Supreme Court evidence the unremitting zeal and vigor with which he has performed that portion of his oath by which he bound himseli to "defend the Constitution of the United States."

The State of Kentucky is doubtless more celebrated for certain of its products which are essential to the happiness of man and the continuance of the race, and to a certain other which conduces to his exhiliration, than it is by virtue of its being the birthplace of Justice Harlan. No son of that State, however, has ever reflected more glory upon it than has he. Few, if any, of the names which are inscribed upon the roll of the Supreme Court stand sponsors more frequently for its decisions than does he.

Justice Harlan delivered his first opinion, in the case of National Bank v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S. 673; his first dissenting opinion in United States v. Clark, 96 U. S. 37; and his first opinion in a case involving a Constitutional question in Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594. Everyone is cognizant of the conspicuous part which he took in the decision of the so-called "Merger Case." Justice Harlan possesses the faculty of infusing his writings with the very tones of his voice so that one who is familiar with the latter must invariably hear it in the former.

My first recollection of Justice Harlan is of a mammoth man shaking the church as he slowly walked up the aisle to his pew on Sunday mornings. The immense bulk of the man effectively killed any germs of incipient scepticism which may have been lurking in my young mind in regard to the absence of youth on the part of Adam, for no one possessed of a normal imagination can so adjust his mental lenses as to reduce John Marshall Harlan to infantile proportions. His laugh and his voice are in proportion to his body, which is a fitting tabernacle for his heart and his mind. No man is so small as to be beneath his notice-none so great as to be above it. For years he has been a regular at

tendant upon the annual Shad-Bakes of the Bar Association of the District of Columbia, and on these festive occasions he spends a great portion of his time in the shooting gallery, where he defends against all comers the reputation of his State.

Several decisions of general interest were handed down by the Supreme Court on the fourth day of last month, and another is in process of argument at the present writing. One of the former is that involving the right of the Interstate Commerce Commission to compel certain railroad companies to produce certain of their contracts before that Commission, the decision being against the companies. Another is that in which the Court upholds the Constitutionality of the "Election Law" of 1902 of the State of Maryland, in regard to its requirements relative to the "declaration of intention" on the part of prospective voters.

Numerous Southern States, in recent years, have amended their constitutions for the ostensible purpose of eliminating the illiterate vote, the real purpose and the actual effect of such amendments being to eliminate the negro vote. Virginia recently followed the example of her sister States in this respect. Two cases involving the Constitutionality of that clause of its new constitution which, in this respect, is obnoxious to the negro, were argued before the Supreme Court during the month of April. The pendency of these cases was heralded by the shepherds of the various colored flocks of this city, and the members of their folds were exhorted to attend Court on the following day. The consequence was that of the many who were called, few were chosen, so far as admission to the courtroom was concerned, but, like that historic little follower of Mary "whose fleece was"— of another color, those who were cast into the outer darkness of the corridor "lingered near and waited patiently about" until the hour of adjournment.

ANDREW Y. BRADLEY

The Editor will be glad to receive contributions of articles of moderate length upon subjects of interest to the profession; also anything in the way of legal antiquities or curiositics. facetic, anecdotes, etc.

NOTES.

A LAWYER of inquiring turn of mind, who recently argued a case before the Supreme Court at Washington, propounds the following questions of Supreme interest:

Does it necessarily follow that Harlan is yellow merely because he is between White and Brown?

Would one be justified in inferring that McKenna stands by night merely because he sits by Day?

Would you conclude that Peckham lives on Capitol Hill merely because he has Holmes so near?

Is it because the Chief Justice sits next to a Brewer that he is Fuller?

A COLORED man at Marshalltown, Iowa, was brought into the Justice Court. Despite the efforts of his attorney the offender was bound over to await the action of the Grand Jury. When court convened the negro's counsel was not present. The case was called and the judge asked the defendant if he had. an attorney.

"Well, suh, I had one," he said, looking "but I ain't seen him since I was done up before the Justice, an' I guess he's done absconded, suh."

"Well, do you wish to employ another attorney?" asked the Court.

"No, suh," was the answer. "I ain't got no money. I'se willin' to let God Almighty look after my case."

"The Court will appoint a lawyer to assist your counsel," was the reply from the bench.

IN one of the counties bordering on the Bay of San Francisco, is a judge whose brusqueness has not endeared him to the members of the profession.

On one occasion, a young attorney was addressing the court when his Honor interrupted him in the midst of a sentence:

"Young man," said the Court, "I wish to ask you a question."

"Certainly, sir," replied the young attor ney, all attention.

"Have you been admitted to practice before the Supreme Court?"

"Yes, sir," was the prompt reply.

"Well," said the judge slowly, "the Supreme Court does some very funny things."

