BOND

บ.

JAY.

act which contains the usual exceptions in favor of infants, &c. and allows three years after the removal of the impediment to bring their suit.

It is contended that since the act of limitations runs against a person beyond sea from the time of his coming into the country, so from analogy it ought to run against a non-resident merchant from the time of his coming, though for a mere temporary purpose, within the country.

The Court cannot assent to the correctness of this reasoning. To render it applicable, the rejoinder ought to have averred that the Plaintiff had become a resident of the state of Maryland more than three years before the institution of the suit. Not having done so, the words of the exception have never ceased to be applicable to the Plaintiff; and, consequently, the statute has never commenced to run.

It is the opinion of this Court that the Circuit Court erred in overruling the demurrer of the Plaintiff to the rejoinder of the Defendant in this cause, and that the judgment be reversed and annulled, and the cause remanded with instructions to render judgment on the said demurrer in favor of the Plaintiff, and that further proceedings may be had therein according to law.

If an equitable

PRESTON v. TREMBLE.

Absent....TODD, J.

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district of title be merg East Tennessee, who had dismissed the Plaintiffs bill in the party has Chancery, upon demurrer, for want of equity.

no relief in equity, al

though the

The bill stated that Preston, the Complainant, had grant be void, title to a tract of land in the state of Tennessee, but as being con- the Defendant, Tremble, fraudulently and deceitfully entrary to law, tered into it, and holds him out.

υ.

In setting forth the title it is stated, that the land PRESTON formerly lay within the state of North Carolina, during which time, one Ephraim Dunlop made an entry for TREMBLE the land in regular form, paid the purchase money to the state, and performed every other requisite to complete the contract; but before a patent was obtained, the legislature of North Carolina passed a law, defining the limits of the Indian boundary, declaring all entries and surveys already made within those limits, to be null and void, and directing the entry-takers to refund all monies received therefor. That Dunlop never received back the purchase money, nor consented to annul the contract. That the law of North Carolina, rescinding the contract was void. That Dunlop afterwards obtained a warrant to survey the land, and obtained a patent therefor, from the state of North Carolina, and afterwards conveyed the land to John Rhea, who conveyed to Preston, the Plaintiff.

P. B. KEY, for Plaintiff in error, contended,

1. That the land was within the territorial limits of North Carolina, who had a right to grant it.

2. That the entry and payment of the purchase money, vested in Dunlop an equitable estate in fee in the land.

3. That the act of May, 1778, was void and inoperative, so far as it attempted to rescind the contract, and destroy the equitable estate of Dunlop.

4. That although the patent which was issued in 1793, in contravention of the law of May, 1778, was declared void and inoperative, to convey the legal title, yet the equitable estate existed and remained in Dunlop.

5. That no legal title to the land having passed to Dunlop, the Plaintiff could not maintain an ejectment.

6. That when no adequate relief exists at law, a Court of equity will interpose its authority, to protect an equitable estate, and by analogy, will give such full relief as a Court of law would, had the title been legal.

PRESTON
V.

TREMBLE

7. That the demurrer ought to be overruled.

MARSHALL, Ch. J.

If your title is good at law, you have no case in equi, ty. If you have any title it is at law. If you have no title at law, you can have none in equity. The equitable estate is merged in the grant.

This is an attempt to substitue a bill in equity for an action of trespass.

Under the

vessel, in

to come into

inquire whe

go.

Absent.... Fond, J.

THIS was an appeal from the sentence of the Cirnon-inter- cuit Court of the district of Georgia, which affirmed course law, that of the District Court, condemning the brig PenobMarch, 1811, Scot, and her cargo of salt, for a violation of the acts had no right of Congress, interdicting commercial intercourse with the waters of Great Britain and her dependencies, (viz. the acts of the U. S. to March 1st, 1809, vol. 9, p. 243.—May 1st, 1810, vol. 10, ther she might P. 186.-The President's proclamation of Nov. 2d, 1810, land her car and the act of 2d March, 1811, p. 346.) By the 4th section of the act of March 1st, 1809, it was not lawful to import into the United States, or the territories thereof, any goods, wares, or merchandize whatever, from any port or place situated in Great Britain, or Ireland, or in any of the colonies or dependencies of Great Britain, nor from any port or place in the actual possession of Great Britain; nor to import into the United States, &c. from any foreign port or place whatever, any goods, wares, or merchandize of the growth, produce, or manufacture of Great Britain, or Ireland, &c.

