unloading, and the storing of freight cars.' Such uses of a street, and the further right to construct a brick and stone depot therein and other structures, are inconsistent with public enjoyment and a deprivation of the right of the public to the use of the street. Of course, a city has a right, within proper restrictions, to authorize a railroad company to lay tracks in a public street and operate cars thereon, but the right so to use the street is to be enjoyed in connection with, and not to the exclusion of, the public. The power to grant the right to a railroad company to use a street does not carry with it the power to authorize ize the company to obstruct the street so as to deprive the public and adjacent property owners of its use. Ligare v. City of Chicago, 139 Ill. 46, 28 N. E. 934, 32 Am. St. Rep. 179." We would be justified on this record in affirming the decision of the Appellate Court without consideration of the other points urged by appellants. In their brief they substantially say: We admit all this, but, as the case was not tried on the theory that this property was a street, we ought not to be bound by our answer. They urge that the bill of complaint claimed it was a part of a public levee or boat landing, and that much of the evidence tended to uphold this claim. The record does disclose that many witnesses on the trial of the case called the land a levee or public landing, and that counsel on both sides, in their examination of witnesses, did the same thing. The ordinance of the city of Peoria passed in April, 1855, stating "that a public ground in front of blocks 1, 2, 3 and 4, in the city of Peoria, and at the termination of every street and alley from the river and lake, are hereby declared to be public landings and landing places in and for the city of Peoria," indicates that at that time the city authorities thought that there was some land between the river and the street which might properly be classed as a public landing. The ordinances of October, 1869, and September, 1884, made a part of this record, tend to show the same thing. But, if Water street as originally laid out was bounded by the Illinois river, under the law, it would extend to the center of the river, and the mere fact that the portion of the street at the water's edge has been known and called, ever since the street was platted, a public landing or levee, would not necessarily preclude it being still held as a part of Water street. If we consider Water street to be only 110 feet wide and the balance of the land to the river a public landing or levee, then is the ordinance in question a valid and binding one? The word "levee" in this record means the same thing as a public landing place. That word, as used in the West and South in this country, means a public landing place. Cen tury Dict.; City of St. Paul v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., 63 Minn. 330, 63 N. W. 267, 65 N. W. 649, 68 N. W. 458, 34 L. R. A. 184. "A landing or levee is a space adjacent to navigable water where vessels may approach and land to unload and receive passengers and freight, and where articles of freight may be left for loading on the vessel, or after they have been unloaded until they can be taken away." Farnham on Water and Water Rights, § 145. A public landing is dedicated to the public use and is held in trust for the public, the same as a street. It cannot be devoted to any use inconsistent with the use of the public. It was held in City of St. Paul v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co., supra, that to give a public levee, or any part of it, to a railway company as a permanent site for its freight house, without reference to the traffic by way of transfer of passengers and freight to and from vessels navigating the adjacent river or other navigable water, would constitute a diversion of the property to a use foreign to and inconsistent with that for which the levee was dedicated. The Supreme Court of California, in discussing a similar question in City of Napa v. Howland, 87 Cal. 84, 87, 25 Pac. 247, 248, say: "It is said that the evidence does not support the finding of dedication 'as a public levee and for public street purposes,' because it shows a dedication, if any, for a public landing. It matters but little what name is given to the place, so long as the fact appears that it was dedicated for a public use. 'A landing is a bank or wharf to or from which persons may go to or from some vessel in the contiguous water.' The word 'levee,' as applied to portions of the public highways bordering on navigable streams and sloughs in the interior cities and towns of this state, has the same meaning as landing." See, also, Oregon Railway Co. v. City of Portland, 9 Or. 231. A public landing is for the benefit of the public generally, and there must be means of access to it. This use is always subject to public regulation, and the right to use a landing does not include the right to make such use of it as will deprive others of a like use. Farnham on Water and Water Rights, § 145a. In Gardiner v. Tisdale, 2 Wis. 188, 60 Am. Dec. 407, it was said: "The term 'public landing,' as used in this case, conveys to our mind the idea of a piece of ground on the bank or margin of Rock river provided for the open and common use of all persons in the debarkation of themselves or their goods, but not a place to be permanently incumbered with piles of lumber or other merchandise or goods, any more than a public highway or street, because the benefits and accommodation to the public which are intended to be conveyed, would be greatly affected, if not wholly destroyed, by any such permanent incumbrance." When the county commissioners of Peoria county, in May, 1834, platted the town of Peoria, they