at the time of its passage. When the fee and salary act of 1879 was enacted neither the West Publishing Company nor any other person in like manner was engaged unofficially in publishing the opinions and decisions of this court. The West Company did not enter upon that work in this state for several years thereafter. In fact, at that time the bar and public in general were advised in regard to the decisions of this court, in advance of the official reports, only by abstracts thereof which were published in the daily newspapers. Under the circumstances, it would be unreasonable to assume that the Legislature in fixing or prescribing a maximum fee or price that the clerk might exact for a copy of record or paper, also intended to include such copies as the clerk shows he has been furnishing to said company for advance publication.

As a legal proposition, it certainly will not be contended that the clerk of this court, in the event he should refuse to furnish to said company the uncertified copies in question, could be coerced by it to do so by mandamus, under existing laws. That the phrase "copy of record," etc., as expressed in the schedule of fees means a certified copy has been repeatedly recognized by the Legislature in the provisions incorporated in the several appropriation acts to which we have already referred. It will be noted that these several provisions, among other things, provide that the clerk of the Supreme Court and the other state officials therein mentioned, before receiving their quarterly salary, are required to pay over to the State Treasurer the amounts of money received for "certified copies of the official records, opinions, or papers, etc." We are aware that an interpretation or construction of a statute by a subsequent Legislature is as a rule not entitled to much weight, for the functions of that body are to enact and not to construe law, but if the word "copy" contained in the fee schedule in question could be said to be of a doubtful or uncertain meaning, these provisions in the subsequent acts of the Legislature would be entitled to some weight as a guide in the interpretation of the meaning of the word "copy" in the fee schedule of the act of 1879. Henderson v. State, 96 Ind. 437, 442; Middleton v. Greeson et al., 106 Ind. 18, 5 N. E. 755. As the provisions in question of the act of 1879 do not apply to or control the clerk in charging or fixing a compensation for furnishing uncertified or unauthenticated copies of the opinions and decisions in controversy, it follows therefore that under the present condition of our laws there is an entire absence of any statutory provision governing or restricting him in the matter.

The Attorney General, in his opposing argument, concedes that, in the absence of any legal restriction or requirement, the clerk is the exclusive judge of the manner of furnishing copies of these opinions. He

finally contends, however, that the clerk has no right to furnish copies of the opinions and decisions of the Supreme and Appellate Courts to the West Publishing Company for advance publication for the reason that the state has a property interest therein and, therefore, is invested with the exclusive right of their publication. The argument is advanced that inasmuch as the state has undertaken to officially publish these decisions, consequently, other persons are impliedly precluded from unofficially publishing them. It is true that section 6 of article 7 of our Constitution provides that "the General Assembly shall provide by law for the speedy publication of the decisions of the Supreme Court made under this Constitution, but no judge shall be allowed to report such decisions." This provision, however, cannot be said to have the effect of prohibiting other persons from unofficially publishing our decisions. In fact, the state has never claimed the right to monopolize the publication of these decisions.

By the above provision of our fundamental law the framers, or molders, thereof recognized not only the importance of having the decisions of the highest court of this state published, but they recognized also the necessity of a speedy publication thereof in order that the people of the state might be advised or informed as early as possible as to the law declared or construed by the highest court. It is generally settled by the authorities that the work of the judges of a court cannot be copyrighted. but that the syllabi, or headnotes, prepared by the official reporter of the opinions and decisions of the court as reported may be protected by copyright. Ex parte Griffiths, supra; Banks & Bro. v. West Publishing Co. (C. C.) 27 Fed. 50, 57; Banks v. Manchester, 128 U. S. 244, 9 Sup. Ct. 36, 32 L. Ed. 425; 7 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, pp. 539, 540.

The policy of the state to permit persons other than the official reporter to publish in advance the decisions of this court has been clearly recognized through its Legislature. In section 7 of an act passed in 1875 (the same being section 5710, Rev. St. 1881), providing for the election of a reporter of the decisions of this court, and fixing the price that might be charged per volume therefor, and giving the reporter the exclusive copyright of each volume published by him, it is expressly provided or declared "that nothing in this act be so construed as to prevent any newspaper of this state from publishing any opinion or abstract of any decision of said court." In Welling v. Merrill, 52 Ind. 350, 355, this court affirmed that any person could print, publish, and sell the reports of the decisions. of this court by purchasing the transcripts thereof from the clerk. While it cannot be said that these decisions are the law of the

