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But it is probable that the President, although citing this dubious support to his interpretation and action, does not after all base the justification of that action upon the 1846 treaty. He appeals rather to a variety of considerations which are of greater or less force, and which, taken together, are held to give the United States an equitable right 'to do what it will in the matter of Panama and a Panama canal, because what it wills is just. The argument in the President's message is substantially as follows:

A fair and even generous canal treaty was made last year with Colombia, a country oft disturbed by popular risings, and no better than it should be.

This treaty failed of the ratification by Colombia which it deserved, and would have had, had the government chosen.

In consequence, a revolution broke out at Panama, "and with astonishing unanimity the new republic was started."

To allow the landing of Colombian forces to quell this rebellion "would mean chaos and destruction along the line of the railway and of the proposed canal, and an interruption of transit as an inevitable consequence," hence it was forbidden.

Colombia being thus held incapable of recovering its power, the new State was recognized, and the parent advised in all friendliness to settle her differences with the triumphant rebel.

The "interests of civilization" demand that the Isthmus traffic shall not be disturbed any longer by unnecessary and wasteful civil

wars.

Colombia alone is incapable of maintaining order on the Isthmus, and has constantly to fall back upon the aid of the United States.

When at last there was an opportunity to repay the United States for these many services, Colombia offensively refused.

Therefore it would be "folly and weakness" and "a crime against the nation" if we do not set up this puppet State, and thus

carry out the great enterprise of building the interoceanic canal.

It is "a project colossal in its size, and of well-nigh incalculable possibilities for the good of this country and the nations of mankind."

This was the argument and the conclusion. Accordingly, without stopping to take breath, the administration made a canal treaty with Panama "better in its terms" than those with Nicaragua and Costa Rica or the one which Colombia rejected.

Translated into every-day speech-and every day one hears just such sentimentswe gave Colombia fair terms, she tried to "hold us up," we set up a State which we could manage, and now Colombia pays the penalty of overreaching herself.

This sort of argument will appeal to men differently. One or two facts are clear about it. One is, that it does not regard Colombia as a sovereign State under constitutional government. The charge that treaty ratification there is at the President's will; the idea that frequent revolutions in a State detract from its sovereignty; the denial to a State of the right to quell insurrection, are proofs of this.

Another fact is, that it is not a case where law enters, but only politics. The moving considerations are purely material. It is the interests of civilization that are appealed to, the world's need of a colossal public work, not the reign of law and the equality of States.

Old precedents have been disregarded and new ones made. These carry us far towards the theory that to the United States belongs such headship of the States on this continent. as to make its own sense of justice, its own will, the only law. To claim such powers without being held to corresponding responsibilities for our weaker neighbors' actions is impossible.

There has been indecent and unnecessary haste, judged by our own or any other stan

dards. The puppet State of Panama, with a population no larger than Milwaukee's, itself a hotbed of revolution, cannot stand alone. We must support it and be responsible for its conduct.

As already suggested, there are some who see nothing out of the way in such reasoning as this, and in the conclusions resulting.

There are others who have regard still for national honor, patience, obedience to law; who fear dangerous precedents; who would keep faith even with weak and treacherous neighbors.

But, such men will be asked, would you permit any State on academic grounds of equality and law to hinder this country from constructing a canal already too long delayed?

The answer is twofold. National reputation is more valuable than national progress. From a purely material standpoint, what our country may gain in ease of communication it may more than offset by awakening po.itical mistrust.

And the second answer is, that no such choice as is contended was forced; that the President's way was bad diplomacy; that with a little more patience and a little more management, all that the United States has at heart could probably have been won. Fifty-three political disturbances, great and small, in Colombia are enumerated in the message, and the railway protected throughout. Why not endure a fifty-fourth? Why not have put down the Panama revolution as threatening the railway-an undoubted treaty right—instead of aiding it, first getting Colombia's pledge to deal fairly with a new treaty? We might have lost a year, but we should have saved our character and had a real State to deal with.

This suggests the second of the inquiries. proposed at the outset. If our recognition. of Panama was warranted neither by law nor by treaty, is it any the less a sovereign State for all that? And if a sovereign State,

but under a Junta, are its contracts valid? To the first part of this question the reply must be, that premature or wrongful recognition may violate the rights of the paren: State, but nevertheless accomplishes its object. For recognition simply means, that, so far as the recognizing State is concerned, the new body is to be allowed to exercise towards it,the rights of statehood. If unwarranted, it may be a cause of war with the parent, but does not affect third parties. They take their own line. They grant or withhold recognition at their own will. And so when A says that B's colony, C, is independent, A grants that colony external sovereignty as to A itself only, and takes the consequences.

