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have entire control over this question, and that consequently no evil can arise until after the elsewhere as unsound, because I did not see if the President should appoint, during the adjournment.

my way clear. I could not be convinced that coming summer, men that we are not in favor I suggest whether it would not be well to Congress would stand up to its principles, but of, we can control those appointments next wait until the policy of Congress shall be devel I was laughed at for so thinking. winter. Let me ask the Senator, if the Pres- loped, so that we can compare it with the pol While I heard some Senators here contendident can, immediately after the Senate ad- | icy of the President, after we know exactly | ing for this principle, while I heard the voice journs, remove an officer and thereby create a what the policy of Congress is. I admit that I of the press contending for suffrage for the vacancy, and can fill that vacancy, to last until do not understand the policy of Congress, and blacks, I also heard others contending for the the last day of the next session of the Senate, I do not wish to commence a war on the Pres punishment of traitors and the disfranchisewhat is there to prevent his doing the same ident as such per se until we get in a position ment of rebels. I was aware how popular that thing at the end of the next session, and so to know whether we agree or not. It seems cry was; but I reflected that disfranchisement continue making vacancies always immedi to me we should devote ourselves to the all

was the old road to tyranny. I reflected that ately after the adjournment of the Senate? || important question of knowing exactly how we it was the effort of faction to disfranchise faction Because, if the policy heretofore adopted by stand, and what we intend to do, and then that had sunk in oblivion all the republics of preceding Administrations be carried out, the there will be time enough to take all the neces antiquity. I reflected that in modern times we President can create a vacancy at any moment sary means to defend that policy when it is bad examples of disfranchisement in Ireland he chooses by turning an officer out, and when known. I have differed sometimes with the and Poland. I reflected that Mexico for the a vacancy is created of course he can fill it. President, and sometimes with the majority of last fifty years had been playing this game Then what control has the Senate over it? If Congress, and I expect I shall continue to do of disfranchisement; that each faction that the Senate rejects the appointment, the vacancy so, and to exercise my judgment upon all || would come into power would disfranchise the has been created, and of course the President questions; but when I see that Congress has a others, and the result was anarchy. I reflected can appoint somebody else. "What control better plan than the President, I shall take upon the argument that the honorable Senhave we over it?

every means I can to vindicate that plan. ators made on this floor to the effect that the Mr. SHERMAN. I have already stated that Now, what are the plans of the two, so far evil under which we are now laboring was we can declare that an officer shall hold his as they have been ascertained and developed? | the disfranchisement of four million blacks; office only for such a term, and that he shall I appeal to Senators and ask them what are that the experiment of disfranchisement in the not be removed, or we may take away from the the plans of the two, and what do they propose South had nearly ruined the country, and President the power to appoint these officers, to accomplish? I have never indorsed the || brought on the recent war; that the cause of or give it to another department or officer. President's plan in full; I have always had that war was the violation of the great prin

Mr. HENDERSON. I thought that was the objections to it, and stated them on all occa- ciple of enfranchisement; and I shuddered at object of this amendment.

sions; it does not meet the whole question; the idea of adding fuel to this fire, adding Mr. STEWART. Mr. President, as I am but it is a plain and simple plan. He says to to the disfranchised blacks seven million disin favor of reconsidering this proposition and us, “Admit loyal members at once; restore franchised whites. I believed that what we rejecting the proposed amendment, it may be the Union on ihat basis; retain your test oath; wanted was amnesty and suffrage. I believed proper for me to state my reasons, as they are admit those who can take that test oath ; and that we wanted amnesty for the rebels, suffrage somewhat different from any reasons that I recognize the States as they existed." Some for the blacks. I believed that we wanted to have heard. If my views had been expressed of us are not satisfied with that. It is possible turn our attention to the principles of deby any other Senator I should not take this that we shall never get anything better, how mocracy, to put faith in the people. I saw occasion to trouble the Senate with any re ever, in this Congress.

no other road out of this difficulty, and finally marks on this subject.

Now, what is the policy of Congress? That | arriving at the conclusion that Congress was I have no doubt of the power of Congress to is the most difficult thing to ascertain that I in earnest, I introduced a resolution proclaimrefuse to pay the appointees named in this know of. It is stated that we want security for ing universal amnesty and impartial suffrage. amendment, or to refuse to pay anybody else, the future. I admit that. I feel the necessity | I repeat, I came to the conclusion that what or to refuse to pass any appropriation bills what of security for the future. I am a warm advo the country wanted was amnesty to tie rebels

I do not think there is any doubt about cate for all the securities that can be taken for and an extension, not a limitation, of the sufjhe power of the President to veto any bill that our republican institutions in the future. I will || frage; that all our ills had grown out of the we may pass. I do not think there is any ques go as far as any man in this Congress to obtain fact that we had deprived four million blacks tion of power involved, because that is ample. those securities which shall do us some good. of their civil and political liberty, and that violaWe can refuse to pass any bill or make any I am not afraid to meet any question, whether tion of the democratic principle had brought appropriation; but it is a question of policy, a it may be called popular or unpopular, when on this rebellion, and caused all the trouble question of a correct line of conduct. Inas

the emergency arises to obtain a guarantee for we have had. much as it has been the habit in this Govern. || security for the future; and I am not afraid to I know you say these men are rebels and ment for the last thirty years for the President | advocate any proposition which will give us should be punished. That is what was said in of the United States to remove officers during || security for the future.

