very credible perfons, and diligent fearchers into ancient books, do molt exprefsly affure us, viz. that both those nations did anciently reckon months for years. And the account of the Chineses is not hard to be reconciled with that of the Septuagint. Now, in fo nice and obfcure a matter as the account of ancient times is, it ought to fatisfy any fair and reasonable inquirer, if they can be brought any whit near one another.

2. It

So that univerfal tradition, and the most ancient hiftory in the world, are clearly on our fide. And if they be, one can hardly with a more convincing argument. For, if the world, and confequently mankind, had a beginning, there is all the reafon in the world to expect thefe two things. 1. That there fhould be an univerfal tradition concerning this matter; because it was the most memorable thing that could be tranfmitted to pofterity. And this was eafy to be done, if mankind sprang from one common root and original, from whence this tradition would naturally be univerfally diffused. may with the fame reafon be expected, that fo remarkable a thing fhould be recorded in the most ancient history. Now, both thefe have accordingly happened. But then, on the other hand, if the world was eternal, and had no beginning, there could be no real ground for fuch a tradition or hiftory. And if fuch a tradition were at any time endeavoured to be fet on foot, it is not easy to imagine how it should at first gain entertainment; but much more difficult to conceive, how ever it should come to be univerfally propagated. For, upon the fuppofition of those who hold the eternity of the world, the world was always peopled; and if fo, there could be no common head or spring from whence fuch a tradition would naturally derive itfelf into all parts of the world. that unless all the world was fometime of one language, and under one government, (which it never was that we know of fince it was peopled), no endeavour and induftry could make fuch a tradition common.

So

If it be faid, That this tradition began after fome univerfal deluge, out of which poffibly but one family might efcape, and that poffibly too of barbarous people; from whom any fond and groundlefs conceit might fpring, and afterwards fpread itself as mankind increased: This

I

I shall have occafion to confider in a more proper place. In the mean time I have fhewn, even from the acknow ledgment of Aristotle himself, that there was anciently fuch a tradition concerning the beginning of the world. Nay, if we may believe him, he himself was the very firft afferter of the eternity of the world: for he fays exprefsly, "That all the philofophers that were before him, "did hold that the world was made," De calo, 1. L. C. 10. Thus much for the first kind of proof this matter is capable of, namely, teftimony.

2dly, The probabilities of reafon do all likewife favour the beginning of the world: As,

1. The want of any history or tradition ancienter than what is confiftent with the received opinion of the time of the world's beginning; nay the most ancient hiftories were written long after that time. This Lucretius, the famous Epicurean, urgeth, as a strong prefumption than the world had a beginning:

-Si nulla fuit genitalis origo

Terrarum & cæli, femperque æterna fuere:
Cur fupra bellum Thebanum, & funera Troja,
Non alias alii quoque res cecinere poetæ ?

i. e. "If the world had no beginning, how is it that the "Greek poets (the most ancient of their writers) men

tion nothing higher than the Theban war, and the "deftruction of Troy?" Were there from all eterni. ty no memorable actions done till about that time? or had mankind no way till of late to record them, and propagate the memory of them to pofterity? It is much, if men were from eternity, that they fhould not find out the way of writing in all that long duration which had past before that time. Sure he was a fortunate man indeed, who, after men had been eternally fo dull as not to find it out, had the luck at lalt to hit upon it.

But it may be, the famous actions of former times were always recorded, but that the memorials of them have been feyeral times loft by univerfal deluges, which have now and then happened, and fwept all away, except (it may be) two or three perfons, that have efcaped, and begun the world again upon a new fcore. This is the only refuge that the Atheist hath to fly to, when he

But he can

is preffed with this and the like arments. not poffibly escape this way: for these univerfal inundations muft either be natural or fupernatural. If they be fupernatural, (as any man that confiders well the frame of the world, and how hard it is to give a natural reafon of them, would be inclined to think), then indeed it is cafy to conceive, how a few of mankind, and no more, fhould efcape; because this will depend upon the pleasure of that fuperior being which is fuppofed fupernaturally to order these things. But this is to yield what we have all this while contended for, viz. That there is a God. But if they be natural, which the Atheift muft fay, then there is nothing to reftrain them from a total deftruction; not only of mankind, but of all the beafts of the earth. This the Atheift cannot deny, not only to be very poffible, but exceeding probable; because he grants it to have come fo pear the matter, that but very few escaped, and no doubt with great difficulty. Now, it is the greatest wonder in the world, that a thing, according to their own fuppofition, fo likely to happen, fhould never have fallen out in an infinite duration. Will any man have the face to fay, that a thing is likely, which did never yet happen from all eterOne would think, that at not only whatever is probable, but whatever can poffibly happen, fhould be brought about in that fpace: fo that, if mankind had been from eternity, it had in all probability, I had almoft, faid, been deftroyed from all eternity; but I may confidently fay, long fince ruined.

