appeared for the defendant. The trial, which was conducted with marked ability on both sides, is one of the most celebrated in the annals of American jurisprudence. In closing the case, Mr. Buchanan confined himself strictly to the legal and constitutional questions involved. The Senate refused to punish Judge Peck owing to some technical objections that stood in the way of his conviction, but soon afterwards it passed an act removing those objections, and so changed the law that no judge has since ventured to render himself liable to be impeached for a similar offence. Mr. Buchanan's standing at the American bar is shown by the fact that President Van Buren offered to make him the Attorney General of the United States upon the resignation of Felix Grundy in 1839, but the future President of the United States preferred to remain in the Senate, of which he was one of the Democratic leaders. After Mr. Buchanan was elected to the United States Senate, in 1834, he never resumed the practice of the law, but he led a busy and active life, during the ten years he was in the Senate, the four years he was Secretary of State, under the administration of President Polk, the three years he was minister to England, in the administration of President Pierce, and, finally, as President of the United States. THE THE BUNYAN WARRANT. THE original warrant under which John Bunyan, the author of Pilgrim's Progress, was arrested, was sold by Mr. Quaritch in London in April of this year for £305. The warrant is signed by thirteen Justices of the Peace, of whom six were baronets and seven esquires. The warrant runs as follows: To the Constables of Bedford and to every of them Whereas informacon and complaint is made unto us that (notwithstanding the King Majties late Act of most gracious gen'all and free pardon to all his Subjects for past misdemeanors that by his said clemencie and induljent grace and favor they might bee moved and induced for the time to come more carefully to observe his Highenes lawes and Statutes and to continue in theire loyall and due obedience to his Majtie) yett one John Bunnyon of yor said Towne Tynker hath divers times within one Month last past in contempt of his Majties good Lawes preached or teached at a Conventicle Meeteing or assembly under color or p'tence of exercise of Religion in other manner than according to the Liturgie or practice of the Church of England. These are therefore in his Majties name to command you forthwith to apprehend and bring the Body of the said John Bunnion bee fore us or any of us or other his Majties Justice of peace within the said County to answer the premisses and further doe and receave as to Lawe and Justice shall appertaine and hereof you are not to faile. Given under our handes and seales this ffowerth day of March in the seaven and twentieth yeare of the Raigne of our most gracious Soveraigne Lord King Charles the Second Ao q'. Dui juxta, etc 1674. Bunyan was arrested March 15, 1674, and his imprisonment in Bedford Jail lasted six months, during which period he thought out, and, it is generally believed, began his immortal work. DOG-LAW IN DOGGEREL. BY CHARLES MORSE, Assistant Editor of the Canada Law Journal. I. DOGS AND TRESPASSERS. SARCH v. BLACKBURN. 4 C. & P. 297. REGULA: Contra nocentem tenere canem non est culpa. I sing the old Ford watchman: (What better name than Sarch But Fate, with her grim ironies, ne'er lets us go unflogged; Defendant was a milkman; and, lest his patrons saw To fright away all trespassers; and up this legend nailed: 'Twas not so much that Sarch's nerve proclaimed heroic breed, One summer morn, his duties done, the plaintiff left his beat, In vain kind Phoebus threw his rays on that portentous sign; The kennel's near, yet no one warns-the men are in the mews, Though homespun's tough, 'twas not enough those sharp teeth to enmesh, Nota. By no exercise of poetic license may a dog be set down as able to remove a pound of carnous tissue at one fell bite, hence we feel it incumbent upon us at this juncture to unhorse the reporter from Pegasus, and bid the latter go to grass, the former to prose, so that Sarch and his cause may be reported aright. The following proposition of law is a fair deduction from