PEACE-OR TRUCE? (II) THE PEACE ACCORDING TO HERR ERZBERGER–1914 AT the moment when the Nineteenth Century and After goes to press it looks as if Herr Matthias Erzberger, the prominent and versatile Catholic Centre Deputy and Minister, would be called upon to play a leading part in the conduct of German affairs. A new Ministry of the Empire (as the republican Federation of German States is still legitimately called, for the German word Reich does not imply monarchy) has been formed. And Erzberger, who, as a Minister without portfolio, has been engaged at Spa, first, in the conclusion of the Armistice and, afterwards, in the constant negotiations regarding its execution or modification, will now be employed in the conclusion of Peace on the Allies' and America's terms and in seeing that they are carried out. In September 1914 Herr Erzberger, then a private but very influential member of the Reichstag, drew up a sketch of peace terms, which, being still under the impression of the early German victories,' he considered ought to be imposed upon Germany's adversaries. It is not from any desire to queer Herr Erzberger's pitch in his new capacity of Vice-President of the Ministry that I propose to reproduce textually his 1914 terms of peace. They have recently been published in full by the Munich Press and afterwards by the Berlin Kreuzzeitung, the organ of the Prussian militarists and reactionaries. Snippety accounts of them have likewise appeared in the English Press. The Kreuzzeitung, indeed, published the document in order to discredit Herr Erzberger; and it had no difficulty in demonstrating his extraordinary inconsistency in having put forward those terms in September 1914, and having subsequently been the father of the so-called Peace Resolution ('no annexations and no indemnities') in the Reichstag in July 1917. Nay, worse things can be laid to Erzberger's charge from the reactionary Prussian point of view. In May 1918 he published articles in the Catholic Press in which he characterised the war aims of his German political adversaries-aims which did not go so far as those formerly advocated by himself as 'deceitful Mammonism' and as 'an extravagant programme of annexation.' If he had justified his change of views by the change in the military situation, his position would have been intelligible. But he adopted a high moral tone and announced that he would continue to combat annexationist plans as disastrous for Germany, for the world and for Christendom. Herr Erzberger may be left to fight these matters out with his countrymen. If the experience of the War has changed his moral outlook with regard to German plans for hegemony and annexation, so much the better for him. But, of course, he must now be careful not to set himself up as an infallible judge of the material or moral expediency of the guarantees which the Allied and Associated Powers now require from Germany for the future, or of the compensations and penalties which they are exacting for past wrongs and crimes. In September 1914 Herr Erzberger sent his draft of peace terms to various Germans in eminent positions. He did not publish it. The replies of these prominent Germans are now available, and it is even more important to show what their views and aims were in 1914 than to expose Herr Erzberger. I therefore append the replies which Erzberger received from the Chancellor, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, the then Minister of War, Falkenhayn, General von Moltke, and Admiral von Tirpitz. It seems especially desirable to show what an open mind, to say the least, Bethmann Hollweg at that time preserved with regard to annexations and indemnities. It has in some quarters been the fashion to represent him as a good man in adversity, borne away from his moorings by the tide of militarism and panGermanism. I have never been able to accept this view, and his reply to Erzberger certainly gives no colour to it. The following is a full translation of the text of Erzberger's draft of peace terms: The The purpose of the present universal war is, according to the repeatedly expressed intention of Germany's enemies, the destruction of the German Empire and the dissolution of Austria-Hungary. German victories have already attained the result that this aim will not be reached. sanguinary struggle of the German people, together with the exertions of Austria, make it an urgent duty to use the consequences of victory in such a manner that German military supremacy shall be secure for all time on the Continent, that the German people shall be in a position to enjoy undisturbed peaceful development for at least 100 years. Only when this aim is attained are the great sacrifices of this war justified. Only then are the wishes of the German people fulfilled. From this point of view all demands and conditions at the conclusion of peace must be considered. The first demand is therefore that Germany can no longer suffer on her frontiers pretended neutral States, which are not sufficiently strong to maintain their neutrality, or which have no desire to remain neutral. The second aim is the abolition of English tutelage, which is so unbearable for Germany in all questions of world-policy. The third is the destruction of the Russian colossus. To attain this the German people have entered this fight, which is without parallel. The lowest conditions of a conclusion of peace must therefore be : (a) Belgium. This country, which has been acquired with so much German blood, can under no circumstances retain its present position. There is no cogent reason for dividing it among the bordering States. In what manner the country is to be treated in regard to political status is a matter for later deliberation. Under all circumstances it must be attained that Germany shall have military supremacy over the country, and not only over Belgium, but over the entire French coastline, stretching via Dunkirk and Calais to Boulogne; it is just as necessary that Germany should obtain possession of the English Channel Islands lying off Cherbourg. Whether in the future Belgium shall be accepted as a confederate State of the German Empire, or whether it shall be received in a European confederacy under German hegemony, need not be discussed for the moment. Under all circumstances our access to the sea to the south of the Channel must be rendered secure by the establishment of coaling stations, naval ports, etc. (b) France. The ceding of large tracts of territory by France need hardly be considered. The cession of the above-mentioned territory bordering directly on Belgium is absolutely necessary. It is a just demand of German industrial circles that the entire Minette District of French Lorraine should come under German dominion, so that it may be carefully exploited by Germany. The old desire of 1870, that the German flag should wave permanently above Belfort, is once more put forward. If France could be compelled to raze her frontier fortifications that would be an additional gain. (c) Russia. The most difficult problem for the conclusion of peace is doubtless the arrangements in the East. It is difficult on account of our internal political conditions; difficult because Germany cannot here decide alone, but must come to an agreement with Austria. The aim should be liberation of non-Russian peoples from the Muscovite yoke and the creation of internal self-government for the individual nations. All this under German military