16. It being customary for the owners of
live-stock being shipped on railroads to
employ others than the servants of the
company to feed and water them at stations
or stopping places, a person coming on the
tracks at such a point, seeking employment
of that kind, is not a trespasser.-Id.*
Degrees of negligence.

v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., (Ky.) | defect of title, in discharge of an ante-
157.*
cedent debt, is a purchaser for value.-Ta-
bor v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, (Ark.) 805.
4. Upon proof of such fraud, in the in-
ception of a note, as to destroy the claim
of the original holder, the presumption of
bona fide purchase for value otherwise ob-
taining in favor of an indorsee before ma-
turity is overcome, and the burden is
shifted upon such indorsee to show that he
paid value in good faith.-Id.
Negotiability.

17. In an action against a street railway
company to recover for running over a
child 19 months old, it not appearing posi-
tively in evidence whether the driver saw
the child on the track or not, but it appear-
ing probable that he did not, held, that an
instruction that the company should ex-
ercise the highest degree of diligence
towards a child of tender years, and would
be liable for slight negligence, was proper.
-Galveston City R. Co. v. Hewitt. (Tex.) 705.
18. For the slightest negligence against
which human prudence, diligence, or skill
can guard, and by which a passenger is in-
jured, the railroad is liable in damages.
A railroad is bound to keep its track clear
of obstructions, so that the engineers of
locomotives may have a clear view ahead
in running their trains.-Louisville & N.
R. Co. v. Ritter's Adm'r, (Ky.) 591.*

Delivery.

5. Neither a certificate of indebtedness

issued by a city to one of its creditors, nor
an order on the city accepted by it, is a ne-
gotiable instrument.-Sonnenthiel v. Skin-
ner, (Tex.) 686.
Indorsement.

6. Blank indorsers on a promissory note
cannot, by a parol agreement between
themselves and the maker, alter the lia-
bility of the latter as fixed by the language
of the note.-Latham v. Houston Flour-
Mills, (Tex.) 462.

7. The payment, by the maker of a ne-
gotiable promissory note, to the original
payee, before its maturity, but after its in-
dorsement and transfer as collateral secu-
rity, constitutes no valid defense to a suit
by the indorsee on the note, although the
maker had no notice of such transfer at
the time of making payment.-Gosling v.
Griffin, (Tenn.) 642.

Demand and notice.

8. When it is sought to charge a partner-
ship as indorsers of a note subsequently
dishonored, the requirements of the law

as to notice of its dishonor are fulfilled

when such notice is left either at the place
of business of such firm with some one in
charge, or at the domicile or residence of
one of the partners.-Fourth Nat. Bank v.
Altheimer, (Mo.) 858.

NEW TRIAL.

See, also, Criminal Practice, 46–56.
Motion for, when to be made, see Homi-
cide, 27.
Reference, on findings of referee, see Ref-
erence, 2.

Misconduct of jury.

2. If one signs a note as surety, and deliv-
ers it to the maker upon the understanding
that he is not to deliver it to the payee un-
til he obtains the signature of another per-
son as co-surety, he will nevertheless be
The affidavits of jurors showing that the
bound if the maker delivers the note with-jury arrived at their verdict by lot are not
out obtaining such other signature, and if admissible to impeach the verdict.-Ward
the payee has no knowledge, at the time of v. Blackwood, (Árk.) 624.
delivery, of the agreement between the
maker and the surety.-Tabor v. Mer-
chants' Nat. Bank, (Ark.) 805
Bona fide purchaser for value.

3. One who takes negotiable paper be-
fore maturity, and without notice of any

Nonsuit.

For want of statutory affidavit, see Exec-
utors and Administrators, 13.
Voluntary, see Appeal, 1.

court, will be considered as waived.-Ad- debt contracted by the company in July.—
ams v. Edgerton, (Ark.) 628.

PARTITION.

By judicial proceedings-Jurisdic-

tion.

Butler v. Henry, (Ark.) 878.

4. Participation in the profits of a firm
is prima facie evidence of partnership, and
it becomes conclusive, as to third persons,
when not rebutted by evidence showing
such participation to be in place of com-
pensation for services.-Fourth Nat. Bank

1. As a general rule, there can be no par-v. Altheimer, (Mo.) 858.
tition in an action to settle a disputed title
Firm property.
to land; but, where the court of chancery
has possession of the case on some clear
ground of equity jurisdiction wholly dis-
tinct from partition, then the cause may
be retained for partition.-Hankins v.
Layne, (Ark.) 821.

5. Real estate sold at a judicial sale was
knocked down to A. and B., partners, A.
having bid it in in pursuance of an under-
standing between him and his partner to
buy it for the firm. In order, however, to
avoid the necessity of getting outsiders to
go on the bonds for the purchase money,
they had the sale entered in B.'s name, and
he signed the bonds as principal, and A.
as surety. Held, that the real estate was
partnership property. - Seiler v. Brenner,
(Ky.) 796.

Rights of partners inter se.

6. One partner is not entitled to com-
pensation from the partnership for his
services in attending to the partnership
affairs, unless there is a contract therefor
express or implied. Gaston v. Kellogg,
(Mo.) 589.

Dissolution.

7. A partner who furnishes the money to
purchase cattle for a partnership, which
wards sells his undivided half interest in
are to be owned in equal shares, and after-
the cattle without making any sale of his
against his partner, thereby dissolves the
interest in the partnership or of his claim
partnership, and loses his lien on the cattle
fer by him of his share of the partnership
owned by his partner, nor does the trans-
have against his partner.-Moore v. Steele,
property transfer any equity he might
(Tex.) 448.