the instructions of Tindal, C. J., to the jury in this case: A person is justified in keeping a dog in his yard for the protection of his premises, and if one in the act of trespassing upon such premises is bitten by the dog, he has no right of action against the owner. But the learned Chief Justice said that a man has no right to keep a ferocious dog in such a situation, in the way of access to his house, that a person coming there for a lawful purpose may be injured by it. In such a case, the owner of the dog could not excuse his liability by showing that he had posted up a danger notice by which the person injured might have been put on his guard had he read it. (See also Brock v. Copeland, 1 Esp. 203; Curtis v. Mills, 5 C. & P. 489.) In the United Sfates it is no defence for the defendant in an action for keeping a vicious dog to show that the plaintiff was at the time trespassing upon the defendant's property, for the purpose of hunting (Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. [N. Y.] 496); or of picking berries (Sherfey v. Bartley, 4 Sneed [Tenn.] 58); or for no particular purpose (Pierret v. Moller, 3 E. D. Smith [N. Y.] 574). Concerning a householder's right, in general, to protect his grounds, Cowen, J. said in Loomis v. Terry (supra) : "As against a trespasser, a man may make any defensive erection, or keep any defensive animal which may be necessary to the protection of his grounds, provided he take due care to confine himself to necessity. But it has been held that, in these and the like cases, the defendant shall not be justified, even as against a trespasser, unless he give notice that the instrument of mischief is in the way." See the Quebec case of Dandurand v. Pinsonnault (7 L. C. J. 131), decided under the Civil law, but enunciating practically the same doctrine as that of the above cases in the American Courts. II. THE SCIENTER IN DOG-LAW. Hathaway v. Tinkham, 148 Mass. 85. Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332. Sing, tuneful Muse, from your Pierian dell, What dearer theme than dogs our pen bestirs? Mens rea's theirs in Massachusetts' law. Down from the time of Sir John Holt, C. J. Fleeming v. Orr, 2 MacQ. H. L. C. at p. 25. "He's bit but once-and may not bite again"; Ibid., at p. 23. Beck v. Dyson, 4 Camp. 198; Vrooman v. Spring Co. v. Edgar, 99 U. S. at p. 654. "A dog, forsooth," (thus runs the Court's advice) Per Lee, C. J. in Smith v. Pelah, 2 Strange He may be hung for his carniv'rous deeds; 1264. Parsons v. King, 8 T. L. R. 114. And in his dining he can't wait for curries, Nor, if provoked to make bite "number two," Smith v. Pelah (supra); Fake v. Addicks, Will that avail to shield him from his rue. 45 Minn. 37. Line v. Taylor, 3 F. & F. 732. Aye, more, once Towser bites, he may be brought, There to assist the drowsy jury's mind. In judging if his owner deemed him kind; Jones v. Perry, 2 Esp. 482; Webber v. Thus the scienter they may find maintained. In self-defence a bite's within the law, Keightlinger v. Egan, 65 Ill. 235; Linck v. He's simply slept upon his legal right. Scheffel, 27 Ill. App. at p. 20. Morris v. Nugent, 7 C. & P. 572. "If I am bitten, I may kill!" you say; Not so if Towser bites and runs away. (The Muse digresses-but not ours to damn: Que voulez-vous? Peste! C'est méthode de femme.) A man may keep a vicious dog to guard His curtilage-but let him be in ward; If licensees are bitten when they enter, Smillie v. Boyd, 24 Sc. L. R. 148; Muller v. A judgment's theirs sans proof of the scienter. McKesson, 73 N. Y. 195. Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 C. & P. 297; Loomis v. Terry, 17 Wend. (N. Y.) 497. Beckwith v. Shoredike, 4 Burr. 2092; Green v. Doyle, 21 Ill. App. 208. But trespassers at night fare not so well, They risk the canine being kind or fell. Tho' when you trespass, with your dog appendant, McKone v. Wood, 5 C. & P. 1; Wood v. Will mulct you if his viciousness be known. EPILOGUE. And so the doctrine runs at Common Law, So, be he bitten, 'tis beyond dispute A man is worser off than a dumb brute. For when of sheep your dog proves a tormenter You're liable by statute, and are fined. Whether you knew the culprit fierce or kind. But when he bites, pray let him bite a