By the 5th section, such goods so imported, (or put on board any vessel, &c. with intent of importing, &c.) as

BRIG

well as all other articles on board, belonging to the same owner, are liable to forfeiture: And by the 6th PENOBsection, the vessel is subject to forfeiture, if the goods are laden on board with the knowledge of the owner or master of the vessel.

The act of May 1st, 1810, and the President's proclamation of Nov. 20, 1810, announcing that France had so revoked the edicts of Berlin and Milan, as that they ceased to violate the neutral commerce of the United States:-And the act of March 2d, 1811, are only referred to, as reviving and enforcing against Great Britain, the provisions of the act of March 1st, 1809.

The claim of the owners of the vessel and cargo, stated, that the vessel sailed from Antigua on the 12th of February, 1811, and being crank and not sea worthy, put into Turk's Island, for ballast, where she took in a load of salt, being informed, by an American vessel, that there was no law to prohibit it. That she sailed from Turk's Island, for the port of Savannah, intending to stand off and on, to get information to know whether she might be permitted to come in or not. That on her approach to the harbor, a gale of wind prevented boats coming to her, and forced her, for the safety of the lives of the crew and the vessel, to make a harbor at Cockspur Island. That before she got a harbor, she was boarded by a revenue cutter, who took possession of her, and forcibly carried her into port. That the salt was not taken in with intent to violate the laws of the United States, but with the express intention and determination, if they found the importation into the United States to be unlawful, to bear away to some foreign porf. She sailed from Castine, in the province of Maine, for Antigua, in December, 1810, and arrived off Savannah, on the 15th of March, 1811..

There was evidence that the vessel might have called at Amelia Island, in the course of her voyage, where she might have got information of the non-intercourse law being in force. That she spoke a vessel of the U. S. just before she came in, but made no inquiry as to the law. That the agent of the owners wrote several letters to be delivered to the captain at sea, informing him of the law, and warning him to go to some foreign port, but they were not delivered, The evidence re

SCOT

U.STATES,

BRIG

specting the necessity of coming in, by reason of stress PENOB of weather, did not seem to be sufficiently proved.

SCOT

V.

The cause was argued by P. B. KEY, for the AppelU.STATES. lants, and I. R. INGERSOLL, for the U. S. *

It was contended by KEY, for the Appellants,

1. That the cargo was not taken on board with intention of importing the same into the United States.

2. That the vessel was forced into Cockspur Harbor, by stress of weather, to save the vessel and the lives of the crew; and while so making the harbor, she was boarded by a revenue cutter, and seized, and forced into the port of Savannah.

3. That she had a right to come into the waters of the U. S. to make inquiry whether she could be permitted to enter, and before a reasonable time had expired, she was forcibly seized and carried in.

4. That coming into the waters of the U. States, under either of the above circumstances, does not constitute an importation, without other and further voluntary acts on the part of the vessel.

Feb. 23....MARSHALL, Ch. J. stated the opinion of the Court to be, that the vessel came at her peril; that she was bound to get information; but was negligent in not calling at Amelia Island, and in not inquiring of the vessel which she spoke off the port of Savannah. Sentence affirmed.

CAZE AND RICHAUD

v.

THE BALTIMORE INSURANCE COMPANY.

The underwriters upon

Absent....TODD, J.

ERROR to the Circuit Court for the district of

à cargo are Maryland in an action of inebitatus assumpsit for freight

The Reporter was absent.