But unfortunately, under our system of international law, a powerful wrongdoer cannot be brought to book by a feeble sufferer. Thus wrongful recognition may be a wrong without a penalty.

To give a single illustration: the recognition by the United States of the new government in Hawaii, which ousted the monarchy in 1894, was likewise premature. But the new State stayed independent and sovereign nevertheless; exchanged ministers with this country; after its government was established, made a treaty with this country; and other powers gradually followed suit, There the injury was to a ruling family and irremediable, not to a parent State retaining its right of coercion. The new State arose within the old limits, not by separation. But the principle involved in recognition is the same, that thereby a new sovereignty exists.

And now our final inquiry. Is our canal treaty, made with Panama under the Junta, valid, and title to property leased or ceded by it, good?

The rules which govern the validity of treaties relate to the State's capacity to contract, to the negotiating agents, to the object of the treaty, and its ratification.

A treaty is void if it contracts to do an unlawful act. It is a fair question, whether Panama's agreement to lease territory and cede property, which Colombia still claims, is not a contract to do an unlawful act. But the point is not pressed, as being precluded by our recognition subject to penalty.

The three other rules all depend upon the Constitution of each State. If semi-sovereign, it has not full capacity. Its agents who act in the name of the State must be empowered by its fundamental law; ratification must be done in accordance with the Constitution.

But suppose there is no Constitution. No popular vote has been taken; no head of the State chosen; no power of ratification lodged in any one's hands. Does the treatymaking power exist in such shape as to entitle other States to credit the action of persons thus unrepresentative and unauthorized?

If a

It is not often, I fancy, that such speedy treaty making after revolution is attempted as to raise this point, and I do not find it directly settled by the publicists. State's independence is recognized by another, it has sovereignty enough to make treaties with that other. But to bind the new State, its agents of negotiation and ratification must be truly representative, in some way entitled to bind their country. Mere assumption of the right would seem a frail basis to build upon. Probably in the case in question, the United States would always claim and always have the power to enforce the Hay-Varilla agreement, as against other powers. Yet who will guarantee that a future Panama, pressed perhaps by future creditors, will not want a larger rental, and deny the validity of this contract on the ground that it was made by those who were unauthorized? In other words, there is enough doubt about the

competence of Panama's agents to cast discredit upon the agreement. It will be good if we can always make it good, but not otherwise.

If this is sound logic, it should follow that to pay Panama as much for a doubtful title under a questionable contract as was to have been paid Colombia for a sound title, is very poor business. It is only done to save face. However, this defect in title under treaty can be and should be cured, by future reference to the proper body for ratification after a Constitution in Panama has been adopted.

Let us set together briefly the conclusions drawn from the considerations which have been presented.

(1) The hasty recognition of a new State in Panama was not in accordance with the law of nations.

(2) To justify it by the Treaty of 1846 requires a new and forced construction of that instrument.

(3) To prevent Colombia's coercion of Panama is an act of war.

(4) The "man in the street's" verdict, that our smart politics served Colombia right, disregards law, sets a dangerous precedent, detracts from the national dignity, and may injure our influence and trade amongst the Latin-American States.

(5) Our duty was and is to let Colombia recover Panama if she can; our policy, to use her troubles to get favorable canal action from the rightful sovereign.

(6) Our recognition, if persisted in, makes of Panama a treaty-making agent, but for ourselves only.

(7) The canal treaty, negotiated and ratified by the Junta, with no constitutional authority or other authorization, is of doubtful validity and the defect will need to be subsequently cured.

W

A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION.
BY EDGAR WHITE.

HEN Mike Brennan sold his town lots

to a real estate syndicate there was a squabble over an old barn that stood on one of them. It was a ramshackley old structure, not good for much besides fuel, but the purchasing concern thought it had more right. to it than Mike, and when he went there with a gang of house movers and began hauling it away, the syndicate got Circuit Judge Shelton to issue a temporary restraining order until the rights of property could be determined.

Constable Burke landed on Mike with his little paper while the moving was in progress. "Phat's dot?" asked Mike.

"Temporary injunction," said the officer. "You're to stop moving that barn until the judge says who it belongs to."

Mike took the paper and ran into the house.

"Mary!" he bawled.

A rosy-cheeked girl of 17 came down

stairs.

"Git yer dickshunary an' find out phat a toomperairy injunchshun is."