man! TH NAMES OF LITERARY COMPOSITIONS. BY BERNARD C. STEINER, HE name of a literary production is not protected by copyright, but is an appendage to the production. A number of decisions of the courts speak of the name as property, but there is some some authority against this view, and it seems better to rest the remedy for improper use of the name on the ground of fraud. Here, as in other cases of competition, the fraud is to be proven, in case the defendant simulates a name composed of a word or words not arbitrary but descriptive in character, and is presumed, when he imitates words distinctly used by the plaintiff. After all, it is the literary production, i. e., the book or periodical of which the name is the symbol, and not the name itself which is protected. Names may be divided into two classes; those of single books and of periodical publications. In the case of the latter, there is a continuance of issue, which gives rise to good will attaching itself to the name of the periodical rather than to the place of publication. The probability of the title continuing to attract custom in the way of circulation and advertising patronage gives a value which may be protected and In the case of the former, disposed of. Jolie v. Jacques, Fed. Cases 1437; Kelly v Hutton, 37 L. J. Ch. 297; L. R. 3 Ch. Ap. 703; Dicks v. Yates, 18 Ch. D. 76. A series of valuable articles on this subject appeared in 1880 in 10 Cent. L. J. 82, 104, 123. 2Name is property: Met. Nat. Bank V. St. Louis Despatch Co., 149 U. S. 436; Gannett v. Ruppert, 119 Fed. 221; Rose v. McLean, 24 Ont. A. R. 240; Walter v. Head, 25 Sol. J. 742, 757; Giblett v. Read, 9 Mod. 459. "It is as much a part of the proprietor's property as his counting room or printing press." Gannett v. Ruppert (CCA), 65 Pub. Wkly. 68; Reid v. Bishop. 4 N. Z. L. R. 222; Munro v. Toucey, 129 N. Y. 38. Bowen said in Walter v. Emmott, 5.3 L. T. N. S. 437. the "name is not property, but the value of the name is the reasonable expectation of using it profitably in business.' Black v. Ehrlich, 44 Fed. 793; "neither author nor proprietor the good will preserved is that attaching to the sale of additional copies of what has been already published, rather than to the future publication of new matter under the same name. Of course, the plaintiff must establish his title by proof of use in publication. When publication occurs, is sometimes a question. of difficulty. In the case of a professor who delivers lectures orally in a class room, the British cases hold that he does not so communicate them to the world so that one may publish them without his consent and that there is an implied contract with the hearer not to publish the notes without the lecturer's consent. Even a third party, to whom the notes are sold and who published them, has been enjoined.5 Publication of a literary production like dedicating a private road to the public, is abandonment"; unless there be copyright; but the abandonment is only to the fair use of a literary work has any property in its name. It is a term of description which serves to identify the work, but any other person can with impunity adopt it and apply it to any other book, or to any trade commodity, provided he does not use it as a false token to induce the public to believe that the thing to which it is applied is the identical thing it originally designated." 'Met. Nat. Bank v. St. L. Dispatch Co., 149 U. S. 436. The rights to publish newspapers are goods and chattels; Foss ex parte, 30 L. T. O. S. 354, on appeal 2 De G. & J. 230; and may be assigned Kelly v. Hutton, 37 L. J. Ch. 297 L. R. 3 Ch. Ap. 703; and then other persons may be enjoined from using the name of the paper, or a similar one, at suit of the assignee; Lawrence v. Times Printing Co., 90 Fed. 24. In a curious case the defendant agreed to publish a magazine, and the plaintiff enforced a clause in the contract that he might use the name and prohibit the defendant's use of it, if the latter failed to bring out the numbers on time. N. Y. Polyclinic School v. King, 57 N. Y. Supp. 796. "Abernethy v. Hutchinson, 3 L. J. O. S. Ch. 209 (1825); Caird v. Sime, 13 Ct. Sess. Cas. 4th Ser. 23, reversed by 12 A. C. 326. "Jeffreys v. Boosey, 4 H. L. C. 965. |