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absccnded, or is absent therefrom and has 71 Am. Dec. 708, that a decree for alimony left no agent therein and his whereabouts is a debt within St. 13 Eliz, c. 5, as to conare unknown." This section

” This section is as follows: veyances in fraud of creditors. In Knapp v. “The court may order said property, or its Knapp, 134 Mass, 353, and in Burrows V. proceeds acquired by mortgage, lease or sale, Purple, 107 Mass. 428, there is language recto be applied in payment of charges incurred ognizing a decree for alimony in gross as a or that may be incurred in the support and kind of debt. maintenance of the absentee's wife and mi- The case of Bailey v. Bailey, 166 Mass. 226, nor children, and to the discharge of such 44 N. E. 143, following and explaining Chase debts as may be proved against said absen- v. Ingalls, 97 Mass. 524, decides that a liatee.”

bility for alimony is not "debt or damage in The petitioner was the wife of the absen- a civil action," within the meaning of the tee, and she obtained from him a divorce a statute in regard to arrest upon execution. vinculo, with a decree for alimony in gross But it hardly affects the general question to the amount of $4,000. For this, exe- with which we are dealing. The decisions cution was issued, and she made her peti- that claims for alimony are not provable in tion to the probate court to have it proved bankruptcy rest upon reasons that have little and allowed as a debt against the estate of application to this case. We are of opinher former husband, in the hands of the re- ion that the word "debts" in this statute is ceiver. The principal question in the case used in its broad signification, and includes is whether this is a debt, within the mean- claims like that now before us. ing of the statute.

The remaining question is whether this The origin of the claim in the obligation debt can be proved against the absentee and of the husband to provide for her support allowed against the property in the receivdoes not militate against its allowance; for er's hands without personal notice to the the statute provides for the payment of absentee. From the nature of the case we charges of this kind which are not directly think it must be provable, upon a proper debts. A decree for alimony in a gross sum, general notice to the receiver and to persons which is a final ajudication for the payment within the jurisdiction interested in the esof the amount named, is within the consti- state. The reason for the appointment of the tutional provision that "full faith and credit receiver is that the whereabouts of the owner shall be given in each state * * to the of the property are unknown and he has left judicial proceedings of other states." A no agent properly to represent him in caring suit may be brought to enforce the payment for his property, and to perform his obliof it as a debt, in a state other than that in gations. In most cases to which the statute which it was entered. Page V. Page, 189 applies it would be practically impossible to Mass. 85, 75 N. E. 92. An obligation under give personal notice to the absentee. We are such a decree is plainly in the nature of a of opinion that the notice in the present case debt, and for most purposes it can fairly was sufficient. Bonnemort v. Gill, 167 Mass. be called a debt. In Gray v. Bennett, 3 338, 45 N. E. 768; Minot v. Purrington, 190 Metc. 522–526, the court said: “The word Mass. 336, 77 N. E. 630. 'debt is of large import including not only

Decree affirmed. debts of record or judgments and debts by specialty, *

and in its popular sense includes all that is due to a man under any

(192 Mass. 391) form of obligation or promise. And long ago

NEW YORK BANK NOTE CO. V. KIDDER it was held, as expressed by Blackstone, that

PRESS MFG. CO. ‘whatever the laws order anyone to pay, that

(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

Suffolk. June 20, 1906.) becomes incidentally a debt which he hath beforehand contracted to discharge.' In

1. CONTRACTS VALIDITY RESTRAINT OF

TRADE. Howard y. Howard, 15 Mass. 196, in refer

A contract by the seller of a printing ring to a liability for alimony, the court used

press, purchased for a certain use, not to sell this language: “The debt is certain and it similar presses to be used in the same way, is is proved by record, and the decree is in

not invalid as in restraint of trade.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 11, effect as much a judgment as if rendered on

Cent. Dig. Contracts, $ 542.] the common-law side of the court." Mr.

2. SAME-ACTION FOR BREACH -- DEFENSESJustice Field, in Knapp v. Knapp, 134 Mass.

NECESSITY OF PLEADING. 353, said, “A decree for alimony, whether Under Rev. Laws, c. 173, $ 27, providing for alimony already due or to become due that the answer shall state each fact intended to in the future is in a certain sense a debt of

be relied on in avoidance of the action, the

defense that the contract sued on was void, record established by a judgment.” So in

because in violation of Anti-Trust Law, July Chase v. Chase, 105 Mass. 385, Mr. Justice 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. St. Morton speaking of divorce a vinculo and 1901, p. 3200], is not available unless pleaded. divorce a mensa et thoro, said, "The judg

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 39, ment for alimony in either case creates a

Cent. Dig. Pleading, $$ 1237, 1261, 1263, 1288.)