The girl hunted up the unabridged. ""Temporary,'" she said, "means 'for a time.' Injunction, a command, an order.'" "A arther, is it, 'fer a time.' All right." "What's the matter, pap?" asked Mary, anxiously, seeing the officer down in the road.

"Niver yez moind, chile," responded her dad. "It's too dape fer gals like yez ter understhand."

Mike returned to the scene of operations, and handed the paper back to the constable, who supposed as a matter of course work would stop. He returned to town.

"B'ys," said Mike, "th' Coort has arthered

we'll sit 'round fer half an hour. It's th' law, yez know."

Not exactly comprehending the philosophy of it, but knowing their pay was running just the same, the men sat down on logs and boards, and whiled the time away telling yarns and smoking. The half hour up, Mike called time, and set them all to work again.

The barn movers were making pretty fair progress down the road toward Mike's farm, when the constable and another man drove up in a buggy. The new figure in the case was a lawyer, and he addressed Mike pretty roughly.

"What do you mean by disobeying the order of the Court in this way?" he demanded.

"Ain't dis'beying no arther of th' Court," said Mike.

"Didn't Burke here give you notice of a temporary injunction this morning?" "Aye; he did thot."

"Don't you know what that means?" "Who be you?" asked Mike.

"I'm the lawyer for the real estate company that bought your lots and barn, and if you don't stop moving that barn you'll have to go to jail for contempt of Court."

Mike advanced to the buggy threateningly.

"See here, Mister Lawyer," he said, "yez can't coom it over me with none of yer shenanagan. I know a thing or two as well as yez. Don't yez spose I know phat a toomperairy injunchshun is?"

"You don't act as if you do."

"Well, I do. It manes an' arther fer a time, an' we knocked off work a whole half Yez hour this marning because of it. needn't coom poking yer papers under my nose no more. We're going to move this

us ter stop fer a time. Fill up yer poipes an' barn."

Threats, expostulations and explanations were alike unavailing. Mike moved the barn where he wanted it, and paid off his men. Next day the constable arrested him and brought him before the judge. Mike cited his authority for his action from the "dickshunary." He construed He construed "toomperairy" literally, and insisted he had shown no disrespect to the Court.

"Have you got $50 to pay your fine, Mr. Brennan?" asked the judge.

"Nary a red, your Grace," said Mike.

"Then I'm afraid I'll have to send you to jail-temporarily."

"If yer Grace's toomperarily ain't any longer than my toomperarily I'll not be afther coomplainin," said Mike.

The Court smiled.

"I guess we'll use your dictionary on 'temporary,' Mike, as far as the jail sentence is concerned," he said.

The syndicate withdrew proceedings before the term came on, and Mike was allowed undisturbed possession of his old barn.

THE ADVISABILITY OF REGISTERING NEGOTIABLE COUPON BONDS.

BY JOHN PHILip Hill,

Of the Boston Bar.

The power to borrow money with which to carry out the purposes of its creation is generally held one of the inherent rights of a corporation. Where this power is present it is well settled that the corporation may issue its promise to pay in the form of a bond.1

Cook, in his treatise on the law of Corportions, defines a corporation bond as "an instrument executed under the seal of the corporation, acknowledging the loan and agreeing to repay the same upon terms set forth therein." (1 Cook on Corporations, sec. 14.) The most usual form is the bond that has promissory notes of the corporation attached in the shape of coupons, each of which is equal to the annual, semi-annual, or quarterly interest on the bond. Coupon bonds form a convenient mode of investment and of securing corporate loans, and are issued alike by municipal and private corporations; by the Federal, State and city governments, as well as by railroads, manufactur'Miller 7. R. R., 8 Abb. Pr. (N. Y.), 431.

ing, mining and nearly all other forms of incorporated enterprise.

Bonds issued by corporations in proper form are held to be negotiable, both by mercantile usage and judicial determination, in all respects with the exception of not being entitled to days of grace."

The object of making bonds negotiable, is to secure convenience and freedom in circulation, and to secure for the bona fide holder a perfect title, protected from all claims or equities against his transferror. It is to the negotiable quality of coupon bonds that their prominence in the money market is largely to be ascribed. Coupons cut from bonds of corporations whose stability is assured are an immediately convertible asset, and the bonds themselves are of nearly equal transferability. So readily may they be transferred that the greatest care is requisite in their keeping, and they rank with bank notes in the esteem of the usual safe-breaker.

2 Haven z. Grand Junction Company, 109 Mass. 88; 5 Thompson on Corporations, sec. 6064.

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