AN old-time lawyer in a town not far from Lowell, Massachusetts, known to everybody as Uncle Ben, was a lover of Old New England rum, and enjoyed an afternoon off occasionally, in the company of congenial spirits. At one of these gatherings Uncle Ben, turning to one of the good fellows present, said:

"Teddy, if you hear your old Uncle Ben has departed from this life, and gone to the better world, go over to B.'s and buy a quart of good Old New England rum, put a feather in your pocket, and proceed to my house. You will probably find mother in tears. After expressing your regrets at the loss to the community and to the profession, ask to see old Uncle Ben. Mother will show you into the darkened front room; when you are alone, and in the presence of death, take out your rum, dip your feather in and rub it across my lips once or twice; and if I don't stick my tongue out, go to mother and my friends and tell them to let the funeral go on,-Uncle Ben is dead."

AN Iowa lawyer tells the following story of his first months of practice. He went to a small country town and secured an office room in front of which was placed the usual sign. Then he sat down and waited for his clients to appear, all the while feeling very much the dignity of his position. The day passed and no one called, and another, and another, until the weeks went by and still there had been no client.

One morning, however, he was at the depot to attend upon the arrival of the daily accommodation train, quite an important function of the town, when a handsome, welldressed young lady approached and inquired, "Is this Mr. Smith?" At once the feeling of importance returned, and in his blandest tone, he replied: "It is, madam. What can I do for you?"

"Can you tell me how much it will cost to send a sow and pigs down to the next station?"

JUDGE JAMES SEVIER, of the Kingston, Tennessee, bar, a great-grandson of the famed John Sevier, hero of King's Moun-tain, and first governor of the State, tells the following story of a busy, money-making old fellow who lived in the country, and seldom went to town, except on business:

One day, while in on an important errand, he was summoned to attend court as a jury. man. He tried to persuade the officer to let him off, but the fellow was incorrigible, and then the man who was "cotch" concluded to try his powers of persuasion with the judge. The latter dignitary declined to excuse him until a certain murder case should have been disposed of, in which case he had found it difficult to secure a jury of competent men.

The cause was at last called, and our friend, the countryman, took his seat in the

box.

He answered the usual questions, leaning as strongly as possible towards the side of his own disqualification, but without avail. He was accepted, and yielded to fate, as gracefully as possible.

The judge had positively promised to ex

cuse him when that case was disposed of, and his heart jumped when the question was propounded to the prisoner, "Are you guilty, or not guilty?" and he responded, "Not guilty."

Thereupon the unwilling juryman snatched up his hat and started to leave the court-room.

"Where are you going, sir?" demanded the judge.

"Why, I'm going home," said the jury

man.

"But you cannot go, until this case is disposed of. I thought you understood that." "W'y, jedge, I thought hit was done disposed of. Didn't ye hear 'im say he ain't guilty?"

The matter was explained to him, and he finally understood that the prisoner's statement was not quite conclusive of the question at issue.

The trial proceeded, and when, after two or three days of torture to the hero of the story, the judge delivered his charge and gave the case to the jury, our friend was called upon to tell what he thought about the defendant's guilt or innocence.

"When he said he wasn't guilty, I believed him, and supposed that settled it," he explained. "But the judge said it didn't, and that of course settled it.

"When I heard what the witnesses for the State said, I was ready to quit, and help hang him. But when I heard what the other witnesses had to say, I wanted to turn him loose, without any more foolishness. Then the attorney general made a speech, and I come to the conclusion again that the feller was guilty, and thought he ought to be hung. But his lawyer made a speech after that, an' I made up my mind that he ought to be turned loose, as I had thought twict before.

"Then Judge Blank, the old fleebitten. numbskull, he made a speech, and now I don't know what in the devil we ought to do. I'm willing ter jest leave the whole thing to the balance of ye, an' I hope ye'll settle it, purty mighty quick. I want to go home, and git to work."

Down in Virginia one planter sued another to recover damages for a dog that had been killed. The lawyer for the complainant confused many of the defendant's witnesses by a severe cross-examination. At last Uncle Charlie, a coachman, took the stand. "Now, uncle," said the nagging lawyer, "did you know this dog that was killed?" "Yes, sah," said Charlie, "I was personally acquainted with him."

"Then tell the jury exactly what sort of a dog it was."

"He was a big, yaller dawg."

"We know that already, Charlie. Tell the jury what the dog was good for."

"Well, sah, he wan't no good. He wouldn't hunt; he wouldn't gyard de house none; he jes' wouldn't do nothin' but lay around and eat. Dat how come dey give him de name he had."

"And what was his name. Uncle Charlie?" "Dey call him 'Lawyer,' sah," answered Uncle Charlie gleefully, and even the judge joined in the merriment.-Philadelphia Ledger.

THE late Sir Frederick Bramwell was famous both as a wit and an arbitrator in engineering disputes. His brother, the late Lord Justice Bramwell, had had dealings with him in both capacities and was well qualified, according to St. James' Budget, to appreciate him.

The Lord Justice was once asked for advice by a young barrister.

"Something comprehensive, sir," said the young man.

"In a general way," began the Lord Justice, "you must be careful of four kinds of witnesses. First, of the liar; second, of the liar who can only be adequately described by the aid of a powerful adjective; third, of the expert witness; and, finally, of my brother Fred."

LAWYER (cross-examining): Where was your maid at the time? Witness: In mv boudoir, arranging my hair. Lawyer: And where were you? Witness: Sir!-Irish Law Times.