3. CORPORATIONS debt of record in favor of the wife.” It was

CONTRACTS RIGHT TO

PLEAD ULTRA VIRES-ESTOPPEL. held in that case, as it previously had been

A corporation organized to manufacture held in Livermore v. Boutelle, 11 Gray, 217, and sell printing presses cannot, after having

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received the benefits of a sale under a contract plaintiff contended through many years of litigabinding the seller not to sell other similar press- tion that it was entitled to recover certain dames to be used for the same purpose, be allowed ages growing out of the breach of the contract to defend an action for breach of this provision on which suit was brought. After a holding of the contract on the ground that it was ultra that this contract was unassignable, and plainvires.

tiff not entitled to recover the particular damages [Ed. Note.For cases in point, see vol. 12,

claimed, and after the appointment of a receiver Cent. Dig. Corporations, $$ 1556, 1557.]

for defendant, plaintiff's predecessor sought to

intervene. Held, that leave to intervene was 4. SAME-REORGANIZATION - ASSIGNMENT OF

properly denied. PROPERTY-RIGHTS TRANSFERRED. An assignment of all corporate property,

[Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 37, including choses in action, by a corporation

Cent. Dig. Parties, $ 69.] to its successor, conveyed a right of action for breach of a contract, but without a special pro- Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk Counvision to that effect, or the consent of the ty. other party, did not convey rights growing out of fiduciary relations between the parties cre

Action by the New York Bank Note Comated by provisions of the contract giving the pany against the Kidder Press Manufacturassignor certain rights as to the profits of other ing Company. The action was referred to a contracts.

master, and from a decree overruling ex[Ed. Note.--For cases in point, see vol. 12,

ceptions to the master's report, and affirming Cent. Dig. Corporations, 882310, 2311.)

it, awarding plaintiff damages and directing 5. EQUITY - REFERENCE - REOPENING CASE

the payment of the same out of certain funds DISCRETION OF MASTER. The hearing of further evidence by a

in court, the receivers of the defendant master after objections to the report have been corporation appeal. Modified and affirmed. heard is within the master's discretion. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 19,

Moulton, Loring & Green halge, for appelCent. Dig. Equity, § 892.]

lants. E. P. Lyon, I. R. Clark, and G. F. 6. SAME-FINDINGS-CONCLUSIVENESS.

Ordway, for appellee New York Bank Note Co. Where the order referring a case to a Victor J. Loring, for appellee Kidder Press master does not require him to report the evi

Mfg. Co. dence, objections as to the sufficiency of the proof to warrant certain findings are not tenable.

BRALEY, J. The right of the plaintiff as a [Ed. Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 19, Cent. Dig. Equity, § 911.]

creditor to participate in the distribution of

the assets in the possession of the receivers 7. APPEAL-HARMLESS ERROR-ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.

depends primarily upon the validity and In an action for breach of contract, de

construction of the contract made between the fendant is not prejudiced by the admission of defendant and the New York Bank Note evidence as to a measure of damages not adopt- Company of New Jersey, and later assigned ed by either master or the court. [Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 3,

to the plaintiff. Appeals having been taken Cent. Dig. Appeal and Error, § 4154.]

by all parties from the interlocutory decrees, 8. DAMAGES-BREACH OF CONTRACT.

the various questions of title, of liability, Where printing presses adapted to a cer

and of the measure of damages, if the plaintain use were sold under an agreement by the tiff is entitled to prove for any amount, are seller not to sell similar presses to any one

open. At the outset it appears that the deelse to be used for the same purpose, the buyer, on breach of the restrictive agreement, was

fendant being engaged in the manufacture entitled to recover the difference between the and sale of an improved printing perfecting value of the presses as protected by the restric- press entered into a contract with the plaintion and their market value as affected by the

tiff's assignor, a corporation which printed breach of the agreement. [Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 15,

and sold strip tickets used by transportation Cent. Dig. Damages, § 302.]

companies, by the terms of which among other 9. SAME-INTEREST ON RECOVERY.

provisions, it agreed not to sell this type of In an action for breach of a contract by a press to other customers to be used by them seller of machinery not to sell similar machinery for a similar purpose. While the defendant to others, the buyer was entitled to interest on

was left unrestricted to make and vend the the amount of the recovery from the date of the breach.

press for other uses to which it might be [Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see vol. 15, adapted, yet as the principle object was to Cent. Dig. Damages, § 141.]

create a partial monopoly the first contention 10. SAME-RECOVERY AGAINST PERSON JOINT- is that for this reason the contract was void. LY LIABLE.