Mexico. That is what was said among the facthe vacation of Congress and to appoint and The question of negro suffrage has been the tions in Rome. It is the same argument that commission others, and for the Government to only grand difficulty. I stated to my constitu they used at the time they murdered the Catiline pay them, there must be some new condition ents before I left home that whenever I came conspirators. Cato used the same argument, of things to make a law of this kind necessary to the conclusion that negro suffrage was a and in a few years afterward the same argument at this particular time. It has not been the necessity as a security for the future in the was used and drove him from Rome and made policy of Congress for the last thirty years to reconstruction of these States I should go for Cæsar imperial. This argument that you use to pass a law of this kind, and of course there it. I came here. I found both Houses of Con disfranchise men leads to despotism, and it is a must be some special reason now influencing | gress advocating this theory. I found them | dangerous argument. It has been for insubordiCongress inducing them to pass such a law at laying down the doctrine that it was the only nation, for treason, that the majority of mankind the present time.

security that could be taken. I found them have been disfranchised; and you cannot show I have heard a great deal about the Presi earnest in its advocacy. In the other House a an instance on record where any good result dent's policy and the policy of Congress. I bill was introduced granting universal negro has come from disfranchisement. On the other have heard a great deal about sustaining the suffrage in the District of Columbia. That bill hand, we have some glorious examples of the policy of the President and sustaining the drew forth a discussion which will mark the beneficial results of a contrary policy. Scot. policy of Congress. The object of this amend annals of the history of debate in America to land was enfranchised, Ireland disfranchised; ment, so far as I have been able to learn from all time. I read that discussion attentively. compare the two. Compare our own progress the course of this discussion, is to prevent the That bill passed the House of Representatives with that of Poland. We have been enfranPresident from using this patronage in support by more than a two-thirds vote. It came to chised, Poland disfranchised. We were enaof his policy. The world will so understand the Senate. The Committee on the District of bled to throw off the yoke when Great Britain it. I believe that has been avowed here upon Columbia, however, saw fit to amend it by re attempted to disfranchise us. We have an exthis floor. I do not think any one doubts that stricting the suffrage and rendering it partial ; || ample of the evil effects of disfranchisement the object of this legislation is to prevent the but on motion of the Senator from Illinois (Mr. in our own country. We found that the attempt President from using the power of his patron. Yates) the bill was recommitted by almost a to disfranchise the negroes, inferior as they are, age to sustain his policy, it is said, as against unanimous vote of this body, for the avowed few in numbers as they are, compared with the the policy of Congress. If it be true that the

purpose of making suffrage in the District of rest of our population, shook this great RePresident has a very bad policy, a policy that Columbia impartial; and from that day on until | public from center to circumference, and now will be entirely destructive to the country, and the 16th day of March I heard eloquent and threatens its overthrow. However you may Congress has a very good policy that will save able speeches on this floor upon that question, “beat about the bush," I believe on full reflecthe country, then it may be well to exercise | declaring that it was the only security that could tion that if this controversy is ever settled you this extraordinary power, unusual as it is; but be given for the future, and I became satisfied will come down to the principle of impartial that involves too extended a discussion for the that Congress would do nothing else. I, how suffrage and universal amnesty, or as near as present time. There is no danger until Con

ever, continued to mention the difficulties in may be. The mere exclusion of a few leaders gress does adjourn. While Congress is in ses

the way, the prejudice which existed in nine from office is immaterial, one way or the other, sion the Senate can reject all the appointinents teen northern States that had the word "white" but you must come down to that principle if of the President; they need not confirm any in their constitutions. The radical press as you ever have a settlement. of his appointments that are not suitable, and I sailed me; I was assailed in this Chamber and Now, what is the policy of Congress on this


It repu.

question? It is not what it appeared to be vote for their own disfranchisement, they are

I rise principally for the purpose of when Congress met; and I mean to be under: less than slaves. I propose to call upon them saying that I agree fully with the honorable stood on this point. I will change every time

for the enfranchisement of all men, but I never member from Ohio, [Mr. SHERMAX,] that in I see a principle that I have never discovered will submit to the proposition to call upon the

relation to all inferior officers, it is competent before, but I will not change and go backward South to vote for their disfranchisement.. It for the Congress of the United States to vest their unless I see a cause and a principle. I say that may be inferred by this time that I am opposed appointment either in the President alone, or the position Congress occupies to-day is not a to some of the provisions of this plan. I shall in ihe heads of the Departments alone, and to strong one. We have before us the report of not be very enthusiastic in advocating a pro provide either that they may be turned out by a committee on this subject; a committee that vision of this kind in our plan, but I do be the party in whose power the appointment is has had great difficulty in agreeing; a commit lieve that discussion and time will bring us a vested or that they may not be turned out. la tee composed of worthy and leading men in | good plan, and then let us commence our war the case of Marbury vs. Madison, referred to both Houses; a committee whose report is re on all who oppose our principles; but let us by my friend from Missouri (Mr. HeydERSON] garded by the country as extremely important, || organize first.

the other day, it will be found that Chief Jus. as reflecting the sentiments of this body-a The fourth section is a good one.

tice Marshall, speaking for the whole court in report which I do not now propose to discuss, diates the confederate debt and all claims for that case, went upon the ground that the par. but which, if adopted, will become a policy. || damages for the emancipation of slaves. That ticular officer whose commission was involved But, before we undertake war with others, let is all right. Then it is provided that these being an inferior officer and his appointment us organize and agree among onrselves and amendments shall have been adopted by three by act of Congress being for the period of five examine this report, and lay down the rules fourths of all the States before any one of the years, it was not in the power of the President that shall govern us. I will look at that report | southern States shall be admitted. You are to remove him during that period; and Mr. for a moment, because I think it is important. not calling upon them to act individually. Justice Story, in those passages of the Com

