me. 442; Merrill v. Walker, 24 id. 237; Plank Road v. Rice, 7 Barb. 162.) The receipt of dividends is conclusive evidence of ownership. Decision below affirmed. Turnbull v. Payson. Opinion by Clifford, J. 2. Judicial records: of bankrupt court: in United States District Court.-Records of a bankrupt court in the Northern District of Illinois authenticated in conformity with the provisions of the bankrupt act, held admissible in an action in the United States District Court in Maryland by the assignee of a bankrupt corporation against a stockholder for contribution to pay the debts of the company. It is not necessary that the record of a judgment should be authenticated as provided by the act of Congress passed in pursuance of article 4, section 1, of the Federal constitution to render it admissible in the courts of the United States; and the District Court of the United States, even out of the State composing the district, is to be regarded as a domestic and not a foreign court, and the records of the court may be proved by the certificate of the clerk with the seal of the court without the certificate of the judge. (Adums v. Way, 33 Conn. 430; Michener v. Payson, 13 N. B. R. 50; Mason v. Lawrason, 1 Cranch, C. C. 190.) Ib.

FIRE INSURANCE.

Condition in policy: loss caused by petroleum.- In an insurance policy against fire issued to an express company upon goods transported by it over railroads, etc., was this clause: "It is a further condition of this insurance that no loss is to be paid in case of collision except fire ensue, and then only for the loss or damage by fire. And that no loss is to be paid arising from petroleum or other explosive oils." By a collision between a disabled train containing petroleum and an express train, upon which the express company had goods, the petroleum was ignited and burned, and with it the goods. The petroleum did not belong to the company, and was not under its control. Held, that the loss of the goods was caused by the petroleum, and the insurance company were, under the clause in the policy, exempted from liability therefor. Judgment below reversed. Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Fargo, President Am. Express Co. Opinion by Strong, J.

JURISDICTION.

Cause transferred from State court: amendment of pleading after transfer.- In this case the appellee,

Sperry, brought suit in a California court against the appellants, who duly appeared and caused the suit to be removed into the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California. In that court Sperry filed an amended or new complaint. On appeal to the Supreme Court one of the errors alleged as ground for reversing the decree in favor of Sperry was, that this amended bill showed no jurisdiction in the Circuit Court. If nothing else was looked at but the bill, there was no jurisdiction shown. Held, that as the proceedings in the State court, which were properly here as part of the record of the case, showed that it was removed from the State court to the Federal court on account of the citizenship of the parties, and this of itself must have given jurisdiction to the United States court before the amended bill was filed; that jurisdiction was not lost because the facts on which it arose were not set out in the old or the new complaint. (Railway v. Ramsey, 22 Wall. 322.) Decree below affirmed. Malbec de Monjoc, etc., v. Sperry. Opinion by Miller, J.

LIFE INSURANCE.

1. Condition against suicide: notice of death and "just claim:" construction of condition.-By a clause of a policy of life insurance, which was conditioned to be void if the one whose life was insured should die by his own hand, it was provided that before demanding payment in case of death due and satisfactory proof should be made to the company of death and of the just claim of the assured. Held, that the just claim of the assured had reference to the title or claim to the policy, and not to the justness of the cause of action thereon, and proof that the death had occurred by suicide did not render the proof unsatisfactory. Judgment below affirmed. Charter Oak Life Ins. Co. v. Rodel. Opinion by Bradley, J.

2. What kind or degree of insanity will excuse and not excuse suicide so as to make insurance company liable.— The judge, after stating that the burden of proving the insanity of the deceased was on the plaintiff, charged the jury as follows: "It is not every kind or degree of insanity which will so far excuse the party taking his own life as to make the company insuring liable; to do this, the act of self-destruction must have been the consequence of insanity, and the mind of the deceased must have been so far deranged as to have made him incapable of using a rational judgment in regard to the act which he was committing. If he was impelled to the act by an insane impulse, which the reason that was left him did not enable him to resist, or if his reasoning powers were so far overthrown by his mental condition that he could not exercise his reasoning faculties on the act which he was about to do, the company is liable. On the other hand, there is no presumption of law, prima facie or otherwise, that selfdestruction arises from insanity, and you will remember a great many jurors were excused from the panel because they thought the law was otherwise; therefore you will bear in mind that there is no presumption, prima facie or otherwise, that self-destruction arises from insanity; and if you believe from the evidence that the deceased, although excited or angry or disturbed in mind, formed a determination to take his own life, because in the exercise of his usual reasoning faculties he preferred death to life, then the company is not liable, because he died by his own hand within the meaning of the policy. "If the insured, being in the possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, from anger, pride, jealousy, or a desire to escape from

the ills of life, intentionally takes his own life, the proviso attaches and there can be no recovery; that is, he did die by his own act. If the death is caused by the voluntary act of the assured, he knowing and intending that his death shall be the result of his act, and when his reasoning faculties are so far impaired that he shall not be able to understand the moral character or the general nature, consequence and effect of the act he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse which he has not the power to resist, such death is not in the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and the insurer is liable." Held, no error (following Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580). Ib.