At common law a sound public policy was Machinery was sold by defendant to plain

held to require that the individual effort and tiff under an agreement not to sell similar machinery to any one else. This agreement was

competition which furnished an opportunity violated, and plaintiff sued the defendant, and for earning a livelihood, or the extension of ibrought action in another state against the trade; should be unrestricted, as the welpurchaser. The latter action was compromised

fare of the community demanded that the inby the payment of a sum of money to plaintiff. Held, that this was a partial satisfaction,

dustrial and business activity of its members which must be deducted from the amount of should be unhampered. But a distinction plaintiff's recovery against defendant.

was early recognized between contracts which 11. PARTIES-INTERVENTION-RIGHT TO INTER

wholly restricted trade, and those which VENE-DELAY. In an action by a corporation on a cause

partially limited its developement and exof action assigned to it by its predecessor, the

tension either as to territory, or to persons; the first being held void, while the latter, if moral nor void for want of corporate authorreasonable, has been upheld as valid. Game- ity, the defendant became bound to its full well Fire Alarm Telegraph Co. v. Crane, 160 performance. Without reviewing the evidence Mass. 50, 56, 35 N. E. 98, 22 L. R. A. 673, 39 there was abundant proof to support the Am. St. Rep. 458; Anchor Electric Co. v. finding that by the sale of a similar press to Hawkes, 171 Mass. 101, 105, 50 N. E. 509, 41 the Hamilton Bank Note and Engraving ComL. R. A. 189, 68 Am. St. Rep. 403; Diamond pany, without the assent of the New Jersey Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 X. Y. 473, 13 N. E. Company, there was a breach by the defend419, 60 Am. Rep. 464. The nature of the busi- ant, which entitled that company to recover ness in which the New Jersey Company was damages. But although this corporation was engaged appears to have been of such charac- dissolved without having brought suit, and ter that it was not unreasonable for its own was succeeded by the present plaintiff, to protection that a stipulation should be in- whom all of its corporate property, including serted which left the defendant at liberty to choses in action were conveyed and assigned, sell this press to all the world for other the fiduciary relations between the parties purposes, but prohibited sales to those who under the term of the contract relating to the by their competition might, and probably proceeds of other sales were such, that withwould ruin its business, and this restriction, out a provision to that effect, which is not therefore, did not render the contract invalid. found, or without the defendant's assent, Morse Twist Drill & Machine Co. v. Morse, which was not given, the plaintiff was not 103 Mass. 73, 4 Am. Rep. 513; Gibbs v. Con- substituted, and hence the assignment passed solidated Gas Co. of Baltimore, 130 U. S. 396, only the bare right of action which previously 9 Sup. Ct. 553, 32 L. Ed. 979; 2 Kent, Com. had accrued to the assignor. Boston Ice (14th Ed.) note 10, “Restraint of Trade," Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28, 30, 25 Am. Rep. 9; and cases there collected: New York Bank New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Engraving Note & Engraving Co., ubi supra; Robinson & Printing Co., 180 N. Y. 280, 73 N. E. 48. v. Drummond, 2 B. & Ad. 303; Arkansas The defendant further claims that the con- Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 127 tract was in violation of the act of Congress U. S. 379, 8 Sup. Ct. 1308, 32 L. Ed. 246; Delaof July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. St. ware County v. Diebol Safe & Lock Company, 1901, p. 3200]) commonly known as the 133 U. S. 473, 10 Sup. Ct. 399, 33 L. Ed. 674; “Anti-Trust Law," but if applicable neither Burck v. Taylor, 152 U. S. 634, 14 Sup. Ct. in its answer, nor by its cross-bill is this