stated street. If Water street be only 110 feet in width, as contended by appellants, then the disputed premises must be a part of the public landing, and the purposes for which they are being used, and would be used under the provisions of this ordinance, are not in any way allied to the use of these premises as a public landing, but, on the contrary, are solely for the use of the railroad companies for their freight and passenger traffic, not appertaining to the passenger or freight traffic on the Illinois river. (Exhibit B): "All the streets and alleys | landing would constitute a constitute a misuser of a and the public square, as therein laid and exhibited, we hereby grant for public purpose, to be and remain forever the property of said town according to said statute." The statute The statute referred to provided that when a town was platted, the "land intended to be for streets, alleys, ways, commons or other public uses in any town or city or addition thereto shall be held in the corporate name thereof, in trust to and for the uses and purposes set forth and expressed or intended." Rev. Laws Ill. 1833, p. 600. If the public authorities dedicated this as a public landing, it was certainly never the intention that any part of it should be used exclusively for purposes which do not in any way pertain to river navigation. Not only does the ordinance authorize appellants to build costly and permanent buildings upon part of the disputed premises, but they have already constructed railroad tracks therein so as to take up at least 75 feet of this public landing that was never before used for railroad purposes. The evidence shows that during high water almost every year practically all of the public landing, except that occupied by the railroad tracks, is submerged. Whether the disputed premises be held a part of a public landing or part of a public street matters little, if the ordinance in question proposes to allow them to be used for purposes foreign to that for which they were dedicated. There is no power in a municipality to sell or grant ground held in trust for the public and to exclude the public there from. The ordinance granted the authorties the right to erect buildings on public property of such nature that their use must necessarily be largely private. On the record before us we are inclined to hold that the use to which the premises in question are being, and will be, put under the ordinance in question is more foreign to, and more inconsistent with, the proper use of a public landing or levee than with the proper use of a public street. It is claimed that a portion of the disputed premises has been paved and is in a better sanitary condition than formerly; that the streets which end at the public landing, where they cross the railroad right of way, are better constructed, and therefore safer for the public, than before. It can hardly be seriously contended, with the great number of additional tracks that have been constructed under this ordinance, occupied by cars being switched back and forth over these crossings, that people can approach this public landing with as little danger as they could formerly. The new tracks laid have caused additional switching and more traffic over the streets. Every additional track and crossing at grade necessarily adds to the difficulty and danger of approach to this public landing. We are aware that there might be a proper use of a public street that might not be a proper use for a public landing, and that what might be a proper use of a public As we have heretofore stated, we would be justified on this record in holding that appellants were bound by their answer, and that the premises in question are a part of Water street. As we have before shown, the evidence in this record tends very strongly to uphold these admissions. If the disputed premises are held to be a part of Water street, the ordinance is invalid because it is not based upon the petition of the owners of land representing more than one-half of the frontage of the street. In either event, we conclude that the uses and purposes, as shown by this record, that are being made, or can be made of a portion, at least, of the disputed premises under the ordinance, whether said premises be held to be a public street or a public landing, are of such a nature that the ordinance grants to certain parties the exclusive use of land which belongs to, and ought to be open and free to the enjoyment of, the public, and that such uses therefore constituted a purpresture, and the city council of Peoria had no authority to pass the ordinance in question. nance in question. It must therefore be held void and of no effect. We find no reversible error in the record. The judgment of the Appellate Court will accordingly be affirmed. Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, c. 24, § 525, requiring an affidavit of the superintendent of assessments or president of the board of local improvement or some employé making and filing an assessment roll that affiant has examined the records for the names of owners of property against which benefits were assessed, that the names of such owners are correctly shown, etc., and section 547, providing that either the officer making the return of a special assessment for a local improvement, or some one acting under his direction, shall make an examination of the collector's books, showing the payments of general taxes during the last preceding year in which the taxes were paid on the property assessed, and shall make an affidavit to that effect, an affidavit on the return of a special assessment for a local improvement merely, and without condemnation proceedings in connection therewith, which conforms to section 547, is sufficient when made by one appointed by the officer making the return to make the required search, though he is not an employé. 