supremacy, perhaps also with a Customs Union. An independent Poland would probably be opposed to legitimate German interests, and might in the course of years develop into a Polish Serbia, which would then cause great difficulties to Germany and Austria. The Russian Baltic Provinces could with their vigorous populations be partially annexed to Prussia or become independent States under German military supremacy; the same could be done with Lithuania. Should a Polish kingdom be created under German supremacy it is absolutely necessary to give it a dynasty which in accordance with existing conditions should belong to the Roman Catholic confession. How Austria must extend in the Ukraine and Rumania in Bessarabia need not here be further explained. The aim should be to exclude Russia from the Baltic as well as from the Black Sea. The sooner this is attained the quicker we shall have peace. Against these proposals the objection might be raised that their execution would bring about an entire change in the whole structure of the present German Empire. This objection is, however, not valid, for it is not a question of annexing the above-mentioned territories to the German Empire. The best solution would be that between the present German Empire and the above-mentioned territories a confederacy of States should be established, guaranteeing for all time the military supremacy of the Kaiser and, according to circumstances, making a Customs Union the aim in view. There would naturally be no question of the introduction of the Reichstag suffrage in these territories. In all military and political questions the Kaiser, the Reichstag, and the Bundestag would retain the decision. An agreement of this description would set aside any objection and offer a full guarantee that the desired aim should be attained. (d) Africa. It would be a great misfortune if Germany were to decide to acquire Morocco for herself as it would amount to a rash dispersion of forces, and the present war has specially shown that the concentration of all the German forces is the first condition of victory. If, on the other hand, Italy could obtain Tunis, and Egypt were to fall to Austria, then our Allies would not only reap considerable benefit from it and England's predominant position in the Mediterranean be destroyed, but the opposition between the Triple Alliance and England and France would be rendered permanent; Italy particularly would be in a state of perpetual opposition to France. In Central Africa a great German Central Africa should be created in accordance with the plan of the late Kiderlen-Wächter stretching from Dar-es-Salam beyond Duala to Senegal; thus the Belgian and French Congo would have to be annexed, Nigeria taken from England, Dahomey and the French West Coast from France. This rounding off of our colonial possessions does not disperse our forces, and gives a new field of activity to German interests. We do not require colonies for settlements, as, after the war, there will be less emigration than during the last few years, when more foreigners came to Germany than Germans emigrated. We must concentrate our people. (e) Indemnity for the Cost of War. For the height of the indemnity for the cost of war the momentary capacity of any individual country should not be decisive. In addition to immense immediate payment there can be arranged a payment in instalments spread over many years, which, for instance, in regard to France could be facilitated by lowering the number of her army considerably by the treaty of peace. Economies in regard to army and navy would place the country in a position to make great payments to Germany. In regard to the height of the indemnity the following points should be considered: 1. Full indemnity for the direct costs of the war. The sum of ten milliards is rather too low than too high an estimate. 2. Full indemnity for all damage done by the war, in respect to which the Province of East Prussia, which has suffered so severely, should receive special consideration, and the injustice done to it 100 years ago by extracting from the country, which was never rich, an indemnity paid out of its own means, should be compensated. The amount of the sum cannot be approximately fixed at present. 3. Redemption of all our imperial debts, more than 80 per cent. of which are due to expenditure upon the navy, the army, and colonial expeditions. In this manner about 250 millions will be set free in our Budget for the purpose of interest and redemption, which will form a reserve, and for years after the war obviate the necessity of introducing new taxes, a consideration which, for the reconstruction of our economic life, is of particularly great importance. 4. Creation of a great Imperial Pensions Fund. The Pension Law of 1908 will involve much greater expenses after this war. If this fund is to be properly provided the sum of about Mk.5 milliards will be required. 5. A large fund will have to be set aside for the creation of German Cable and Wireless Stations. In regard to the amount of this sum nothing can be said at present. The same may be stated in regard to a fund to be placed at the disposal of His Majesty the Kaiser for the distribution of grants of honour to victorious generals and successful statesmen. 6. For social purposes (reduction of the age limit for old-age pensions, etc.), money should also be set aside, and particular attention should be given to the creation of a large fund for the improvement of housing, in the form of a great sum for a species of Imperial Mortgage Bank, which could then grant second mortgages to co-operative concerns run by the poorer classes. Such an institution would meet with a particularly favourable reception among the masses of the people, as, in regard to housing, nothing can be done without large funds, and the war has shown how necessary it is with the increasing industrialisation of the people to pay special attention to the preservation and improvement of their health. Appended are the replies which Herr Erzberger received. The Imperial Chancellor Herr von Bethmann Hollweg wrote: General Headquarters: I beg you to accept my best thanks for your kindness in sending your memorandum. In all circumstances we must hold out until the future of Germany is completely secured. Although all possibilities must be thoroughly considered, final decisions will nevertheless entirely depend upon further developments. Yours very truly, (Signed) VON BETHMANN HOLLWEG. From this letter it is evident that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg was prepared to give thorough consideration to Herr Erzberger's views of a peace and that, if 'developments' had been more satisfactory, that consideration might have been of a quite favourable character. General von Falkenhayn wrote: General Headquarters: 6.9.14. DEAR (German: sehr verehrter) HERR ERZBERGER,-I thank you very much for sending me the memorandum on possible terms of peace which you submitted to the Imperial Chancellor. I need not say how entirely I share your view that the nation must not have bled in vain. All the same -the Germans, like other people, do not hang anybody unless they have first caught him! Both the whale and the polar bear will give us many a nut to crack before we can divide their skin. [A nice mixture of metaphors!] And the continuance of the present splendid spirit of sacrifice on the part of the people will be requisite for a long time, until we can |