696, 38 L. Ed. 578. ground for relief directly or inferentially Upon the entry of an interlocutory decree stated. If at inception the contract was void which thus properly defined and limited the as being prohibited by this statute, then to be plaintiff's claim, the case was referred to a available such a defense must be specially master for the assessment of damages. To pleaded. Rev. Laws, c. 173, & 27; Granger v. his report numerous exceptions were taken Ilsley, 2 Gray, 521; Bradford v. Tinkham, 6 by both parties concerning the exclusion and Gray, 494; Rice v. Enwright, 119 Mass. 187; admission of evidence as well as to the rule Hunting v. Downer, 151 Mass. 275, 278, 23 N. adopted by him for the ascertainment of E. 832.

damages, but while no appeal was taken by It is also urged as another reason for avoid- the plaintiff from the decree overruling them, ance that the contract was not within the and confirming the report, the defendant havscope of the defendant's express or implieding appealed its exceptions are next to be corporate powers. But if a foreign corpora- considered. These exceptions so far as they tion, and the terms of its charter are not relate to the reopening of the hearing after shown, it is alleged in the original bill, and the submission of the draft report call for not denied by the answer, that it was organ- no comment, as the admission of further ized for the purpose of making and dealing evidence offered by either party after hearin printing presses, of which the manufact- ing their objections and before finally settling ure and sale of the perfecting press comprised his report was within the master's discretion. only a part. While created for the purpose of Under the decretal order, the master was not engaging in a particular kind of business, required to report the evidence, and those ther? was no prohibition upon the form of

exceptions which depend either upon a differcontracts it might adopt to effect a sale of ent view of the testimony, or that some of his its product, and it should not be permitted to findings were not supported by sufficient repudiate a transaction if otherwise valid, proof, are not tenable, and may be dismissed and under which it received, and has retained without further remark. O'Brien v. Murphy, the consideration as being in excess of its 189 Mass. 353, 75 N. E. 700. And the recorporate powers, when such a course must maining exceptions which relate to the result in positive injury to the plaintiff. measure' of damages present the principal Slater Woolen Co. v. Lamb, 143 Mass. 420, question. 421, 9 N. E. 823; Prescott National Bank v. It is evident that the plaintiff endeavored Butler, 157 Mass. 548, 549, 32 N. E. 909; Nims to obtain compensation based upon the differV. Mt. Hermon Boys' School, 160 Mass. 177, ence between the cost of printing tickets, 179, 35 N. E. 776, 22 L. R. A. 364, 39 Am. St. and their price which the assignor was reRep. 467. The contract being neither im- ceiving under its contracts. But this esti

