be of itself; which yet must be granted on both fides; and therefore this difficulty ought not to be objected by cither. But then on the other fide there are these two great› and real difficulties. 1, That men generally have al ways believed the contrary, viz. that the world had a be ginning, and was made by God. Which is a strong evidence, that this account of the exiftence of the world is more natural, and of a more eafy conception to human understanding. And indeed it is very natural to conceive, that every thing which is imperfect, (as the world and all the creatures in it must be acknowledged in many refpects to be), had fome caufe which produced it, fuch as it is, and determined the bounds and limits of its perfection; but that which is of itself, and without a caufe, may be any thing, and have any perfection which does not imply a contradiction. 2dly, To affert mankind to have been of itself, and without a cause, hath this invincible objection against it, That we plainly fee every man to be from another. So that mankind is afferted to have no caufe of its being, and yet every particular man must be acknowledged to have a father; which is every whit as abfurd in an infinite fucceffion of men, as in any finite number of generations. It is more eafy indeed to conceive, how a conftant and permanent being, fuppofe matter, fhould always have been of itfelf; and then that that should be the foundation of infinite fucceffive changes and alterations: but an infinite fucceffion of the generations of men without any permanent foundation is útterly unimaginable. If it be faid, that the earth was always, and in time did produce men, and that they ever fince have produced one another; this is to run into one great abfurdity of the Epicurean way, which fhall be conidered in its proper place. And thus I have endeavoured, as plainly and briefly as the nature of the argument would admit, to prove, that the account which the fcripture gives of the existence of the world, is most credible, and agreeable to the reason of mankind; and that this firft account which the Atheist gives of it, is altogether incredible. And now I expect, after all this, the Atheist will complain, that all that hath been faid does not amount to a strict demon ftration stration of the thing. It may be fo. And if the Atheist would undertake to demonstrate the contrary, there might be some reason for this complaint. In the mean time I defire to know, whether, when both fides are agreed that the world is, and that it muft either have its original from God, or have been always of itself; and if it have been made evident, that on one fide there are fair proofs both from teftimony and reafon, and as convincing as the nature of the thing is capable of, and no pretence of proof on the other; and that the difficulties are most preffing on that fide which is deftitute of proof: I fay, if this have been made evident, I defire to know whe ther this be not upon the matter as fatisfactory to a wife man as a demonftration? For in this cafe there can be no doubt on which fide the clear advantage of evidence lies, and confequently which way a prudent man ought to determine his affent. I come now, in the fecond place, to confider the other account, which another fort of Atheists, those whom I call the Epicureans, do give of the existence of the world. And it is this. They fuppofe the matter of which the world is conftituted to be eternal, and of itself, and then an infinite empty space for the infinite little parts of this matter (which they call atoms) to move and play in; and that thefe being always in motion, did, after infinite trials and encounters, without any counsel or defign, and without the difpofal and contrivance of any wife and intelligent being, at laft, by a lucky cafualty, entangle and fettle themfelves in this beautiful and regular frame of the world which we now fee; and that the earth, being at first in its full vigour and fruitfulness, did then bring forth men, and all other forts of living creatures, as it does plants now. This is in fhort the Epicurean account of the original of the world; which, as abfurd as it is, Lucretius, 4. 5. hath very elegantly expreffed in these verses. Sed quibus ille modis conjectus materiai, Nec Nec quos que que darent motus pepigere profecto : Terrai, maris, & cæli, generifque animantum. Thus he like a good poet, but a very bad maker and contriver of the world. For I appeal to any man of reafon, whether any thing can be more unreasonable, than obftinately to impute an effect to chance which carries in the very face of it all the arguments and charaders of a wife design and contrivance? Was ever any confiderable work, in which there was required a great variety of parts, and a regular and orderly difpofition of thofe parts, done by chance? Will chance fit means to ends, and that in ten thousand inftances, and not fail in any one? How often might a man, after he had jumbled a fet of letters in a bag, fling them out upon the ground before they would fall into an exact poem, yea or fo much as make a good difcourfe in profe? and may not a little book be as eafily made by chance, as this great volume of the world? How long might a man be in fprinkling colours upon