PAYMENT.

See, also, Subrogation.
In county scrip, see Taxation, 13.
Acceptance of negotiable paper.

1. Proof that a joint maker of a note
gave, in payment thereof, his check on a
bank where he had no funds, and that the
holder surrendered the note for such check,
will not sustain a plea of payment.-Henry
v. Conley, (Ark.) 181.*
Application.

2. A payment will not be applied to usu-
rious interest without the debtor's con-
sent.-Edwards v. Rumph, (Ark.) 635.

Penalty.

Jurisdiction of justice, see Justice of the
Peace, 1.

978

PERJURY.

What constitutes.

1. Perjury may be assigned upon a false
statement affecting only a collateral issue,
as that of the credit of the witness.
Washington v. State, (Tex.) 228.

2. A county clerk having authority to ad-
minister oaths, but not being required,
upon an application for a marriage license,
to take an affidavit as to the age of the par-
ties, the making of a false affidavit upon
that subject will support an assignment
for false swearing, but not for perjury.
Davidson v. State, (Tex.) 662.

Covenant, action on, see Covenant.
Judgment, under prayer for general relief,
see Fraudulent Conveyances, 14.

Justice's court, pleadings in, see Justices of
the Peace, 5.

Motion to strike out, when proper, see Par-
ties, 2.

Pleading and proof, see Eminent Do-
main, 3.

Railroads, stock-killing cases, see Railroad
Companies, 12–14.

Suretyship, action on bond, see Principal
and Surety, 1.

General principles.

1. Under the rule that, where a party fails
3. Upon trial of an indictment against A.
to aver a fact, which, if true, is important
for falsely swearing, in applying for a mar-
riage license, that his fiance was 18 years to a recovery on his part, such fact will be
of age, false testimony given by B. that the taken in the light most adverse to the plead-
girl picked cotton with him 13 years be-er, in an action against an insolvent and
fore, and was then a big girl, is perjury.-

Id.

Evidence.

4. In Texas, under Code Crim. Proc. art.
746, a conviction cannot be had unless upon
the testimony of at least two credible wit
nesses, or one credible witness corrobo-
rated strongly by other evidence.-Wash-
ington v. State. (Tex.) 228.

5. A. was indicted and tried for illegally
branding a calf alleged to belong to B.
Upon the trial of B. for perjury, alleged to
have been committed by him upon that
trial, held, that a judgment in B.'s favor,
in a civil suit brought against him by A.
for the calf, was not admissible in evidence
on behalf of B., when offered generally.-
Hill v. State, (Tex.) 764.

6. If, upon trial for perjury, the judg-
ment in the proceeding in which the per-
jury is alleged to have been committed is
admitted on behalf of the prosecution, the
court should give instructions limiting the
effect of the evidence.-Davidson v. State,
(Tex.) 662.

7. Upon trial for perjury, the state may
show by the attorney in the case in which
the perjury is alleged to have been com-
mitted why he called defendant as a wit-
ness in such case, in order to show, if pos-
sible, that the false statement was made
with premeditation; Pen. Code Tex. art.
189, making it a defense if the false state-
ment was made by mistake, through inad-
vertence, or under agitation.-Id.

PLEADING.

See, also, Damages, 4, 5; Ejectment, 4; Gar-
nishment; Indictment and Information;
Justices of the Peace, 5; Quo Warranto, 1, 2.
Service of process after amendment, see
Writs, 5.

Bankruptcy, discharge in, see Bank-
ruptcy, 3.

his assignee for the benefit of creditors, it
will be assumed that the assignment con-
tained a provision exacting releases from
accepting creditors where the contrary
view is important to the plaintiff's right of
recovery, and he has made no averments
thereon in his pleadings.-Mills v. Swear-
ingen, (Tex.) 268.

Complaint.

2. In an action to recover the value of a

draft intrusted to defendant, an attorney,
for collection, a complaint as follows:
Plaintiff states "that in the spring of 1875
he delivered defendant a check or draft
upon S. & M. for $125, and directed him to
send the same to P. Bros., Watson, Ark.,
for collection, and, before the same had
been sent by defendant, plaintiff called
upon defendant, and gave him some direc-
tions, but the defendant wholly disre-
garded the requests and directions of the
plaintiff, and sent said draft to one M., in
Arkansas; that, by reason of the conduct
of the defendant in disobeying the orders
and directions of the plaintiff, the plaintiff
is damaged in the sum of fifty dollars, for
which he asks judgment, "—is sufficient to
apprise defendant of the nature of plain-
tiff's claim, and the extent of the damages,
and to support a judgment, and bar another
action.-Butts v. Phelps, (Mo.) 218.

3. In an action to recover for breach of a
contract, it is sufficient for plaintiff to al-
lege a general compliance with the con-
tract on his part, without alleging specific-
ally and in detail the performance of every
act required to be done by him.-Long v.
McCauley, (Tex.) 689.

Amendment-Notice of filing.

4. Where a party has pleaded or demurred
in an action, the only notice to him of the
filing of an amendment by the opposite
party that is necessary is the order of court
granting leave to file the amendment.—
Rabb v. Rogers, (Tex.) 303.

Mortgage, power of sale, see Mortgages, 11. Liability of principal to third per-
Trusts, powers implied under trust, see
Trusts, 6, 7.