The first section of the constitutional amend Their action will do them no good. It seems mentaries to which the honorable member also ment reported by the committee, if it stood

to me, as it stands, with a provision calling referred, takes the same ground, and I have alone, would grant universal civil and politi upon the South to vote to disfranchise them never heard it disputed, that it is in the power cal rights, if it means anything. I think, how selves and making it impossible for them to of Congress by law to place inferior officers in ever, that that was not the intention. If get in unless they will consent to their disfran a situation to which the power of removal by that was not the intention, it adds nothing | chisement, and postpone their admission until the President will not apply, to withhold from to the Constitution. It is evident that such three fourths of the States adopt these amend him a power which he has not except with the was not the intention, because the second sec ments, it is not a very good plan. While I do consent of Congress, as far as the inferior offition provides for a case wherein the States not fully approve of the President's plan I cers are concerned. In the absence of any deny the suffrage. It admits that that is a freely say that I think the President's plan is provision in relation to such inferior appointpart of the programme, that they may deny a better one than the plan of the committee. ments, placing the appointee out of the reach suffrage. The second section, which is re I believe that we can get a better plan than of the party who is to appoint for the tern of garded as so all-important, is a provision that either. I do not believe this report rellects the the law, whether he be the President or the has been discussed in its substantial features sentiment of any member of the committee. head of a Department or a judge of the court, in this body for weeks, and has finally been | I believe it is a compromise of contending it is in the power of the appointing power to voted down. If in making these constitu forces and conflicting opinions. They have remove ; but it is in the power of Congress to tional amendments we are to be the judges, as gotten wearied of the subject. I believe if we provide that there shall be no removal in such we are from necessity, in our own case-be get it into Congress and discuss it we shall cases except upon such terms as Congress them. cause we cannot, until these guarantees are develop something from this plan which will selves may provide. The honorable Sepator fixed, allow the South to come back, and we be more satisfactory. I do not believe any from Ohio, therefore, in my judginent-and I must judge for them and ourselves-I say then | gentleman on that committee will say he favors can add nothing to the force of his argumentin examining the amendments, I want to judge that entire plan, but he will


"I submitted is clearly right in the opinion that he has eximpartially. I say this provision is not impar to it in order to get a report. As it stands || pressed. It is an opinion that I have held for tial. If a move in that direction is to be made, thus, let us postpone any outside issue ; let us inany, many years. I entertained it atter an changing the basis of representation, we should direct our attention to the work of reconstruc examination of the subject during the Presi. change it from numbers to voters and not in: tion legitimately, and it seems to me fruits dency of General Jackson. vent an unfair proposition as this is. Being a may coine of it. We certainly never will agree I said the other day that the authority of the judge in my own case, I want to judge fairly. ll upon a plan if we commence warring upon the President of the United States to remove bad This section provides, by its practical opera President without a plan, distract our forces, not only never been denied by the Supreme tion, for excluding from the basis of represen. and reduce our majority requisite to pass the Court in any of the cases in which that questation the non-voting population of the South plan when agreed upon ; and consequently I tion was presented, but had been virtually and including the non-voting population of hope that this amendment will be withdrawn admitted. The case that I had in my mind the North. The non-voting population of the and postponed until we know whether the the name of it, however, I did not for the moSouth, according to the contemplation of this President agrees with us or whether we differ ment recollect--was the case of ex parte Henamendment, are the blacks. They will be from him.

nen, reported in 13 Peters. Hennen was a excluded because they are native-born. The I did not intend to be drawn into a prema clerk of the district court of the United States non-voting population of the North are aliens, ture discussion of this question, and perhaps I

for Louisiana. The act of Congress gave to and they will be included because they are not have anticipated too far the discussion that that district judge the authority to appoint the citizens. I say, therefore, that this provision must necessarily arise upon the report of the clerk, and without assigning any cause for his is unfair, and it will be regarded as unfair in committee. I do not intend to despair of get removal other than the wish to appoint a perits operation. If you are going to make a ting a good proposition submitted to the coun sonal friend, which appeared in the proceed. change in the basis of representation change | try. I still have the utmost hope. I shall still || ings, he removed Hennen and appointed someit to voters, which I have always contended for, do all I can to secure that end. "If we can form body else, and Hennen applied for a mandamus

But I say, furthermore. that I do not believe none that is feasible, then I shall do all I can to compel the district court to reinstate him in there is any necessity for this change. I be to prevent any special war being made upon the office. The court, in the opinion as deliv. lieve that if we plant ourselves on the original | the President, because if we have failed he has ered by Mr. Justice Thompson-as we all know, principle of democracy, that all the people done no more, and we have no right to com one of the ablest judges who ever sat upon that shall be trusted to vote, we will find no neces. plain. I want to be distinctly understood that bench--throughout recognized, as I think, the sity for these expedients. I hope that before I shall not vote to destroy what has been ac authority of the President to remove. I will this session closes we shall arrive at some con complished by the President until a better plan read a sentence or two from that part of his clusion of that kind. I am opposed to wasting of reconstruction has been agreed upon by Cour opinion. He says: our strength now in a war with the President gress; and if he can use his patronage in aid * It cannot for a moment be admitted that it was until we have spent our power upon these of bis policy let him do it, for unless we have

the intention of the Constitution that those ollices

which are denominated inferior offices should be held amendments and attempted to agree and have a plan and a policy to vindicate we will have no

for life. And if removable at pleasure, by whom is a firm foundation. He can do no harm until use for patronage.

such a removal to be made? In the absence of all that is done; and when we have planted our Mr. HOWE obtained the floor.

constitutional provision or statutory regulation it selves on the broad principles of democracy

would seem to be a sound and necessary rule to con

Mr. JOHNSON. As I am obliged to leave sider the power of removal as incident to the porer and equal rights to all men, we can stand forth the Senate, I appeal to the honorable Senator of appointment. This power of removal from office bold and strong; our principles will fight our to permit me to detain the Senate for about

was a subject much disputed and upon which a great

diversity of opinion was entertained in the early bisbattles for us; but until we have a platform of ten

or fifteen minutes only.