3. Conditions avoiding policy: condition as to payment: as to residence: waiver.-By conditions in a life insurance policy, the same was to become void in case of failure to pay the regular premium on the day it was due, and also if the insured, without the consent of the company, should reside within certain prohibited districts. It was, however, provided, that even after the day for the payment of the premium had passed, the company would waive the failure upon being satisfied that the insured was still in health, and it was customary for an agent of the company to receive premiums after they were due, and his acts in doing so were sanctioned by the company, who furnished him with renewal receipts for the purpose. The agent had, however, no authority to waive the forfeiture arising from residence in the prohibited district. The insured, who had failed to pay a premium when due and was residing within the prohibited district without consent, was taken sick with yellow fever, of which he shortly after died. While he was sick his agent called upon the insurance agent and paid the premium and received a receipt renewing the policy for one year, signed by the company and countersigned by its agent. The agent of the insured was asked nothing about the health of the insured, and he said nothing. Held, that while the insurance agent would be presumed to have authority to waive the failure to pay the premium when due, he would not be to waive the forfeiture caused by residing in the prohibited district, and the receipt of the premium by him and issue of the renewal receipt would not operate as a waiver. Even for the purpose of making the waiver of the failure to pay effective, the insurance agent should have been informed of the state of the health of the insured. Globe Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wolff. Opinion by Field, J.

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their bill in the chancery court of that State against the defendant in error, a municipal corporation, to enjoin the collection of a tax imposed upon their shares of stock by said corporation, and to have the tax declared illegal and void.

The bill was demurred to. The chancellor sustained the demurrer and dismissed the bill. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of Tennessee, the highest court of law or equity in the State, the decree of the chancellor was affirmed, and thereupon the case was brought to this court by writ of error.

It is contended that the statute of the United States which authorizes the taxation by State authority of the shares of stock in a national bank, but provides that such taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals, has been violated in the case of the present plaintiffs. 13 Stat. at Large, 102. The first cause of complaint arises out of the act of the legislature of the State of Tennessee of March 1, 1869. The act, it is said, provides that no tax shall be assessed upon the capital of any bank or joint-stock company organized under the laws of that State. This, it is insisted, is an exemption from taxation of property in the hands of individual citizens, and operates to produce a greater rate of taxation on the plaintiffs' shares in the Fourth National Bank of Nashville than is assessed on other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals, to wit, on such banking capital, and hence, that such taxation is illegal.

The statute enacts that no tax shall be assessed upon the capital of a State bank, but proceeds, in the same section, to say that its shares shall be included in the valuation of the personal property of the owner, for the purpose of assessment for State, county, and municipal taxation, at the same rate that is assessed upon other moneyed capital, and that, in addition thereto, the real estate owned by the bank shall be subject to the same taxation as other real estate.

This objection, in its general character, may be considered in connection with the second objection. The answer to both of them is found in the principle thus laid down in People v. Commissioners: That the rate of taxation upon the shares should be the same or not greater than upon the moneyed capital of the individual citizen which is liable to taxation; that is, no greater in proportion or percentage of tax in the valuation of shares should be levied than upon other moneyed taxable capital in the hands of the citizens." 4 Wall. 256. See, also, Hepburn v. School Directors, 23 Wall. 480, post.

Second. By an ordinance of the defendants' corporation, passed on the 18th of April, 1870, it is provided that certain interest-paying bonds issued by the said corporation shall be exempt from taxation by said corporation. It is said that there are many such bonds in existence in the hands of individuals; that by such exemption the complainants' shares are taxed at a greater rate than is assessed upon such bonds, and that, therefore, the taxation complained of is in violation of the act of Congress forbidding the taxation of national shares at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individuals. There are several answers to this objection: 1st. It is not alleged in the bill that the bonds therein referred to are in fact exempted from taxation for municipal purposes. After reciting the issue and proposed exemption, the bill says that said property is "thus exempted from all municipal taxes;" that is,

that, as a matter of law, it follows from the facts before stated that it is thus exempt.