THE fair plaintiff had sued the elderly capitalist for breach of promise and her lawyer was trying to persuade her to compromise. "He offers," said the lawyer, "to give you one-third of the sum you are trying to recover if you will withdraw the suit."

"I won't do it," she replied. "I want the full amount."

"Failing in that," pursued her attorney, "he offers to marry you."

"What do I want to marry him for?" The lawyer shrugged his shoulders. "Well," he said, "think of the possibilities of a divorce suit, with a fat claim for alimony."-Chicago Tribune.

SUPREME Court Justice Leonard A. Giegerich always had a kindly feeling for Timothy J. Campbell and enjoys regaling his friends. with reminiscences of the eccentric politician. At the Catholic Club on the evening of the funeral he recalled an incident of Campbell's career on the bench that may not have appeared in print before.

"Tim" was presiding at a trial where it soon became apparent that the plaintiff had no just claim to recover. At the proper moment counsel for defendant, as is usual under such conditions, asked the judge to dismiss the complaint.

"Complaint dismissed," jerked out Campbell, not waiting for a word from the lawyer for the plaintiff.

"But, hold on, your Honor," shouted the latter, in a fury. "Surely you won't dismiss my complaint without hearing me against the

motion ?"

"Go ahead, counselor," replied Campbell, leaning far over his desk, and hissing defiance. "Go ahead with your argument. But I'll bet ye tin dollars I dismiss your complaint."-New York Mail.

Two Irishmen were in court, one for stealing a cow, the other a watch. "Hello, Mike! What o'clock is it?" said the cowstealer to the other.

"And sure, Pat, I have no time-piece handy, but I think it is most milking time."

CORRESPONDENCE.

To the Editor of THE GREEN BAG:

Sir: The unfortunate war now existing between Russia and Japan, and the lack of a previous and formal declaration has given rise to much discussion in the press as to the necessity and advisability of a declaration previous to hostilities.

As to the advisability of a declaration, there can be no doubt, for the rights and liabilities of belligerents arise upon the existence of war. A formal act of the Governments fixing the date of the outbreak of war, gives and taxes the whole world, belligerent, as well as neutral, with notice. It is of importance to the belligerents, for it makes them alien enemies from the date established, and forbids friendly communication of all kinds. It is of importance to neutrals, for it subjects them to liabilities non-existent in time of peace. A formal declaration is, therefore, in the interests of the belligerents themselves desirable.

But however desirable it may be, it is not necessary. War is not a theory; it is a fact, and its existence is ascertained in the same manner as any other fact. The first act of a hostile nature sufficiently establishes the beginning as well as the existence of war. (Dole 7. Merchant's Mutual Marine Insurance Co., 51 Me. 465, 470; The Teutonia, L. R. 4 P. C. 171; The Panama, 87 Fed. R. 927, 933.) A declaration may interfere with important military or naval advantages arising from striking the first blow. This may be bad morals, but it is good law. Indeed, it may be well nigh impossible to issue a formal declaration, as in the cases of a civil war (The Prize Cases, 2 Black 665; Matthews v. McStea, 91 U. S. 7.)

In the matter of practice, it may be said that from the middle of the eighteenth century belligerents have consulted their individual interests, at times making a formal declaration; at other times, striking the blow in full peace and declaring the war afterwards by legislative enactment. General Maurice, in his interesting little work on "Hostilities Without Declaration of War," published in 1883, enumerates no less than one hundred

and four instances of war without previous declaration, from the years 1700-1870. From which it would seem, admitting that a declaration is advisable, that bad precedent makes binding, if not "good" law. The late W. E. Hall admirably summarizes the doctrine in his masterly "Treatise on on International Law." (5th edition, pp. 377-385.)

In regard to the justice of a particular war, we may well rest content with Shakespeare's line: "Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel just." If we attempt to discriminate we fail utterly. Russia regards the war as just and stigmatizes Japan's conduct as little less than nefarious. Japan considers Russia's conduct no less reprehensible. Each belligerent pins the badge of moral purity to its breast and seeks to have "his quarrel just" as far as the subjects are concerned, and each probably succeeds. Self-preservation is above nice ethical distinctions, and in the ultimate analysis war may be said to involve this doctrine to a greater or less degree. And of self-preservation each nation is naturally the final judge.

In conclusion, war is a fact and is provable as such whether it be officially declared or not; its justice or injustifiableness in a particular instance depends upon the interests of the belligerents, of which they are the proper if not the sole judges. I am, Very truly yours,

JAMES B SCOTT.
Columbia University School of Law,
New York, April 4, 1904.

To the Editor of THE GREEN BAG:

Sir:-Why should a lawyer be put to the trouble of marking a jury case for trial? In every State in our country with the possible exception of Maine and Massachusetts a case is put on the trial list by the court when issue is joined by the parties and the pleadings are at an end. For a lawyer to be obliged to mark a case for trial after he has entered it in court, seems to me an unnecessary waste of time and labor.

JOSEPH M. SULLIVAN.

Boston, April 10, 1904.