tory of this Government. This related, however, to principles npon which we can stand, it seems Mr. HOWE. Certainly.

the power of the President to remove officers apto me idle to fight the President.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. President, I do not

pointed with the concurrence of the Senate: apd the

great question was, whether the removal was to be The third section submits a proposition to know that I made myself understood when this by the President alone or with the concurrence of the the southern States to vote for their own dis question was before the Senate on a former Senate, both constituting the appointing power. Na franchisement. I say that when they vote for occasion, and it is likely that some of the mem.

one denied the power of the President and Senate, their own disfranchisement they are no longer | bers of the Senate may have supposed that I

jointly, to remove, where the tenure of the office was

not fixed by the Constitution: which was a full recentitled to freedom, and it should be the work was of opinion that it was not in the power of ognition of the principle that the power of removal of the United States to provide a penal colony the Congress of the United States to interfere

was incident to the power of appointment. But it for them and send them there. If they will

was very early adopted, as the prac:ical construction with the President's right to remove in any of the Constitution, that this power was vested in tha


President alone.. And such would appear to have of the Government to remove without assign- | adopted. I shall regret most profoundly the been the legislative construction of the Constitu- || ing any cause; and it has now become, as I day when by any act or vote of the Senate or

think, the settled construction of the Consti of the House of Representatives such a usage Then he refers to the acts constituting the tution, that so far as relates to appointments shall be sanctioned or seem to be sanctioned. several Departments of the Government, and which you have given to the President, al When any proposition is laid before this body in speaking of that which provides for the con though they are to be made by and with the I ask, and I think I have a right in the name stitution of the Navy Department, he says: advice and consent of the Senate, he has a of the Constitution to demand, that its merits

“When the Navy Department was established in right to remove, and has a right to fill the places || shall be passed upon with strict regard to its the year 1798, 1 Story, 498. provision is made for the charge and custody of the books. records, and docu

made vacant by removal, provided the removal own terms. If we, a majority of this body, ments of the Department, in case of vacancy in the

is made during the recess of the Senate. approve the merits of the proposition, we have office of Secretary, by removal or otherwise.”

Mr. HOWE. Mr. President, I shall be very no right to reject it. We betray what, in our In all the other laws, the provision is " by reluctant to see this vote reconsidered and to judgment, is the true interest of the people if removal by the President or otherwise." The see this amendment rejected, because I think we do reject it. No man has a right to tell words " by the President'' are omitted in the the amendment a very proper, a very judicious, us that the President will veto the bill, and we act establishing the Navy Department.

and a very necessary one.

There is no mere have no right to listen if we are so told. When " It is not here said, by removal of the President,

measure of expediency and but few of neces the Senate approves a measure right, it is as is done with respect to the heads of the other De sity the defeat of which would occasion me so bound to assume that the President will think partments; and yet there can be no doubt that he

much chagrin and mortification as to have any it right, and that he will approve the measure; holds his office by the same tenure as the other Secretaries, and is removable by the President. The measure of any kind prevail by the sort of and upon this point I will not believe any teschange of phraseology arose, probably, from its hav argument which is adduced in support of the timony except the direct and official testimony ing become thesettled and well-understood construc reconsideration of this vote. I could not but of the President himself. When we have contion of the Constitution, that the power of removal was vested in the President alone in such cases,

regret most deeply that the Senator from Ohio sidered and approved a measure, then he is although the appointment of the officer was by the [Mr. Sherman] thought fit to introduce here called upon to consider, and approve or disPresident and Scnate." the argument which he has laid before the

approve; and when he has had an opportunity Mr. FESSENDEN. What is the Senator Senate. What is it? Conceding, for the pur to consider, and has told us that lie disapreading from?

pose of his argument, our right to a lopt this proves, I will believe him, and I will believe Mr. JOHNSON. Thirteen Peters, page 259 ; amendment, he still invokes the Senate not no man but him. and from that time to this, I am sure I can say to do it; and why? Because it involves the I therefore lay out of view entirely the sugwith truth that I speak knowingly–no judge of Legislature in a collision with the Executive. gestion that the adoption of this amendment the Supreme Court has ever questioned the For twenty years prior to 1860 a great deal of will involve us in any controversy with the power of the President to remove, although the the legislation of ihis body, and a great deal of President. If he does not approve of the appointment is made by and with the advice the political action of the people of the United bill with this amendment upon it, he will veto and consent of the Senate. My honorable friend States was controlled, not by appeals to the the biil possibly; if he does not see fit to apfrom Ohio bas said that it never could be in judgment of legislators or to the consciences prove the bill, he will unquestionably veto it; any state of excitement the design of Congress and convictions of the people, but directly to and then the two Houses will be called upon to deny his right to remove his Cabinet officers : their fears. The argument more potential than to determine what they will do in that coutinand yet it is in the power of Congress to repeal any other that was heard throughout the Re. gency, to pass upon the reasons he gives for all the laws by which those officers are appointed. || public was, upon various and sundry questions, not approving the bill. Cabinet officers are not provided for in the Con. not that it is or is not right and expedient, but But, says the Senator, it is an amendment stitution. His authority over them is derived you must adopt this or reject that; if you do to an appropriation bill--an appropriation bill from that part of the Constitution which says pot there will be a collision somewhere. I am every dollar of which is needed for the good that he shall have the authority to appoint all glad to know that in those days, which I some of the public service, and by putting upon this the officers particularly named, and all officers times am made to fear were braver days even bill this measure which may prove obnoxious the appointment of whom is vested in the Presi than these, there was no attempt to frighten to the President, you jeopard, you bazard the dent and the Senate. Congress may, there the Legislature by pointing out the horrors of a safety of the bill. How so, or if so, what posfore, repeal those laws and leave no Cabinet collision with the President. We were threat sible measure can you put into an appropriaofficers at all, and the President will have to eped invariably with collisions in different tion bill and not run the same hazard! Every act upon his own judgment; but the good sense portions of the Union. Different States of the single individual appropriation in this bill miglit and patriotism of the men of 1789 showed low Union said, if you do not submit to this policy, have been opposed upon precisely the same important it was that the President should have or to that, the Union will be disrupted. That ground. If any Senator bad assumed to say official advisers, and they therefore provided was the threat which was held over the Legis the President is opposed to this or that approthat the heads of these several Departments | lature in those days. But now we are urged to priation, he could have called upon 118 with just should be what is terined the Cabinet of the pause, to reject an amendment conceded to be as much authority to lay aside that particular President; and in all the laws providing for addressed to the discretion of the Legislature, appropriation upon peril of baving the bill the appointment of those officers it is assumed because within its jurisdiction, for the simple vetoed, and the appropriations lost in case we that the power of removal shall remain in the and single reason that if we adopt it it may put it in. This is only designed to be one of President.