state, nevertheless they are the evidence or exposition of what this court construes the law to be, and as such are binding upon all people within the state. Center School Tp. v. State ex rel., 150 Ind. 168, 173, 49 N. E. 961. Turning to the decisions of other courts we find that the Supreme Court of the United States, in Banks v. Manchester, supra, said: "The whole work done by the judges constitutes the authentic exposition and interpretation of the law, which, binding every citizen, is free for publication to all, whether it is a declaration of unwritten law or an interpretation of a Constitution or a statute." See, also, Nash v. Lathrop, 142 Mass. 29, 6 N. E. 559. In the latter case, the court said: "The decisions and opinions of the justices are the authorized expositions and interpretations of the laws, which are binding upon all the citizens. They declare the unwritten law, and construe and declare the meaning of the statutes. Every citizen is presumed to know the law thus declared, and it needs no argument to show that justice requires that all should have free access to the opinions, and that it is against sound public policy to prevent this, or to suppress and keep from the earliest knowledge of the public the statutes, or the decisions and opinions of the justices. Such opinions stand, upon principle, on substantially the same footing as the statutes enacted by the Legislature."

In Banks v. West Publishing Company, supra, Justice Brewer presents the question as follows: "It is a maxim of universal application that every man is presumed to know the law, and it would seem inherent that freedom of access to the laws or the official interpretations of those laws, should be co-extensive with the sweep of the maxim. Knowledge is the only just condition of obedience. The laws of Rome were written on tablets and posted that all might read, and all were bound to obedience.

* The majority of the citizens of the state, in a large sense the lawmakers, may determine the conduct of all; but can knowledge of what is determined be withheld? This, of course, is more emphatically true as to statutes, but is also true as to judicial opinions which, though not laws, are official interpretations of law.

The opinions, at least those of the highest tribunal, are always considered as official interpretations of law, both statute and common, and are binding upon all citizens. The same argument which supports the state's claim of property in judicial opin

ions supports that property in statutes. The state pays the judges and, therefore, owns the product of their official toil. The same is true as to Legislatures. * * It is worthy of argument, however, that on this side of the water the proprietary right of the state in the statutes or judicial opinions has never been affirmed except in the late case in the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut."

It is a well-known fact that for many years in this jurisdiction law magazines and newspapers have exercised the right of publishing in advance of the official reports decisions of the higher courts. Not only is this true in this state, but likewise in respect to the decisions of the higher courts of other states. This right so far as we are aware has never been denied or in any manner controverted by this state, but on the contrary, as we have shown, has been expressly recognized by the Legislature.

The work of the West Publishing Company in expediting the publication of the opinions and decisions of this and the Appellate Court and thereby placing them at an early date after they have been handed down in the hands of the bar and public is to be commended.

It would certainly not be in harmony with the policy of this state, as manifested by it in the past, for this court to hold that the West Publishing Company, under existing laws, should be denied the right of obtaining copies of the opinions of this and the Appellate Court for publication in advance of the official reports. Such a holding would virtually serve in effect to suppress or withhold any advance publication of these decisions, as said company is now engaged in doing, and would thereby deprive the bar and the people generally of this state from being early advised in regard to the law to which they are required to yield obedience as declared or construed by the higher courts.

As a final conclusion upon the matter herein involved we express our judgment that the clerk of this court, under the circumstances, is, in his discretion, at liberty to furnish to said West Publishing Company for publication the uncertified or unauthenticated carbon copies in question at and for a price or compensation less than 10 cents per 100 words. It is clear that at present there are no legal restrictions upon his right in this respect to the contrary.

The petition herein is sustained at the cost of the petitioner.

(192 Mass. 552)

MALOON v. BARRETT.
(Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.
Essex. Sept. 6, 1906.)

BROKERS-SALES-RIGHT TO COMMISSIONS.

Defendant placed certain real estate in the hands of plaintiff, a broker, for sale, directing him not to advertise the same. Plaintiff published an advertisement of the property in good faith, having forgotten his instructions, and a purchaser, learning that the property was for sale by reason of the advertisement, went to defendant direct, as the result of the advertisement, and purchased the property. Held, that defendant was not entitled to deal with the customer in fact secured by plaintiff's efforts, though by unauthorized means, as if defendant himself had secured the customer, and, having sold the property to him, was liable to plaintiff for commissions.