canvas with a careless hand, before they would happen to make the exact picture of a man? and is a man easier made by chance than his picture? How long might twenty thousand blind men, which fhould be fent out from the feveral remote parts of England, wander up and down, before they would all meet upon Salisbury-plains, and fall into rank and file in the exact order of an army? And yet this is much more easy to be imagined, than how the innumerable blind parts of matter fhould rendezvous themselves into a world. A man that fees Henry VII.'s chapel at Westminster, might with as good reafon maintain, (yea with much better, confidering the vaft difference between that little ftructure and the huge fabrick of the world), that it was never contrived nor built by any man, but that the stones did by chance grow into thofe curious figures into which they seem to have been cut and graven; and that, upon a time, (as tales ufually begin), the materials of that building, the ftone, mortar, timber, iron, lead, and glafs, happily met together, and very fortunately ranged themselves into that delicate order in which we see them now fo clofe compacted, that it must be a very great chance that parts them again. What would the world think of a man that fhould advance fuch an opinion as this, and write a book for it? If they would do him right, they ought to look upon him as mad: but yet with a little more reason than any man can have to say, that the world was made by chance, or that the first men grew up out of the earth as plants do now. For can any thing be more ridiculous and against all reason, than to afcribe the production of men to the first fruitfulness of the earth, without fo much as one inftance and experiment in any age or history to countenance fo monftrous a fuppofition? The thing is at first fight fo grofs and palpable, that no difcourfe about it can make it more apparent. And yet thefe fhameful beggars of principles, who give this precarious account of the original of things, affume to themselves to be the men of reafon, the great wits of the world, the only cautious and wary perfons that hate to be impofed upon; that must have convincing evidence for every thing, and can admit of nothing without a clear demonftration for it. II. Speculative Atheism is unreasonable, because it gives no reasonable account of the univerfal confent of mankind in this apprehenfion, That there is a God. That men do generally believe a God, and have done in all ages, the prefent experience of the world, and the records of former times, do abundantly testify. Now, how comes this perfuafion to have gained fo univerfal a poffeffion of the mind of man, and to have found fuch general entertainment in all nations, even those that are most barbarous? If there be no fuch thing as God in the world, how comes it to pass that this object doth continually encounter our understandings? whence is it that we are fo perpetually haunted with the apparition of a Deity, and followed with it where-ever we go? If it it be not natural to the mind of man, but proceeds from fome accidental diftemper of our understandings, how comes it to be so universal, that no differences of age, or temper, or education, can wear it out, and fet any confiderable number of men free from it? Into what can we refolve this strong inclination of mankind to this error and mistake? How come all nations to be thus feduced? It is altogether unimaginable, but that the reafon of fo univerfal a confent in all places and ages of the world, and among all differences of perfons, fhould be one and conftant. But no one and conftant reafon of this can be given, but from the nature of man's mind and underftanding, which hath this notion of a Deity born with it, and stamped upon it; or, which is all one, is of fuch a frame, that, in the free use and exercise of itself, it will find out God. And what more reasonable than to think, that if we be God's workmanship, he should set this mark of himself upon all reasonable creatures, that they may know to whom they belong, and may acknowledge the author of their beings? This feems to be a credible and fatisfactory account of fo univerfal a confent in this matter. But now what doth the Atheist resolve this into? He is not at one with himself what account to give of it: nor can it be expected he fhould; for he that will overlook the true reafon of a thing, which ufually is but one, may easily find many falfe ones, error being infinite. But there are three which he principally relies upon; fear, tradition, and policy of state. I fhall briefly confider thefe. 1ft, He would make us believe, that this apprehenfion of a God doth fpring from an infinite jealoufy in the mind of man, and an endless fear of the worst that may happen; according to that divine faying of the poet, which he can never fufficiently admire, Primum in orbe deos fecit timor, "Fear first made gods." So that it is granted on both fides that the fear of a Deity doth univerfally poffefs the minds of men. Now, the question is, Whether it be more likely, that the existence of a God fhould be the cause of this fear, or that this fear fhould be the cause why men ima→ gine there is a God? If there be a God who hath imVOL. I. C preffed |