involve us in a collision with the President of a great many provisions in a single bill. It is Now, my friend has said that we can provide the United States. Sir, if the Constitution, not in terms an appropriation. It is in terms against any removal by the President of post which we talk of frequently and which we reg. a direction as to the disbursement of the money masters and collectors of the revenue. That is | ularly swear we will support, ineant anything, appropriated, and I know of nothing more all true. We may by law give to the President if it meant to secure anything, it meant to proper or more regular than the inposition of the power to appoint those oflicers and deny secure a body to enact laws that should be as just such regulations as this, touching the disto him the power to remove them. We may independent of the President as the President bursement of moneys upon bills making approgive to the Secretary of the Treasury the like is on the Legislature.

priations of public moneys. power and deny to him the power to remove Mr. STEWART. Will the Senator allow But, says the Senator, if we do put it on and them; but I am sure no Senator would be will me one word at this point?

if the President does veto this bill, then the ing to say that the power of removal, in cases Mr. HOWE. Certainly.

postal service must suffer and languish through of that description, should not be vested some. Mr. STEWART. The Senator misappre a whole year, and we shall be held responsible. where; and the question, therefore, which would hends me-

Why shall we be held responsible? What shall present itself, it' such a measure was proposed Mr. HOIVE. I am not referring to the Sen we have done to occasion this disaster to the to the Senate, would be, where will you vest *ator from Nevada. I have not got to him yet. postal service? We have seen fit to incorpoit? Will you vest it in the President of the Mr. STEWART. The Senator misappre rate a section into the bill making appropria. United States? If not, will you vest it in the hends me if he supposes that is the ground I tions for that service, which we approve, which Secretaries? It must be vested somewhere, or place it upon. I place it on the ground that we deem right in itself, and it is conceded by we niust run the risk of having dishonest or I do not know whether we have got any use those who urge this argument to be right. We incapable officers in the several Departments || for any such war as yet, and I want to wait put it on to this bill; and the President, it is of the Government. If you vest it in a Secre

assumed, does not approve it, and therefore he tary, the President can remove the Secretary, Mr. HOWE. If my friend from Nevada will not assent to the appropriations, and we and appoint one who will suit him better, and will wait and see, he will know when I reach are to be held responsible for the disaster that thus effect the same object.

him. I was referring to the argument intro overtakes that branch of the public service. I I agree with the honorable member that it is duced by the Senator from Obio. I say the conceive that he who wrongfully refuses to apadvisable that the patronage of the Govern Constitution intended that the action of this prove the bill is alone responsible for the conment should not be used for political purposes. law-making tribunal should be absolutely inde sequences that follow. If we put a provision In the beginning of the Government, and in pendent of the action of the Executive, except in this bill which the President ought not to the debates in 1789, which led to the determi through the simple exercise of the veto power. approve,

then he is justified in vetoing the bill, nation of Congress that the power to remove But the argument which is paraded here calls and the consequences that may follow upon was in the President, it was stated, and it is so upon us as a matter of usage, as a matter of this service justly attach to us; but if we put stated, I think, in one of the numbers of the l expediency, as a matter almost of necessity, to nothing on this bill but what the President Federalist, that the exercise of that power, inquire at the White House what sort of legis ought to approve, then I do humbly conceive without cause, would be a good reason for im lation will be approved there before we venture that he ought to approve the bill, and if he peachment. But it has long been the practice II upon it. I am unwilling to see any such usage refuses to approve the bill he is not only re

and see.


sponsible for rejecting this proposition, con that wait to be provided for. I will not encour tence, I will omit the rest of it; until he unceded to be right in itself, but he is responsible | age the President to postpone that act of jus derstands clearly that he will relish the service to whatever consequences follow to this branch tice until this Congress shall have adjourned, of Congress, he does not like to step out of of the public service.

and then do it upon his own private account. the service of the President. But the Senator from Ohio insists that it is Let him do it now, because now justice waits I do not know but that I am prepared to not necessary. He says there is no necessity to be done; let him send here the names of commend such prudence as that; and I canfor it now; it is entirely within our power to do these crippled soldiers and let us pass upon not really relieve the Senator from his diffithis thing; it will be justified if the President

the case.