[Ed. Note. For cases in point, see vol. 8, Cent. Dig. Brokers, § 48.]

Report from Supreme Judicial Court, Essex County.

Action by one Maloon against one Barrett. A finding was entered in favor of plaintiff, and the case was reported to the Supreme Judicial Court. Judgment for plaintiff on the finding.

Contract by a real estate broker to secure a commission for a sale of real estate to one Arbing, who learned that the property was for sale by reason of an advertisement published in a newspaper by plaintiff, who had been instructed by defendant not to advertise the property in any newspaper. Arbing, who saw the advertisement, went to the defendant direct and bought the property. Plaintiff published the advertisement in good faith, having forgotten his instructions.

A. B. Tolman, for plaintiff. Henry T. Lummus and Chas. Neal Barney, for defendant.

LORING, J. The defendant's first contention is that the plaintiff would not have been entitled to a commission had there been no direction by the defendant not to advertise. It is stated in the agreed facts that the customer "went to the defendant solely as a result of said advertisement." That would have been decisive in favor of the plaintiff had there been no direction not to advertise the property. Gleason v. Nelson, 162 Mass. 245, 38 N. E. 497; Dowling v. Morrill, 165 Mass. 491, 43 N. E. 295; Pratt v. Burdon, 168 Mass. 596, 47 N. E. 419; French v. McKay, 181 Mass. 485, 63 N. E. 1068.

The difficulty in the case at bar arises from the fact that the defendant told the plaintiff not to advertise. The plaintiff was employed to find a customer, but was instructed not to use an advertisement as a means of accomplishing that which he was employed to effect. For that reason the case does not come within cases like Boston Ice Co. v. Potter, 123 Mass. 28, 25 Am. Rep. 9; Pittsburgh Glass Co. v. Macdonald, 182 Mass. 593, 66 N. E. 415, and Smith v. Wenz, 185 Mass. 229, 70 N. E. 57.

Moreover it is agreed that the plaintiff had

forgotten the restriction not to advertise. That is in substance an agreement that he acted in good faith, and for that reason this case does not come within Sipley v. Stickney, 190 Mass. 44, 76 N. E. 226.

It has been urged on behalf of the defendant that inasmuch as the plaintiff's right to sell was not exclusive of the defendant he had a right to sell to Arbing without paying the plaintiff a commission. That is hardly an accurate statement of his rights. To be accurate, what the defendant would have had a right to do was to sell the property to Arbing without paying the plaintiff a commission if he had secured Arbing as a customer without the aid of the plaintiff. When Arbing went to the defendant solely as a result of the plaintiff's advertisement and informed the defendant that he had "seen the advertisement and that he desired to purchase the property," the possibility of the defendant's securing Arbing as a customer without the plaintiff's aid came to an end, and the defendant knew it. Whether the defendant was or was not harmed by that possibility being ended by the plaintiff's unauthorized act in advertising the property is and always will be a matter of conjecture. The defendant has not proved, and cannot prove, that had it not been for the unauthorized advertisement he would have secured Arbing as a customer.

When the possibility of the defendant's securing Arbing as a customer through his own (the defendant's) efforts was ended by the plaintiff's unauthorized advertisement, one of two results followed: Either (1) the defendant could sell to Arbing, although secured by the plaintiff's efforts, because the possibility of the defendant's securing Arbing as a customer had been brought to an end by the plaintiff's using an unauthorized means, that is to say, the defendant was in the same position that he would have been in had he in fact secured Arbing as a customer; or (2) the defendant (not having secured Arbing as a customer through his own efforts) could not sell to him as his (the defendant's) customer. In the latter case the defendant would not be bound to treat with Arbing as a customer as he would have been bound to do had the means used by the plaintiff been authorized; he could have refused to recognize him as a customer because obtained by the use of means which he forbade the use of. But in the latter case, if he elected to deal with him he would have dealt with him as a customer procured by the plaintiff, since he was in fact secured by the plaintiff, and not as a customer who became such through his own efforts; and having elected to deal with him he would be held to have ratified the means used by the plaintiff to secure him. That is to say, it is a case where the defendant had to accept or reject the plaintiff's action as a whole. He could not ratify it in part and repudiate it in part.

Suit v. Woodhall, 113 Mass. 391; Coolidge v. Smith, 129 Mass. 554; Eaton v. Littlefield, 147 Mass. 125, 16 N. E. 771.