This is not sufficient, especially when it is alleged in the brief opposed that the fact is otherwise.

2d. By the statutes of the State of Tennessee, passed subsequently to the issue of the bonds, all personal property, of every kind and nature, is required to be listed and assessed for taxation.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee hold, in the case before us, that this statute repeals and overrides the ordinance of exemption and brings these bonds within the scope of general taxation. This is a decision of a State tribunal upon the construction of its own statutes, which we are bound to respect.

3d. Considering the objection on its merits and in connection with the objection first described, the case is met by Hepburn v. School Directors, 23 Wall. 480.

By a statute of Pennsylvania, it was enacted that "all mortgages, judgments, recognizances and money owing upon articles of agreement for the sale of real estate shall be exempt from taxation, except for State purposes." There, as here, it was objected that this exemption by relieving certain specified property from taxation brought the case within the prohibition of the act of Congress, and thus vitiated the tax sought to be enforced. This court held otherwise.

The act of Congress was not intended to curtail the State power on the subject of taxation. It simply required that capital invested in national banks should not be taxed at a greater rate than like property sim ilarly invested. It was not intended to cut off the power to exempt particular kinds of property if the legislature chose to do so. Homesteads, to a specified value, a certain amount of household furniture (the six plates, six knives and forks, six tea-cups and saucers, of the old statutes), the property of clergymen to some extent, school-houses, academies and libraries, are generally exempt from taxation. The discretionary power of the legislature of the States over all these subjects remains as it was before the act of Congress, of June, 1864. The plain intention of that statute was to protect the corporations formed under its authority from an unfriendly discrimination against them of the power of State taxation. That particular persons or particular articles are relieved from taxation is not a matter to which either class can object.

The third objection is equally untenable. The statute referred to does not purport to relieve any property from taxation. It provides a mode for ascertaining the average capital of the merchant, and for giving a license to carry on the business of a merchant. He is required to pay an ad valorem tax on all his capital and a license tax in addition.

The observations already made are pertinent under this head.

The judgment is affirmed.

RECENT BANKRUPTCY DECISIONS.

DEFICIENCY.

In estate of bankrupt: liability of bankrupt to make good. The bankrupt must give a satisfactory explanation of deficits which are shown in the assets of his estate, or pay over the amount thereof to the assignee. Where the bankrupt fails to account for a large amount of property, he will be ordered to pay over the value thereof, where it appears that his wife has property which is not shown to have come from third parties,

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What does not constitute: construction of contract.The bankrupts were a firm carrying on business under the firm name of the Middleborough Shovel Company. On June 28, 1877, Richardson, one of the partners, happened to meet in the cars Mr. Tobey, treasurer of the Tremont Nail Company, and told him that he wanted to borrow about a thousand dollars to save him a journey to New York, where he could obtain it; that if the Tremont Nail Company would lend him the money it would be repaid out of the first money received from John Dunn of New York, for whom they were filling a large order. The loan was made and a note for thirty days given. A few days after Richardson went to New York, and found that the agents of his firm there were about to fail, or had failed. He received an advance of $1,700 from Mr. Dunn, and returned to Boston on July 4. He saw Mr. Tobey on the 5th, and told him about the matter. On July 6 the money due was paid to Mr. Tobey, and the same day the firm stopped payment. Negotiations were entered into for settlement with creditors, by which the petitioners were to stand in the same condition as if the sum of $994.92 had not been paid to Tremont Nail Company. The Shovel Company afterward went into bankruptcy, and the Tremont Nail Company claimed this as a privileged debt. The court held that the agreement between the parties did not give any lien or charge on Dunn's debt in favor of these petitioners, and their petition to stand as privileged creditors was denied. U. S. Dist. Ct., Massachusetts, Nov. 23, 1877. Ex parte Tremont Nail Co.; Re Middleborough Shovel Co.

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND.*

BANKRUPTCY.

1. Agreement to forbear bankruptcy proceedings, not forbidden by bankrupt law. - The Bankrupt Act of the United States (1867, ch. 176) does not prohibit the creditor of an insolvent from taking a contract or covenant from a third person for the payment of money, as an inducement to forbear proceeding against such insolvent to have him declared a bankrupt. Ecker v. McAllister.

2. When promise by third person to pay debt of bankrupt voidable.- An action cannot be maintained upon a promise to pay the debt of a third person, in consid

*To appear in 45 Maryland Reports.

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