We can coöperate now, we are here | culty. I do not know what is the policy of should assume to make removals for insuffi to coöperate with him both in the act of Congress. I am struggling here to find out, cient or unworthy reasons. But, the Senator removal and in the act of appointment. to develop, the policy of Congress. I trust in says, that time has not come; wait; do not The Senator admits, and I believe all who | the name of the Almighty and of the people inaugurate the war; pass your regular appro have spoken in opposition to this amendment and of the Constitution that a part of the priation bills; when another session shall have concede to-day, that the power is in the Legis: || policy of Congress is to adopt this amendconvened, if you find the President has exer lature to fix the terms of all these officers and ment; and if my friend from Nevada approves cised this power, then put on the checks. Is to take from the President the right, if he has | it, I ask his assent to it. If he does not apthat sound advice to give to the Legislature? it, as I think by the statute he has, not by the prove it, then I think he ought to vote against It is assumed here on the part of some that in Constitution, to remove any of these officers. But I ask him to lay aside now and forthe recess of the Senate the President may We can, it is said, take that from him; and ever the idea that he is inaugurating a fight remove every officer employed in the public they say, why not do it? This is an indirect with the President of the United States when service, the term of whose office is not fixed method of accomplishing the purpose, and the || he simply sits here like a Senator and gives by the Constitution. If there be danger that Senator from Ohio says it does not accomplish to his country the benefit of such judgment he will exercise this power for partisan or polit- | it after all. What is our purpose ? To restrict as he has upon any and every question that ical purposes, the time will not come, perhaps, the exercise of this power of removal. Do it may be laid before him. That is the idea that until Congress shall have adjourned; and the then directly, they say, by act of Congress, and I want to see started. It has lingered about occasion will have passed before the next ses declare that the President shall not make these these Halls a great deal too long, and it is besion will convene.

The Senator says, do not removals. Sir, that is only one way to do it. cause it has lingered here so long that it makes anticipate any such thing; wait, try him, and | Is it a better way than this? That is the exer the adoption of just such an amendment as when you convene again if you find he has done cise of a greater power than this is. This does this so very necessary. it, then provide the remedy. When the wolf not say in terms, “ You shall not removeatall,'' I bave spoken so far, Mr. President-and I is in the yard, be sure you shut the gate! Well, but it says that if you do remove without cause have spoken longer than I intended to doI am not anticipating any maladministration on the officer whom you select to succeed shall from the stand-point presented on the other the part of the President; but I find a certain not be paid. They tell us we may prohibit him side, conceding that the amendment was right power claimed here to make these removals, from removing at all, but it is very hard to say in itself and entirely within our discretion. Is with or without cause, for any reason that pleases when he has removed and a man has been there any doubt about it? I understand the the President; I deny that such power is given | appointed, that man shall not be paid. Hard? || Senator from Maryland concedes it to-day. I to the President by the Constitution; I insist | Why? Upon whom is it hard? It is not hard said the other day, and I repeat again, that that the Legislature should not recognize any upon the incumbent particularly. It is not any whoever doubts or denies our right or our such power; but because I find it insisted upon harder than the existing law, under which the power to incorporate this amendment upon here, and by some assuming to speak in the President can remove him or does remove this bill ought to vote against it, and whoever name of the President, I am led to fear that whenever he pleases. It is harder upon the doubts or denies the power of Congress to rethe power may be exerted, and if exerted it incumbent of the office, to be sure, than would || strict the right of removal and to fix the tenure will be exerted during the very next vacation be a law which said he should not be removed of these offices, I think ought to vote against of this body; and when you come together at all; but that we do not choose to say; we the adoption of this amendment, for I concede again the occasion for its exercise will have want to reserve the power somewhere to re now, as I conceded then, that if the Constitupassed; officers of the obnoxious kind will all move for cause; but is it hard upon the ap tion confers upon the President of the United have been removed from their places and those | pointee? Yes, it does seem to be rather hard || States the power to remove these officers, that places will be filled with officers of the right | upon a poor, ambitious aspirant for a post is a power which he may exercise in defiance kind, approved by the President himself. When office to say that after he is put into it and dis of us, and when he has exerted it in any case that is the case, says the Senator from Ohio, charges the duties of it he shall not be paid; || he has made a vacancy, and when he has made then put on the brakes, to use a form of ex but recollect that is no harder upon the aspir a vacancy he has not merely clothed himself pression I get from the President himself. When ant for the post office than it is to say to the with the right, but he has charged himself with

gets all these offices filled with just such men President, as they suggest to us to say, “You | the duty under the Constitution of seeing that as he likes, then pass an act of Congress shall not makethe removal; therefore you shall vacancy filled. It turns, then, upon our right which will prevent him from making a removal not make the vacancy; and therefore you shall to restrict this power of removal. I shall not without the consent of the Senate! It strikes not make the appointment,' for if we say that, detain the Senate with any argument upon that me that that would be a little late in the season as they urge us to say it, certainly the vacancy | point; to-day I do not understand it to be con. to plant with any certainty of a valuable crop: cannot be made, and certainly the aspirant troverted; and I have only one single remark

But these were not the only objections urged cannot be gratified. But, says my friend from to make upon that head. As I read the Conby the Senator from Ohio; they were the objec. Vermont [Mr. Poland) in an "aside,” in the stitution, f must say that if the President has tions that I regretted to hear the most, for I one case the man would hold the office, in the || the right under the Constitution, and inde. do not like to have such considerations ad. other case he would not. True as holy writ; | pendent of statute law, to remove a postmaster dressed to a legislative body ever. I like to but by whose fault or connivance does he hold at pleasure and for political reasons, he has have their judgments, their reasons, their con the oilice? By the connivance of the Legis- the right to remove a judge of the Supreme victions appealed to ; their fears never. There lature? By ours? The law does not compel Court. If he has a right to remove one of was another objection. He argues that by the him to take the office. He sees fit to take it these civil officers, he has the right to remove adoption of this amendment we restrict the with the deliberate notice placed upon your every civil officer. I mean if he has it under power of the President to make removals. I statute that he cannot be paid if he sees fit to the Constitution. But you tell me that the think so; it is the very purpose. But if we take office under those circumstances. He Constitution expressly fixes the terms of the restrict him in the exercise of that power, says acts with his eyes open, and he acts volunta- || judges, limits them to good behavior. Yes, I the Senator, we may put it out of his power to rily; there is no sort of duress or constraint admit it. If you see fit to fix the term of a remove a civilian who has been in office from laid upon him. Of what shall he complain? | postmaster at four years or ten years, or during the beginning of the war and to put in his place Why shall he complain ?