2. APPEAL OBJECTIONS IN TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENCY. Where counsel for an objector in a proceeding to confirm a special assessment concedes that he has not read the legal objections, but thinks they are copied from the blanket form, and is unable to state any reason in support of the objections, the court on appeal will not review the overruling of the objections. 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONFIRMATION OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENT EVIDENCE. An ordinance originating a local improvement consisting of the construction of lawn hydrants for sprinkling lawns and electric light cables did not provide for connecting the water mains with the hydrants, nor for connecting the electric cables with any source of electric current. Held, in proceedings to confirm a special assessment, that the petitioner was properly allowed to show that these connections would be made, so that the property owner would obtain the benefit contemplated. 4. APPEAL-HARMLESS ERROR-INSTRUCTIONS. Where, in proceedings to confirm a special assessment, the jury was not required to determine whether the assessment was lawfully levied, an instruction stating the issues was not prejudicial because it stated that the assessment was levied by the authority of the board. 5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - LOCAL IMPROVEMENT-DETERMINATION BY MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES-FINALITY. The municipal authorities are the sole judges of the necessity for the construction of a local improvement, and the jury in proceedings to confirm a special assessment cannot determine a question of necessity. 6. SAME-CONFIRMATION OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENT-INSTRUCTIONS. An instruction in proceedings to confirm a special assessment, that if the value of the property of the objector is increased for any use for which it is adapted the property will be benefited, correctly charges that the improvement will benefit the property if it increases the value thereof, and is not objectionable as warranting a finding that the property would be benefited, though it would sustain damages in excess of the benefits. Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; L. Honore, Judge. Proceedings by the West Chicago Park Commissioners for the confirmation of a special assessment. S. B. Lingle filed objections. From a judgment of confirmation, the objector appeals. Affirmed. This is an appeal from a judgment rendered in the circuit court of Cook county on June 17, 1905, confirming a special assessment levied on land adjacent to Marshall boulevard, by authority of the West Chicago Park Commissioners, for the purpose of improving said boulevard according to the scheme or plan of the commissioners, set forth in their ordinance. The park commissioners filed their petition for the levy of the special assessment for said improvement on April 4, 1902, and the proceedings were had under the local improvement act of 1897 and the acts amendatory thereof. The petition sets forth the steps taken for a public hearing; the park commissioners sitting and acting as a board of local improvements, etc. The petition also sets forth the adoption of a resolution, providing that the improvement should be divided into two sections-section 1 extending from the south curb line of West Nineteenth street to the northerly bank of the West Fork of the South Branch of the Chicago River, and section 2 extending from the southerly bank of the West Fork of the South Branch of the Chicago River to the Illinois and Michigan canal; that an estimate of the cost was made in writing by the engineer, which estimate was made a part of the record of the first resolution; that petitioner, acting as a board of local improvements, caused a notice of the time and place of the public hearing to be mailed and posted, as provided by law; that petitioner, the West Chicago Park Commissioners, prepared an ordinance, signed by its members, acting as a board of local improvements, together with an estimate of the cost itemized; that said ordinance, with the recommendation and estimate of the cost, was referred to petitioner's committee on improvements on February 11, 1902, and published, etc.; that on February 25, 1902, the committee reported said ordinance back, recommending that it be passed, and that on said last-named day it was passed, and the estimate made by the engineer approved. The petition alleges that the improvement provided for in section 1 of the boulevard consists of resurfacing the macadam roadway in the center of the boulevard, and building roadway wings extended to the outside lines thereof at all intersecting streets; constructing a granite concrete combined curb and gutter along the outside lines of the roadway and roadway wings; also sidewalks along the outside lines of the boulevard, and crosswalks across the lawn spaces; grading and filling lawn spaces on each side of the roadway; constructing storm water sewers and catch-basins for surface drainage of the roadways; planting two rows of trees on each side of the roadway; constructing lawn hydrants for sprinkling lawns; and constructing and installing electric light conduits, cables, and switches, manholes, lamp-posts. and lamps. The petition alleges that the improvement in section 2 consists of a limestone macadam roadway, 50 feet wide from curb to curb, from the West Fork of the South Branch of the Chicago River to Western avenue, and 43 feet in width from curb to curb from the drainage channel to the Illinois and Michigan canal, etc. The total estimated cost of the improvement in