The principal grounds upon which appellant's counsel asked for a reversal and new trial are, that the evidence is insufficient to justify the first, third, and fourth findings of fact by the trial court, which are as follows:

"1. That at all the times between the first day of January, 1850, and the first day of January, 1880, none of that portion of what is now Union Street upon which fronts the premises described in the complaint in this action was a public street, but such portions of what is now Union Street was within the exterior boundaries, and was part and parcel of a valid grant made to a private person by the alcalde of the town of San Francisco prior to 1850, to which title by grant the defendant in this action has succeeded, and was at all times between said first day of January, 1850, and said first day of January, 1880, held in private ownership, and had not been conveyed to the city of San Francisco, or to the city and county of San Francisco, nor dedicated to public use."

"3. That the superintendent of public streets, squares, and highways did not recommend to said board that said work be done, and did not make any recommendation in regard thereto.

"4. That the board of supervisors of the city and county of San Francisco never had nor acquired jurisdiction to order the said work of grading mentioned in the complaint in this action."

If the first of these findings is justified by the evidence, the third will not be necessary to the support of the judgment, and the fourth is merely a conclusion of law, and as such is repeated in its appropriate place.

In support of the first finding, it appears that defendant put in evidence two grants from Alcalde T. M. Leavenworth, one to to Nelson Taylor of one-hundred-vara lot "numbered 25, on page 4, District Record 'B,' and bounded on the west by lot 15 of said plat," dated December 23, 1848; and the other to Stephen A. Harris, of onehundred-vara lot numbered 15, "lying and being situated

outside the limits of the town survey and in the western vicinity of San Francisco, on or near a road to the Presidio, and numbered (15) fifteen on the plan referred to in the petition aforesaid," and dated September 25, 1848. To these grants are attached the petitions to the alcalde therefor, and each containing a description of the land applied for, which is referred to in the grant, and thereby connected with the description in the grant. No objection was made to the introduction of these alcalde grants or the petitions thereto attached, or to the form thereof, except that it was objected to each "that the lands purported to be granted are not described not described with sufficient certainty to identify the same, and that the petition is ambiguous, because it does not designate any specific property." We think the court properly overruled this objection. There is no patent ambiguity in the description, and no evidence tending to discover latent ambiguity. The description is of lots, one hundred varas square, and numbered 15 and 25, as "marked on page 4, District Record 'B.'" The grants refer to this District Record "B" as containing a "plan," or "plat"; and it appears that the book-District Record "B," was produced by the recorder of the city and county of San Francisco from his cffice, and was introduced in evidence in connection with each of the alcalde grants, and that "said book showed the location of the premises described in said grants, and a certificate in due form of the issuance of each grant."

Beside, lot 25 is described as "bounded on the west by lot 15 of said plat," so that the two lots in question adjoin each other; and then lot 15 is described as bounded "on the north by the southern line of boundary of lot granted by George Hyde, and numbered one (1) on page four (4) of District Record; on the west by lot number eleven (11) of the same plan, and south and east by land yet unsurveyed, said land lying in the western vicinity of San Francisco, and near the road to

the Presidio, and numbered fifteen (15) on the plan referred to in the petition" attached to the grant. Nothing in the evidence tended to show that the things or objects mentioned in these descriptions did not exist, or that they may not be located and identified; or that by them and the plan or plat contained in the book, District Record "B," in the recorder's office, the two lots in question may not be completely identified. Surely it cannot be said, "as matter of law, that on the face of the deed (grant) the description was so vague as not sufficiently to identify the land." (Thompson v. Thompson, 52 Cal. 157.)

It was admitted by the plaintiff that the premises described in this action, and all that portion of what is now Union Street upon which front the premises described in the complaint in this action, are included in and are a part and parcel of the lands described in and granted by the two alcalde grants heretofore (in the record) set out; and that at the dates of the alcalde grants hereinbefore (in the record) set out, T. M. Leavenworth was the alcalde of San Francisco, and in the actual and unquestioned exercise of his authority as such alcalde. It was admitted that one-hundred-vara lots Nos. 15 and 25, described in said alcalde grants, lie within the limits of the lands confirmed to the city of San Francisco by the final decree of the circuit court of the United States confirming to said city its pueblo lands."

The defendant also proved that on the twenty-third day of December, 1881, he acquired through mesne conveyances all the title granted to Nelson Taylor and Stephen Harris by Alcalde Leavenworth, as aforesaid, in and to said lot No. 25, and all that portion of lot No. 15 lying east of the center line of Polk Street; and further proved that the premises described in the complaint, upon which the assessment was levied, and all that portion of Union Street upon which it fronts, are included

in the land to which the defendant acquired title on the third day of December, 1881, as above stated.

There is no evidence or pretense of a grant or any kind of conveyance by the defendant or his predecessors to the city or city and county of San Francisco of any interest or easement in any part of the land occupied by Union Street; but it is claimed by counsel for appellant that a dedication was proved, and that that part of the first finding to the contrary is not justified by the evi

dence.

To constitute a dedication, there must have been a manifestation of the owner's intention to dedicate to a public use, and also an acceptance and use by the public for the purpose intended and manifested by the owner. (Harding v. Jasper, 14 Cal. 647; San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 542; Quinn v. Anderson, 70 Cal. 454; Hope v. Barnett, 78 Cal. 9.)

As to the intention to dedicate, there was at least a substantial conflict of evidence, if not a preponderance against it; and that there was no user by the public until after the grading, for which the assessment in question was levied, seems to have been proved. The following is the substance of the principal parts, if not all, of the evidence bearing upon the issue as to dedication:

A judgment roll and notice of lis pendens in case of II. P. Gallagher v. Stivers et al., which was an action of ejectment for the recovery of lot No. 15, commenced in April, 1860, were put in evidence by the plaintiff (Gallagher having been one of the mediate grantors of defendant), by which it appeared that the property sued for was described in the complaint and notice of lis pendens as "commencing near the northeast corner of Union and Polk streets, being all of Laguna survey, lot No. 15."

The complaint was not verified, and the plaintiff recovered judgment for the whole lot 15. This indicated that Gallagher then understood that

there was a street called Union Street near the commencement point of his description.

What was its condition, whether it was used, or was passable for travel or not at that time, does not appear from the description nor from the judgment roll. For aught that appears, a portion of what is now used as Union Street, but not extending to the grading for which the assessment in question was levied, may have been dedicated to and then used by the public to a point (say Larkin Street), which Gallagher considered "near" the starting-point of his description, but which startingpoint cannot be identified by anything in the record; but however this may be, we think no intent of Gallagher to dedicate his own land to be used as a public street can be properly inferred from this description alone, and there is no other evidence tending to prove it.

Michael Reese acquired the title to all the land in question, by deed from H. P. Gallagher, dated June 1, 1862, and continued to own the same until December 23, 1881, when his executors conveyed the same to the defendant; and continuously from 1862 to 1878 lot 25, and that part of lot 15 lying east of the center line of Polk Street, were each assessed to him in solido and the taxes were paid thereon. On the twenty-eighth day of May, 1880, said executors-Jacob Rosenberg, Charles Lux, and Joseph Rosenberg-remised, released, and quitclaimed to the city and county of San Francisco "all lands reserved under the Van Ness ordinance." It is claimed by counsel that "a part of the land so reserved was that part of Union Street crossing the one-hundred-vara lot involved in part here," but this does not seem to be shown by the record. It will be seen that this quitclaim. conveyance was executed after the completion of the work for which the assessment in question was levied. Yet counsel for appellant contends that this form of conveyance implied an admission that the releasee (the city and county) had a precedent estate in the land, and that