78 N.E.-30

mate not having been taken as a measure of pany already begun in another jurisdiction. computation either by the master, or the trial A demurrer having been interposed it had court, the defendant has not been prejudiced been obliged to join the defendant as a by evidence admitted in support of this posi- | party. New York Bank Note Co. v. Hamiltion, and its exception to such admission be- ton Bank Note & Engraving Co., 83 Hun, comes immaterial. The report recites that 593, 31 N. Y. Supp. 1060. And instead of the parties agreed that the sale to the Ham- prosecuting the action here in which any ilton Company was before the date of the liability of the defendant could have been assignment, and as this sale was the specific speedily determined, it chose to proceed with act of violation, whatever cause of action the litigation in another forum. New York the New Jersey Company possessed, then Bank Note Co. v. Hamilton Bank Note Enaccrued. At that time the assignor owned graving & Printing Co. and Kidder Press two presses which if new could have been Mfg. Co., ubi supra. But wherever prosecuted; bought in the market for much less than the and whether at law or in equity, the plaintiff sum paid for the second press, the price of at common law had only one cause of action, which also was taken as the basis of valua- namely, the chose assigned by the New Jersey tion of the first press bought before the con- Company. It now suggests notwithstanding tract was made. The value of both presses the express allegations of the pill before us when fitted for use in printing strip tickets, to the contrary that the defendant was joined and protected by the restriction may be fair- merely for conformity, while relief and damly said to have been equal, and besides, this ages were asked onıy as to the principal devalue even if divided by the recitals in the fendant. When, however, the history of the contract was the total estimate fixed by the entire controversy is read, form ceases to be agreement. Parker v. Simonds, 8 Metc. 205, of primary importance, and whatever its 213. To take the difference between this attitude the only object sought was the reamount which as to one press was enhanced covery of damages from both parties, and by the cost of certain mechanical changes, for injunctive relief solely because this deand the market price, established the loss fendant had broken its contract. New York caused by the depreciation, and provided a Bank Note Co. v. Kidder Press Mfg. Co., 176 correct measure of compensation. What Mass. 151, 152, 57 N. E. 348. The multiplifurther elements of damage might have cation of actions for the same cause whether been presented if the assignor had continued sounding in tort or contract does not have in business, and brought suit need not be the effect of multiplying damages, and while considered, as within this limit at least it the release under seal is couched in general would have been entitled to recover. West- terms, no attempt was made to show existfield v. Mayo, 122 Mass. 100, 105, 23 Am. ence of any other demand, and it is to be Rep. 292; Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co., 8 assumed that the suit was brought aud prosePick. 90, 99, 19 Am. Dec. 306; Noble v. Ames cuted in good faith. Smith v. Way, 9 Allen, Mfg. Co., 112 Mass. 492, 497; Somers v. 472; Burnet v. Smith, 4 Gray, 50. Indeed the Wright, 115 Mass. 292; Townsend v. Vicker- discontinuance of the action, and discharge son Wharf Co., 117 Mass. 501; Manning v. of the bond sufficiently indicates that the Fitch, 138 Mass. 273, 277; Whitehead & compromise was regarded as a settlement of Atherton Machine Co. v. Ryder, 139 Mass. the litigation with the releasee. See Brown 366, 371, 31 N. E. 736; Abbott v. Hapgood, v. Cambridge, 3 Allen, 474, 476; Aldrich v. 150 Mass. 248, 22 N. E. 907, 5 L. R. A, 586, Parnell, 147 Mass. 409, 18 N. E. 170. It is 15 Am. St. Rep. 193. The addition of interest not material to determine whether the dewas proper, for the amount assessed became fendant and the company were joint debtors due when the contract was broken, and as within the meaning of section 1942 of the the plaintiff should be fully compensated it Civil Code of Procedure of the state of New ought not to suffer loss from the delay in pay- York, relating to the compounding of claims ment. Hovey v. Newton, 11 Pick. 421, 422; against joint debtors, under which one debtor Ainsworth v. Lakin, 180 Mass. 397, 62 N. E. is not discharged by settlement with the 746, 57 L. R. A. 132, 91 Am. St. Rep. 314; other, as the plaintiff's claim had not been Peabody v. New York, New Haven & Hart- merged in a joint judgment. Before this ford Railroad Co., 187 Mass. 489, 73 N. E. settlement had been effected the amount 649. But though none of the exceptions can which the plaintiff could recover had been esbe sustained it is also contended that this tablished by decree of a court of competent assessment should be reduced by deducting jurisdiction, to the final decision of which a sum subsequently received by the plaintiff it had submitted its cause. In either jurisfrom the Hamilton Company. This question

This question diction, although the breach of the contract comes up in the form of a report which states in itself was not a tort, it was entitled to that all the facts relating to the material but one satisfaction of damages, whether issues appearing in the record of the entire obtained by compromise when unliquidated, litigation are to be considered in its de- or by payment after the amount had been termination. After bringing a suit at law ascertained and adjudicated. Vanuxem v. in this state which appears still to be pend- | Burr, 151 Mass. 386, 388, 389, 24 N. E. 773, ing, and to which the original bill in the pres- 21 Am. St. Rep. 458. In Stimpson v. Poole, ent case is ancillary, the plaintiff proceeded 141 Mass. 502, 505, 6 N. E. 705, 707, it was with an action against the Hamilton Com- said "money paid which is to be in full for an unliquidated or a disputed claim is taken in a present demise, subject to all the conditions in discharge of it, and constitutes a full de- and covenants of the original lease, and taking fense against any further assertion of the

effect at the expiration of the first term, and

no subsequent agreement or second lease is claim. What is received is deemed in law

necessary. to be a satisfaction of the claim.” That the

[Ed._Note.-For cases in point, see vol. 32, Hamilton Company in fact might not have Cent. Dig. Landlord and Tenant, $$ 270–289.] been liable to respond does not affect the ad- 2. SAME-SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENT. justment, or the application of the payment. The parties to a lease may, by a subseLeddy v. Barney, 139 Mass. 394, 397, 2 N. E.