section 1, extending from West Nineteenth street to the south branch of the Chicago River, is $89,865.72, and of the improvement in section 2, extending from the river to the Illinois and Michigan canal, the estimated cost is fixed at $56,907.50, making a total estimated cost of the entire improvement of $148,773.22. On April 11, 1902, John P. Garner was appointed to make the assessment, having been selected and designated by the president of the West Chicago Park Commissioners for that purpose, and he made and prepared an assessment roll, and reported and returned the same into court on March 19, 1903, and caused notices to be posted and mailed and filed affidavits thereof on July 20, 1903, on which date an order was entered that objections should be filed within three days. On August 3, 1903, a default was taken and entered of record as to all property not objected for. Appellant, Lingle, filed 28 objections to the confirmation of the assessment against his property. On December 28, 1904, the cause came on for hearing upon legal objections. On January 18, 1905, an order was entered permitting an amendment of the assessment roll for the purpose of correcting a description as to certain property located in section 2 of the improvement. On January 23, 1905, appellant's counsel filed a new set of objections, and on January 26, 1905, a motion to dismiss the petition. On February 4, 1905, an order was entered overruling all motions to cancel and annul the assessment, and all objections, except the objection that the assessment was not equitably and proportionately placed between the public and the property, and sustaining said last-mentioned objection, and ordering that the entire assessment be referred back to the commissioner who prepared the same, with directions that the assessment be recast in such manner that 25 per cent. of the total costs of the improvement be assessed as public benefits, and the remainder thereof against the property to be benefited, etc. After the coming in of the revised assessment roll after recasting of the assessment, and on April 19, 1905, an order was entered that all of the testimony, proceedings, arguments, objections, and motions theretofore offered and urged on behalf of the objectors to the original assessment roll should be considered as reoffered to the revised assessment roll, and that all of the decisions, rulings, and orders of the court upon the same, and all exceptions to said decisions, rulings, and orders, stand and 'be made to apply to the revised assessment roll. Theretofore, on April 8, 1905, counsel for appellant had filed another motion to dismiss. The motions to dismiss the petition filed by appellant's counsel were overruled. All legal objections were overruled on April 19, 1905, and thereafter, on the same day, the cause came to trial before the court and jury on the question of benefits, and the jury rendered a verdict sustaining the roll as presented, so far as appellant was concerned, and, after motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment had been overruled, judgment was entered on the verdict. The present appeal is prosecuted from such judgment. Dwight D. Root, for appellant. Benjamin F. Richolson and Delavan B. Cole, for appellee. 1 SCOTT, C. J. (after stating the facts). Appellant contends that each of his motions to dismiss the proceedings should have been sustained, and that, as they went to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the proceeding at all, his rights in reference thereto were saved by his motion in arrest of judgment. In the statement preceding his brief he points out 53 separate and specific errors which he says were committed by the court below, and in support of this formidable array of alleged errors he presents a brief of 5 pages, an argument of 5 pages and a reply of 5 pages, and the court having heretofore determined this cause adversely to appellant, and having thereafter granted a rehearing, his brief and argument and reply brief are now supplemented by a petition for rehearing of 8 pages. His brief and argument and supplemental documents are so meager that it is exceedingly difficult to understand the position of appellant with reference to the various alleged errors upon which he insists. As we understand the jurisdictional question, however, it is this: Section 525, c. 24, Hurd's Revised Statutes of 1905, provides that, where property is taken or damaged under the local improvement act, the superintendent of special assessments or president of the board of local improvements shall file with the report of the commissioners an affidavit, made by himself or some employé of his office, showing that the affiant has carefully examined the records in the recorder's office in the said county for the names of the owners of reeord of the property which is to be taken or damaged for the improvement. A search in this case of the books of the collector of Cook county to ascertain the persons who last paid taxes on the respective parcels of real estate assessed, and the residences of such taxpayers, was made by Clair D. Vallette, who made affidavit made affidavit thereto, from which it appears that at the request and under the direction of the officer appointed to spread the assessment he made the search in question; and appellant's position is that, as it does not appear from Vallette's affidavit that he was an employé in the office of the superintendent of special assessments or president of the board of local improvements, the affidavit is insufficient. There was no condemnation proceeding in connection with this special assessment proceeding, and the affidavit in question was made, not under the provisions of section 525, supra, but under the provisions of section 547 of chapter 