In the opinion of a majority of the court it is not possible to say that the defendant had a right to deal with the customer in fact secured by the plaintiff, although by unauthorized means, as if he had been secured by his own efforts, and the second is the true view of the case.

The defendant having elected to deal with Arbing, the entry must be. Judgment on the finding.

(222 I11. 270)

SIDWAY et al. v. AMERICAN MORTGAGE

CO.

(Supreme Court of Illinois. June 14, 1906. Rehearing Denied October 10, 1906.)

1. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-EMPLOYMENT OF AGENT EVIDENCE.

On a bill for an accounting between principal and agents, evidence held to show that the contract between the parties was shown by correspondence between them, and not by a subsequent oral conversation.

2. SAME--COMPENSATION OF AGENT.

Under an agreement whereby agents were to care for and manage ioans of their principal's money up to and including their maturity and collection, where they had given up the business of the principal they could not claim commissions on the interest notes not then due and thereafter to be collected. 3. SAME AGENT.

PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT BY

Where agents collected money belonging to their principal, but retained it without making report thereof, and represented mortgage loans as outstanding, when, in fact, they had been fully paid to the agents, they were not entitled to any commissions.

Error to Appellate Court, First District. Action by the American Mortgage Company against Leverett B. Sidway and another. From a judgment of the Appellate Court (119 Ill. App. 502), affirming a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendants bring error. Affirmed.

Lee D. Mathias (Willett H. Cornwell, of counsel), for plaintiffs in error. Bentley & Burling, for defendant in error.

SCOTT, C. J. The defendant in error filed a bill for an accounting, in the circuit court of Cook county, against the plaintiffs in error. The plaintiffs in error answered denying that they had withheld any moneys from the defendant in error to which the latter was entitled, but alleging that the defendant in error was indebted to the plaintiffs in error in a large sum for services rendered, and that there was a large balance due the plaintiffs in error on such account. A general replication was filed to this answer. The cause was thereupon referred to the master in chancery to take and report the evidence, with his conclusions. Objections were filed before the master and overruled by him, and these objections were renewed as exceptions in the circuit court, so 78 N.E.-36

as to preserve for review all questions now urged in this court by the plaintiffs in error. The circuit court followed the master's report in all particulars except as to some minor questions, and decreed that the plaintiffs in error pay the defendant in error the sum of $32,274.01, and the sum of $721.47 taxed as costs together with other costs of the suit. The Appellate Court for the First District has affirmed this decree, and the case is now before this court for a review of that judgment of affirmance.

The record is voluminous, and the abstract, containing 982 pages, correspondingly so. Nevertheless, the questions involved are simple, and no detailed statement of the evidence in this opinion is necessary for the proper understanding or disposition of them.

Defendant in error is a corporation organized under the companies act of Great Britain and Ireland, with a capital stock of £85,000, with its principal place of business at Edinburgh, Scotland, engaged in loaning money. Plaintiffs in error composed a firm located in Chicago, Ill., and this firm, and the two firms which successively preceded it, and to whose business, rights, and obligations it succeeded, acted as agents of the mortgage company in this country from 1882 until April, 1896. Leverett B. Sidway was the senior member of each of these firms. All of these firms will be included under the designation "the firm" in this opinion.

Plaintiffs in error contend, as stated above, that the moneys for which they were required to account were due them for services, and they classify these services under the following heads, to wit: First, the Corbin farms; second, the Oregon frauds; third, the Southern inspection; fourth, the Arkansas usury cases; and fifth, miscellaneous services. The critical question in the consideration of these claims is whether the agency existed pursuant to a letter dated December 21, 1881, being an offer on the part of Sidway, Bogue & Co., accepted by the defendant in error, as it contends, or whether the agency for loaning money was created by an alleged conversation or parol arrangement in 1884, between Leverett B. Sidway, one of the plaintiffs in error, and Mr. James Tait, representing the defendant in error. For a clearer understanding of the matter it should be stated that the firm of Sidway, Bogue & Co., formed in January, 1878, was composed of Leverett B. Sidway, one of the plaintiffs in error, and George M. Bogue, up to the time when H. T. Sidway, the other plaintiff in error, a son of Leverett B. Sidway, became a member of the firm. This firm was dissolved in July, 1893, and was succeeded by the firm of L. B. Sidway & Co., composed of the plaintiffs in error.