quent agreement, prolong the time, although

the lease is silent on this subject. 107. If the reservation by the releasor that

3. SAME--EXTENSION OF LEASE-EFFECT-CANit did not relinquish its claim against the

CELLATION. defendant prevents the release from being a A tenant made improvements on an oral full discharge, the receipt of a partial pay

understanding that the term should be extended ment likewise is to be treated as a partial

for five years after the termination of the ex

isting lease. Afterward the parties made a satisfaction, which the plaintiff must apply written agreement granting an extension of the in reduction of the sum awarded by the de- term, subject to all the terms of the original cree. Brown v. Cambridge, ubi supra; Wood

lease, one of which gave the lessor the right after a notice to cancel the

the lease. Held v. Mann, 125 Mass. 319; Hudson v. Baker,

that the written agreement for an extension 185 Mass. 122, 125, 70 N. E. 419. This con- controlled the oral negotiations preceding it, clusion being adverse to the plaintiff, it then and gave the lessor a right to terminate the contends that the appeal of the New Jersey tenancy by compliance with the provisions upon

that point of the original lease. Company from a decree which denied a petition for leave to intervene should be sus- Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk Countained. After many years of litigation, when ty; Franklin G. Fessenden, Judge. it became apparent that the contract was Action by William T. De Friest and others unassignable, this right is asked for the pur- against Richards M. Bradley and others. pose of getting enhanced damages, which if From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs recoverable would go to the plaintiff, but if appeal. Affirmed. for no other reason this lapse of time, united

Warner, Warner & Stackpole, for appelwith the persistent effort in the courts of

lant Wm. J. Lemp Brewing Co. Dickson another state at a large expense to the estate

& Knowles, for appellant De Friest. Ropes, unsuccessfully to maintain a contrary prop

Gray & Gorham, for appellees. osition, is sufficient to justify the refusal by a court of equity to allow further delay

BRALEY, J. The original lease contained to the manifest injustice of other creditors,

neither a covenant for renewal, nor an agreeas well as the debtor. Cooke v. Barrett,

ment for an additional term at the election 155 Mass. 413, 414, 29 N. E. 625.

of the lessee. If the last provision had been We do not find it essential to specifically

inserted, and the option had been exercised, consider other questions of procedure raised

there would have been a present demise to by the appeal of the receivers, and referred

take effect at the expiration of the first term, to in their brief. It may be presumed that

and no subsequent agreement or second until their accounts are passed, and the

lease would have been necessary. Stone y. claims of intervening creditors have been

St. Louis Stamping Co., 155 Mass. 267, 270, adjusted, no order for distribution will be

29 N. E. 623. The leasehold estate would made, and that payment to the plaintiff will

have been thus prolonged to the end of the not be ordered until these steps have been

entire period, subject, to all the conditions taken. It follows from what we have said that

and covenants, including that of the right

of the lessor to cancel the lease at his pleasall the interlocutory decrees and orders from which appeals have been taken are affirmed.

ure upon giving written notice, and paying

the stipulated sum which was to be graduBut while affirming the second decree be

ated in amount according to the time the cause no error is found therein at the time of entry, it is to be modified either by an

lessee had occupied the premises. Dix v.

Atkins, 130 Mass. 171; Toupin v. Peabody, interlocutory, or in the final decree by deducting from the amount of damages the payment

162 Mass. 473, 39 N. E. 280. It was, howreceived by the plaintiff, with such allowance

ever, within the contractual power of the of interest at the legal rate as may be con

parties by a later arrangement to prolong sidered expedient.

the term although the lease was silent on Ordered accordingly.

this subject, and this was done by an instrument which has been referred to as the

agreement of extension, which was executed (192 Mass. 346)

and became operative before the term proDE FRIEST et al. v. BRADLEY et al. vided for in the lease had expired. In legal (Supreme Judicia! Court of Massachusetts.

effect this agreement operated to extend the Suffolk. June 20, 1906.)

term as effectually as if its principal provi1. LANDLORD AND TENANT-EXTENSION OF sion had been inserted in the lease in the LEASE-EXERCISE OF OPTION.

form of an option of extension, for a further Where a lease contains an agreement for

definite period at the election of the lessee, an additional term at the election of the lessee, the exercise of the option by the lessee results

who subsequently made such an election. By

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