24, supra, and is in compliance with the provisions of that section, which require that an affidavit be made by the officer making the return, or some one acting under his direction, stating that the affiant has made an examination of the collector's books showing the payment of taxes during the last preceding year, to ascertain the person paying the taxes on the property assessed. But this section does not require the affiant to be an "employé in the office," as does section 525, supra. No lack of jurisdiction appears from inspection of this affidavit. Other jurisdictional objections are pointed out in the statement and referred to in the brief, but they are not discussed in the argument, and they are so extremely technical and so entirely devoid of merit that we deem it unnecessary to discuss them. Do Upon the consideration of the legal objections filed below, the court undertook to ascertain what objections the appellant was insisting upon, when the following colloquy occurred between court and counsel: The Court: "Just let me take your objections for a moment please. [Counsel here handed written objections filed on behalf of Lingle property to court.] Mr. Root: I have have not read them myself. They were filed by another attorney. The Court: Your first objection is 'that the ordinance for said proposed improvement is incomplete, informal, and otherwise invalid.' you desire to urge that objection? Mr. Root: May it please the court, I would not like to be catechised about those things. The Court: Well? Mr. Root: I have not read them. The Court: You have been approaching this occasion for a long time, and now you are up against the point. If you have any objections to this assessment to make, make them now. I am asking whether you desire to argue that the ordinance is incomplete, and so forth. There is no later time when this case is going to be reopened and retried. Mr. Root: Well, if it please the court, I have just come into this case. While these objections may have been filed some time ago, I, myself, was only spoken to about this case a day or so ago, and I have not had time to look them over. The Court: You are not prepared at this moment, then, to back up this objection? Mr. Root: I am only prepared as far as I have exhibited my hands to the court so far. The Court: The second, "The West Park Commissioners have no authority to pass said ordinance.' Have you anything to offer on that-argument or evidence? Mr. Root: No. The Court: I will just overrule these as I go along. One and two objections overruled. "There is shown no necessity for making said proposed improvement.' Anything to offer on that? Mr. Root: I don't think that would properly be tried at this time, unless your honor desires to hear it. If your honor wishes to hear evidence on that now, I think I am prepared to offer evidence on that proposition. The Court: Well, is it an objection that you have any right to make, Only before, I think, Then I will overrule anyway? Mr. Root: a jury. The Court: it, and when you want to renew it before the jury, I will take up the question then. No. 3 is overruled. "The proposed improvement is for the general or public benefit.' Are you entitled to make such an objection as that? Mr. Root: I think that goes to benefits. The Court: I will overrule No. 4. Now, No. 5: "The ordinance authorizing said improvement does not specify the nature, character, locality, and description of the proposed improvement.' Mr. Root: Well, it don't describe it fully. It omits some things and describes other things. The Court: Which things are omitted from it and misdescribed? Mr. Root: If your honor will read that again, I will try and catch it. The Court [reading]: "The ordinance authorizing said improvement does not specify the nature, character, locality, and description of the proposed improvement.' Mr. Root: May it please the court, I think those are copied right from the stereotype blanket form-simply type written-I think they are the same, verbatim; I don't know. The Court: To shorten this matter, have you offered all the evidence or argument that you have to offer at this time upon all the objections that you filed? Mr. Root: I have more evidence to offer as to the benefit to the omitted property and as to that which we are speaking about. The Court: Well, as to that, I gave you leave at a later time, if you have any such to offer, to make a showing, and make application for leave to present it." The court then overruled all the legal objections. In Fisher v. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 268, page 270, 72 N. E. 680, page 681, we said: "An appeal is allowed for the purpose of reviewing the decision of the county court upon the objections filed, and if that court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter, the party appearing there must present his objections to that court. Objections must be made in such manner as to show the point on which a decision is asked, and to enable the opposite party to obviate the objection, if it can be done. The county court is not charged with the duty of searching for objections which are not pointed out, and an objection not made in that court must be regarded as waived, and cannot be made for the first time on appeal to this court." We think where counsel for an objector in a special assessment proceeding comes into court, and concedes that he has not read the legal objections filed, but thinks they "are copied right from the stereotype blanket form," and is unable to state any reason whatever in support of the objections, such objections are properly overruled, for the reason that they are not made in such a manner as to show to the court the points upon which the decision is sought. Where such objections, under such circumstances |