In their letter dated December 21, 1881, addressed to the defendant in error, Sidway, Bogue & Co., after referring to interviews in regard to loaning money for the defendant in error, stated: "We will undertake to

make such loans upon five years' time, and to care for and manage them up to and including their maturity and collection, to the best of our ability, for a compensation of 5 per cent. on the amount so loaned, such compensation to include all charges for making the necessary papers and the attorneys' charges for examining the title, the one-half of said charge to be collected from the borrower at the time the loan is made and the remainder to be collected by deducting onefifth part of it from each annual coupon, when collected from the borrower." The letter further states: "No greater charge than 5 per cent. on the amount loaned will be made, including the sum collected from the borrower and the sum deducted from coupons, or paid us in any manner by your company, and should it appear advantageous to change the manner of collecting the said compensation we will readily make any equitable change which may appear necessary." At the close of the letter it is said: "We shall at all times take pleasure in advising your board of matters in America which may be of importance to the company's business, and shall aim to maintain such intimate business relations as are in our opinion necessary for securing the best permanent results."

The directors of the defendant in error, on January 11, 1882, accepted the foregoing offer, subject to the adjustment of the necessary details. In a letter from the secretary of the defendant in error to Sidway, Bogue & Co., care of L. B. Sidway, it was stated that Mr. Sidway had mentioned that it would be some little time yet before the firm would propose to operate for the defendant in er

ror.

There was some delay in commencing the business, so far as loaning money was concerned, but shortly after the acceptance of the offer the firm began to transact business for defendant in error in reference to loans and other property interests which it already had in the United States, and the loaning of money by the firm began in 1885.

On the part of the plaintiffs in error it is contended that the contract under which the firm operated after 1884 was a parol agreement, made between Leverett B. Sidway, representing his firm, and James Tait, representing the defendant in error, at the city of Chicago, in the year 1884, under and by virtue of which the defendant in error agreed to furnish Sidway, Bogue & Co. $400,000 each year for five years, to be loaned by them on five-year loans, on which the commissions of the firm would be $20,000 per annum, and by which the firm, from money so furnished and from collections from the principal after the first loans began to fall due, would have $400,000 to loan annually so long as the contract remained in force. And it is further contended by plaintiffs in error that the services rendered before this oral contract was made were rendered under an arrangement pertaining to those services

alone, which arrangement did not contemplate the loaning of money.

Defendant in error did not furnish $400,000 to be loaned in any one year, and the firm seems to have made no complaint on this score. James Tait is dead, as are others who participated in these transactions, and the testimony of Leverett B. Sidway is the only direct evidence in the record as to the alleged parol agreement. Nevertheless, the master in chancery and the circuit and Appellate Courts rejected his theory of the matter, and found that the services rendered were under and in pursuance of the proposition contained in the letter dated December 21, 1881. We are in accord with the Appellate Court in the views which it expresses in reference to the existence of the alleged oral contract, in the following language: "The improbability that the evidence of so important a contract should be left to rest in parol testimony; the fact that the company had been making a continual breach of the supposed agreement for five years, and yet H. T. Sidway, on his visit to Edinburgh in 1889, made no direct reference to the arrangement of 1884 or its breach; the fact that a careful search failed to reveal anything in the files, records or correspondence of the company showing any reference to such a contract; Sidway's testimony to the effect that the terms of the contract, or its continual breach, or the failure of the company to pay for the extra services, never became the subjects of correspondence between the parties; that Bogue (Sidway's partner) never heard of the contract; all these, and other facts and circumstances appearing in the record, convince us that no such contract was made, and that the finding of the master to that effect is correct, under the evidence."

We agree also with the Appellate Court that the services relating to the Corbin farms and the Oregon frauds, which were of a special character, were settled and paid for long before this suit was commenced, and that the other services for which compensation is claimed, and which plaintiffs in error regard as special or extra in character, while not within the provisions of the alleged oral agreement, are within the terms of the contract as expressed in the letter dated December 21, 1881, and that plaintiffs in error are therefore not entitled to any extra compensation therefor.

The only question remaining for consideration is the claim of the plaintiffs in error for $2,111.56 commissions on unpaid interest, which claim is set forth in the statement of account rendered by plaintiffs in error under date of August 10, 1896. Prior to the time of making this charge the plaintiffs in error had given up the business of the defendant in error. Under the agreement set forth in the letter above mentioned, plaintiffs in error were to care for and manage the loans up to and including their maturity and col