good behavior, the two cases are put upon a a poor soldier who has been crippled in the The Senator from Nevada [Mr. STEWART] footing so far as the law is concerned. It war; and will you not leave him that power? seems to think we are anticipating, reach- being conceded that we have the right to fix No, Mr. President; I think we had better not ing out for, seizing a weapon to strike before the tenure of these offices, when we have done under existing circumstances leave him that it legitimately comes to us. He does not like it it is just as much a law as the Constitution, power. I take it that all the occasion of the this amendment. Why? Not because we for the Constitution of the United States is no exercise of that power that will exist for a good have not the power to pass it, not because it more valid than any act of Congress made in many years exists now. I thank my God

that is not right in itself, not because he would pursuance of and in accordance with the Con. we are enabled to reflect at last that our sol avoid a collision with the President, but he stitution; and if you see fit to fix the tenure of diers are done being crippled. All the crip- has not got ready to enter into a struggle with these offices, and yet concede that in spite of ples that are to be made in the progress of this the President, because he does not precisely your law, which says it shall be four years or rebellion are now made and are to be provided | know whether he can stand by Congress or six years, the President may, under powers for; here is the tribunal, the President and the not. He waits to know what is the policy of derived from the Constitution, remove within Senate together, that can make provision for Congress. Until he knows whether he is on the term, then he may remove the judge ; and them; and I shall not concede, either upon the the side of Congress he does not like to make every one of the officers employed in the civil suggestion of the Senator from Ohio or upon up an issue with the President. Until, in or in the military or in the naval service is not the suggestion of any other member of the other words, he can see and understand pre an agent of the people of the United States, Senate, that the President is more willing to cisely how he will relish the service of the Al not an agent of the law, but he is a servant of take care of these crippled soldiers than we mighty he does not like to desert-no, I believe the President.

There are numerous cases of the kind ll it would not be proper to go on with that sen. Sir, if any such notion bas prevailed in the



minds of the American people, I think it is debates in Congress upon this subject, and I | Mr. Smith, of South Carolina. Some contended time to wipe it out. I could illustrate the had supposed that if there was any question that inasmuch as it required the advice of the necessity of this by facts which have fallen clearly and definitely settled, hoth by the prac Senate before an appointment could be made, under my observation within a very short time. tice of the Government and by judicial decision, the Senate also had the power, conjointly with This is not the occasion to parade them before it was the power of the President to remove the President, to remove, and that the Presthe Senate; but there is not a Senator sitting those officers whom he had the power to appoint, || ident had not the power without the advisory here that cannot point his own finger to numer and whose terms of office were not limited to || body. But after full argument-and it is one ous instances illustrating the necessity of teach a particular period, or during good behavior. of the ablest and most exhaustive arguments to ing the American people that it was not the Has the President the power, for instance, to be found in the debates of Congress either in design of our institntions to make the Presi- || appoint the heads of Departments? Has he former or present times—it was decided by dent of the United States responsible for public | the power to remove them from office if he Congress that the President, being the appointopinion, or to make him a missionary clothed sees proper? I do not know that I understood | ing power, had in himself alone the power with patronage and power and emoluments for the honorable Senator from Maryland aright; of removal. And, sir, should it not be so? the purpose of inculcating his own opinions or I do not know but what he half conceded that What are these but executive officers? Their his own political doctrines upon the people. this power might be taken away from the Pres. || appointment is an executive duty; they are

Mr. SAULSBURY. Mr. President, when ident by repealing the acts establishing those called upon to discharge executive functions; this subject was before the Senate originally, I || Departments. But to show that this power of tlre President of the United States is respon. did not mingle in the debate, because I con removal clearly exists in the President I will sible for their conduct to the people and to the sidered it then, as it seems to be now, a con cite two passages from the Constitution of the country; and therefore, being chargeable with troversy more between the two branches of the United States, if it is not now out of order to the due administration of public affairs, and Republican party than between the Republican quote from that instrument.

being clothed with the executive power, it party and the party to which I belong. Sir, The Constitution, in section two of article would, upon principle even, if there were no there seem to be two wings of that party, ac two, provides that

authority one way or the other, and we were cording to this debate, the one led by Congress "The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of | driven to reason abstractly on the subject, be and the other by the President of the United the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the nothing but right and proper that the power to States. As I have said before, I belong to

militia of the several States, when called into the
actual service of the United States; he may require

remove should be in the authority which is neither, but I belong to a party much older

thcopinion, in writing, of the principal officerin cach responsible to the country for the action of the than either, a party having its origin at the of the Executive Dopartinents upon any subject relat executive agents. foundation of this Government, a party under ing to tho duties of their respectivo offices, &c.