2. Another probability of the world's beginning is, the account which we have of the original of learning, and the most useful arts in feveral parts of the world. Now, if the world had been eternal, these in all likeli hood would have been found out, and generally fpread long ago, and beyond the memory of all ages. There are fome arts indeed that are peculiarly convenient to fome particular nations, and others that are only ferviceable to the humour and fashion of one or more ages. These are not likely to spread; and they may come in, and go out, and return again as often as there is occa fion. But thofe which are generally useful to mankind in all times and places, if they were once found out,

(and

(and who would not pick they should in an eternal du→ ration?) it is not imaginable but that they should have been spread innumerable ages fince. Nor can any man give a good reafon how they should ever be loft, but by fome fuch accident as an univerfal deluge; which has been spoken to already. But now, on the contrary, the beginnings of learning, and of the most useful arts in feveral nations, is very well known. And I add farther, that where-ever learning and civil arts have come, this tradition concerning the beginning of the world hath been moft vigorous, and afferted with the greatest clear nefs and confidence.

3. The feveral parts of which the world confists, be ing (fo far as, by thofe parts of it which we know, we can poffibly judge of the reft) in their nature corruptible, it is more than probable, that in an infinite duration this frame of things would long fince have been diffolved; efpecially if, as the Atheist affirms, there be no fuperior being, no wife and intelligent principle, to repair and regulate it, and to prevent thofe innumerable diforders and calamitous accidents, which muft in fo long a space in all probability have happened to it. This Lucretius, 1.5. alfo urges as a convincing proof that the world

was not eternal.

Quare etiam nativa neceffe eft confiteare
Hac eadem ne neque enim mortali corpore quæ funt,
infinito jam tempore adhuc potuiffent
Immenfi validas avi contemnere vires.

I

It must neceffarily (fays he) be acknowledged, that the world had a beginning; otherwife thofe "things which are in their own nature corruptible, "had never been able, from all eternity, to have held ❝out against thofe forcible and violent affaults, which

in an infinite duration must have happened." Nay, thus much Ariftotle himself every where grants, that if the frame of the world be liable to diffolution, it must of neceffity be acknowledged to have had a beginning.

These are some of the chief probabilities on our fide; which, being taken together, and in their united force, have a great deal of conviction m them: efpecially if this be added, that there is no kind of pofitive proof fo

T

much

much as pretended on the other fide. The utmost that Ariftotle pretends to prove, is, that the world proceeded from God by the way of a natural and neceffary effect, as light does from the fun. Which if it be true, as there is no tolerable ground for it, the world indeed would be without beginning, but not of itself. And thus I have done with the first consideration, I propounded to speak to, viz. That there are fair proofs on our fide, and as convincing as the nature of the thing is capable of; but that there is no pretence of proof on the other. I proceed therefore to the

2d confideration, That the most preffing difficulties are on that fide on which there is no proof.

Those who deny a God, and hold the world to havę been eternal, and of itfelf, have only two things to object against us: The difficulties, that there are in the notion of a God, and in making the world of nothing. To the firft I answer, That we attribute nothing to God that hath any repugnancy or contradiction in it. Power, wifdom, goodnefs, juftice, and truth, have no repu gnancy in them to our reafon; because we own these perfections to be in fome degree in ourselves, and there fore they may be in the highest degree that is poffible in another. The eternity of God, and his immenfity, and his being of himself, how difficult foever they may be to be conceived, yet thefe perfections must be granted to be fomewhere; and therefore they may as well, nay much better, be afcribed to God, in whom we fuppofe all other perfections to meet, than to any thing else. And as for God's being a fpirit; whatever difficulty there may be in conceiving the notion of a spirit, yet the Atheist must grant the thing, that there is a being or principle really distinct from matter; or elfe fhew how mere matter, which is confeffed by themselves to be void of fenfe and understanding, and to move neceffa rily, can produce any thing that has fenfe, underftanding and liberty, As to the other difficulty, of making the world of nothing, I fhall only fay this, that though it fignify an inconceivable excefs of power, yet there can no contradiction be fhewn in it. And it is every whit as eafy to conceive, that fomething fhould be caufed to be that was not before, as that any thing should

be