But, sir, judicial decisions, as well as uniform whose counsels and advice and management The Constitution contemplates offices denom- || practice, has settled the question. This princithis country grew from a feeble Republic to be inated here as Executive Departments; and in 1 ple was clearly recognized in the case of Marone of the greatest nations upon the earth. 1789 Congress proceeded, under the authority || bury vs. Madison in 1 Cranch. It was recog. During its existence and control no civil war of the Constitution, to create those Executive nized and decided to be settled law in the case afflicted the land, and none of the evils were Departments—the office, as it was called, of of ex parte Hennen in 13 Peters. It was deexperienced under its management of public | Secretary of Foreign Affairs, now Secretary clared in both cases that the law was clearly affairs that we have suffered during the short, of State, and the offices of Secretary of War, settled, and if you turn to the Life of Washing. brief, and terrible reign of this now distracted Secretary of the Treasury, and Secretary of the ton, by John Marshall, Chief Justice of the Uniparty. The Democratic party has but very little Navy. In the bills organizing those Depart-ted States, who certainly ought to have known interest in this controversy as a party. Be ments this very question was most elaborately something upon the subject, you will find that lieving, however, the President to be patriotic, || argued and solemnly settled by a vote of Con he declares it to be settled law that the power and that his policy, if carried out into practice, i gress, that the power to appoint and the power of removal is with the President alone. And would conduce to the general benefit of the to remove both existed in the President of the yet, notwithstanding this construction and the whole country, would be the means of soon United States. It passed by a very large ma uniform practice from 1789 down to the pres. restoring amicable relations between the States jority. The main argument upon the bills ent hour, some in this debate have gone so far of this Union, and would again putus on the high establishing those Departments arose on the as to question the right of the President of the road to prosperity and happiness as a people, power of the President to remove the officers United States to remove the head of a Departthe Democratic party, with a unanimity, yea, at the head of them, after he had appointed ment or any other officer. I might add to this sir, a generosity seldom witnessed in the his

them by and with the advice and consent of | authority the weight of the great name of Chaniory of political parties, sustains the President the Senate.

cellor Kent, of New York, who held the same in every constitutional effort to restore the The language of the Constitution is, that the doctrine. This debate is the first time in my relations which formerly existed between the President shall nominate and by and with the || life, in the last twenty-five years at least, that I States. That is the connection and that is the advice and consent of the Senate shall appoint. have heard the doctrine questioned. only connection which the Democratic party | Now, who appoints to oflice? What was the Congress itself has uniformly heretofore bas with this controversy.

argument then? Some said the appointment recognized the power of removal to be in Sir, I should not have risen on this occasion was made by the Presidentand the Senate; but the President. In the acts of 1789 establishing if it had not been for a remark which was made if we look for a moment we shall see that the the Departments of Foreign Affairs or State, of by the honorable Senator from Vermont, (Mr. Senate has nothing to do in making an appoint the Treasury, and of War, provision was made Poland.] I listened with great pleasure to his ment; it acts simply as an advisory body. The for the appointment of subordinate officers to speech. It was able; it was in good taste; it Presidentnominalesand the Presidentappoints, | take charge of the books, papers, &c., of said was just such a speech, with very slight excep but before he makes an appointment he takes Departments in case of the removal of the heads tions, as we should have expected from a gen the advice of the Senate. When is the appoint- l of said Departments by the President. This is tleman of his high reputation. But I was sorry ment perfected? Is it perfected when the Sen a clear legislative recognition of the right of to hear one remark which fell from the lips ate gives its advice? No, sir. Then the Sen the President to remove, and every President of that honorable and distinguished Senator. ate does not appoint. The appointment is has acted under the Constitution in conformity When war was raging in the land, when the pas. || only complete and perfect when the President with this recognition of right. sions of the people were excited, when brother | attaches his signature to the commission. It But, sir, there are officers whom the Presi. was arrayed against brother, and when parties was decided in the case of Marbury vs. Madison dentnow has the power to remove that Congress and individual men were striving to prove that that to render an appointment complete there may prevent his removing, by depriving him they were more loyal than their neighbors, I must be the signature of the President to the of the right to appoint them; but I hold that expected that men would so far forget propri- | commission. The commission is the evidence while you leave him the appointment of these ety as to deal in epithets towards their polit of the appointment, and it is not issued and officers, you cannot take away from him the ical opponents; but I had hoped that when signed until after the Senate bas advised the power of removal. The Constitution empow.

ers Congress to vest the appointment of infewhen the spirit of party had become Caine, di appointment; but suppose after the Senate


rior officers in the courts of law or in the heads never again in the Senate of the United States to make out the commission and does not affix of Departments. Congress has done that in should hear the term "copperhead" drop his signature to the commission, I ask you, is reference to the appointmont of clerks, &c., in from the lips of any Senator But, sir, there there any appointment? Clearly not.

the Treasury and other Departments. Conis an old maxim, de gustibus non disputandum This shows that the President, and the Pres gress may by law provide for the appointment est. It may be the taste of honorable Senators ident alone, has the appointing power, and of inferior officers by some other party than to indulge in such epithets; I will not imitate that the office of the Senate is nothing but that the President, if Congress sees proper to do so; the example. Not that it affects me; but I of an advisory body. That being so, the ques but Congress bas not so far seen proper to do hope that it is the last time in the Senate of tion comes back to this: what is the principle | so; and the proposition now is to attach to an the United States that we shall be compelled governing the power of removal? Any one appropriation bill for the support of the postal to listen to such epithets.

who looks into Lloyd's Debates of that dny service of the country an amendment providing While I am up, Mr. President, I will say a will see that the doctrine was universally ad that if the President of the United States shall, word upon the measure now before the Senate. initted in the argument that the power which not only in reference to a vacancy happening It is very strange to me how the power of the appoints is the power which can remove, and during the sitting of Congress, but in reference President of the United States to remove cer which alone can remove. I know that in those to a vacancy which may occur during the recess, tain officers from their offices can, at this late early days the question arose whether the only 1 undertake to exercise the power admitted to day, be questioned. I had supposed that, as power of removal was not by impeachment. be his, the person appointed by him shall not Senators, we were familiar with the early Il Some advocated that doctrine ; among the rest, ll receive pay unless he shall be confirmed by the

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